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This thesis explores the persistence of labour tying arrangements among female labourers 
in agriculture in India. This research is a comparative study of women’s labour tying in 
Aranthangi (Tamil Nadu) and Chinsurah (West Bengal). I argue that these labour 
arrangements are driven through familial/gendered relations, exercise of power at the 
village level, and macroeconomic and political forces. Set against the backdrop of rising 
feminisation of agricultural wage employment coupled with growing insecurity of work 
and survival, this study identifies that rural female labour (which is predominantly agrarian) 
is commoditized and under-valued. Consequently, the female labourer is often drawn into 
exploitative labour contracts. I identify rural labour in this thesis through Bernstein’s 
category of ‘classes of labour’ (1996; 2010).  
In this study, I identify the ways in which the classes of labour enter labour tying 
arrangements in agriculture. The presence of labour tying is often understood through the 
ideological divisions of Classical Marxist and Neo-classical analyses. Classical Marxist 
analysis understands these labour arrangements as remnants of pre-capitalist society, 
which withers away with commercialization of agriculture. Neo-classical theorists identify 
these labour arrangements as mutually beneficial relations for both the employer and 
labourer. Moving away from this binary understanding of the presence of tied labour, I use 
Hart’s analytical framework to show how the presence of tied labour among female 
‘classes of labour’ are an outcome of multi-scalar power relations in rural society. I posit 
that these multi-scalar power relations in rural society create relations of dependency, 
obligation and privilege that draw female labourers into tied labour arrangements. I 
identify, these multi-scalar power relations as regimes of labour tying, where unfreedom 
experienced therein, are differentiated along gender, class and caste identities. The 
regime of labour tying, therefore, needs to be understood as a process that is here to stay, 
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Landowner Apart from large landholdings, this category is identified as 
employers of rural labour, those who carry out multi-cropping, 
commercial agriculture and also operate as money lenders.  
Kharif  Refers to a cropping season, where crops that are sown in May and 
harvested in December/ January.  
Rabi  A winter cropping season, where crops are sown in winter and 
harvested in spring.  
Zaid The period between the rabi and kharif periods.  
Tehsil  Sub-district  
Patta  A government issued legal document stating the ownership of the 
land.  
Benami  A land transaction made under a false or fictitious name.  
Patwari  The village accountant, who keeps a record of the amount of land 
and crops grown.  
Pradhan  The village head man, who is also the chief of the village council. 
There are elections held for this post.  
Gram Panchayat  Village council. The gram panchayat is grass root level local 
government institution.  
Fasli  Refers to a harvest calendar of twelve months from July to June.  
Tamil 
Punjei  Dry land cultivation  
Nanjei  Wet land cultivation  
Pannaiyal  A system of tied labour, where the labourer and his/her family is 
tied to the landowner. They are paid wages in cash and kind. 
xiv 
 
Thottam Garden Land 
Mirasidar Arabic term for landlord whose rights on the land were 
transferrable, by sale, mortgage or inheritance. 
Thaiye Mas Month of January in the Tamil Calendar. 
Coolie Unskilled worker 
Bengali 
 
Aman/Aus/Boro Three seasons of rice. Aman is harvested in November and 
December. Aus rice is sown in March/ April and is harvested in the 
Summer months. Boro is a summer rice that is sown in November 
and December and Harvested in May and June. Aman rice is grown 
in Chinsurah.  
Pāt Jute 
Chaasi  Farmer 
Bhaage  Land tenancy pattern where the share of the produce is shared 
between the landlord and tenant.  
Theke  Land tenancy pattern where the landlord receives land rent.  
Bargadars  Sharecroppers 
Bandha Kishen  Tied labourer found in West Bengal. The labourer is tied to the 
landlord, and carries out both agricultural and house work for the 
landlord. Payments are received in cash and kind.  
Dhaner gola  Storage unit for rice. 
Majdoor  Unskilled labourer. 
Arathdar  A local trader. 
Dhaan kata  Harvesting rice. 
Dhaan tolla  Make bundles of the rice stalks and carry it to cart. This is task 
carried out by men. 
Eksho diner kaaj/ 
noor naal valey  
Both terms in Bengali and Tamil respectively mean hundred days 
work, which referred to MGNREGA work. 
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Savitri is a 32-year-old female agricultural labourer from Hooghly, West Bengal. She works 
as a wage labourer for a landowner, helps her bargadar (sharecropper) husband cultivate 
land, and has leased in land to grow vegetables. In 2009, Savitri borrowed money from a 
landowner to cover losses incurred in agriculture and to provide food for her family. In 
order to repay the loan, she decided to work as a bandha kishen (tied labourer), and 
continues to do so till date. Lata, a 45-year-old Dalit agricultural wage worker, from 
Pudukkottai, Tamil Nadu cultivates her own land, is a tenant farmer and works as an 
agricultural labourer. In 2011, Lata incurred heavy losses due to the poor monsoons, which 
she was able to cover by borrowing money from a private moneylender, and a landowner. 
Lata worked as a tied labourer for 6 months to repay the loan from the landowner, and to 
reduce the high and usurious interest rates on the loan from the private moneylender.  
Two stories, chosen from two field sites (Tamil Nadu and West Bengal) in this research, 
highlight the multiple roles undertaken by rural female labour. This labour is 
predominantly agrarian and operates as agricultural labourer as well as cultivator. The 
labour relations are shaped by interlocking relations of labour, land and credit that are 
manoeuvred through debts, obligations and duties. These relations, embedded within the 
asymmetrical power relations at the village level, create conditions that draw female 
labour into labour tying arrangements.  
This thesis investigates changing rural female labour relations in India, with specific 
reference to the persistence of labour tying arrangements in agriculture. Labour tying 
arrangements and the severity of unfreedom experienced by female labourers is 
understood in the context of exercise of power at the village level (i.e. the rural power 
structure, domestic politics) and the effect of macro-political and economic factors on 
labour-employer strategies. I conduct a comparative study of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal 
to explore the effects that rural power structures and local bureaucrats have on labour 
relations under different political systems. I use Gillian Hart’s (1986b) framework of 
analysis to argue that the persistence of labour tying arrangements needs to be assessed 
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within a particular economic and socio-political context (macro level policies), as this 
affects the rationale of labour and landowner/employer strategies (micro level processes). 
The primary emphasis in this thesis is on female labourers who enter labour tying 
arrangements, not men. This is not to assume that men do not become tied labourers any 
longer, even though their numbers are falling (see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). 
Instead, I attempt, through this thesis, to highlight the existence of tied labour 
arrangements among female labourers, who play a pivotal role in Indian agriculture1 and 
whose work continues to remain ‘invisible in the public domain’ (Ghosh, 2015).  The 
feminization of rural labour and the shift of labour tying from men to women make it 
important to revisit the question of persistence of labour tying.  
The Census of India recorded an increase in the number of female agricultural labourers 
from 49.5 million in 2001 to 61.6 million in 2011 (a 24 percent increase over ten years). For 
the same time period, the number of female cultivators decreased from 45.8 million in 
2001 to 36 million in 2011 (a 21 percent decrease over ten years). It is important to note 
that the categories of ‘agricultural labourer’ and ‘cultivator’ are not mutually exclusive. As 
evidenced in Savitri and Lata’s cases, they are both cultivators as well as agricultural 
labourers, and there is an interlinkage of labour contracts with land and credit contracts 
(Srivastava, 1989). Evidence from the two field sites, in this research; shows how the nature 
of these interlinkages determines the extent of dependence, and exploitation experienced 
by the female labourer.  
Studies on rural labour relations in India highlight that the presence of interlinked 
contracts, the rise of unfreedom and increase in tied labour contracts, appear as 
mechanisms used by landowners to combat periods of labour shortage (Bardhan & Rudra, 
1978; Bardhan, 1983). Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) in their study of Chittoor 
                                                          
1 Women workers carry out a range of activities in agriculture; as farmers, co-farmers, agricultural labourers, 




district identify that it was primarily women who enter tied labour arrangements rather 
than men2. Other studies talk of tied labourers as ‘naukars’ (servants), in Uttar Pradesh, 
who enter such relations in lieu of loan repayment (The National Commission on Rural 
Labour, 1991). Jodkha (1994, 2014) identifies such relations in Haryana as ‘labour 
mortgage’. These studies describe variations in the degree of unfreedom experienced by 
labourers within a context of agricultural development3. It is in this context that Bernstein’s 
(2006, 2010) argument remains important- that the agrarian question of capital has been 
bypassed and that there are no pre-capitalist relations/classes waiting to undergo 
transformation. What we have is a fragmented reserve army of labour, in insecure and 
exploitative work, unable to secure a generalised living wage under capitalism (see Lerche, 
2011: p.386).  
Bernstein’s argument is placed within the political economy tradition that highlights the 
distress of the labouring class. Hart nuances it further by viewing labour relations as an 
outcome of power relations at the village level, as well as the macro level. In this thesis I 
show how labour tying processes are conditioned through the interplay of both micro level 
processes and macro level policies, creating what I refer to as a ‘regime of labour tying’. 
In the following section I justify why I use Bernstein’s category of classes of labour to 
identify which labourers I am looking at. Once identified, I use Hart’s framework to 
understand the presence of labour tying arrangements. 
 Theoretical Constructions 
As described above, this thesis uses Hart and Bernstein’s framework of analysis to 
understand the conditions that result in the persistence of labour tying arrangements in 
agriculture in India. In the current global production system, it is important to understand 
                                                          
2These gendered positions within tied labour create a docile and pliant workforce: a ploy often used by 
employers to discipline their labourers. 
 
3 Srivastava (1996, 2000), identifies a U-shaped relationship between development and attachment, with 
changes in the nature of attachment, especially in the case of long duration labour contracts.  
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the continued presence of labour tying arrangements and how women come to occupy an 
unfair share of this exploitative labour relation. In order to explain this phenomenon, this 
section addresses the theoretical debates that explain the presence of unfree labour 
relations in agriculture and the ambiguity in its very definition. This ambiguity further 
emboldens the idea of understanding labour tying through Bernstein and Hart.  
Debates surrounding ‘unfree’ labour relations have focussed on definitional aspects of free 
and unfree labour, on concepts of relative freedom, how one understands free and unfree 
labour- are these an outcome of market mechanisms or an outcome of non-economic 
coercion (Thorner, 1962; Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Brass, 1990; Ramachandran, 1991; see 
Guerin, 2013, p. 409). Brass (1990, 1994) identifies the presence of unfree labour as a 
process of deproletarianization; a process that labourers are drawn into through 
indebtedness. Brass (1990, 1994, 2000) talks about negative freedom, where the labourer 
is deprived of the ability to sell his or her labour power, and therefore, can be easily 
controlled, disciplined and cheapened- situations that keep the labour force fragmented 
and reduce their bargaining capacities.  
Rao (1999) identifies unfreedom in terms of the ability of the labourer to exit a contract. 
This ability rests on the bargaining capacity of the labourer (positive freedom).  Banaji 
(2003) on the other hand, identifies the impossibility of drawing a distinction between 
freedom and unfreedom in a labour contract, as any labour contract always involves some 
form of coercion. There are different understandings of freedom and in turn multiple 
findings of unfree labour contracts/relations (Rao, 1999). This thesis is not free from such 
bias; however, in order to avoid the complexities associated with the diverse definitions of 
unfree labour, I resort to understanding unfreedom through labour tying arrangements. 
The different definitions and ways of identifying unfree labour stem from an 
understanding of the presence of unfree labour and its relationship with capitalism, i.e. 
capitalist development in agriculture.  Neo-classical economists, such as Bardhan (1983, 
2001), consider unfree labour relations as mutually beneficial under imperfect market 
economies. Bardhan’s understanding of unfree labour (labour attachment) is based on 
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relations of reciprocity and actions followed by choice. The choice to be in a particular 
labour tying arrangement is to maintain job security. Bardhan (1983), in identifying these 
relations as voluntary, does call attention to the unequal nature of these relations, where 
the choice to ‘choose an employer lies perilously close to the choice to starve’ (1983, p. 
502).  Bardhan and Rudra (1979) in their study on West Bengal, identify that bonded labour 
is on a decline in agriculture, however labour tying in voluntary contracts is said to be on a 
rise. Labour tying here is understood as a risk averting behaviour and is a part of capitalist 
development in agriculture (Bardhan, 1983).  
Brass (1999) is vehemently opposed to Bardhan’s views and rationalisation of labour tying 
and unfreedom. Brass (1999, 2006) states that unfreedom is an inherent part of capitalism 
and refutes the notion of a labourer’s choice. Instead, labour relations are conditioned 
through mechanisms of coercion and capitalist accumulation strategies that work to 
cheapen labour costs and control the labour force, in turn preventing class-consciousness 
to take form- the process of deproletarianization.  
The semi-feudal thesis explains unfree labour as a remnant of feudal society. Within this 
semi-feudal logic, the presence of such labour relations is indicative of society being in a 
transitionary phase of capitalism, where unfree relations will disappear with the complete 
transition to capitalism (Bhaduri, 1973; Patnaik, 1987). The reason for this continued 
debate with semi-feudalism, when dealing with Indian agriculture, is the presence of 
tenancy patterns such as sharecropping, bondage, usurious money lending, etc. (Bhaduri, 
1987; Patnaik, 1987, 2001). The Left parties in India (CPI, CPM, CPI (ML) and CPI (Maoist))4 
continue to align themselves with the semi- feudal thesis. The presence of unfree labour is 
understood through a process of paternalistic landlordism, the primary drivers for 
exploitation among rural labour (see Shah, Harriss & Lerche, 2013).   
A reason for the radical left parties in India to strongly hold on to the semi-feudal thesis is 
the classical Marxist understanding of capitalism and freedom of wage labour. In the 
                                                          
4 Refer to List on Abbreviations on page (iii) 
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Marxian debate, the development of capitalism relies not only on capital but on the 
availability of free wage labour. According to Marx, a labourer is free in a double sense- 
free (dispossessed) from the means of production and free (compelled) to sell his or her 
labour power, i.e. possessing the freedom to choose an employer. In a feudal society 
labourers lack this freedom (see Lerche, 1999; Guerin, 2013). The presence of unfree labour 
is then not compatible with capitalism (Rao, 1999). 
The explanation of unfree labour using the semi-feudal thesis means that unfree labour 
will vanish with the onset of commercialization in agriculture. This however, is far from 
true. Studies in India have revealed the presence of unfree labour (with particular reference 
to attached labour) in regions that are commercialised and developed (Bhalla, 1976, 
Garikipati, 2009; Jodhka, 2013).  
The presence of unfree relations such as tied labour needs to be placed within the current 
global production system, where unfreedom is one of the mechanisms used to control 
labour (Lerche, 2011). This understanding moves away from the rigid binaries of 
free/unfree labour. The relative freedom or unfreedom experienced by labourers under 
capitalism is a matter of degree, where unfreedom can be of mild or harsh forms. 
Discerning this continuum highlights multiple contracts that labourers enter into as well as 
the existence of intra-contractual variations (Rogaly, 1996).  
Unfreedom experienced in different relations keeps the labour fragmented, with limited 
access to generalised living wages (Bernstein, 2004). Poor conditions of work and 
remunerations have created conditions where labour is no longer solely dependent on 
agriculture, but turns towards non-agricultural work for its survival- indicative of the crisis 
of labour reproduction (Bernstein, 2006; Lerche, 2013). This change has transformed the 
relationship of labour and capital, where pre-capitalist agrarian classes have given way to 
classes of labour (Bernstein, 2006).  
The crisis of labour and its entry into exploitative and oppressive conditions of work is an 
outcome of agrarian neo-liberalism (Bernstein, 2001). Under such conditions, Bernstein’s 
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framework of analysis and class categorisation is a useful analytical research tool. Since 
the research is on rural labour, I use Bernstein’s agrarian class categorization, with 
emphasis on the third class category- the classes of labour, to identify who is to be studied.  
The classes of labour, according to Bernstein (2001), cannot reproduce themselves as 
capital and therefore turn to informal, insecure and oppressive conditions of work to 
ensure everyday survival. The ‘classes of labour’ have diverse social locations and 
identities, which are further differentiated along lines of gender, caste and class. The 
classes of labour can secure their survival through a wide range of activities, such as 
agricultural wage labour, farming, and non-agricultural work (Bernstein, 2010).  Using 
Bernstein helps identify and understand that the entry into oppressive conditions of work 
are taking place within the context of neo-liberal development, drawing away from the 
rigid binaries put in place by the debate of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of 
production.  
The main focus of this research is on rural female labour and the oppressive work 
conditions I identify are labour tying arrangements. Using the category of classes of labour 
helps identify that these are not oppressive labour relations that are entered by the 
landless labourers alone, but by a particular agrarian class that succumbs to the pressures 
of neoliberal growth, drawing them into informal and insecure work.   
Bernstein acknowledges the changing effects of social, political and economic relations 
that give rise to the non-homogenous classes of labour category. However, in order to 
understand the different mechanisms through which labour tying arrangements persist, I 
use Hart’s (1984, 1986a, 1986b) framework of analysis, which helps understand why this 
particular form of labour segmentation exists and persists in both labour slack and tight 
periods.  
Hart’s analysis draws on aspects of social control and power relations present in rural 
society to explain the persistence of labour tying arrangements. Hart (1986a) identifies 
certain practices that operate along the lines of exclusion and selectivity (p. 189). These 
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practices put in place privileges that keep the labour force fragmented, and create a 
complaint and disciplined labour force.  These practices act as instruments that control 
labour, as these privileges ‘carry with them the threat of withdrawal’, often making the 
labour arrangements self-reinforcing (Hart, 1986a: p. 194). Understanding tied labour 
arrangements through the processes of social control and labour management draws 
labour relations out of the debate of agricultural backwardness and advancement- an 
analysis which provides only a partial explanation of the nature of labour arrangements 
(Hart, 1984).  
Hart (1986b), highlights the symmetrical distribution of power in rural society and the 
presence of other forces that shape tied labour arrangements. The other forces recognised 
by Hart (1984) are political and social relations. This is typically the relationship of the rural 
elite with local bureaucracy, which exerts social control over the labourer and labour 
process. Social control, understood through relations of power is multi-layered, which is 
altered with changing political regimes and socio-political interests. In understanding 
labour tying arrangements through a multi-tiered power hierarchy, Hart (1986) moves 
away from explanations that rely only on class relations or imperfect markets (see Rogaly, 
1996).  
Hart identifies the presence of labour tying arrangements through power relations at the 
village level and through larger macro political economic forces. Using Hart’s analytical 
framework (that is based in Java) is useful in the Indian context, as this is a country that has 
experienced differentiated rates of development in agriculture.  It is also a country where 
asymmetrical power relations, driven predominantly along the lines of caste and gender, 
mark rural societies. The relations of power at different levels are understood through 
relations of privilege, exclusion and selectivity. The privileges that Hart (1986b) identifies 
in her work are used in this thesis to understand the presence of tied labour among the 
female classes of labour. These privileges include relations that the classes of labour have 
with land, credit relations, the impact of state policies, and how the effects of these are 
conditioned through networks of power between the rural elite and the local bureaucracy. 
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Furthermore, since the research focus of this thesis is on rural female labour, power 
hierarchies generated through patriarchal/gendered relations play an important role in 
understanding the nature of tied labour arrangements. The multi-layered and multi-scalar 
relationship highlights, the continued presence of tied labour relations in rural society in 
India. These relations constitute the politics of tied labour that I refer to as the ‘regime of 
labour tying’, set in the larger political economy debate.  
The multi-scalar relations that give rise to tied labour relations observed among the female 
classes of labour are identified in the different chapters of this thesis. The following section 
discusses the layout of the thesis and the questions I answer in each chapter.  
 Chapters 
The thesis, which is a comparative study of two states in India, on the persistence of labour 
tying arrangements in agriculture, is organised in the following manner. Chapter 1 
discusses the works of scholars who have engaged with the presence of unfree labour 
within the much larger debate of agrarian capitalism. The chapter is divided into two broad 
sections. The first section charts out a discussion of free versus unfree labour, bonded 
labour and tied labour. Drawing on work specific to India, this section examines the 
changing debates surrounding the nature of bonded labour, and unfreedom experienced 
by labourers. The drivers of unfreedom are understood through the labour-employer 
relationship, interlinkages between factor markets, and interactions of larger macro-
political and economic structures, following which I lay down my framework of analysis. 
The second part this chapter turns towards more specific debates on female labourers and 
cultivators within India.  
Studies on tied female labour in India highlight how, apart from market interlinkages, 
gender politics, both within the domestic arena and workspace, generate dependencies 
that push women into disadvantageous and exploitative work contracts. The discussion 
draws attention to the multiple ways in which women enter labour tying arrangements, as 
female labourers within India are not restricted to the singular identity of a wage labourer. 
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Women workers enter labour tying arrangements with varying degrees of exploitation, 
often differentiated along the lines of gender, caste and class. The nature of work contracts 
is further altered through larger broad-based policy interventions. The discussion on micro 
level processes and macro level policies determines the focus of the study and the subject 
to be studied- the persistence of tied labour arrangements among female classes of labour.  
Chapter 2 discusses the rationale behind employing certain methods, and the reasons for 
choosing the two states of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, the sequence and different 
phases in which the fieldwork was conducted, and the respondents selected for my 
interviews. By working on two regions, I aim not to present them as two case studies, but 
by using a relational concept of comparison, I attempt to highlight the existence of labour 
tying arrangements through the interconnectedness of multiple layers of practice, power 
and meaning (see Hart, 2002). The chapter also discusses the experiences and obstacles I 
faced as a researcher in the field sites and the way in which it moulded my access to and 
understanding of the information gathered.  
Chapter 3 is a description of the two chosen field sites (Aranthangi in Tamil Nadu and 
Chinsurah in West Bengal). The chapter draws on data obtained from the household level 
village survey of the two regions. A total of four villages were selected, two from each 
region, and data on caste, occupation, migration, income status of household, land use, 
agricultural labour days, and MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act), were collected. In addition to socio-economic data, the chapter provides 
a description of labour relations and associated wages observed in the regions. 
The evidence gathered for the purpose of this research is divided into two sections. The 
first section focuses on interlinkages between land, labour, credit, and the generation of 
labour tying (Chapter Four and Five). The second section turns its attention towards the 
effects of broad based social welfare policies in the rural landscape, which come with the 
promise of poverty alleviation, that affect livelihood and labour deployment strategies of 
rural female labour (Chapter Six and Seven).  
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Chapter 4 and 5 discuss contracts and interlinkages with land and credit respectively. 
Chapter 4 discusses land tenancy patterns observed in Aranthangi and Chinsurah among 
female labourers and marginal farmers. Women entering land contracts are conditioned 
by socio-cultural norms associated with the woman’s capacity to cultivate and plough the 
land. For female agricultural labourers, cultivating land is a means to make them 
independent, and reducing dependence on agricultural wage work. The chapter discusses 
the extent to which dependence on agricultural wage work and labour relations are altered 
through tenancy arrangements. The second interlinkage addressed in this thesis is credit. 
The increasingly poor access to formal credit sources has driven the classes of labour to 
rely on private moneylenders and their usurious rates of interest. Chapter 5 discusses the 
various credit institutions and relations that either directly or indirectly transform labour 
relations, resulting in different labour tying contracts.  
The second section of this thesis takes a look at macro level policies and their effects at the 
village level. Since the time of Indira Gandhi’s famous populist slogan of ‘Garibi Hatao’ 
(abolish poverty), the Indian government has time and again introduced anti- poverty 
polices and directives (Frankel, 1978; Gupta, 1999; Rudolph & Rudolph, 1987). Chapter 6 
examines the effects of one such broad based social welfare programme- MGNREGA. 
Scholars talk of the success of MGNREGA (particularly in Tamil Nadu), and how it has not 
succumbed to clientelistic and patronage politics (see McCartney & Roy, 2015). The 
chapter provides a comparative examination of the impact of MGNREGA on labour 
relations in both regions, and the ability of the scheme to free labour days and improve 
negotiating capacities of female labourers, especially within labour tying contracts.  
Chapter 7 highlights the spatial interconnectedness between micro and macro level 
political practices, and the extent to which state complicity with the local elites is 
maintained in the presence of poverty alleviation policies. This chapter looks at the effect 
of the Public Distribution System (PDS) and Minimum Support Price (MSP) on labour 
relations. The chapter discusses the inadequacies of PDS and MSP and how access to 
schemes are determined throughout networks maintained with the local bureaucracy and 
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landowners, generating relations of debt and obligation- relations which determine the 
nature of labour tying.  
The empirical findings presented in this thesis bring me to my conclusion; that the 
persistence of labour tying arrangements among female labourers is a mechanism that 
keeps labour fragmented with the exercise of power at the micro level and macro level 
policies. The comparative nature of this study highlights how the female classes of labour 
in Aranthangi have better access to land, credit and state policies. This has provided female 
labourers with the ability to negotiate labour and land contracts, a phenomenon witnessed 
in negligible proportions in Chinsurah. Notwithstanding the positive effects, labour tying 
arrangements exist in both regions, although the degree of exploitation and nature of 
contract vary in the two regions. The manner in which macro level policies are 
implemented in the two regions clearly affect the nature and unfreedom experienced by 
these tied female labourers.   
The presence of labour tying arrangements is understood through relations of debt 
entered into by female labourers. Interlocking transactions of land, labour and credit 
preserve the constant generation of debt. Debt, an intrinsic part of the lives of rural female 
labour, is perpetuated through domestic and production politics. The ability of female 
labourers to negotiate labour contracts is further affected by the improper 
implementation or manipulation of state benefits such as MSP, PDS and even MGNREGA 
(maintained through networks between the local elite and bureaucracy). The presence of 
these diverse institutions shape labour tying contracts and the degree of exploitation 
experienced by female labourers. As a process of social control and labour management, 
labour tying arrangements persist in different forms within a constantly evolving social and 
political environment. The presence of such labour relations, as discussed in this thesis, 
needs to be understood in terms of relations of power at multiple levels, its complexities, 





Chapter 1: Unfree Labour and Agrarian Neoliberalism  
 
This chapter, through its discussion on various theoretical debates surrounding labour 
relations and class formation, lays down a theoretical framework for the dissertation. It 
also spells out the objectives of this research. For the purpose of this research, I draw on 
the works of Henry Bernstein and Gillian Hart. The research, with its emphasis on female 
labour, focuses on tied labour relations in Indian agriculture and argues the same has 
continued presence. The investigation of tied labour arrangements looks at how power 
relations at the village level and relations with macro-political and economic forces shape 
such arrangements. The tied labour arrangements are identified across four villages in the 
states of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal in India. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section uncovers the larger debates 
surrounding the agrarian question, within the context of neoliberal capitalism. The section 
highlights Bernstein’s development perspective and categorisations of rural labour 
classes, which provide a relevant analytical tool to decipher the category of labour in the 
neo-liberal context. The agrarian question from below has been replaced by the 
relationship of labour and capital. This relationship has transformed pre-capitalist agrarian 
classes, giving way to the ‘classes of labour’. The classes of labour, within contemporary 
capitalism, are a modern fragmented reserve army of labour, characterised by growing 
insecurity of employment, lack of a generalised living wage and are marred by the inability 
to procure minimum reproduction costs (Bernstein, 2006; Lerche, 2013: p. 389). In order to 
sustain themselves, the classes of labour take up non-agricultural wage work but do not 
leave farming. The partial move towards non-agricultural wage work is indicative of the 
crisis of labour reproduction (Lerche, 2013). Drawing on this category of ‘classes of labour’, 
I present a case for ‘tied labour relations’ to highlight the exploitative ways in which labour 
survival is sought. The second section highlights the debates on unfree labour relations, 
drawing on empirical studies, spanned across the country, with specific reference to tied 
labour arrangements. In uncovering the varied understanding of the presence of tied 
labour arrangements, I turn to the work of Gillian Hart addressed in the third section. Hart’s 
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work, though set in rural Java, highlights how the constant negotiation of relations of 
power at the village level and the relationship of the rural elite with local bureaucracy 
embody tied labour arrangements. Understanding tied labour arrangements through the 
lens of social control and labour management explains why these labour relations continue 
to persist even with changes in the political and economic structures. The fourth section 
draws on more specific examples of India, highlighting agrarian distress within the region. 
The fifth section looks specifically at tied labour arrangements among female labour and 
how their relations are shaped through, domestic relations, caste and kinship ties, work 
conditions and labour struggles, all of which generate varying degrees of unfreedom.  
1.1  The Agrarian Question of Capital and Labour 
The section focuses on a theme ‘the agrarian question of capital and labour’ from 
scholastic perspectives offered by Lerche, Byres, Bernstein and Harriss. In light of the 
theme, the category of classes of labour - which is the focus of the thesis - is discussed.  
 The agrarian crisis witnessed during the ninth (1997-2002) and tenth (2002-07) plan 
periods in India registered a decline in agricultural GDP rates from 4.8 percent in 1992-97 
(eighth plan) to 2.5 percent in 1997-02 and 2.4 in 2002-07 (Economic Survey, 2011).  This 
period of crisis, which accompanied the adoption of neo-liberal policies, was marked with 
reduced public investment in agriculture, the withdrawal of subsidies, the reemergence 
and growth of private money lending and usurious credit (Lerche, 2011; Kannan, 2014; 
Lerche et al, 2013). A publicized manifestation of this period of crisis was the growing 
number of farmer suicides (Kannan, 2014). The 11th plan period in the country witnessed a 
recovery from this crisis, where the agricultural growth rates increased to 3.5 percent, 
following an increase in state investments (Economic Survey, 2011; Lerche et al, 2013).  
The periods of crisis and growth in agriculture in India have been uneven and affected the 
agrarian classes differently. Rich farmers, through investment, are continuously 
accumulating, creating a dividing line between different rural classes (Lerche, 2011: p. 112-
113). The uneven rates of growth across the country implied a slow transition to capitalist 
development. This transition was characterised as a semi-feudal stage (Bhaduri, 1973; 
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Patnaik, 1991). According to Bhaduri (1973), the obstacles to capitalist growth in the 
countryside were an outcome of landlord dominance— which thrives on rent — termed as 
landlordism. Harriss (2014), highlights that the built in depressor associated with semi-
feudalism does not hold true any longer, as landlordism is on a decline. The landlords have 
no or declining control over the people. The landlords continue to remain economically 
and politically powerful, but this is done through consolidation of power outside of 
agriculture, such as access to government funds and public sector jobs (in Lerche et al, 
2013: p. 342). Rural workers are no longer dependent on landlords for survival, and have 
branched out to non-agricultural wage work5. Within the country’s current mode of 
capitalist development, the importance of agriculture, as a provider of capital has declined, 
i.e. the country is ‘progressing without proper agrarian transition’ (Lerche, 2011: p. 105).  
According to Bernstein (1996, 2006), the agrarian question of capital has been bypassed.  
Byres (1996, 2003), who takes a classic political economy approach, states that the 
agrarian transition has not taken place in the country. The transition would lead to 
increasing class differentiation with the creation of a dominant and growing capitalist class 
from the peasantry, and an increase in wage workers from among the poor peasants. Any 
surplus generated by the capitalist class is then used to fund industrial investment (Byres, 
2003)6. This understanding of agrarian transition rests on the development of agriculture. 
Bernstein (1996) proposes an alternative argument to agrarian transition. He identifies 
that industrial development, in the era of globalisation is no longer dependent on 
agriculture in the national market, but on international finance and global product 
markets. Lerche (2011, 2013), drawing on evidence from India shows that development in 
the country aligns itself to Bernstein’s argument, where agriculture is not supporting 
growth of the economy, i.e. the interdependency of industry and agriculture have declined 
                                                          
5 Lerche (2013) shows that there is growing inequality between landowners and landless, where ‘marginal 
farmers are becoming de facto wage earners’ (Lerche et al, 2013: p. 342).  
6 Byres (1996) counters Bernstein’s claims by drawing on examples from India, where capitalist transition in 
agriculture is limited to the northern states of Punjab and Haryana, and the rest of the country still displays 
pre-capitalist forms of production.  
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(Lerche et al, 2013: p. 344). In the 1990s the non-agricultural sector grew at a rapid rate 
despite the weak growth experienced in the agricultural sector (Lerche, 2013). Hence, the 
agrarian question for capital does not hold relevance today (Bernstein, 2006). With the 
agrarian question of capital bypassed, labour relations and conditions are understood 
through relations with capital and not with agriculture. The survival of labour is no longer 
dependent on agriculture alone, but is pursued through non-agricultural wage labour. The 
ruling class does not rely on agrarian surplus and labour does not require agriculture alone 
to survive. Under such conditions, land reforms, drawn out through political alliances, are 
not feasible to bring capital and peasants together to generate accumulation from below. 
Instead, land reforms operate with the agenda of social justice (Bernstein, 2006).  
The class positions and differentiation identified by Bernstein (1996, 2001) arise from petty 
commodity production and the combined interactions of capital (such as land) and labour. 
Peasants, small farmers or family farmers are transformed into petty commodity 
producers, who depend on subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture and labour 
commodification. The different combinations of wage labour, self-employment and 
farming, under capitalist systems, lead to the disintegration into classes of labour or capital 
(Bernstein, 2001). In identifying capitalist development and accumulation through petty 
commodity production, Bernstein draws in specificities of accumulation and class 
dynamics. Unlike the conceptualisations of Patnaik (1987), which understand class 
formations through the peasantry7, Bernstein’s framework highlights the dynamic nature 
of rural class formation, conditioned by capital, labour and non-class attributes such as 
gender, kinship structure, caste, asset ownership, dispossession/proletarianization of 
weaker farmers, etc. (see Bernstein, 2010).  
Bernstein (2010) identifies a distinct yet fluid hierarchy of classes among petty commodity 
producers. The accumulating class at the top of the hierarchy are the petty capitalists. The 
                                                          
7 Patnaik (1987) identifies peasant class differentiation through the labour exploitation criterion. 
Differentiation of the peasant class depends on the concentration of means of production. These include 
landholding, size and composition of the family, the cropping pattern, and the amount of labour used.  
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petty capitalists, emergent or rich farmers are able to reproduce themselves as capital and 
pursue numerous economic activities to ensure accumulation (Bernstein, 2010b). 
Theoretically, this category is distinct from the category of big capitalist farmers as defined 
by Patnaik (1987) and Ramachandran (2011). The subject of this study is on female labour 
and therefore, I have not theoretically engaged with the category of rich/ capitalist farmer.  
The middle is occupied by petty producers who combine labour and capital for survival. In 
India they could be the middle and small farmers (Reddy and Mishra, 2009). Placed at the 
bottom of the hierarchy, the third category is what Bernstein (2010b) calls the classes of 
labour. The classes of labour cannot reproduce themselves as capital. For these labourers, 
daily survival is difficult and ensured through insecure and oppressive wage employment, 
informal sector activities, small-scale farming and non-remunerative activities. The wide 
range of activities undertaken to secure their survival highlight the diverse social locations 
and identities of the labour. Such diversity within the category suggests that there is barely 
any homogeneity with the proletarian class, other than their need to secure their survival 
(reproduction) through ‘direct or indirect sale of their labour power’ (Bernstein, 2001: p.5). 
The classes demarcated by Bernstein are dynamic categories, where class differentiation 
is heightened through social, economic and political factors such as gender, caste, asset 
ownership, livelihood diversification, change in farming practices, etc.  
Bernstein, in dealing with the agrarian question of capital and labour, theorises the 
changing nature of capitalism and labour. Labour is in a state of crisis as a result of agrarian 
neo-liberalism (understood in the context of trade liberalisation, reduced state support, 
especially to small farmers, etc.), and under such conditions labour cannot secure its 
survival through farming and turns to insecure, unstable and oppressive employment. 
Bernstein’s class differentiation of petty commodity producers presents itself as an 
analytical tool for the purpose of this research. First, the fact that attributes such as gender 
and caste, are a key feature of class differentiation, finds place within the Indian context. 
Second, Bernstein’s class categorisations help identify the rural labour class, the primary 
subject of this study. Third, the ‘classes of labour’ category, underscores the extremely 
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fluid nature of class locations brought about through interactions between capital and 
labour. The thesis researches a specific labour relation- labour tying arrangements, and 
using Bernstein as a theoretical reference point helps identify who is to be studied, and 
more importantly, the changing nature of these relations, in terms of survival strategies. 
The following section provides a detailed discussion on debates surrounding unfree labour 
relations, with specific reference to tied labour relations in the Indian context. Drawing on 
different empirical works, the section highlights the changing nature of unfree labour 
relations taking place alongside agrarian development. The section ends with the 
proposed framework of analysis for this research, which borrows broadly from the works 
of Gillian Hart.  
1.2  Unfree labour under Capitalism 
The agrarian structure as defined by Daniel Thorner (1976: 8) refers to a “network of 
relations among various groups, who draw their livelihood from the soil”. This definition 
highlights the presence of a diverse set of agrarian relations between those who buy and 
sell agricultural labour, which result in numerous contractual forms and labour 
arrangements (Rogaly, 1996). Empirical work undertaken in India explores the diversity of 
agrarian labour arrangements and the continuous transformations they have undergone. 
The labour arrangements range from single-stranded daily wage contracts to multi-
stranded complex contracts, within which a labourer is under obligation to sell his/her 
labour to a particular employer for longer and unspecified durations (Hart, 1986b; Karnath 
1995; Ramachandran 1990; Rogaly, 1996). To put it simply, labour arrangements range 
from casual daily wage labourers (considered free) to unfree labourers. The multiple forms 
of labour arrangements vary in duration of the contract, form of payment, type of payment 
received, degree of obligation and the nature of interlocked markets of land, credit and 
labour (Hart 1986a; Rogaly 1996). The existence of these diverse forms of labour 
arrangements have sparked debates on the degree and kind of agrarian development 
experienced in India. These debates are explained in the following section through an 
understanding and presence of free and unfree labour.  
19 
 
Classical Marxist political economy identifies free labour (an inherent part of capitalist 
development) as being doubly free, i.e. free from ownership of production and freedom to 
sell his/her labour power and freedom to choose and change the employer 
(Ramachandran, 1990). The freedom to choose and change employers, as highlighted by 
Ramachandran in his book Wage, Labour and Unfreedom in Agriculture, implies a move 
away from servitude, which places the presence of unfree labour in pre-capitalist systems. 
A free labour is therefore, considered to be ‘free’ from any coercive power and available 
for production, having the ability to commodify and recommodify themselves within the 
agricultural cycle (see Brass, 1999; Guerin, 2013: p. 409).  Daniel and Alice Thorner (1962) 
consider a labourer free if he or she is able to reject the conditions of work and wages 
offered. The labourer can do this prior to or even after taking up a job by giving notice. The 
Thorners do agree that there might be economic conditions that could make the labourer 
agree to terms he/ she does not consider favourable, however, this is done only for a 
temporary period (p. 21).  
Using this definition of ‘free labour’, an unfree labourer is one who does not have the ability 
to choose or change their employer, in turn they lack or have even surrendered any 
bargaining power which does not provide them with the freedom to exit the relationship 
(see Ramachandran, 1990; Srivastava, 2005; Geurin, 2013). ‘Through custom, compulsion 
or specific obligation, this bond labourer is tied up to his master’s needs. He can neither 
quit nor take up work for another master without first receiving permission’ (Thorner, 
1962: p. 21).  
The nature of unfree labour in the present context is generally identified through relations 
of debt/credit, often resulting in what is referred to as debt bondage (Srivastava, 2005; 
Breman, 2008; Lerche, 2007, 2011; Guerin, 2013). Within the context of debt bondage, 
Daniel and Alice Thorner were among the earliest to classify unfree labour ‘a) labourers 
who are under full time service and receive an annual pay; b) labourers who work for a 
single employer and are under the beck and call relationship, and c) which is a situation of 
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forced labour, in which, tenants have to perform certain tasks in a year for the landlord, 
where the wages received are nominal and at times there might be no pay at all’ (p.22).   
The categories of unfree labour as described by Thorner characterise a period prior to 
technical advancement and growth in Indian agriculture — Green Revolution — and 
therefore, it is not considered to be representative of the so called ‘modern’ labour 
relations, particularly when labourers are wanting to escape from their dependence on a 
single employer coupled with the more general move away from ‘thraldom’ 
(Ramachandran, 1990). Unfree labour consists of a range of labour relations. (For the 
purpose of this research, I focus on tied labour arrangements, a form of unfree labour)  
One of the most extensive works, which documents the changing nature of unfree labour 
in both the pre and post-independence era in India, is that of Jan Breman. Breman (1974, 
2007) traces the changes experienced in the bonded labour system in Gujarat, known as 
halipratha. His work recognises the changes that the halpatis (a labour community who are 
Scheduled Castes) underwent with a rise in free labour relations, and the transformation 
to new forms of capitalist unfree labour relations. Breman refers to this unfree labour as 
‘neo-bondage’, as their basic characteristics have undergone certain changes. They are 
based on a labour contract that are exclusively economic in nature. Breman (2007) here 
refers to a change in the patron client relation and a decline in the landlord’s ‘need’ to retain 
social hierarchy through such ties. Labour under neo-bondage find themselves in more 
time-bound contracts, where the labour can be bonded for just a season and not for an 
unlimited period of time. One of the reasons for these short-term seasonal ties is that most 
of these labourers tend to be migrants and, hence, are not tied to employers for a long 
period of time. In addition to this, the labourers are hired and fired by a labour contractor 
and the employers, in turn, have distanced themselves from the labour hiring process 
(Breman and Guerin, 2007). Empirical studies on neo-bondage, have focused on non-
agricultural activities, such as in brick kilns, or rice mills (Breman and Guerin, 2009). These 
studies show that the reason for debt bondage and bonded labour relations is due to the 
rise of seasonal migrant labour flows and the role of the labour contractors and 
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intermediaries (Breman and Guerin, 2009; Srivastava, 2009). Guerin (2013) sees this as 
shift in patronage ties from the employer to the labour contractor, who is very often from 
the same caste and class as the labourer. The transformation in labour employment 
relations and whether bargaining capacities and/or work conditions have improved in such 
cases is, however, a debatable issue. The shifting of patronage ties to the labour 
contractor, creates unfreedom, under capitalist conditions, which impacts the labourer’s 
work conditions and bargaining capacity, and is different from that experienced under old 
forms of bondage (Guerin, 2013).   
Changes in labour relations, accompanied with the changes in wider social structures, and 
has altered the nature and extent to which labour is and remains unfree. Unfreedom is 
experienced in varying degrees, often taking up indiscernible forms. The worker, 
therefore, experiences different impacts of freedom and unfreedom (Ramachandran, 
1990).  Along with the presence of casual wage labour that is considered free, there is an 
entire spectrum of labour relations that emerge, where a labourer may be attached 
(henceforth referred to as tied) to an employer or credit relations (Brass, 1991; Srivastava, 
2000) (for example, labourers who are tied through debt bondage), labourers who 
experience unfreedom through the extension of labour services or obligations 
(Ramachandran, 1990), etc. The mode of payment and duration for which the labour 
remains tied varies with different contracts. Often labour tying is seasonal in nature, where 
the labourer is tied due to tenancy arrangements or credit relations. The presence of such 
tied labour arrangements are often attributed to employers securing labour during tight 
labour markets and to ensure the timeliness of operations (Bhalla, 1976; Bardhan and 
Rudra, 1980). However, tied labour cannot simply be viewed as a mechanism to secure 
labour, where loans taken are considered as advance on wages (Da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999), in their study in Andhra 
Pradesh, highlight that labourers in tied labour arrangements receive far less wages than 
that set by the market rate. In addition to this, the unfreedom experienced depends on the 
ability to negotiate the contract. If the labour arrangements are too time-consuming then 
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they might deprive the labourer of seeking work elsewhere (Ramachandran, 1990; Da 
Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Labour tying contracts can have varying durations, 
depending on which, labourers can be tied for a particular season, the period of repayment 
of loan, an entire agricultural year, or even be tied multiple times within a year. Caught in 
a perpetual cycle of indebtedness, the labourer can be tied due to lease arrangements and 
credit relations (Bardhan, 1983, Srivastava, 1989, Brass, 1990; Da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999, Guerin, 2013; Jodhka, 2014). The diversity and complexity of tied 
labour arrangements, and its associated unfreedom, raises questions about whether its 
presence needs to be understood as an intrinsic part of capitalism.   
As the discussion highlights, unfree labour encompasses an entire spectrum of labour 
relations. For the purpose of this research, I focus on labour tying arrangements. The 
persistence of unfree labour relations within agriculture has raised questions on the kind 
of agrarian development experienced in the Indian context. The theoretical debates 
surrounding the nature of agrarian development has provided numerous interpretations 
and definitions to understand the complexity and diversity of labour contracts. The 
following section looks into debates that have emerged within Marxist political economy.  
1.2.1 Theoretical Constructions within the Indian Context 
Numerous interpretations have emerged in trying to understand the presence of unfree 
labour within the Marxist political economy framework. These have been discussed in this 
section representing the various ways scholars within the Marxist framework have 
understood and theorised unfree labour. Some scholars (such as Bhaduri, 1983; Utsa 
Patnaik and Manjari Dingwaney, 1985) identify unfree labour as remnants and relics of past 
‘traditions’, and therefore, unfree labour is said to disappear with the transition to ‘mature’ 
capitalism. This is the underlying argument of the semi-feudalism thesis, where the 
presence of such labour relations retards the onset and development of capitalism, 
thereby keeping most of the agrarian sector into what Patnaik (1987, 2001) refers to as 
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oppressive semi-feudal capitalism or Junker style landlord capitalism8. Under this form of 
landlord capitalism, despite numerous land reforms, the monopoly of landholdings is 
preserved, contributing to continuance of unequal power relations in rural society. Bhaduri 
(1983) identifies the presence of semi-feudalism in India through sharecropping and usury, 
all of which act as deterrents to development, and incompatible to capitalist accumulation 
(Brass, 1999) Patnaik’s (2001), assessment of semi-feudal production relations is 
understood not through the presence of free or unfree labour relations but rather the 
inability to reinvest in agriculture. Therefore, even though there exists a burgeoning 
presence of capitalist farmers, non-capitalist modes of production relations continue to 
operate, fixing Indian agriculture in a semi-feudal mode of production (Patnaik, 1987, 
2001).  
The semi-feudalism argument and landlord capitalism find resonance in Byres’s (1996) 
discussion on the agrarian question, i.e. the transformation to capitalism. According to 
Byres (1995, 1996), capitalist development will ensue when there is successful agrarian 
transition and the reverse will take place when agrarian transition is faced with many 
obstacles9. The multiple paths of capitalist development rests on the kind of landlord class, 
class differentiation and struggles (Byres, 2009). The Prussian path of development sees 
the transformation of the feudal landlord class to a capitalist class. Under these conditions, 
                                                          
8 Patnaik (1972, 1986, 2001), drawing from examples in India, identified that a large part of the Indian agrarian 
economy can be categorised as Junker-style landlord capitalism. However, the northern belts, which 
benefited from the Green Revolution, particularly the states of Punjab and Haryana, are driven by ‘dynamic 
agrarian capitalism’, i.e. a region characterised with high productivity, free wage labourers and a dominant 
peasantry. This dynamic agrarian capitalism that Patnaik (2001) talks about is attributed to landlord 
capitalism, which is an intrinsic characteristic of the Indian agrarian economy and was promoted through 
land reforms (p. 22). The zamindars are now referred to as capitalist landlords who utilise pre-capitalist 
relations of caste based oppressions to appropriate surplus. In addition to this the capitalist landlords would 
only invest in agrarian development if the profits they received were more than the amounts earned by 
ground rent and in investment in non-agriculture (Ramachandran, 2011).  
 
9 Byres’ (1996) explanation of the transition is seen through two paths that he borrows from Lenin- the 
Prussian and the American path. The Prussian path is described as capitalism from above where the only 
transformation is of feudal landlords (such as the zamindars) to capitalist landlords and maintaining other 
relations of production. The American path is described and capitalism from below where the rich peasants 
become the capitalist class and the poor peasants work as agricultural or wage earners. The landlord class 
does not exist or is broken up by the revolution (Lenin, 1962).  
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class consciousness arises only among a small proportion of the landlord class and the 
majority of farmers and landless labourers remain suppressed and exploited (Bernstein, 
2010b; Byres, 1996, 1999; Lerche 1998, 1999). Within the Prussian path, transition to 
capitalism is marked by semi-feudal features. The other is the American path which does 
not stifle the development of the peasantry and they transform themselves into capitalist 
farmers. Byres (1996), drawing from examples in India, explains that capitalist transition in 
the country has taken place in a sporadic manner and tends to be limited in the northern 
states of Punjab and Haryana, and the rest of the country still shows persistence of pre-
capitalist forms of production, as described by Patnaik (1987).    
The semi-feudal thesis is the first school within the Marxist political economy that can be 
identified which continues to be communicated through the party programmes of the 
Leftist parties in India, such as the CPI, CPI (Marxist), CPI (Marxist, Leninist) and CPI 
(Maoist) (Shah, et al, 2013). The CPI (M) party strategy clearly states that landlordism 
(where the oppressor is the landlord) and exploitative tenancy contracts are the reasons 
for the worst forms of exploitation experienced by the ‘Indian peasantry’ (Karat, 2000). A 
change in the party programme of 2000 from that of 1964 recognizes that there is a change 
in the nature of landlordism from semi-feudal landlords to capitalist landlords. However, 
this manner of landlordism is said to have only superimposed capitalism, and in doing so 
has preserved an entire gamut of exploitative semi-feudal relationships. For any concrete 
and successful agrarian revolution to take place, these capitalist landlords need to be 
eliminated in order to transform production relations. While the CPI (M) recognizes the 
presence of a capitalist landlord, the relations of production are semi-feudal in nature, 
which does not allow development in agriculture (i.e. the transition to capitalism) to take 
place10.   
Mohan Rao (1999, 2014) adheres to a similar understanding, where he believes that unfree 
labour and capitalism are not compatible with one another. Unfree labour typifies pre-
                                                          
10 Despite what the semi-feudalism thesis postulates, Bhalla (1976) and Jodhka (1993, 2013) identify attached 
labour relations in the agriculturally developed state of Haryana.  
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capitalist modes of production, which are not economical in nature and will be replaced by 
capitalist labour relations (primarily the commodification of labour). In addition to this, 
Rao (1999) does not consider the payment of advances as loans that create unfree 
relations. If the labourer is able to pay back the loan amount, he or she is able to exit the 
labour relation without being tied down to so-called non-economic coercions (see Lerche, 
2007).  For the labourer and employer to be embroiled in advance payments is considered 
a normal aspect of contractual payment (Rao, 1999). According to Rao, when certain 
advance payments transform themselves to debt bondage, they do so under semi-feudal 
power relations (where the ruling class has control of both economic and political wealth) 
keeping the labourers in bondage.  In this explanation, the labourer ends up serving the 
lender during peak seasons but is left on their own during slack seasons. Rao (1999) 
recognises this skewed balance of power that does not work in favour of the labourer and 
in doing so recognises the presence of exploitation in numerous labour contracts. 
However, he does not believe that it would necessarily be tantamount to an unfree 
relationship (see Lerche, 2007). What Rao neglects in his assumptions is that the 
oppressive and coercive conditions of work make the labour unfree (Srivastava, 2009), 
which is a mechanism used by the rural elite to exercise control over labour and demobilise 
agrarian organisation (Brass, 1990). 
A second school of thought within the Marxist political economy framework is that 
proposed by Brass (1999, 2002, 2014, 2015), where unfree labour is compatible with 
capitalism. Under these conditions the labour loses control over the sale of their labour and 
labour costs are cheapened. In doing so, their class consciousness is arrested and results in 
what Brass terms as de-proletarianisation. The idea of de-proletarianisation challenged 
the notion of capitalist transformation from free to unfree labour, as this phenomenon is 
not restricted to the early stages of capitalism alone (Brass, 2015). Drawing on examples 
from Peru and Haryana, Brass focusses on relations of debt bondage, usually an outcome 
of advance payments taken from the employer. He argues that any form of debt-based 
labour relation, whether permanent or casual or for short or long durations, is unfree, as 
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these conditions create situations where the labour power either ceases to be a commodity 
or is recommodified by someone else, that is, the labourer does not have the freedom to 
sell their own labour power (Brass, 2015: p.291).  Under such conditions the labourer ceases 
to be free. From the case studies of India (Haryana) and Peru, Brass  comprehends the basic 
nature of such unfree labour; a) they might voluntarily enter the labour contracts but lose 
control over their labour and cannot exit the contract freely, b) the labour under relations 
of debt works for much longer hours than those who are debt free and unattached, c) the 
higher rate of exploitation experienced is a result of the growing relation of dependence 
on the employer/lender; and d) unfree labour is largely driven through non-economic 
coercion. However, unlike the traditional forms of unfree labour, the modern forms do not 
restrict themselves to a single employer. Brass’s concept of de-proletarianisation provides 
a critique to the semi-feudal thesis that views unfree labour as an obstacle to growth. 
Unfree labour is an intrinsic part of capitalist development in agriculture and what he 
identifies as capitalist farmers/employers are successfully creating unfree labour 
conditions to prevent class struggle from below (see Kapadia and Lerche, 1999; and Lerche 
2007a).   
Brass (1994) asserts that within capitalist production relations, unfree labour is preferred 
over free labour and the production system operates to eliminate any freedom of the 
workforce, hence de-proletarianisation. The de-proletarianisation thesis has been 
criticised for intensifying the dichotomy of free and unfree and that free and unfree labour 
need not be viewed in terms of such ‘rigid binaries’ (Guerin, 2013; Lerche, 2011). This 
criticism draws from the theoretical understanding of unfree labour and capitalism as 
discussed by Banaji (2003). In capitalist production relations, all workers experience some 
form and degree of domination and exploitation, and according to Banaji, to have such 
strict binaries undermines ‘the basis of Marx’s critique of wage labour and its legal 
mystification’ (quote from Bernstein, 2013: p. 313). Banaji draws on Marx’s dual sense of 
freedom where even when a labourer is free, he/ she operates under unequal power 
relations, starvation and exploitative and oppressive work conditions (see Daum, 1990). 
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Banaji (2003), in his analysis, points out that capital is of two kinds, total social capital and 
individual capital. The latter is driven through surplus accumulation and not the presence 
of free or unfree labour. Individual capital is not restricted to free wage labour. For the 
purpose of and for generating surplus, it can incorporate multiple kinds of exploitation like 
exploitation of peasant family labour, less free forms like coerced wage labour, and unfree 
labour. Exploitation experienced by the labourer is an inherent part of neo-liberal 
capitalism, where labour is constantly cheapened and disciplined and made more docile 
(Lerche, 2011). The conditions for formal labour are becoming worse and are replaced with 
informalised contract labour, and within this global production system, unfreedom is just 
one of the ways in which labour is controlled (Lerche, 2011).     
Moving away from the rigid binaries of unfree labour, Lerche (2007, 2011) advocates that 
the unfree-free dichotomy needs to be understood more as continuum of relations, ‘all 
containing degrees of unfreedom’ (Lerche, 2011: p. 11). In such a situation, unfree labour 
as expressed in Brass’s term of de-proletarianised labour is the extreme end of the 
continuum. Within present day neo-liberal capitalism there is a hierarchy of occupation 
which Lerche (2011) also refers to as the ‘hierarchy of powerlessness’ (p. 69). Lerche (2011) 
constructs this hierarchy of occupation using the National Statistical Survey data in India, 
where bonded labour occupies the lower end of the hierarchy, who are generally tied to an 
employer through interlocked credit markets and have labour obligations. Formal hired 
labour, who are protected through labour legislations and have proper contracts, mark the 
other end of the hierarchy. The self-employed are also identified in this hierarchy, where 
they are self-employed for the purpose of survival, along with those who are unpaid, to 
those who are self-employed with assets to support them (such as capitalist farmers) (p. 
69). Labour is not restricted to a particular category; household members and a single 
labour might occupy more than one position on the hierarchy. The positions occupied 
determine the extent of poverty experienced and the degree of exploitation and 
unfreedom experienced by the labourer. The occupation hierarchy highlights conditions of 
differentiation and exploitation that is experienced by labour under capitalism (Lerche 
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2010). The labour conditions and labour relations keeps the labour fragmented and 
exploited with limited access to a generalised living wage (Bernstein, 2004). The 
relationship is best understood as that of labour and capital and not between labour and 
agriculture; for which reason the agrarian question has now been bypassed (Bernstein, 
2004, 2006).  The relationship between capital and labour, dominated by capitalist social 
relations, brings together a new ‘classes of labour’, which tries to secure its reproduction 
through insecure and oppressive means, emphasising the growing distress of labour under 
capitalism (Bernstein 2001). The hierarchy of occupation (Lerche 2010) and classes of 
labour (Bernstein 2001, 2004, 2006) both elicit the varied nature of labour relations, 
thereby reaffirming the errors in viewing labour free and unfree, within the current global 
production system.   
Guerin (2013) further advocates the need to study aspects of unfreedom as a continuum. 
Her work looks at bonded labour in Tamil Nadu (brick moulders, cane cutters and those 
employed in the rice drying industry), and highlights how labourers experience mild to 
harsh forms of bondage. The labourers identified in Guerin’s study worked in almost near 
captive conditions to those who were tied only through debt bondage for a single season 
(see Lerche, 2011: 23). Guerin (2013) identifies these bonded labourers as those who have 
their freedom, wages and bargaining power restricted significantly by relations of debt 
(p.411). This continuum of labour bondage (where labour need not be bonded for an 
indefinite period of time) contains within it both the economic and social compulsion to 
sell their labour (Rogaly, 1996). This compulsion is witnessed in both agricultural and non- 
agricultural work. Studies show the presence and growing dominance of unfreedom in 
non-agricultural work, however, keeping this in mind, one also needs to look into the 
extent to which labourers have the option of moving out of agricultural wage work, and 
the conditions of unfreedom experienced therein.   
This section discussed the present and continuing debates in understanding the presence 
of unfree labour relations; whether they are remnants of pre-capitalist relations or an 
inherent part of capitalism. Referring to unfree labour as a part of a pre-capitalist society 
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exclusively, confines our understanding to a binary — free and unfree labour. Instead, 
viewing labour unfreedom as an intrinsic part of capitalist development and characterised 
as a continuum highlights the degrees of exploitation that is experienced by the labour. 
The following sections highlight this very point when looking into changing unfree labour 
relations in agriculture and the different definitions used to identify unfree labour relations 
in the Indian context. 
1.2.2  Changing Unfree Labour Relations in India 
The following section is a discussion on labour arrangements focusing primarily on work of 
two scholars, Jan Breman and V.K. Ramachandran. This section identifies that traditional 
bonded labour relations are on a decline and the very nature of tied arrangements has 
shifted to an individualised contract. Breman (1974) identifies this through the process of 
neo-bondage and depatronisation. Ramachandran (1990) and others identify unfreedom 
experienced in labour relations as an outcome of commercialisation of agriculture. 
However, the debates highlight the different ways in which unfree labour is understood 
within the Indian context, often giving rise to conflicting findings.  
Possibly the most prolific scholar who has written about the changes in labour bondage 
experienced in Indian agriculture is Jan Breman. His work on South Gujarat spans across 
three decades. Breman (1974) looks at a particular labour arrangement that is based on the 
relationship between patronage and exploitation; he discusses the changes this 
arrangement has undergone over time based on revisits to the field. The relationship is 
between landlords/masters and labourers/farm servants. The farm servants (halis) 
identified were Dublas who are SCs and were attached to the landowners. This relationship 
of servitude lasted the entire lifetime of the hali, and in most cases, would get passed on 
to the next generation. Breman (1974, 2007) notes that those from the Dubla community 
ended up becoming a hali as a result of taking an advance from the landowning caste. This 
advance was (in the 19th century) in most cases made to meet marriage expenses. Once 
committed as a hali, a Dubla carried out an entire range of activities for the landlords; from 
cultivating the fields to any other activity that was demanded of him by his master. This 
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relationship of halipratha was not confined to the male Dubla workers, but extended to his 
family members, where his wife would work as a maid and their daughter would help their 
mother in tasks such as washing clothes, grinding the grain, fetching water from the well, 
keeping the house clean, etc. The hali’s sons would tend to cattle (Breman, 2007: p. 35). 
The hali was provided a meal and would receive wages, in the form of grains, at the end of 
day. The amount of grain received was often just about enough to feed the hali’s family. 
The hali lived on the master’s land and was provided material by the master to build a hut. 
In addition to this, the hali was also given a piece of the land which he could cultivate and 
keep the yield for himself. The hali received other benefits and gifts in the form of clothing, 
shoes and sometimes even some tobacco and some money to buy drinks as well. Under 
this system of halipratha the master was obliged to look to after the basic needs of the hali. 
This system of patronage that Breman (1974) describes in his work refers to a ‘pattern of 
relationships in which members of hierarchically arranged groups possess mutually 
recognized, not explicitly stipulated rights and obligations involving mutual aid and 
preferential treatment. The bond between patron and client is personal, and is contracted 
and continued by mutual agreement for an indeterminate time' (p. 18). There are rights 
and obligations that the hali and the master have to fulfil, however, the relationship is 
asymmetrical and deeply exploitative (see Beteille, 1975). 
Halipratha, under this relationship of patronage, was marked by indebtedness and 
bondage, but also provided some social protection. While the master did provide 
advances, he also tried to ensure that the debt did not increase unchecked. One 
mechanism of doing this was by providing the hali with land to cultivate for himself. 
However, in reality reduction and repayment of the loan was not possible and both the 
master and the hali were aware of this. The master would try and keep the debt to a 
minimal and the hali would try and maximise the loans. The hali was never able to repay 
the loan and this got passed on to his son and his family, creating hereditary attachment 
(Breman, 2007).    
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This relationship of patronage between the hali and his Anavil Brahmin master was 
sustained through social and economic pauperisation. The landowners enjoyed good 
terms with the bureaucracy. During the period of 1920 to 1940s, Breman (1974) clearly 
shows how the political party in power (Congress) paid lip service to bringing about 
improvement for the Dublas, and other landless labourers, while they defended the 
interests of the landed classes.  Left wing activists such as the All India Kisan Sabha led 
numerous strikes and agitations against the bonded labour system. The different 
institutions and organisations that were put in place all agreed on the abolition of the 
bonded labour system. Mahatma Gandhi (great leader) brought about a supposed 
abolition by referring to the Dublas as Halpatis. However, despite these interventions the 
removal of bonded labour was not enforced, instead it rested with voluntary 
implementation by the landowners (Breman 2007). The removal and shifting focus of left 
organizations and the Congress not wanting to disrupt its privileged political base left little 
room for transformation of this labour relation (see Lerche, 2007).  
The post-independence period in India witnessed changes in halipratha. Breman (2007) 
highlights the declining importance of halipratha as a labour arrangement with incoming 
of capitalist methods in agriculture alongside shift in cropping pattern in Gujarat. 
Landowners wanted to minimize the advances that they would give out. No longer were 
the presence of farm servants synonymous to power and prestige for the landowners. 
Landlords all looked towards a comfortable lifestyle and having one or more servants was 
enough to cater to their lifestyle demands (Breman, 2007). The landowners, despite 
changes in their lifestyle, continued to substitute their labour power with that of the 
labourers. This phenomenon was prevalent among the Anvil Brahmins, who are the upper 
caste in the villages studied by Breman. Along with them, landowners who belonged to 
the lower caste groups employed labourers in their field to satisfy their social aspirations 
(Breman, 2007: p. 191). The dissatisfaction towards bondage was voiced by the halis 
deserting their work. However, this rarely took place, as the landowner’s ties with 
bureaucracy meant that the halis could never go to the police for help.  
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The lip service provided by the Congress party continued, the then Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi (1966-77) as part of her 18-point anti-poverty programme, focused on the removal 
of bonded labour- seen in the implementation of the Abolition of Bonded Labour Act 
(1976). While policies like this were implemented nothing was ever done to tackle the 
asymmetrical power relations that existed in rural areas (Breman, 2008).  
The emergence of capitalism in the region brought along a change in halipratha. The 
Dublas were no longer confined to and dependent upon the Anvil Brahmins for work, with 
their labour freeing up they could now seek employment with different landowners. 
However, this change brought along with it a change in the patronage relationship. The 
landowner was now no longer obliged to provide employment to the Dublas during periods 
of no work, or even provide land for cultivation or building a house. The decline of these 
privileges coupled with the increasing use of migrant labour worsened the conditions for 
the landless Dublas (Breman, 1974, 2007).  Under such conditions the Dublas looked for 
other means of employment, migrating out of the village. This movement resulted in 
Dublas escaping the village, agricultural wage work and the landowners. Migration was 
now viewed as aspirational among the younger halpatis (Breman 2007). The movement 
and dissent voiced by the Dublas brought along with it a change in the way the landowners 
perceived the Dublas. In the pre-independence era, movement of the Dubla was controlled 
by the masters, where the only hope of escape was desertion and that was considered a 
sin. Now, with Dublas refusing to work as halis, the landowners stereotyped them as lazy, 
irresponsible, disrespectful, and extravagant in their expenditure, lacking the ability to 
work hard and manage their lives. These attitudes, while a result of the Dublas moving out 
of bonded labour relations, was also reason for landowners not to continue to give grains 
during periods of lean or no work as it would encourage their uneconomical mentality 
(Breman, 1974; 2007). The change in attitude of landowners and reducing the need for 
farm servants is what Breman (1974; 2007; 2008) refers to as depatronisation  
Depatronisation, within the capitalist system, brought along with it the removal of the 
labourers’ right to work, which was ensured under haliprtha, and along with this the social 
33 
 
security of the labourer was no longer guaranteed. Labourers are dependent on the 
landowners for work but this is without the same aid and protection that they received 
previously: ‘the risk of subsistence has shifted onto to the agricultural labourers (Breman, 
1974: 226). Increase in poverty is further perpetuated by the Dublas refusing to work as 
halpatis to break away from the relations of dominance perpetuated through inequality 
(Breman, 2007). Despite the process of depatronisation taking place, with rising poverty, 
the fundamental relationship of dependency has remained the same and relations of 
coercion and at times even servitude are extracted though relations of debt (Breman, 
1974). Dependency results in perpetuation of unfree labour relations, differing in 
characteristics. The labourers are no longer bonded for an indefinite period of time, they 
are now contractual in nature, shorter in duration, monetised and the relationship between 
the employer and employee is less personalised (Breman, 2010)11.  This is similar to what 
was observed by Bhalla (1974) who identified a continuity in attached labour (naukars), but 
they were now formal and contractualised in nature.  
From the discussion above, Breman, through his socio-historical analysis, identifies 
capitalist processes in agriculture, identifying how labour segmentation (driven through 
non-class associations like gender, religion, etc.), migration and the obstructive role of 
political parties result in changing accumulation patterns in rural society. Despite providing 
such rich material spanning across 50 years of research, Breman's work lacks theorisation, 
does not pay much attention to conceptual categories and, though he talks about 
marginalisation of women12, there is very little emphasis on gender relations. However, 
Breman’s work is important, mainly through its empirical analysis, where he highlights the 
                                                          
11 An important contribution made by Breman, in recognising a new form of unfree labour relation as neo-
bondage is that this relation is not confined to the agricultural sector; but is rampant throughout the non-
agricultural sector such as construction and brick kilns (Breman & Guerin, 2009). 
 
12 Breman (2007) observes that women are usually found to work in or near their villages due to their domestic 
and reproductive responsibilities, and female workers are preferred because of certain attributes of docility 




changing rural class relations in Gujarat, which can be used as an important point of 
reference to understand these phenomena in other parts of the country. 
While Breman highlights the decline in traditional bonded labour relations in South 
Gujarat, similar kinds of work carried out in other parts of India show a decline in traditional 
bonded labour arrangements as well (Cerderlof 1997; Gough, 1981; Heyer, 2000; Lerche, 
1996, da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Jodhka, 2014, Carswell & De Neve, 2013)13. Da 
Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) observe a decline in the traditional permanent attached 
(tied) labourers (jeethagallu) in Andhra Pradesh, complimented by an increase in non-
permanent tied labour arrangement. They identify two mechanisms through which 
labourers are tied through credit and through lease. In a tied labour arrangement through 
credit, the labourer remains tied till the loan is repaid. However, the frequency and purpose 
of loans taken have an impact on the duration of labour tying. Tied labour arrangements 
through lease are more seasonal in nature compared to credit relations. Tied labour 
through lease is a mechanism used by landowners to secure male labour during labour-
tight seasons. Tied arrangements through lease combined with loans intensified the 
landowner’s claim on labour. Labourers commonly enter such relations in order to meet 
their consumption costs (da Corta and Venkateshwalru, 1999). 
The change in labour relations was also noted by Breman (1974), where apart from social 
and political factors that have resulted in this change, a reason for the decline of bonded 
labour and the subsequent shift to neo-bondage is an outcome of change in cropping 
pattern (cultivating fewer labour-intensive crops). In addition to this, the decline of bonded 
labour is also attributed to the increasing migration of workers, and a decline in the patron-
client relations which is viewed as an economic liability by the landowners (see 
Ramachandran, 1990).  
Gough (1981, 1987) finds similar decline in patron client relations in Thanjavur. Gough 
identifies three broad types of labour relations in her field studies- the pannaiyal (who is 
                                                          
13 Heyer’s study of villages in Coimbatore from the 1980s to 2008-9 shows a decline in the number of 
pannaiyal labour, replaced by casual and contractual labour.  
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the farm servant) who belonged to the ex-untouchable castes, a second group of farm 
servants who belonged to the middle or low ranking caste and casual labourers. The 
pannaiyals were bonded to the landowners through relations of debt which were bound by 
legal sanctions. Desertion was uncommon as the bonded labourers were always brought 
back by the police. As pannaiyals they had access/rights to some resources, such as leaves 
to build their huts but they were bound to the socially and economically dominant 
landowners in the village. The decline in the number of pannaiyals and an increase in the 
number of casual labourers in the region of Thanjavur, was associated with an increase in 
migration, increasing fragmentation of the land, and a decline in the grain payments and 
the subsequent decline of subsistence earnings of the labourer provided by the landlords. 
However, in this region one of the most important factors, which brought about a decline 
in the number of pannaiyals, is the active role played by the Communist Party. The 
intervention of the Communist Party ensured decline of punishment that labourers 
experienced at the hands of the landlords. Gough (1987) shows that with the increase in 
the casual labour force, the agricultural labour force is less pre-capitalists and more 
proletarianised (p. 289-90). However, at the same time she recognises that poverty is acute 
and a growing problem of this labour force. As both Gough (1987) and Breman (2007) note, 
even under added circumstances of deprivation, the agricultural labourers no longer 
succumb to a regime where their survival is dependent upon being farm servants.  
One of the stark differences noted with the decline of traditional bonded relation is the 
shorter duration of contract (Breman & Guerin, 2009) and the fact that it is more an 
individual labourer who is bonded, rather than an entire family14 (Ramachandran, 1990). 
The change in labour relations brings along with it associated changes in unfreedom 
experienced by the labourer. The degree of unfreedom experienced within different labour 
relations is no longer time bound. Ramachandran (1990), in his work in Gokilapuram, 
                                                          
14 While Ramachandran does make this distinction, he recognises that, in the case of male labourers who are 
tied, their wives do work (primarily domestic work) for the landlords as well. However, the changing gender 
dynamics, as discussed in section 2.5, show that the same is not the case when female agricultural wage 




describes that a labourer in bondage and a free labourer ‘stands at two ends of a continuum 
of degrees of unfreedom’ (p. 170). The halis, pannaiyals, jeethagallu and naukars, who 
formed the traditional bonded labour relations, were all farm servants. However, as 
explained above, the duration of bonded labour relations have shortened and the 
continuing presence of farm servants need not imply that they are bonded, as they can quit 
the current employment and even repay the debt working for another employer 
(Ramachandran, 1990).  
Freedom and unfreedom, two theoretically distinct concepts, in practice operate side by 
side, one overlapping with the other. Ramachandran (1990) observes a growing number of 
casual wage labourers in Gokilapuram, however, these labourers are subjected to varying 
degrees of unfreedom. Unfreedom is recognized with the presence of labour services 
rendered to the landowner/employer. Labour services and its associated obligations often 
make it difficult to differentiate between freedom and unfreedom of the labourer. The 
range of services relate more to domestic tasks than agricultural tasks15. These labour 
services can last a few days to an entire year, a lot depends on the extent to which the 
labourer is at the ‘beck and call’ of the employer. These labour services range in duration, 
remuneration, wages received, nature of tasks, form of contract, mobility and the type of 
obligation (Ramachandran, 1990). Breman’s (1974, 2007) discussion of freedom, within the 
context of landlessness, casualisation of the labour and neo-bondage, remains confined to 
two ends of the social hierarchy, the Anvils and the Dublas. There is limited discussion on 
the intermediate classes and the changes they have undergone. In taking unfreedom to 
incorporate a range of activities (labour services), Ramachandran (1990), Lerche (2011) and 
Guerin (2007, 2013) broaden the radius of understanding the presence of unfreedom 
alongside the commercialization of agriculture. 
Ramachandran (1990) notes the agrarian revolution in the region affected labour 
absorption and labour demand in the region. The improvement in farming practices and 
                                                          
15 For activities listed as labour service, see Ramachandran, 1990; p. 177-78. 
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technology (HYV seeds, conversion of dryland to wetland, etc.) increased the demand for 
labour. This demand in labour grew for short term contracts in particular, whereas long 
term contracts declined. However, an increase in wage labour does not bring about a ‘freer’ 
labour system as the case points out.  
Ramachandran (1990) refers to these labour services as tools of subordination used by the 
employers, in present times, to keep costs low (see Brass 1995 and da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999). The increasing casualisation of the labour force and the unequal 
distribution of assets results in increased pauperisation of the labour (Lerche, 2013). The 
labour services entered furthers the dependent relationship of the labourer upon the 
landlord/employer. This dependency is mutual, as the employers do require labourers 
during periods of peak labour demand (Rogaly, 1996). However, this relationship is 
asymmetrical, with economic power reinforcing cultural and even religious domination 
(see Rogaly, 1996), often resulting in tied or fully attached labourers (Jodhka, 1996). The 
labour relations identified in Ramachandran’s study hint at not only economic changes 
which he provides a detailed discussion of, but of social and political conditions in the 
region.  
This section introduced some of the important literature on unfree labour in India, and the 
changes from long-term to short-term bondage, often driven by relations of debt. 
Whether it is Breman, Gough or Ramachandran, all talk of economic and ‘extra-economic’ 
(social and political) coercion experienced by the labourer often rendering him/her unfree 
and tied to a relation of debt. However, it is important to note that the different authors 
take different value positions in terms of unfree relations, where Breman finds short-term 
monetized forms of bondage insecure due to lack of patronage available in earlier 
arrangements (similar to that identified by Rudra, 1987), Ramachandran (1990) considers 
labourers caught in long-term contracts to be in worse-off relationships. It was found that 
the presence of unfreedom and that of tied labour is perpetuated through interlocking 
transactions between factor markets and through relations of power and dominance; 
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credit plays a critical role in these transactions. The following section discusses the debates 
surrounding interlocked factor markets and the presence of tied labour in agriculture.   
1.2.3 Providing explanations of Unfree Labour through Interlocking Transactions in 
Agriculture 
The factors of production are land, labour and capital, hence the market where these are 
sold and bought are the factor markets. Ideally, these ought to be determined freely by 
demand and supply if a classic economic view is taken. The Marxist perspective highlights 
that the commodification of land, labour and credit has not emerged independent of each 
other, but rather in bundled or interlocked ways, mediated by agrarian institutions. This 
phenomenon has been discussed from multiple scholastic perspectives here.  
The diverse forms of labour services highlight the extent of exploitation and coercion that 
the labourer experiences. The unfreedom experienced in labour arrangements determines 
the incidence of tied labour (Rogaly, 1996). However, the ideologically diverse ways in 
which exploitation, coercion and unfreedom is explained provides varied understandings 
of the ways in which labour is tied and what constitutes attachment. The extent of 
unfreedom needs to be understood in terms of the relationship between the labourer and 
employer and between different factor markets, such as credit and land: the multiple ways 
in which surplus is appropriated (Srivastava 1989, Rogaly, 1996). The studies mentioned 
above all talk of change in labour relations witnessed with the casualisation of the labour 
force, driven primarily by growing poverty and increasing indebtedness. The dynamic 
nature of labour relations, the labour recruitment process and exploitation experienced by 
the labourer are outcomes of interrelations between the different markets/surplus 
appropriation strategies (Srivastava, 1989: 493).  
The debates surrounding interlocked markets and the incidence of unfreedom are often 
placed within the capitalist and pre-capitalist development debate in agriculture. Bhaduri 
(1973) identifies the interlinkage of tenancy and credit contracts as obstacles to 
development in agriculture. Bhaduri argues that market forces which are not properly 
39 
 
developed result in semi-feudal forms of exploitation. Peasants engaging in market 
transactions do so under the compulsion of subsistence consumption, which are met by 
loans from the dominant landowning class (Bhaduri 1983; see also Swain, 1999). The 
tenancy-cum-credit interlinkage discussed by Bhaduri, results in surplus extraction; 
through rent and through greater claims on the peasant’s produce through usury, keeping 
the peasant under semi-feudalist control and obligations (often seen in the form of labour 
services).  Within this system, the landlord, to maintain his economic and political power, 
would resist the use of technological innovations to increase yield, thereby maintaining an 
inadequately formed market and oppressive labour relations (Bhaduri, 1973). Bhaduri’s 
understanding of such so called semi-feudal practices draws from Lenin’s description of 
labour services as a relic of feudalism and which takes numerous forms and results in low 
productivity.  
‘Sometimes peasants undertake for a money payment to cultivate with 
their own implements the fields of the landowner…Sometimes the peasant 
borrows grain or money, undertaking to work off either the entire loan or 
the interest on it. Under this form a feature particular to labour-service 
system, in general stands out with great clarity- the bondage, the usurious 
character of this sort of hire of labour. In some cases the peasant works “for 
trespass”…or “work simply out of gratis”, or just for a drink, so as not to lose 
other employments by the landlord. Lastly, labour service in return for land 
is very widespread in the shape of either half-cropping, or directly of work 
for land rented, for grounds used etc.’ (Lenin 1899: 200 cited in Hart, 1986a).  
The quote clearly states that the labourers’ dependency upon the landlord is fortified 
through relations of credit, access to land and securing future employment opportunities. 
Bhaduri (1973) uses this understanding to show that, in the Indian context, these semi-
feudal practices retard development and operate on a system of domination and 
subordination of the laboring class, keeping them tied to the landowners/employers. The 
semi-feudal relations as described by Bhaduri are representative of the pre-independence 
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labour relations observed by Breman (1974, 2007) where the Dublas worked as a bonded 
category, and the Anvil Brahmins maintained such relations to hold on to positions of 
power and prestige. However, as described in the previous section, these labour relations 
have undergone numerous changes and traditional bonded labour are found only in 
handful of cases (see Heyer’s (2000), work on Coimbatore).   
Bhaduri’s understanding of retarded agrarian development under tenancy-cum-credit 
interlocked markets was supported by Bharadwaj (1985), who claimed that interlocking 
transactions resulted in increasing the exploitative power of the employers/landlords, the 
dominant sections of society. Interlocking according to both Bhaduri and Bharadwaj result 
in ‘underformation’ of markets (see Srivastava, 1989: 498). The semi-feudal and 
underdeveloped market thesis, which reinforces exploitation, was criticised by Bardhan 
and Rudra (1980), who argue that the presence of interlocked markets was more prevalent 
in technologically advanced agricultural regions. Bardhan (1980) shows that the nature of 
agrarian development does not depend on the presence but rather on the nature of 
interlinkage of factor markets (p.82). Bardhan (1980, 1984) recognizes that the landlord 
and the tenant enter into numerous transactions that span across different markets, 
renting of land, hiring of labour, in marketing of outputs, in credit, etc., which reinforce 
market imperfections. The presence of attached labour in India does not share similar 
characteristics with that of a feudal serf. Bardhan (1980) does not consider labourers 
bonded if they are indebted to an employer for consumption credit or for land. Rather, it is 
a situation of mutual dependence- regarding it as a market relationship between the 
employer and employee. The employer hires in labour for either long or short contracts to 
ensure their supply during periods of peak labour demand. In the peak season, the wage 
rate might be lower, but this is adjusted with the labourer receiving ‘higher wages than the 
marginal product of labour’ during lean seasons (Bardhan, 1984: 67).  
Bardhan and Rudra’s (1983) work on West Bengal shows that with the improvement in 
agricultural technology there is a substantial change in the agricultural crop cycle which 
requires the timeliness of operations and a demand for labour at short notice (p. 506). 
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Under such conditions, the optimal labour arrangement that the employer would prefer is 
that of tied labour. Bardhan and Rudra (1983) identify the decline in bonded labour, but 
highlight the significant incidence of varying degrees of labour tying arrangement- which 
includes labour under annual or seasonal contact or contract specified for a certain period, 
even a few days. The presence of such labour relations is explained along the lines of risk-
sharing behaviour. Tied labour that operates within this imperfect market has multiple 
personalized ties, which are beneficial for both the employer and labourer. The presence 
of tied labour is explained as a two-tiered labour system on the farm. According to Bardhan 
(1983, 2003), for the labourer, tied labour relations are understood as a mechanism to 
attain job security. For the employer, the presence of tied labour ensures a mechanism of 
control over the growing demand of hired labour in agriculture. The tied labour in this 
context carries out labour supervision and controls and disciplines the casual labourers. 
This double-tiered system of labour hire is a way to put a check on class solidarity among 
agricultural labour, where the tied labour would not participate in many of the labour 
movements (Bardhan, 2003). Bardhan and Rudra (1983) attribute presence of interlocking 
transaction and tied labour as an outcome of uncertainty of labour and asymmetry of 
information (see Srivastava, 1989: 499). 
 In Bardhan and Rudra’s (1980) study on West Bengal, the interlocking factor markets 
resulted in a range of labour contracts within agriculture16. These include the a) unattached 
labourer (casual worker), b) attached worker (farm servant) who work on annual contract 
and explosively for a single employer, c) semi-attached labour, which are of three types; 
Type 1 if they work for an employer for a designated period of time, but are free to work 
for other employers; Type 2- if they are obliged to work for a particular employer for a 
particular number of days and Type 3, if they are obliged to work for an employer for an 
                                                          
16 In their categorisation, Bardhan and Rudra (1980) clarify that a casual daily wage labour may not 
necessarily receive payments on a daily basis, or that a long term contract assumes a relation of dependence 
and dominance. In fact, they assert that a causal labourer might be more dependent upon the employer for 
work than a labourer in a long term contract. The daily wage labourer might be under very different kinds of 




indefinite period of time. In their analysis, krishen is another category of attached workers 
identified, who cultivate land and get paid a portion of the total produce and are different 
from bonded labourers that are said to be on a decline in the region of West Bengal 
(Bardhan and Rudra, 1980: 1478-79).   
A key element in the understanding of attachment or tied labour is that by looking at the 
entry of such labour arrangements, Bardhan and Rudra (1980) do away with unfreedom, 
and view these relations purely based on market transactions, where attachment is a 
response to reduce higher costs experienced during peak season (see Jodhka, 1994).  Brass 
(1990), as discussed previously, dismisses the notion of voluntary entry into a contract on 
part of the labourer, instead the presence of tied labour and unfree labour relations is a 
strategy used by the employers to control labour (also see Rogaly, 1996). Jodhka’s (1994, 
2013) field study in three villages in Karnal, Haryana, shows that attached labour, are not a 
privileged section of workers as envisaged by Bardhan and Rudra (1980,) instead they are 
more indebted than casual labourers. While the labourer might have entered the 
relationship voluntarily, at no point was the relationship free from exploitation and 
unfreedom (Jodhka, 1994)17. Social positions within agrarian society also determine the 
extent of unfreedom experienced by the labour class. Lerche (1998), in his work in Uttar 
Pradesh, highlights how the Chamars (Scheduled Caste) prefer working for the Yadavs 
during peak season, as they get paid better wages. On the other hand, during the lean 
season, the Chamars are forced to work for the Thakurs18 at a lower rate in a niji relations, 
which often leaves the Chamars indebted. In this particular case, the caste position held by 
the landowners determines the extent to which the Chamars can negotiate both wages 
and work conditions.   
                                                          
17 A similar analysis was provided by Bhalla (1976) who identified that along with growing technological 
advancement in Haryana tied labour contracts took on different permutations and combinations, which was 
used as tool by the employers to suppress the growing bargaining power of the rural labour force, which she 
called the ‘re-designed fabric of conservative rural power’ (p. A 27).  
 
18 The Thakurs are the highest caste in the region followed by the Yadavs.  
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Srivastava (1989), in his study on three villages (which covered both advanced and 
backward villages) in Uttar Pradesh, highlights two routes of entry for labourers into 
interlocked transactions. The first route is by debt. This debt is generally taken due to some 
compulsion and can operate through sharecropping or wage labour. Very often, in taking 
a loan, the labourer becomes indebted.  The second route is where the labourer might 
become indebted after working as a farm servant, entering interlinked transactions, where 
payments are extracted through wages (own labour) or through tenancy arrangements 
(family labour) (p. 516). Srivastava goes on to add that, even if the labourer ceases to be a 
farm servant, interlinkages can continue to operate, with the ex-farm servant ‘working on 
a priority basis’ (p. 516). Srivastava (1989) describes the interlinkage of tenancy, credit and 
labour with both farm servants and daily wage labourers. In eastern Uttar Pradesh (a 
region which has resemblance to backward agriculture), the presence of tied labour in 
agriculture was more contractual. The ‘adverse’ forms of labour tying, such as labour 
service, priority labour or underpayment, were found in the western region of Uttar 
Pradesh (resembling agriculturally advanced regions), very often reinforced by traditional 
patron-client relations. Srivastava (1996), like Breman (2007), notes that the landowners 
started moving towards less labour-intensive agriculture in Uttar Pradesh, and this was 
accompanied with an increase in migrant labour, often drawn into oppressive work 
conditions. Both west and east Uttar Pradesh recorded a decline in traditional bonded 
labour/ ‘unfree permanent labourers’ from the post-Green revolution period (1960s 
onwards), and an increase in monetised and interlinked contractual relations (see Devi, 
2006: 204). Interlinkage, irrespective of whether operating in a backward or an advanced 
region, generates surplus, for example, through credit, wages, rent, etc. (Srivastava, 1989). 
Interlinkage of credit and land markets does not necessarily indicate an increase, but rather 
just another mechanism of appropriating surplus, which helps understand the persistence 
of tied labour relations.  
Srivastava (1989; 1996; 2005) moves away from the debate of capitalism and semi-
feudalism and asserts that the relationship of labour attachment, as an outcome of 
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interlinked markets, has a U-shaped relationship with agricultural development. There is a 
decline in labour attachment in the initial stages of agrarian development, which increases 
and intensifies with advancement in agriculture. This notion finds support in Rudra’s (1987) 
work on West Bengal, where a comparison of backward and advanced agricultural regions 
showed tied labourers to be more unfree in the latter. Srivastava’s (2005) emphasis on tied 
labour has shifted from local to migrant populations. In his initial study (1989), he notes an 
increase in recruitment of attached labour which came from Bihar or Nepal, who are drawn 
into what he refers to as more adverse forms of interlocked contracts (Srivastava, 1999). 
What Srivastava (1996, 1999) describes is that while interlocked transactions might be 
beneficial for labourers and they might enter such relations voluntarily, it does not 
necessarily imply freedom on behalf of the labourer. Instead, freedom is determined by 
the conditions of work, the ability to leave a contract and existing socio-economic 
conditions of the labourer entering such relations. Srivastava’s discussion on market 
interlinkage and labour tying focusses more on the consequences of debt rather than 
focusing only on debt as indicated by Brass (1999) (cited in Guerin, 2013).  
The presence of interlocked contract is seen in both commercialised and ‘traditional’ 
production relations (Srivastava 1989). Labour tying arrangements as an outcome of 
interlocked markets cannot be understood as a transitory phenomenon, as they are seen 
to reappear in places which are capitalist (for example, Bhalla, (1976) and Jodhka, (2013)). 
The very nature of ubiquity, and reappearance, indicates that these relations cannot be 
explained away as relations of mutual dependency arising out of market seasonality (see 
Hart, 1986a). This makes interlocked markets an insufficient category to understand single 
or multi-stranded labour relations (see Rogaly, 1996: 127). Hart (1986a) proposes that 
interlocking transactions need to be understood through mechanisms of social control 
that ensures labour management (supply and compliance).  Social control is understood 
through relations of privileges (and attached to this is the threat of withdrawal), relations 
with the rural elite and political forces, etc. The relations that embody social control give 
rise to exclusionary labour arrangements, represented for the purpose of this thesis as 
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labour tying arrangements. In order to understand the contractual diversity that exists in 
the labour market, I use Gillian Hart’s framework (drawing on aspects of social control and 
labour management) to identify the presence of labour tying arrangements.  
1.3 Using Gillian Hart to Understand Tied Labour Arrangements  
Discussions in the previous sections highlight debates surrounding unfree labour relations 
and the different ways in which they experience unfreedom. Explanations regarding the 
changing nature of labour relations in agriculture in India show a range of labour 
arrangements, from daily wage contracts to multi-stranded permanent contracts that 
places restrictions on the labourer, and draws out obligations to work for certain 
employers. The diversity in labour arrangements emerges out of relationships between 
individuals or groups, degrees of obligation, duration of the contract and interlocked 
market relations (Rogaly, 1996: p.103). The ambiguity in categorising tied (attached) or 
causal labour is further enhanced through this diversity, as labour arrangements are not 
formed along a singular axis and neither is their experience of freedom. Power relations 
between the different players along the multiple axes in labour arrangements become key 
to understanding its current nature and presence. In order to understand this, I turn to 
Hart’s (1986b) work on labour relations in Sukodono in rural Java. In her analysis, Hart 
(1986) highlights the coexistence of different institutional arrangements that generate 
social control, which can shape and constrain the labour process. 
Drawing on the empirical findings, Hart (1984, 1986b) highlights the numerous employer 
strategies involved in recruiting, organising and disciplining the labour force, labour 
deployment strategies and accumulation strategies of employers. Hart (1984, 1986b) 
identifies variations in earnings based on crop production in the villages and the place of 
employment, that is, whether within or outside the village. She observed that poorer 
households looked for job security and opted to work for a longer duration contract which 
payed them lower wages. However, job security was not the only condition that 
determined access to these ‘privileged’ employment opportunities; personal ties with the 
employer also played a key role.  
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In the formation of the different labour arrangements, Hart (1986) distinguishes between 
different forms of social control and labour management. One form of labour control is 
seen in the more direct form of supervision of workers, the threat to withhold payment or 
terminate the contract, so as to ensure work and effort from the labourer. The other end 
of the spectrum of labour control is identified as “cheaper and more effective methods of 
labour management” (Hart, 1984: p. 49). These subtler methods are identified as privileges 
that are extended to the labourer, benefits that are under the constant threat of withdrawl, 
either implicit or explicit. The presence of certain privileges and the nature of the worker-
employer relationship creates certain exclusionary labour arrangements that keeps the 
labour force fragmented. Hart notes that if employers substitute the benefits with higher 
wages, it has a similar impact on the labour relationship, but the ability to withhold non-
wage benefits has a greater impact on the labour relationship. The nature of privileges is 
varied, where on the one hand it can be understood through land allotment and credit 
facilities, and on the other through protection services. The protection services do not 
necessarily refer to traditional patron client relations, rather protection services are 
understood as a means of job security. However, the nature of these privileges are not 
static and changes based on the discretionary capacity of the employer. The extension or 
withdrawal of privileges coupled with economic vulnerability of the poor household ensure 
labour effort (labour management) and worker docility (social control) (see Rogaly, 1996: 
p.129). For the privileges to be effective tools of labour management and control, they 
need to be applied selectively. Employers can choose to extend privileges to a certain 
group of employers which keeps the labour fragmented. Under such conditions, labour 
fragmentation can take place in slack or in labour tight seasons. Therefore, labour market 
forces provide a partial explanation of the nature of labour arrangements (Hart, 1984). 
Hart (1984) draws attention to the presence of ‘other forces’ that give rise to, shape and 
place limits on labour processes. The other forces that result in the process of labour tying 
are not only land and credit, but social and political relations as well. Hart (1984) recognises 
that these social and political relations are deliberate strategies used by the employer to 
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‘influence the worker in non-labour spheres, or to use social connections in order to 
enhance the labour process’ (p.52). These relations are not remnants of traditional patron-
client relations, which will die out with market rationality, but a mechanism to exert social 
control over the labour force, not only within, but beyond the workplace (Hart, 1986b).  
Social control, therefore, is multifaceted and can emerge from numerous sources (Hart, 
1984), differentiated along the lines of gender, class and caste.  
Social control and labour management are understood through the relationship of 
exercise of power at the village level and the effect of macro-political and economic factors 
on employer strategies (Rogaly, 1996: p. 128). In the case of Sukodono, Hart (1986b) shows 
this through the relationship of the rural elite with the bureaucracy that ensured their 
access to subsidised credit and other state benefits. The relationship with the bureaucracy 
is essential because access to state incentives determines the nature of the relationship 
forged with the workers. In addition to this, the role and nature of the state influences the 
labour arrangements in a region, such as maintaining social stability and containing the 
behaviour of the rural poor that could be considered disruptive (Hart, 1984).  Hart (1984), 
through her comparison of Bangladesh and Java, shows how different national political 
systems influence employer strategies and labour arrangements.  
Hart’s framework, though drawn out from her empirical findings in Java, provides a 
coherent foundation that can be applied to the Indian context in understanding the 
presence of tied labour arrangements. Hart looks at the asymmetrical distribution of 
power and how it reverberates and aligns itself to the differentiated agendas of employers 
and workers, and the effect of changes in political regimes on rural power structures and 
labour arrangements. In dealing with power hierarchies at multiple levels, Hart moves 
away from explanations relying completely on imperfect markets and or class relations 
alone (see Rogaly 1996, p. 130-131). For the purpose of this research, I use Hart’s inclusive 
framework to identify contractual diversity in labour arrangements and explain and 
understand the presence of tied labour arrangements in India. With regards to the Indian 
context, I use Hart’s framework in conjunction with Bernstein’s work on the agrarian 
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question of labour as a crisis of reproduction. The purpose is to identify contractual 
diversity within the larger political economy debate.  
The following section provides a discussion on the Indian agrarian economy, addressing 
aspects of agrarian distress, the role of the state and the state of farmers and labourers in 
relation to neo-liberal capitalism. This discussion identifies the crisis of labour experienced 
under current agrarian capitalism.  
1.4 Indian Agriculture and Development 
The economic reform introduced by the Congress Party in 1991 led to high growth of the 
Indian economy, making it one of the emerging markets (Reddy and Mishra, 2009). 
However, between the periods of 1994/95 to 2004/05, agricultural growth rates dropped 
to 0.6 percent a year (Lerche, 2011).  This was the period of agrarian crisis, which witnessed 
increasing farmer distress and a growth of usurious money lending. The period from 1991 
to 2003 witnessed a stagnation of public investment (0.05 percent growth rate), and an 
increase in private investment (3.71 percent growth rate) (Chand, 2009). The decline in 
public investment, which began in the 1980s, escalated in the 1990s with liberalization 
(Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010). The small and marginal farmers, during this period, face 
constant struggles in adapting to changing technologies and state inputs (Reddy and 
Mishra, 2009)19. The unevenness of growth, marginalisation and declining productivity can 
be traced back to the period of Green Revolution. By the 1980s the high productivity that 
was promised by the Green Revolution had reached its limit, yields started stagnating and 
costs of production began increasing (Harriss, 2013: p. 203). The rising cost of production 
was an outcome of farmers being forced to use expensive and inefficient fertilisers and 
pesticides, and the rapidly declining groundwater levels (Harriss-White and Janakarajan, 
2004). There was also a decline in both private and public investments in agriculture, which 
                                                          
19 As Reddy and Mishra (2009) note, the Green Revolution package and the implementation of HYV seeds, 
worked in favour of those farmers who had better access and control over the resources. The Green 
Revolution technology, though being scale neutral, was in no way resource neutral (Byres, 1981). A result of 
this was that benefits and profits accrued to a small group of farmers, who had access to better resources 
through formal and cheap credit facilities, and better input-buying capacity (Reddy and Mishra, 2009, p. 14).  
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escalated with liberalisation policies adopted by the country (Ramachandran and Rawal, 
2010; Ramachandra, 2011). The country has emerged out of its period of crisis, however, 
growth and development has taken place in an uneven manner. Studies showed that for 
small farmers, cultivation of crops alone was insufficient for family survival, whereas larger 
landowners (those who had 10 acres or more) were able to generate profit (Ramachandran 
and Rawal, 2010; Basole and Basu, 2011). In addition, the Green Revolution, which ushered 
in technological transformation in agriculture, did little to increase crop employment 
(Harriss-White and Harriss, 2007).  
1.4.1.1 Land  
Agriculture in India employed 70 percent of the population in the 1970s, and in 2009-10 this 
figured dropped to 53 percent (Lerche, 2013). In 1981-82, 46 percent of landowners had 
less than a hectare of land. Agriculture in the country witnessed massive structural 
changes, where in 2002-03, 63 percent of landowners were marginal farmers, and carried 
out wage work, with the latter generating a significant portion of their income (Reddy and 
Mishra, 2009; NCEUS, 2008, cited in Lerche et al, 2013). Under such conditions, marginal 
farmers actually operate as wage labourers and receive only a subsidiary income from their 
plot of land (Reddy and Mishra, 2009; Lerche, 2013). These are conditions that were 
exacerbated by the adoption of neo-liberal policies, which brought along with it the 
reversal of land reforms, declining public investment, deterioration of social and 
development banking, public infrastructure for storage and marketing, cut backs in public 
distribution, etc. (Chandrashekar and Ghosh, 2002; Frankel, 2005; Krishnaraj, 2007; 
Ramachandran, 2011). Marginal improvements in agricultural growth, were observed in 
the period immediately after the crisis, were possible through increased state expenditure 
(Lerche, 2011)20. 
                                                          
20 The gross capital formation in agriculture and allied activities as a proportion of agricultural GDP increased 
from 2.9 per cent in 2004-05 to 3.7 per cent in 2006-07. This increase was an outcome of increased 
expenditure in agriculture by the state (Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010). 
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The impact of agrarian distress is differentiated and, as briefly discussed, the reasons for 
this are many fold. Ramachandran (2011) observes that with trade liberalisation, a distinct 
line of division emerged between the rich farmers/capitalist farmers and the marginal and 
small farmers. Drawing on evidence from Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh, Ramachandran (2011) shows that the rich farmers had 
higher incomes because they owned most of the land, agricultural technology and had 
control over input costs. The poor farmers succumbed to high rent costs. In addition, land 
reforms within the country, initially aimed towards distributive justice, were being revised 
(for example in Maharashtra and Karnataka), where the state wanted to promote agri-
business, which benefited the rich farmers and large corporations (Patnaik, 2003; 
Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010; Ramachandran, 2011). The repercussions of such moves 
on the poor farmers, especially women and those who belonged to lower castes, has a 
deeper and harsher impact on livelihood survival (Athreya, 2009).  
The liberalisation period witnessed an increase in tenancy, including reverse tenancy 
(Ramachandran et al, 2010). The purpose and type of cultivation sheds light on the 
conditions of distress experienced by farmers. Rich farmers who leased land from poor 
farmers did so for cultivation of cash crops. Poor farmers leased land from rich farmers for 
the cultivation of food crops, where they paid a portion of the produce as rent. For the poor 
farmers, the increase in yield was complimented with an increase in cost of production, 
often making it difficult for these farmers to cover all costs, and pushing them into debt. A 
majority of these farmers belong to the Scheduled Tribe or Schedule Caste category, and 
in order to meet payment costs had to supplement agriculture with other activities and this 
was seen with the out-migration of men and the concentration of women in the villages 
(Ramachandran et al, 2010).   
1.4.1.2 Credit 
Credit among workers and farmers lower down in the rural hierarchy, was obtained 
through informal debt, a process aggravated with the adoption of neo-liberal policies that 
brought along with it the gradual destruction of rural banking facilities (Ramachandran, 
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2011). From the 1990s, social and development banking has been on a decline, which has 
resulted in increased indebtedness, especially among labourers and small and marginal 
farmers (Ghosh, 2005). Small borrowal accounts of total bank credit, registered a decline 
from 25.4 percent in the early 1990s to 3.1 percent in 2001 (Shetty, 2009). A reason for this 
was public sector rural banking, where a large number of rural banks were shut down. The 
policy move added to the inadequacy and fragmentation of rural credit facilities 
(Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010). This trend, though partially redeemed in 2004, overall 
led to an increased dependence on informal credit (Ghosh, 2005; Ramachandran and 
Rawal, 2010). According to the 59th round of the National Sample Survey report on the 
Situation Assessment Survey of Farmer Households (2003), for households with less than 
0.01 hectares of land, 77.4 percent of their loans were from non-institutional agencies and 
the remaining 22.6 percent from institutional agencies21.  
The dependence on informal sources of credit has created an elaborate structure of 
coercion, where the high rates of interest keep farmers under conditions of continued 
distress (Shetty, 2009; Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010). These structures of coercion are 
magnified and differentiated along lines of gender, caste and class (Hart, 1991). Ghosh 
(2005) observes the dependency of informal credit among tenants (also includes those 
who did not own any land in their name) and women farmers. Debt incurred by this group 
of cultivators was an outcome of privatisation- privatised and increased groundwater 
usage, health and education services, increased power tariffs, privatisation of institutes 
dealing with seeds, etc. (Patnaik, 2003; Ghosh, 2005). 
1.4.1.3 State Policies 
Farmers, with liberalisation, faced problems with rising cost of production and a decline in 
agricultural commodity production (Reddy and Mishra, 2009, Ramachandran, 2011; 
Harriss, 2013). In adhering to the WTO trade regime, farmers are now faced with problems 
of market volatility, which are much more severe than internal market fluctuations. State 
                                                          
21 Of this amount, 47.3 percent were from money lenders (NSS, 2003).  
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policy in the form of Minimum Support Prices (MSP) is unevenly implemented throughout 
the country and does not cover the total cost of production incurred by famers 
(Ramachandran & Rawal, 2010). The rich farmers in the district of Bardhaman in West 
Bengal reported that the MSP for paddy increased by Rs.30/- per quintal (Rs.1050/- to 
Rs.1080/-) in 2011-12, but farm input costs have more than doubled in 2012 (Bera, 2012). 
The increase in farm costs and reduced MSP has varying effects on the classes of farmers 
and aggravates class differentiation, where small and marginal farmers are the worst 
affected.  
The dynamic nature of class relations of capital and labour and the role of the government 
is further understood through agro-commercial capital in post-harvest trading and 
processing (Lerche, 2011).  Harriss-White (2008) in her work on West Bengal, highlights the 
class character of government policies in West Bengal, which supports the rice mills in the 
regions. The case of West Bengal is particularly interesting because, the Left Front 
government, who were committed towards implementing pro-poor policies, were now 
aligning themselves to the rice mill owners and promoting agro-businesses. Processing 
and trading in this region took place on the one end with petty trading and processing, 
where profits were reinvested in farming. At the other end were large rice mills that were 
run by the ex-landlord elite and a trading community called the Marwaris. Capital is 
accumulated through trading, moneylending and renting out of land. The lower-level 
traders and farmers are tied to the large-scale traders through pre-harvest and pre-
delivery loans. This relationship often results in the tied-in farmers to accept lower rates 
and delayed payments for their produce, which then squeezes out any profit margins from 
these farmers. The large scale rice mill owners created monopolies, and any increase in 
state procurement prices rarely percolated down to the farmers. In addition to this the 
state regulated banks were providing cheap finance to the mills, which sustained the 




A reason for promoting finances among the rice mill owners was to allow the West Bengal 
government to procure paddy from these mills to distribute subsidised rice in cities. The 
Left Front, in colluding with the interests of the large-scale mill owners, has placed this 
agro-commercial class at the apex, which has created unequal trading relations, and 
strengthened class differentiation and commercialization (see Lerche, 2011: p.110) 
 
Another important policy that needs mention here is the Public Distribution System (PDS). 
PDS is concerned with food security and has experienced setbacks with economic 
liberalisation (Swaminathan, 2008). The effects of these setbacks do vary from region to 
region. In 1997, subsidised goods distributed through PDS were to be done in a targeted 
manner. The government, in working towards food security, set itself the role of 
identifying the poor. The process of identification left out a large section of the poor 
populations. Data from NSS (61st round) showed a large number of labour households and 
Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe households were excluded from this scheme 
(Ramachandran and Rawal, 2010). Those households that were given Below Poverty Line 
(BPL) and Anna Antyodaya Yojana (AAY) cards received subsidised food grains. Those who 
did not receive cards, or owned Above Poverty Line (APL) cards, were left out of this 
scheme (Swaminathan, 2008). The problem with the targeted PDS lies not with food 
distribution, but with the fact that identities among the rural poor are being carved out by 
the state, which in turn determines access to state benefit. The state, through its targeted 
PDS scheme, is encouraging a process of social exclusion (Swaminathan, 2008). Such 
exclusions add to growing problems of food security and distress among the rural poor. 
The system of targeted PDS was, however, not accepted by all states in the country. Tamil 
Nadu is the only state which has replaced the targeted PDS system with a universal PDS 
system (see Harriss et al, 2010, Khera, 2011). PDS in Tamil Nadu expanded the quantity 
and number of commodities it distributed, which reduced the number of days of work both 
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women and men had to carry out, particularly among the Dalit community (Heyer, 2010)22. 
The positive impact of universal PDS on food security, while beneficial for the classes of 
labour, is not a policy change that is being encouraged throughout the country. The 
universalisation of PDS can be seen as move towards poverty alleviation. 
Apart from the problems associated with targeted PDS, the institution itself suffers from 
problems of diversion (Dreze and Khera, 2011). Grains such as rice and wheat, that are 
supposed to be distributed to the fair price shops, are often sold in the open market by 
corrupt intermediaries (Dreze and Khera, 2011). While PDS itself has witnessed 
improvements, reduced availability of commodities, adds to the distress of workers and 
farmers lower down in the hierarchy. 
Ramachandran and Rawal (2010) note that the government’s focus on employment 
guarantee schemes, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS), which provides 100 days of employment per household, can 
encourage rural development23. The MGNREGS has had positive effects on female wages 
and female work participation (Khera and Nayak, 2009). Jeyaranjan (2011) observes the 
positive effects of MGNREGS on wage rates of women workers and even on their capacity 
to negotiate work contracts in a village in Tamil Nadu. Despite these positives, Jeyaranjan 
(2011) notes that the scheme in itself cannot promote rural development, where the 
economy is marked with low growth and poor infrastructure. Moreover, MGNREGS is not 
universally successful throughout the country, and suffers from problems of corruption, 
insufficient work availability, delayed payments, etc. (Dreze and Khera, 2009). Even 
though the scheme has improved female work participation rates, the scheme has 
increased the burden women have taken upon themselves, between wage work and 
domestic work (Chant, 2007).  
                                                          
22 Heyer (2010), from her studies, shows that male labourers had to work fewer days (1-2 days) to feed their 
families under the expanded PDS in 2008-9.  
 
23 For more details on the scheme, see (http://www.nrega.ap.gov.in/Nregs/)  
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The discussion in this section highlighted important aspects of the Indian agrarian 
economy. The adoption of neo-liberal policies in the country has dragged a significant 
portion of the agrarian population into poverty, food scarcity and declining wage 
employment (Ghosh, 2005). The discussion on land, credit and state policies, highlights 
the need to understand the entry into insecure and exploitative wage employment, 
through power relations operating across a number of levels. The presence of insecure 
wage employment in agriculture in particular cannot be explained through principles of 
market essentialism, but through agrarian power relations that keeps the labour 
fragmented.  
The NCEUS report (2009) recognises that the growing number of small and marginal 
farmers in agriculture are the group worst hit by the crisis, along with agricultural labourers 
(NCEUS, 2007, 2008). In the period of crisis, a large number of male marginal and small 
farmers diversified in search for non-agricultural employment. The same was not 
witnessed for women, who due to socio-cultural restrictions and lack of employment 
opportunities, were concentrated in agriculture (NCEUS, 2007). The NCEUS report in 
2009, recognises the increasing number of female farmers (where 40 percent of farmers in 
India were women), especially among the marginal and small farmers (p. 242). Despite the 
agrarian economy having come out of its period of crisis, the concentration of women 
farmers and agricultural labourers is indicative of distress, inequality and associated 
patriarchal ideology. Such situations push the need for a gendered analysis. The following 
section discusses women in agriculture and the associated labour relations.  
1.5 Women in Agriculture 
The previous sections discussed theoretical debates surrounding the identification and 
understanding of tied labour relations in agriculture, the framework of analysis I propose 
to use for my research, and the situation of agriculture in India. This section highlights the 
main subjects of my research- rural female labour and gender relations. The section 
uncovers the debates surrounding feminisation of the labour force in India and the gender 
division in the work space. The discussion moves into more specific examples of 
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feminisation in relation to tied labour arrangements. The third part of this section deals 
more specifically with aspects of gender, class and caste in determining the varied nature 
of labour struggles in the country.  
Over the past five decades, rural labour in India, particularly agricultural labour, has 
experienced rapid feminisation. The intensification of the production process in agriculture 
with the onset of the Green Revolution is said to have increased the demand for female 
labour (Harris, 1982; Athreya et al, 1990; Ramachandran, 1990, 2006). Data from the 
census of India shows an increase in female agricultural labourers from 24.6 percent in 1961 
to 48.5 percent in 2011. The male agricultural labour population increased from 16.2 
percent to 34.4 percent. Though the male agricultural labour population is considerably 
high, female agricultural labourers occupy a greater share in the workforce24. There are 
however interstate variations, where women comprise 66.30 percent of the workforce in 
Madhya Pradesh, 73.09 percent in Gujarat, 47.8 percent in Maharashtra, 48.17 percent in 
Tami Nadu, 15.87 percent in West Bengal and 27.92 percent in Odisha (Census of India, 
2011). The uneven patterns in female work participation draw attention to socio-economic 
variability, but also to variations in gender relations in these regions. Martha Chen’s (1989) 
work clearly denotes the changing nature of female work participation, according to 
changing agro-ecological zones. Chen (1989) draws out five agro-ecological zones- a) 
irrigated paddy cultivation (Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu), b) rain-fed paddy cultivation 
(West Bengal, Odisha and parts of Bihar), c) irrigated wheat (Haryana and Punjab), d) rain-
fed wheat (Maharashtra), e) hill regions and tribal belts. Apart from the hill regions, in all 
other regions women are found in the ‘residual category’ of wage labour, while men are in 
contracts with greater security. The labour relations described by Chen have undergone 
changes over the decades, with men moving out of agricultural wage work, and women 
substituting the male agricultural labour force (Da Corta and Venkateshwrlu, 1999; Olsen 
                                                          
24 Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999), in their study in Andhra Pradesh, show how data on feminisation of 
agricultural labour is underrepresented. One of the reasons they highlight is that data collected is based on 




and Ramana Murthy, 2000). Despite inter-state variations, the larger process of 
feminisation has raised questions on the extent to which the process has been 
empowering, whether it has improved the status of women within households and if it has 
improved bargaining powers in the work space (Kapadia, 1992, 1993; da Corta & and 
Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Garikipati, 2009).  
The Marxists thesis posits that the feminisation of labour is taking place under conditions 
of casualisation of the workforce, unprofitable crop production, distress-driven migration, 
wages bordering on starvation and gender divides in agricultural wage work and wages, 
and therefore, does not result in women’s upward mobility (Agarwal, 1984; Duvvury, 1989; 
Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001; Vepa 2007).  The 
increased work participation of women has increased their responsibility and subsequent 
burden of meeting basic household provisions (Olsen and Ramana Murthy, 2000). 
Moreover, women’s debt obligations have also increased, which often results in women 
accepting lower wages, accompanied by increased unfreedom and worsening of work 
conditions (Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Garikipati’s (2009) study in Andhra 
Pradesh critiques the Marxist debates on the grounds that studies on feminisation of 
labour have remained confined to an understanding of class, and that the process of 
feminisation needs to be understood in relation to women’s position within the household.  
The neo-liberal debates understand the feminisation of labour as being a demand-driven 
process, where female labourers experience an increase in wages and subsequently better 
work conditions (Bennett, 1992, as cited in da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). The 
increase in demand of female labour, witnessed across the country and especially in the 
southern states in India, accompanied the intensification of farming and use of High 
Yielding Variety (HYV) seeds, which accompanied the Green Revolution (see Chand et al, 
1985). Bennett (1992) draws on evidence to suggest that under conditions of demand 
driven employment, the conditions of female labourers have improved, particularly with a 
decline in the wage differential gap between male and female labourers. Such suggestions, 
made within the neoliberal debate that focuses on aspects of production, employment 
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trends and income, assume that with growth there is a parallel increase in women’s status 
and welfare (see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Under such circumstances, policies 
that are geared towards improving women’s welfare should then focus on improvement in 
agricultural growth alone. For various rural employment schemes implemented in the 
country, this has been the guiding paradigm, with very little consideration on the gender-
specific impact of policies (Garikipati, 2009: p. 520)25.  
Studies carried out on rural female agricultural labour show that this is far from true. Da 
Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999), in their study of Chitoor district in Andhra Pradesh, 
show that within the workforce there is a gender-based class division. According to their 
findings, 62.4 percent of women’s time was spent on both agricultural and non-agricultural 
tasks, whereas for men, 51.8 percent of their time was occupied in self-employed activities. 
In this context, the gender divide draws women to agricultural wage work and to work as 
exchange labour. Men, on the other hand, are self-employed and avoid agricultural wage 
work (p. 104). Chaudhry (1994) and Garikipati (2009) have described similar gender 
divisions in Haryana26 and Telengana, respectively.   
Another manifestation of class division is seen in wage differences. The rising share of 
female participation has not witnessed a similar increase in their real wages, in comparison 
to men. In Andhra Pradesh, Garikipati (2009) shows that while men earned 72.3 percent of 
the minimum wage in the state in rural activities, women earned a mere 38.5 percent of 
the minimum wage. A look at the National Sample Survey (NSS) from two rounds (2009-
10 and 2012-13) on agricultural wages in India, shows an increase in real wages and along 
with an increase in wage gaps between men and women workers carrying out similar tasks. 
                                                          
25 A look at Mahatma Gandhi Employment Guarantee Scheme shows increased participation of women 
(Guerin and De Neve, 2013). This increased participation, while understood as voluntarism on behalf of 
women workers, further adds to their work load burdens (Chant, 2007; Garikipati, 2009). 
 
26 According to Chaudhry (1994), with men continuing to look after their holdings and seek off-farm 
employment, repercussions of these are felt with a visible proletarianisation of women. Within this capitalist 
system, men having access to the means of production and ownership rights places him is a different class 




Ploughing, predominantly a male task, shows the maximum wage gap increase from 
Rs.56.06/- in 2009-10 to Rs.81.17 in 2012-13. The increase in wage gap is observed for tasks 
that are carried out jointly, such as harvesting (Rs.18.64/- in 2009-10 to Rs.34/- in 2012-13) 
and in those tasks that are considered exclusively ‘female’, such as weeding and 
transplanting (Rs.21.36/- in 2009-10 to Rs.43/- in 2012-12)27.  
The increasing wage gaps, in the context of feminisation of labour, draws attention to 
women’s status, their bargaining power and post-reform policy issues. The post-reform 
period witnessed a stagnation of budgetary allocation to agriculture and policies now are 
working towards an eventual phasing out of subsidies altogether (Balasubramanyam, 
2003). For capitalist farmers, the most effective way to cut costs is through decreasing 
wages. This was made possible through the feminisation of tasks, especially in those that 
were done jointly by men and women. With fewer men carrying out agricultural tasks, the 
farmers were able to cut down wage costs (Garikipati and Pfaffenzeller, 2012: p.850). The 
process of feminisation is an outcome of farmer cost-reduction strategies, male labourers 
refusing to carry out poorly paid agricultural wage work, carrying out off-farm activities 
and migrating out for work (see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999, and Olsen and 
Ramana Murthy, 2000).   
Influences of feminisation of labour are seen in both casual daily wage labour and in tied 
labour arrangements as well. Garikipati (2009), in her study, surveyed 291 households, and 
from these households identified 172 male wage labourers and 235 female wage 
labourers28. The study identifies that the seasonality of labor demands has an impact on 
the migration patterns of labourers, a process predominant among male labourers. From 
the households surveyed, a substantial number of its members were involved in tied labour 
                                                          
27 For a more detailed state wise break up wage differences, please refer to Appendix 1. 
 
28 The classification scheme used in this study is drawn using ‘labour class rank’, where the class position is 
identified based on the laboring status. This system was developed by Bardhan (1984) and da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu (1999) (Garikipati, 2009: p. 521). Interestingly, women who work on their husband’s farm 
are classified as farmers in this study. Being classified as a farmer does not indicate that women have control 
over the land. However, the study uses this classificatory scheme to do away with any form of ‘downward 
bias vis-à-vis female labour’ (Garikipati, 2009: 522).   
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or tied harvest arrangements. These arrangements were prevalent especially during the 
dry season when there is a dearth of work and labourers pledge their labour to a particular 
employer in return for loans. These arrangements often result in extremely low wage 
payments, recurring debt traps and the inability to commoditise labour freely (Srivastava, 
1989; da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Garikipati, 2009). There is no legal coercion in 
these relationships, rather the continuing external pressures of poverty (see 
Ramachandra, 1990). From this study, with the majority of male labourers migrating out 
for work, labourers who stay behind in the villages (predominantly female labour) are very 
often left with limited choice between choosing not to work, irregular casual daily wage 
employment or more ‘regular’ tied labour arrangements.  
Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu’s (1999) study of Chitoor (from 1970 to 1995) shows clearly 
how this process of feminisation is visible among tied labour arrangements. The findings 
in the 1970s reveal that there were more men tied (83.3 percent) than women (77.5 
percent). During this period, male labourers who were tied automatically resulted in their 
wives getting tied as well. For permanently bonded labourers during this period, their 
wives (apart from those who had to carry out domestic services) were not permanently 
attached. The employers appropriated their labour, where these women were expected to 
come and carry out all female-related tasks for them, but were paid low wages similar to 
those of tied labourers (p. 108-109). In subsequent years, with the introduction of state-
granted assets, such as provision of land and subsidized rice to name a few29, men were 
able to shift their attention to non-agricultural employment and break free from tied 
labour arrangements. Even though a decline was registered among female tied labourers 
                                                          
29  Andhra Pradesh, under the rule of the Telegu Desam Party (TDP), made government wastelands available 
to the landless. This policy benefitted male labourers in Chittoor. In 1969, with wasteland distribution, 
landless labourers in Chittoor were able to acquire housing sites which gave them opportunity to move out 
of their employer’s land. They received 1.7 acres of land on average in 1969 and in 2001 an additional 0.4 
acres of land under the land ceiling act (Garikipati, 2009; p. 526). In addition, the government also introduced 
non-agricultural employment in the area, such as the construction of government offices, building of roads, 
damns etc. However, as mentioned, the benefits of these state provisions and assets were rarely received by 
female labourers (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; p. 83-84). The state also provided families with rice at 
subsidised rates. This reduced the labourer’s dependence on the employer for work and the employer’s 
ability to claim their labour (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999).  
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this was much less than male tied labourers. Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) in 1995, 
observe that that male labourers who were tied still resulted in their wives being tied. A 
change from the 1970s is the presence of female tied labourers from households where the 
male labourer is free.  
Labour tying in this study was identified through credit transactions and lease, i.e. tied 
labour for credit and tied labour for harvest. In tied for harvest contracts, it is generally men 
who enter such relations (in the case of Andhra Pradesh), but the burden to repay loans 
falls disproportionately on women (Garikipati, 2009).  In households where the men and 
their wives were tied, women were tied to either pay off their husband’s loans (tied labour 
for credit) or were expected to carry out daily wage work for the landowner/creditor and 
perform unpaid tasks. In households where the woman is tied, it is usually an outcome of 
small and frequently required consumption loans taken by them, or at times larger loans 
taken for the purpose of ceremonies, or medical expenses. Women began taking on the 
responsibility of larger loans because their husbands, who had moved out of tied labour 
relations, alienated the landowners. Employers preferred lending money to women as it 
was considered a safe investment and a means to secure their labour power (see Bardhan, 
1983, 2000). Women, compared to male labourers, were also considered to be pliant, 
hardworking and disciplined, who unlike their husbands, would carry out unpaid tasks30 
(Kapadia, 1993; da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; see also Lerche et al, 2012). The 
feminisation of tied labour relations in Chitoor can be understood as a mechanism, used 
by the capitalists to reduce costs (Garikipati and Pfaffenzeller, 2012).  
The entry of women into tied labour arrangements was accompanied with their male 
counterparts opting out of such relations. Any form of dissent expressed by the male 
labourers was done standing on the shoulders of these female tied labourers (see also 
Garikipati, 2009). Male labourers, in order to hold onto their freedom, refused to take up 
low paying agricultural wage work, however, at no point did they stop their wives from 
                                                          
30 Women in Chitoor carried out a range of unpaid domestic activities for the employer and in return received 
a ‘saddi’ breakfast (left over food from the previous day).  
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carrying out such work or enter tied labour relations. The men would prefer to remain 
unemployed than take up agricultural wage work and their ability to maintain this struggle 
stemmed from the shifting of responsibility to women (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 
1999; Olsen and Ramana Murthy, 2000). With men not contributing to the household 
income, the women are then forced to take up exploitative low-paid work, a process 
further accentuated by their lack of access to off-farm work and caste norms (Duvvury, 
1989; Lerche, 1999; Krishnaraj, 2004; Vepa, 2007).  
The shifting of responsibility to women, in Chittoor, is also an outcome of the mode of 
payment. Male labourers, especially in tied relations were paid twice a year. The free male 
labourers now receive higher wages on a daily basis, and this is often spent on alcohol and 
tobacco. This further adds to the withdrawal of male earnings towards household 
provisioning. A withdrawal of men from agricultural labour did not witness an increase in 
sharing of domestic responsibilities. In fact, women labourers, especially tied labourers, 
were seen to carry out agricultural wage work, unpaid domestic work for the employer and 
had the growing burden of household chores (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). The 
domestic relations diminish the ability of women to search and negotiate for higher paid 
or better jobs (Kapadia, 1992, 1993; Garikipati, 2008).  
Struggles that improve the status of male labourers have broadly been generated out of 
government programmes, providing them with assets that allow them to take on higher 
paid work. Women, on the other hand, tend to be excluded from such work. Even when 
migrating with their husbands for non-farm work, they are not the ones who negotiate the 
terms and conditions of work, but work as a fait accompli (Vepa, 2007; Garikipati, 2009). 
The stark gender division is an outcome of cultural differences, but also a lack of ownership 
rights (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Garikipati, 2009). The ownership of assets and 
the accompanied benefits that go to male labourers places them in a different class of 
workers than women (for further details see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). Such 
differences and divisions make it difficult for women to negotiate their work conditions, 
wages and even freely commoditise their labour (Garikipati, 2009). The feminisation of 
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labour, under such conditions, has not altered women’s domestic position for the better, 
nor has it improved control over assets. Garikipati (2009) shows the limited control women 
have over household decisions, where, despite working as farmers, sale of crops are 
managed by male members of the household, an activity which is considered to be in the 
male domain. Moreover, women have limited control over farm incomes, wages from 
agricultural wage work, and even migration wages (see also Krishnaraj and Shah, 2003). 
Women labourers have much less spending money for personal use, as a larger portion of 
the money goes towards meeting household payments, especially on children. Women’s 
lack of control on incomes and assets, and the burdens placed on them by patriarchal 
expectations31, has negative effects on their welfare status (Garikipati, 2008). A suggested 
policy-level change, which can alter power relations, is land ownership for women, which 
automatically adds to security and better negotiating capacities (Agarwal, 1994, da Corta 
and Venkateshwarlu, 1999).  
Garikipati (2009, 2012) and da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) highlight a change in the 
nature of labour relations, from permanently attached to non-permanently attached 
labour, and more women entering such relations. Bhalla (1976) and Jodhka (1994, 1996, 
2013) observe similar patterns of increase in non-permanent tied labour relations. 
However, the nature of such labour relations and the control of assets and commodities 
vary between communities and regions (Krishnaraj and Shah, 2003).   
Along with gender divisions in the workforce, domestic relations, cultural perceptions and 
caste and kinship relations play an important role in organising the rural female workforce 
(Athreya et al, 1990; Ramachandran, 1990; Kapadia, 1995, 1996). Kapadia’s (1995) work on 
Aruloor, in Tamil Nadu describes the role of caste and kinship relations, in determining 
women’s access to work and associated struggles. These relations extend certain 
privileges to certain workers that create what Hart (1986a, 1986b) identifies as 
exclusionary labour arrangements. Exclusionary labor arrangements, within the Indian 
                                                          
31 The term patriarchal expectation refers to the division of domestic chores that are carried out.  
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context, has emerged amidst growing unemployment, casualisation of labour, declining 
obligations of the employer (the process of depatronisation as underlined by Breman, 
1974, 2007), and irregularity of work, decreasing rights of labourers (Kapadia, 1992, 1995, 
1996), which has resulted in a hardworking and docile female labour force (Hart, 1986b, 
1992).  
Kapadia’s (1995) work focuses on female Dalit workers (those who belong to the ex-
untouchable caste), and observes a change in labour relations in the region. There is a shift 
from ‘fixed’ daily wage rates to ‘negotiable’ piece-rates. Piece rate work is identified as 
contract work, a fixed period of work that ensures job security, especially for those who 
are at the lower end of the caste hierarchy (Harriss-White and Gooptu, 2001; 
Ramachandran, 1990; Kapadia, 1996; Olsen and Ramana Murthy, 2000). Piece-rate wages 
are used as an exclusionary device that controls the labour force and keeps it fragmented 
(Kapadia, 1996). Employers prefer piece rate wages as this reduces the time and cost of 
supervision and the agreed payment is made upon satisfactory completion of work. For 
workers, piece-rate work is coveted as it pays more than daily-wage work, despite it being 
harder and more work. Women labourers in Aruloor work in gangs/groups, membership to 
which is not constant, but is controlled through kinship and caste ties. Since the recruiters 
for this group are from the same street, family, caste, etc., one expects greater equality 
within such groups, however, Kapadia (1996) noted that this was far from true and the 
main labour recruiter had certain patronage powers. The power of recruitment, has 
therefore, shifted from the employer to the labour recruiter (for further discussion see 
Breman and Guerin, 2009).  The labour recruiter has the power to include or exclude 
workers from the labour group, and through this process creates exclusionary labour 
arrangements as described by Hart (1986b) (Athreya et al, 1990 cited in Kapadia, 1996). In 
Hart’s study of Java, exclusionary labour arrangements were organised by the employer 
(1986b), however, in this particular case as noted by Kapadia (1995,1996), the exclusionary 
labour arrangements are practiced by one group of labourers over another. Despite a 
considerable amount of power resting in the hands on the recruiter, the labourers within 
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this group feel that they are all equals and decisions to bring in new members is taking 
jointly by the group32. Kapadia (1996) notes that this is merely an ideology, which makes 
the recruitment process seem just and conceals the fact that labour recruitment is based 
fundamentally on kinship.  
Working in all female work groups, within piece rate contracts, internalises a process of 
self-discipline and control within the workforce (Kapadia, 1995). Within the environment 
of scarcity of work, piece-rate contracts are seen as a boon, where small all-female groups, 
work for longer hours and harder work to get higher pay. In addition, the employers only 
agree on payment if the job is done satisfactorily. The threat of non-payment under 
conditions of poverty creates a regime of self-supervision, i.e. the labourers are disciplining 
one other. The internalisation of discipline is an extension of the employer’s control over 
the labour force. This is a change from traditional labour relations, where labourers faced 
brutal punishment (see Gough 1981), to a more subtle and menacing form of social control, 
which keeps the labour force fragmented and exploited (Kapadia, 1995, 1996).  
1.5.1 Labour relations and Labour Resistance: 
The effects of labour fragmentation are seen in the diverse manner in which labour 
struggles are carried out in different regions.  It is important to mention that collective 
action, militant resistance and non-violent resistance, against the landowning class in the 
country, can be traced back to the British rule (Gough, 1968, 1974). Gough (1981), in her 
work on Thanjavur, emphasises the role of the Communist party of India in leading such 
peasant revolts. The scale of peasant uprisings was varied but continuous in this region in 
the post-independence phase. When larger strikes were clamped down by the state and 
police, labourers carried out smaller uprisings at intervals, especially during the harvest 
                                                          
32 The exclusionary arrangement practices of female labourers, described by Kapdia (1993, 1995), is a break 
away from Rudra’s (1984) model, which highlights the pervasive presence of unequal patron-client relations, 




season, when the demand for labour was the highest (Gough, 1981)33. Gough (1974) makes 
an important observation that those who are lower down in the social hierarchy succumb 
to different forms of oppression, poverty, famine, etc., all of which indicate the continuing 
importance of labour struggles that finds resonance in today’s neo-liberal economy.  
An important aspect about labor struggles is that it is a continuous process, which at times 
manifests itself in the form of revolts. James Scott’s (1985, 1986) work highlights the 
everyday labour struggles and resistance that the labour/ peasantry engage with in order 
to reduce their oppression. He identifies these through everyday processes of foot 
dragging, ignorance, pretension, slander, etc. These forms of resistance do not require 
collective action and can be applied in diverse ways across different geographical regions, 
and in diverse socio-political contexts. Scott’s idea of everyday resistance is faced with the 
criticism of not taking into consideration the gendered nature of such relationships (Hart, 
1991). Hart’s (1991) fieldwork in Malaysia shows a distinct difference in male and female 
actions that are conditioned by patron-client relationships. Compared to men, the political 
marginalization of women allowed them to openly challenge oppressive structures. Hart’s 
observation in Malaysia highlights women’s agency and the space across which it is 
negotiated. These are conditioned through political dynamics, social class structure and 
power relations that can result in covert and overt ways of resistance (Jeffery and Jeffery, 
1996).  
Kapadia (1993) observes labour resistance along the lines of mutuality among the Pallar, 
female labour gangs, which are based on caste and kinship ties. While there is competition 
for work between female members of the group, they are aware of their collective interest, 
which helps them push for higher wages. An earlier example of the Shahada movement in 
Maharashtra shows how peasant organisation and militant action have strengthened the 
resistance of the Adivasis (Mies, 1976). The organisation comprised of different categories 
of workers where a total of 40 percent of the workers were women. The mass organisation 
                                                          
33 Gough (1974) underlines the dominating presence of peasant revolts taking place across the country at the 
time, such as the Naxalbari movement in 1969 in West Bengal and the Santhal movement in Bihar in 1971.   
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and growth of political consciousness among the landless labourers resulted in a successful 
revolt in the country which forced the government to grant them more relief packages 
(Mies, 1976; p. 478). The effects of the Shahada movement were not felt across all regions, 
and this is indicative of the fragmented and varied nature of labour resistance and struggle.  
Da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) observe that male labourers are pulling out of 
agricultural wage work and especially tied harvest and credit relations. Male labourers 
struggle against the higher caste employers are a move towards freedom and better 
wages. Male labourers refused to take on agricultural wage work as they wanted to move 
away from the exploitative work conditions of traditional bondage. They consider this 
work demeaning for themselves because of the way they are treated in the fields by the 
Reddy employers. While male labourers consider this work demeaning, they do not have 
a problem with the women from their households doing the same work. The withdrawal 
of men from tied labour relations is understood to be important to their status, even if this 
takes place at the cost of women. In fact, men chose not to take up agricultural wage work, 
even if they did not have any prospect for work. In such situations, they rely on the earnings 
of their wives. Women on the other hand, are not passive receptors in this process. They 
are aware of the exploitative work conditions and the low wages but need to work in order 
to meet household expenses. Male labourers are not shirking family responsibility, but are 
in an ‘acute form of class struggle with their current employers, a struggle sustained at the 
expense of women’s own struggles’ (p.106). Men do not include the women in their 
struggles, so as to enhance their own struggle, but this is done at the cost of women who 
receive lower wages and increased unfreedom (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). 
Labour struggles encouraged by men, in the particular case of Andhra Pradesh, are taking 
place at the cost of women labourers. For transformation to take place, work availability 
and increased income are not sufficient for female labourers. Instead a ‘conscious political 
struggle within the domestic arena’ is necessary (Harriss-White, 2004, cited in Garikipati, 
2009: p. 537). Changes in the domestic arena can come about with increased bargaining 
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capacity associated with asset ownership for women (da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; 
Garikipati, 2009).  
There are numerous ways in which political agitations and labour resistance are carried 
out. This section discussed a few labour resistance experienced within the country. The 
ability or success of labour resistance is conditioned through structures of power and the 
degree to which the labour is fragmented. Exclusionary mechanisms/tactics (as seen in the 
case of tied labour relations) keep the labour force fractured, which places limits on 
agrarian mobilisation and organisation.  
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the debates regarding the question of tied labour relations. First 
and foremost, the labour class to be studied is identified, using Bernstein’s category of 
classes of labour. This category breaks away from ideas of the peasantry and proletariat, 
outlining a fluid class category that secures its survival through oppressive and exploitative 
employment. Using Bernstein’s classes of labour proves useful for the purpose of this 
research, as it helps identify the empirical class categories. The classificatory scheme of 
agricultural labour as a class is not sufficient to understand the multiple ways in which 
commodification of labour takes place, within a capitalist system of production. 
Bernstein’s classes of labour identifies the fluid class locations, which fluctuate due to 
social, economic and political relations. 
Second, the chapter moves onto more specific debates surrounding capitalist and pre-
capitalist relations to explain unfree labour relations. This section identifies tied labour as 
a particular unfree relation, which is the focus of this research. These debates highlight the 
inherent problem in understanding the presence of tied labour relations through the semi- 
feudal thesis, as an outcome of imperfect markets, or even understanding these relations 
as problems of capitalism. In order to resolve the problems created by these debates, I use 
Hart’s analytical framework to explain the presence of tied labour relations. Hart (1986b) 
recognises that diversity of labour arrangements needs to be understood through power 
relations at number of levels. These power relations are identified at the local level and 
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through interactions of the rural power structure with local bureaucrats that influence 
labour arrangements within different political settings. Moreover, these relations break 
away from the rigid dichotomy of free and unfree labour and urges one to understand 
unfree labour relations more broadly as a continuum of labour relations that produce 
varying degrees of unfreedom (Lerche, 2011). Understanding tied labour arrangements as 
an outcome of power relations incorporates within this analysis non-class identities, such 
as gender and caste, asset ownerships, etc. (all of which affect class positions and 
dynamics), which is particularly useful in the context of India.   
Using Hart’s framework of analysis, the study will try to uncover how unfreedom is 
institutionalized through different exclusionary practices and strategies. Within the 
context of neo-liberalism and feminization of the labour force, the research will try to 
identify how tied labour relations emerges as a mechanism of survival for female labour- 




Chapter 2: An Account of Methods 
“We first need the courage of our conviction, then courage to challenge our convictions and 
finally the imagination to sustain our courage with theoretical reconstruction”- Burawoy 
(1998: p. 20) 
 
This chapter outlines the objectives of the study, fieldwork plan, methods employed to 
obtain data and an account of experiences and limitations I faced as a researcher. 
The objective of the research is to study labour tying arrangements among rural female 
labour in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. The research traces these labour arrangements 
through the relationship between micro-level processes (such as interlinked factor 
markets and power relations at the village level) and the effect of macro-level policies.     
The focus on Tamil Nadu and West Bengal in the previous chapter highlights the presence 
of tied labour in agriculture and the transformations they have undergone. Do these 
transformations necessarily indicate a decline in exploitative labour relations and 
unfreedom experienced, particularly among rural female labourers?  
In this thesis, I address issues of unfreedom and oppressive work conditions within 
agriculture, through the nature and occurrence of labour tying arrangements. My research 
focuses on the persistence of tied labour arrangements in agriculture, and uncovers the 
mechanisms through which they continue to takes place. I identify these mechanisms 
through interlocked factor markets, gendered/familial relations and the relationships of 
the rural elite with the local bureaucracy. Within this context, labour tying arrangements 
are examined as a contemporary phenomenon that has adapted and transformed itself 
under agrarian capitalism. Through an extended case method, I carry out a comparative 
study to investigate this persistence of labour tying under two politically distinct regimes. 
This comparison is to examine the persistence of labour tying as a phenomenon, and to 
locate whether it is an outcome of land, labour and credit relations, and of state complicity 
with the agrarian capitalist class.  
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The respondents I interviewed for the purpose of this study are agricultural labourers 
(particularly female labourers), small farmers, medium and large landowners. The 
emphasis on female agricultural wage workers in this research highlights the negotiation 
of gendered politics, class and caste positionalities within labour tying arrangements, 
shedding light on the ways in which women enter and exit such work contracts. The 
research is a comparative study carried out across four villages in Tamil Nadu and West 
Bengal, using survey methods and ethnography  
In Section 3.1 of this chapter I provide a description of the social, economic and political 
structures present in the field sites of Aranthangi (Tamil Nadu) and Chinsurah (West 
Bengal). This description emphasises the need for a gendered analysis in understanding 
the ways in which labour tying arrangements continue to persist. Observations of this in 
the field are best understood through the concept of relational comparison. This concept 
does not view the existence of labour tying arrangements merely as a particular instance 
but as a product of multiple and interconnected sites of interaction between land, labour, 
credit and the state. Section 3.2 and 3.3 discuss how I chose the field sites, the methods of 
data collection, the politics of location that shaped the research process, and the 
limitations I faced as a researcher. Section 3.4 addresses the ethical dilemmas I tackled as 
a researcher in the process of carrying out this work, and Section 3.5 concludes the 
research. 
As I mention in Chapter 2, following from the works of Guerin (2013) and Lerche (2007), I 
identify unfreedom in tied labour as a continuum, with contracts experiencing mild to 
harsh forms of unfreedom. In order to identify these different labour arrangements and 
the conditions under which labourers enter such arrangements, the study identifies 
multiple trajectories of labour tying; not as an outcome of production relations alone, but 
relations of the state, and of the market. I use a comparative method to highlight this 
multi-layered process. The purpose of a comparison is not to highlight different instances 
but the multiple scales along which political and economic forces operate to reinforce 
labour tying arrangements. The micro-study areas identified for the purpose of this thesis 
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are not viewed as isolated cases. Instead, connections and relations are drawn from land, 
labour, credit and state to identify the persistence of labour tying in agriculture in India. 
This research shows how labour tying arrangements are driven through a diverse set of 
interactions between the local, state and national government. This helps me link my cases 
to the larger question - In what ways, if any, do the state and the dominant classes contribute to 
the persistence of labour tying -the very same ‘democratic’ state that called for land reforms, 
rural credit banks and daily minimum wage? 
2.1 The Area of Enquiry 
Studies on rural labour relations in India identify the complexity and diversity of labour 
arrangements within capitalist development in agriculture. In order to understand such 
multi-stranded labour arrangements, I use Gillian Hart’s (1986b) framework of analysis. 
Though set in rural Java, Hart shows how the differentiated agendas of employers and 
employees, and different rural labour arrangements are influenced by the rural power 
structure and interactions with the macro-political and economic factors within different 
national political systems. Hart (1986b) illustrates how the rural power structure and local 
bureaucrats have the ability to influence labour relations and labour segmentation, very 
often perpetuating the economic vulnerability of workers (see Rogaly, 1996).      
 This multi-tiered framework of analysis brings forth the questions I address in my 
research- 
- How and through what mechanisms do labour tying arrangements persist?  
- How, if at all, do these labour tying arrangements produce various kinds of gendered 
unfreedom?  
- To what extent are women in particular able to negotiate such labour tying 
arrangements?  
- To what extent do state interventions, such as PDS (Public Distribution System) and 
MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), affect labour 
tying arrangements and the degree of unfreedom experienced by rural female labour?   
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As discussed in Chapter 2, interlocked markets of land, labour and credit alone do not 
determine labour relations. Hart’s (1986b) work on Java highlights how labour 
management is driven through relations of power and social control (Hart, 1986, 1991). 
Therefore, to understand labour relations, it is necessary to not only look at the ground 
level but its effects and interactions with wider macro-political and economic forces. This 
is carried out through a comparative study between two Indian states- Tamil Nadu and 
West Bengal. This comparison is to highlight the influence of different social and political 
systems on labour tying arrangements.  
Aranthangi tehsil (Tamil Nadu) and Chinsurah tehsil (West Bengal) were chosen as they are 
predominantly paddy producing regions, with a high proportion of female agricultural 
labourers, who are the main subjects of my research. I focus on female agricultural labour 
to identify labour tying processes in these two regions. The reason for this is to understand 
the ‘politics of tied labour’ differentiated along lines of gender, caste and class. Agrarian 
scholars who have worked on India have focussed heavily on these two states, particularly 
with emphasis on the Green Revolution transforming labour arrangements (Bardhan and 
Rudra, 1979; 1983; Heyer, 2000; Kapadia, 1996; Ramachandran, 1990). While these studies 
do discuss the existence of tied labour, they generally talk of a decline of this phenomenon, 
particularly when they relate it to older forms of bondage prevalent in the regions, such as 
pannaiyals in Tamil Nadu (Carswell and De Neve, 2013; Heyer, 2000). The aim of this study 
is not to identify neo-bondage as Bremen (1997, 2009) has done, or to focus on types of 
labour bondage and unfreedom experienced by workers (as indicated by Guerin, 2013). It 
is to observe transformations of labour arrangements and conditions that drive female 
labourers in particular towards labour tying within agriculture. 
In order to answer the research questions, I use the extended case method, in which the 
aim is to reconstruct theory through empirical observations (Burawoy, 1998, 2009). The 
extended case method tries to understand the implications of larger processes that 
operate at the micro level. I approach the question with the understanding that labour 
tying in agriculture in India is an outcome of socio-political processes operational at the 
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ground level, and at the same time conditioned and reinforced through larger macro 
political-economic forces exerted by political parties and agrarian reforms. This is not to 
say that the specific labour tying arrangements identified in this study are representative 
of India as a whole. Rather, the purpose behind this study is to see if these labour tying 
arrangements are an inherent outcome of agrarian reformism that emerges out of populist 
party politics. This is the underlying principle of the extended case method that links micro 
and macro processes; where the interactions and interconnectedness between the two 
results in the persistence of labour tying. In this study, I link four villages in Tamil Nadu and 
West Bengal to the larger social and political forces of agrarian capitalism in India. There 
are multiple levels of interactions that highlight how labour tying persists through relations 
with land, credit, labour struggles and state interventions. The comparison is not just to 
identify differences but also to trace whether socio-political structures and forces result in 
the pauperization and tying of labour. In the end, this multi-layered analysis shows how 
macro processes of capitalist accumulation in agriculture take place through the landed 
capitalist class being coupled with state complicity, deepening conditions of economic 
vulnerability within the rural labour force.   
2.2 Making Field Choices 
I chose two geographically and agro-ecologically distinct regions, Aranthangi in 
Pudukkottai district of Tamil Nadu (Figure 1) and Chinsurah in Hooghly district of West 
Bengal (Figure 2) to study the different ways in which labour tying arrangements operate 
within the larger dynamics of agrarian capitalism. For the purpose of this research, the 
names of the villages have been changed in order to maintain anonymity.  
Aranthangi lies in the hot, semi-arid eco-region with red loamy soils. The crops grown here 
are kharif34 season rice, millets, groundnuts and sugarcane. Chinsurah lies in the sub-humid 
to humid eco-region with alluvial soils. The crops grown here are kharif season rice, 
                                                          
34Kharif crops are sown from June till September, during the monsoon months, and harvested in January. 




potatoes, and some jute. Karaimedu and Thirasu villages were chosen in Aranthangi35. 
Karaimedu and Thirasu are both revenue villages36. Karaimedu is not a contiguous village 
but comprises of six different villages (Kariamedu, Valathoor, Vallimalai Nagar, Jawahar 
Nagar, Kalvai Nagar and Chenguttai). It has a total area of 1666.7 hectares, a population of 
3907 and a total of 794 households according to the 2001 Census. Thirasu consists of two 
villages (North Thirasu and South Thirasu) within an area of 854.45 hectares, and with a 
total population of 4285 and 876 households. For the purpose of this survey, only four out 
of the six villages were selected in Karaimedu where I surveyed a total of 326 households. 
North Thirasu was selected for the second village, where I surveyed a total of 359 
households. In Chinsurah, Madhabpur is one of the nine villages that belong to the Dadpur 
gram panchayat. For the purpose of this survey, five out of the nine villages were surveyed 
and I refer to all these villages as Madhabpur. In Madhabpur, a total of 269 households 
were surveyed. Bardhanagar is one of the eight villages in Pandua block I chose, and a total 
of 193 households were surveyed37. The reason for choosing these four villages was 
because of caste composition and occupation.  
Of the entire population in Karaimedu, only 6.99 percent (Census of India, 2001) belong to 
the Scheduled Caste (SC). The focus of this research is on the agricultural labour class and 
therefore emphasis was given to collecting information about SCs who resided in Jawahar 
Nagar and Chenguttai villages38. In addition to this, at the time of survey a majority of the 
residents from Valathoor and Vallimalai Nagar had out-migrated for work as construction 
workers and domestic maids, both within Tamil Nadu and to Dubai. It is for this reason that 
these two villages were omitted from the survey. Thirasu revenue village consists of North 
                                                          
35 These villages were chosen after completion of an initial pilot survey across six villages in this region.  
 
36 A revenue village in India is one with a definite surveyed boundary. A revenue village may have one or more 
than one hamlet but the entire revenue village is treated as one unit (Census of India, 2011).  
 
37 Data on individual hamlets in West Bengal are not available for which reason I have not provided any data 
on total population and area of village.  
 
38 Details of the villages, caste and occupational composition are explained further in Chapter 4. 
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and South Thirasu, where the total SC population is 2.53 per cent (Census of India 2001). 
The SC households are located in North Thirasu, which also houses some of the largest 
landowners, which ensured a great degree of diversity in data collection. According to the 
Census of India village profile (2001), Karaimedu recorded a total of 794 households, and I 
surveyed a total of 326 households. In Thirasu, the census records showed a total 874 
households and my survey covered 359.  
For Madhabpur in Chinsurah, five villages were surveyed out of a total of nine. According 
to the Census of India (2001) data, in Madhabpur 84.07 per cent of the population are SCs 
and 0.5 per cent of the population belong to the Scheduled Tribe category. Madhabpur, 
which lies in the Polba-Dadpur block, has a total of 364 households. A total of 269 
households were covered in the village survey.  The four villages in Madhabpur were 
excluded as they were SC villages, and having surveyed two SC villages I wanted to ensure 
that I capture other caste groups within this region. Bardhanagar is a small village in the 
Pandua block and according to the Census of India (2001) it has a total of 225 households, 
where 45.05 per cent of the population are SCs and 20.03 per cent are STs. The village 
survey conducted (10. 07. 2012 to 16. 07. 2012), recorded a total of 193 households. At the 
time of survey, many families particularly among the STs had migrated out for work to 
neighbouring districts of Bardhaman and Howrah since this was the paddy-sowing period.  
The diversity in caste was captured through the permutations and combinations 
mentioned above. Apart from caste diversity, there were three important reasons for 
choosing the much larger regions of West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. First, for both these 
regions the most important crop is paddy, and the Green Revolution played an important 
role in increasing paddy yields. With paddy as the predominant crop, the percentage of 
female agricultural labourers is high as they play an important role in the paddy production 
process. Census (2011) records show that in Tamil Nadu, 55.5 per cent of total workers were 
female agricultural labourers, and in West Bengal, 45.5 per cent of total workers were 
female agricultural labourers. I chose these two states where the percentage of female 
labour is high, as this group of workers are central to the research. Understanding the 
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cropping patterns is important as these are based on a gendered political economy, where 
female labourers continue to be an integral part of the production process.   
 
Figure 1:  Location Map of Aranthangi, Pudukkottai 
 





Figure 2: Location Map of Chinsurah, Hooghly 
Source: West Bengal, Primary Census Abstract, Census of India, 2001 
 
Second, these states have recorded evidence of ‘bonded labour’, which was made illegal 
in 1976.  According to the National Survey on Bonded Labour published in 1981 (Marla. 
1981), Tiruchirapalli, Tanjore and Pudukkottai had recorded the highest incidence of 
bonded labourers in Tamil Nadu. Of the 2, 50,000 reported bonded labourers in the state, 
6 percent were agricultural labourers. However, there is no mention of whether these 
bonded labourers were men or women.  
Historically, male labourers entered bonded labour arrangements in the region (Tamil 
Nadu) with their wives and children working along to assist in subsidiary tasks. In the 
context of growing male outmigration in the post-liberalisation era, and reducing 
importance of agricultural wage work, this division of labour within the system of labour 
bondage has disintegrated (see Heyer, 2000). However, other empirical studies have 
shown (such as in Andhra Pradesh) that instead of the practice being done away with, 
women have now replaced their male counterparts (Olsen and Murthy, 2000). In the 
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context of Tamil Nadu, does the declining importance of agriculture then necessarily mean 
that practices of labour bondage have been done away with? This research will highlight 
how such tied labour practices are taking place in both Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, and 
the extent to which they are prevalent. 
Third, Hooghly is considered to be one of the most industrialized districts in West Bengal. 
The climate is conducive for jute production and a majority of the jute mills of the country 
are located along the Hooghly River. However, with a decline in demand for jute, these 
industries are gradually shutting down and most farmers in the region have shifted from 
production of jute to paddy, with a reliance on the next big cash crop in the region- potato. 
Despite the government’s claim that this is a fast growing region of small and large scale 
industries, the region continues to rely on agriculture, particularly for employment (India 
Net Zone, 2013). For female labourers in this region, who have restrictions placed upon 
their movement, agriculture is now a safety net. These situations have called for female 
agricultural labourers to secure their jobs and this research shows that a possible way of 
doing this is through labour tying.  
There are two key events that shaped the uniqueness of the agrarian economy in these 
regions. In the 1960s, Tamil Nadu was one of the first states to introduce High Yield Variety 
Seeds (HYV), which made it a rice exporting state. In 1977, the Left Front came to power in 
West Bengal and introduced one of its most effective land reforms ‘Operation Barga’39. The 
two regions have followed distinct economic and political trajectories. However, in both 
regions, this research identifies practices that result in labour tying, especially among 
female labourers.  
2.3 Getting down to Fieldwork 
I grew up in Chennai and Kolkata, and a part of my family traces its lineage back to a village 
called Vandawasi in North Arcot, Tamil Nadu. For both the chosen field sites, my 
background and Indian nationality were helpful as I had knowledge about the language 
                                                          
39 Operation Barga is a land reform movement carried out in west Bengal, where there was a recording of 
sharecropper, so that they could obtain legal protections against eviction from landlords.  
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and the socio-cultural practices in the region. Moreover, my background placed me as a 
local within the field, albeit in a privileged position. However, not having lived in this 
region, I was placed in a paradoxical situation, where my associations could place me as a 
local and simultaneously as an outsider in the field area, as noted by Ergun and Erdemir 
(2010). I have previously been a part of projects40 where I worked closely with female 
labourers in rural and urban India. Therefore, working in rural areas of Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah was not alien to me. In November 2011, I commenced fieldwork with a basic 
knowledge of the tasks and duties of agricultural labourers. Whether my efforts would find 
any tied labourers, or if I could link the existence of labour tying arrangements to social 
practices and the role of the state, would emerge during the course of my work. In the 
following section I discuss how I entered the field site, negotiated with the villagers and 
collected data for my research.  
2.3.1 Accessing the field 
I had decided to work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah tehsils but had not decided to work on 
these villages yet. Access to the field site is negotiated through a gatekeeper (Garfinkel, 
1967; Lewis-Beck, et al, 2004), who legitimises my position as a researcher, granting me 
access and mobility. That said, in both Aranthangi and Chinsurah, there were not one but 
many gatekeepers, as it is difficult to find one person who has access to goods and 
information, is recognised and respected by everybody. In order to gain access into the 
field sites, I had to first touch base in Delhi, the place where I had a few contacts (especially 
in CWDS and JNU). For Tamil Nadu, an obvious solution presented to me was to use the 
contacts I had in my maternal village (Vandawasi). However, more often than not, the 
contacts I had (pradhan and MLA) would ask me to study my own village. This was 
something I did not want to get into as I felt that my position of privilege in the village 
would be difficult to negotiate with, and would not yield proper results.  
                                                          
40 The project I worked on was headed by the Centre for Women’s Development Studies, New Delhi. This 




Having decided that I would work in Aranthangi, I got in touch with the President of the 
Student Federation of India (SFI) in Jawaharlal Nehru University41 who introduced me to 
two members of the Democratic Youth Federation of India42 (DYFI), who were residents of 
Karaimedu and Thirasu. The DYFI members, while very intrigued with my project, 
informed me that I would not find any tied labourers or what is referred to as pannaiyals in 
this area. “It’s been thirty years since labourers have worked as pannaiyals”; this was what 
I was told every time I entered a village. No one in the area openly spoke of pannaiyals as 
it was a social taboo. Despite this, I decided to explore the area with them. I ignored what 
the locals had to say because they spoke of traditional pannaiyal relations, often 
understood as bonded labour relations. I was not looking for traditional pannaiyal labour 
in the villages as numerous studies have documented its decline. I was interested in 
identifying forms of labour tying arrangements that persist in the region, which can have 
varying periods of attachment. Moreover, I wanted to examine how rural labour 
(particularly female labour) identify with and enter such relations. I travelled with them to 
six different villages, using state buses, auto rickshaws, cycle vans and a moped (which I 
ended up pushing for the last leg of my journey through paddy fields). After interacting 
with people from these villages, I decided to work in Thirasu and Karaimedu, as they had a 
high percentage of female agricultural labourers, the villagers were engaged in a range of 
occupations, and these villages had a diverse caste structure. In order to understand the 
capital labour relations on the basis of caste, I interviewed and engaged with different 
caste groups, at no point confining myself only to Dalits. I looked for a combination of 
occupation and caste groups in the villages to see whether labour tying arrangements are 
an inherent part of the agrarian structure, or if their presence is determined by the lack or 
presence of alternate jobs. 
                                                          
41Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) was where I completed my Masters and M.Phil.   
 
42The Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI) is a Left-wing organisation. It is one of the largest youth 




In Karaimedu, I met a schoolteacher who taught English, and was friends with the DYFI 
members. He introduced me to the pradhan (village headman) of the village. Through my 
association with the pradhan, who was Thevar and a large landowner, I was able interact 
with the landed class and local elites who accepted and welcomed me. I decided to live in 
Karaimedu and travelled to Thirasu, located at a distance of 8 kms. This was done due to 
Karaimedu’s proximity to different transport options compared to Thirasu. Vehicles that I 
hired in Karaimedu could be taken to Thirasu with ease, which granted greater mobility. 
Furthermore, the family I lived with was friends with the MLA of Pudukkottai43. My 
personal acquaintance with the MLA’s family made the host family all the more protective 
of me. While convenient, it did create restrictions when interacting with other class and 
caste members of the village. When engaging with female respondents in particular, in 
order to break the ice, I did not use any of the host family’s connections.  However, it was 
difficult to hide where I was living, as news about my host family connections did travel 
fast.  I received help from a woman in the village who runs a self-help group; her presence 
helped women trust me and open up to me. 
The host family would not let me go unaccompanied to any Pallar or Paraiyar locality after 
4 pm, as the men there would be drinking. They would constantly tell me that these men 
are “uncultured” and it was not safe for me to go alone, even if it was just to talk to the 
women. This was clearly an outcome of upper caste-class perceptions of drunkenness and 
culture or the lack thereof. As an ethnographer, the politics of location, power hierarchies 
and relations are a constant process of negotiation (Wolf, 1996). In this situation I 
conceded to their demands, as it was a matter of building trust and securing my 
relationship with members of the village who were important gatekeepers. In fact, for the 
first five days, I was chaperoned by a Paraiyar44 (SC) male labourer, Sreedhar, who worked 
for my host family. Sreedhar was my facilitator in the field and my ‘designated’ protector. 
After a few days, he stopped accompanying me on the pretext of work, which in turn 
                                                          
43His son was an acquaintance of mine through my university connections.  
 
44 Paraiyars are lower caste groups that are under the Schedule Caste category. 
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hampered my mobility. Sreedhar accompanied me because the host family had instructed 
him to do so, he did not want to travel with me the entire day. On one of the days when 
Sreedhar came along with me, I met a female self-help group member, Tara.  Sreedhar 
used this meeting as an opportunity to walk out of the arrangement, telling me that I would 
get more work done with Tara and that she was a very helpful and respectable woman. In 
a way this was beneficial as Sreedhar’s presence limited my access to female agricultural 
labourers, which was overcome by Tara’s presence. Tara introduced me to other self-help 
group members who helped me with my fieldwork. Moving around the village with her, I 
was able to interact with a larger section of female labourers, across castes. The 
snowballing method, with the information provided by Tara, help build trust with the 
respondents faster (Lewis-Beck, et al. 2004).  
In Aranthangi, I was careful not to disclose my connections with SFI. In no way did I want 
my political leanings to affect my position vis-à-vis the villagers. The common complaint 
villagers had against Left organisations in this region is that they are disruptive and keep 
shouting slogans but do not work45. This was interesting to note because not far away in 
Pudukkottai town, the elected MLA was a CPI (Communist Party of India) member. 
Despite the presence of the Left, there is limited percolation of its politics and ideology in 
both Karaimedu and Thirasu. Not disclosing my political leanings was an attempt to try 
and hold onto positions of neutrality that are necessary for the integrity of the research.  
Despite efforts at neutrality one is never removed from the ‘politics of location-’- whether 
as a woman, as an outsider, or living with an elite family in the village.  
In Aranthangi, political contradictions and alliances surfaced in numerous ways. Although 
I was careful not to disclose my connection to SFI, electoral politics at the ground level did 
create hostile situations for me. During one of my visits in Karaimedu to a landed 
Ambalakar (Backward Caste), I was treated in a hostile manner. The male head of 
                                                          
45 This might seem as a common lament that villagers and people in general have about political parties. 
However, the inactivity of CPI in this region is measured against the DMK and AIADMK, who are extremely 




household stopped the interview and constantly kept asking me where I had come from. I 
tried to explain to him who I was and what I was doing there. However, no explanation 
seemed to pacify him, until another farmer, who I had interviewed previously, was passing 
by, and greeted me. He verified my story with the Ambalakar landholder, after which his 
demeanour changed. He told me that he was wary of me because of my attire. During my 
fieldwork in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, I would wear a salwaar kameez46. On that particular 
day I was wearing a black and red salwaar kameez, which was the same colour combination 
as that of Dravida Munettra Kazhagam (DMK). He thought that I was from the DMK party 
and was trying to get information about the All India Anna Dravida Munettra Kazhagam 
(AIADMK) party members and supporters.  His perception about me led him to disbelieve 
anything I told him. At this point it became important to assert my identity of being a 
researcher from London, so as to remove myself from this particular space and time. This 
instance shed light on his political loyalties to AIADMK, and as he was an important party 
member, he was wary of my intentions and me. The animosity coupled with fear towards 
the opposition party was interesting to note, especially in a village that unanimously 
elected a pradhan who belongs to DMK.  
Chinsurah, however, was a different story. In 2011, after 34 years of rule in West Bengal, 
the Left Front government was defeated by the Trinamool Congress Party. The time I was 
carrying out my fieldwork was a period where cadres were shifting party allegiance, and 
those who remained with the Communist Party of India (Marxist) – CPI (M) went into 
hiding47. The villages I chose to work on, Madhabpur and Bardhanagar, were 40 kms away 
from Singur48 and the people resented the Left Front and particularly the CPI (M). None of 
                                                          
46Salwaar kameez is traditional attire that consists of a pair of loose pants, which is the salwaar and a 
tunic/shirt known as the kameez.  
 
47 The reason I use the word hiding is because the villagers who, during the course of my fieldwork, revealed 
to me that they still supported the CPI (M) did so in a hushed and secretive manner.  
 
48Singur is a sub district of Hooghly that gained prominence with the riots that ensued from unlawful 
acquisition of land for the Tata Nano project in 2007. A total of 997 acres of land was acquired to build the 
car factory, in the face of tremendous opposition. The current Chief Minister, who was then a part of the 
opposition, led a movement called “Save the Farmland” movement. This led to clashes with the state, 
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the Communist Party connections I had in West Bengal could be used, as the particular 
time did not favour such connections, and in turn would have adversely affected my 
research and conflicted with my attempts at maintaining neutrality. In my efforts to 
maintain neutrality, I gained entry into Chinsurah through the Krishi Vigyan Centre 
(KVC)49. Using a personal contact who was the director of the KVC, I gained access to this 
institution. A field consultant from the Centre took me to four different villages, which 
were 30 kms from Chinsurah town. With his help, I was able to meet with large, medium, 
small, and marginal landholders. My presence in the village, especially amongst the larger 
landholders, was not questioned since I had come from KVC. I decided to work in two 
villages- Bardhanagar and Madhabpur, which had both caste and religious diversity. In this 
region, especially in Madhabpur, the large landholders were Muslims. None of the upper 
caste Hindus (Brahmins in particular) owned land in similar proportions- they were 
primarily medium landowners. It was interesting to study the significance of caste 
hierarchies and religion in determining land and labour relations, in such a situation. This 
made me think about whether these Muslims, who have acquired land over time, operate 
as capitalist farmers, who provide loans, hire labour, lease out land, and have an important 
role to play in both social and administrative dealings of the village.  
In Chinsurah, I lived with one such Muslim landholder. He had the largest landholding in 
the village with approximately 147 acres, and living with him granted me access to other 
classes of farmers. Gaining access to the labourers, however, was not an easy process. 
Since labourers in the village knew where, and with whom I lived, initial meetings with 
them were brief, with controlled responses. I struggled to uncover any information about 
the presence of labour tying arrangements in the village. In the initial phase of getting to 
know the village area, unlike in Aranthangi, I did not ask direct questions regarding the 
                                                          
resulting in riots, state killings and the Tatas pulling out of the state. It is considered to be one of reasons for 
the downfall of the Left Government. 
 
49 The KrishiVigyan Kendra (KVK) was sanctioned by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research. With 
centres spread across West Bengal, this KVK in Chinsurah focuses on need-based and skill-oriented 




presence of tied labour. Despite this I still stumbled across numerous road blocks, where 
labourers were not willing to give me time and employers vehemently denied the presence 
of tied labour relations. This got me to a point where I believed that I would not find any 
tied labour in this region.  
However, one interview with a particular medium landowner Najam revealed that he had 
tied labourers working for him- this is referred to as bandha kishen in Bengali. Najam 
provided me with a point of reference. He identified that the bandha kishen he had 
employed had taken a loan to pay for her husband’s medical expenses and was now 
repaying the loan by working for him.  Through these labourers, using the snowballing 
method, I got to meet other bandha kishens in the villages and was also informed that this 
was a common practice especially found among female agricultural wage workers. The 
bandha kishen relation was identified through relations of debt, where female labourers 
also carried out housework for the landowners- indicators that helped me identify bandha 
kishens in this region.  
During my stay in Madhabpur, I was given fixed times when I could work. This placed 
restriction on my mobility and affected class relations. My position was assessed through 
associations to my host family. For female labourers, especially those who worked for my 
host family, it was a particularly tricky situation, as they felt obligated to comply with the 
wishes of their employer to talk to me. This furthered the unequal power relations that 
existed between the respondents and me. The unequal power relations were not just 
restricted to the respondents but extended to my host family too. The host family did not 
want me venturing out in the village after sundown. Like Aranthangi, they had similar 
concerns about my safety. They did not want me to go and talk to male labourers and 
farmers alone in their homes50. In fact, the first few interviews- of medium landowners and 
female agricultural labourers were done in the host family’s house. The host family would 
                                                          
50 Even though my focus is on female agricultural labourers, I thought it necessary to expand the field of 
inquiry to male labourers to obtain a clearer understanding of how work is negotiated along the lines of 
gender politics.  
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tell me that “we want you to work for your studies, and understand it is important but not 
at the cost of your safety”. Fear for women’s safety had emerged as a major concern in the 
last six to eight months from the time of fieldwork because of an increase in the number 
of rape cases in the region. In addition to this, they were particularly wary of Bardhanagar 
as it was said to be a village notorious for sexual violence. The larger landholders from 
Madhabpur mentioned that the “TMC should not have had representatives from the 
Santhals (ST) and Bauris (SC), they do not understand how to run a village, and it has 
become unsafe for everyone there, because we do not know when they (if they feel like it) 
might attack us”. The mistrust associated with the Santhals and Bauris played on the 
consciousness of the employers and their understanding of the place. They could not 
accept the change in power relations, with the ex-untouchables securing administrative 
power.  
The power hierarchies and structures in the village affected my positionality as a 
researcher. As a woman it was easier to interact with other women labourers, especially 
when I was alone with them, away from the gaze of any member of the host family or even 
fellow male labourers. Women opened up to me, disclosing information such as instances 
of sexual harassment at the hands of particular employers and domestic violence. In other 
instances, female respondents would introduce their daughters to me and present me as 
a role model, where they would tell them that because I studied, I have reached this 
position where I can go to London, and that they should learn something from me. This 
sentiment stemmed from villagers treating me as a local of the village, even though I was 
not a part of it. Interviews with male respondents were a lot more business-like, where the 
questions had to be specific; otherwise they did not see any reason to sit through the 
interview. Age also played a role in the interviews with men. Older men could sit with me 
and talk for long periods of time, compared to younger men. The dynamics were 
constantly changing where my positionality as a researcher was not ‘fixed’ but ‘relational 




2.3.2 Data Collection 
This research relies on the use of both Primary and Secondary sources of data. Before 
describing my field data and collection methods, I will briefly talk about the secondary 
sources of data used. The secondary sources of data include tabulations from the Primary 
Census Abstract for Pudukkottai and Hooghly in 2001 and 2011. I used the economic tables 
to obtain information on main and marginal workers, and farm and non-farm workers at 
the village level. In addition, I gathered information on the types of crops grown and land 
use patterns from the Primary Census Abstract (2001). For the purpose of carrying out my 
fieldwork, I used data from the 2001 abstract, as this was the latest data that was provided 
by the Census of India at the time of my survey. Later on, in the course of writing up, I used 
data from 2011, as and when it was made available51. There were not drastic differences in 
the trends depicted in the 2001 and 2011 data. However, I did use it, as it is the most recent 
data available on workers and cultivators in the regions. 
The Census does not provide a detailed account of information on debt or landholding. For 
information on debt, I used the data provided by the National Sample Survey organization 
(NSSO). The 59th round (January – December 2003) Report on the Indebtedness of Farmer 
Households provides information on the sources of debt, based on activity and landholding 
capacity for the two states. Even though the data is obtained at the state level, it provides 
a basic understanding on the kind of loans taken and reason behind taking such loans.  For 
data on landholding, I used the data available in the Agricultural Census (2001- to 2011), 
obtained at the sub-district level. With the help of secondary data, I had information on 
three key aspects of the study- number of female cultivators and agricultural labourers 
(important in identifying the subjects I wanted to study) in the villages, the different 
sources of debt available, and the distribution of land in both West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. 
The secondary data provided me with basic socio-economic information on the region, 
data and trends that were later corroborated through village surveys and interviews.  
                                                          
51 The trends of workers and non-workers in the village sites did not show any significant variation and it is 
for this reason that I used the more recent 2011 data to describe trends.  
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Primary data collection from the field sites was carried out in two phases. In the first phase 
I carried out a household level village census and in the second phase, I conducted in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews. For the second phase of this fieldwork I used a random 
sampling method. I used a snowball method for sampling due to the nature of the 
questions asked; this method provided me with a potential set of contacts in trying to 
locate and identify tied labour.  After I decided to work in Karaimedu and Thirasu in 
Aranthangi, and Madhabpur and Bardhanagar in Chinsurah, I embarked upon my 
fieldwork. My fieldwork is ethnographic and the data collection methods used include 
fieldwork interviews, observations and focus group discussions. Detailed accounts of the 
fieldwork are provided in the section below.  
2.3.2.1 Primary sources- Household Level Village Survey 
Census data is useful to identify general trends in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. However, 
in order to capture and understand the more recent changes at the village level, I carried 
out a household level village survey (Appendix 1). I surveyed a total of 986 households in 
Karaimedu and Thirasu (10.11.2011-26.11.2011) and 463 households in Bardhanagar and 
Madhabpur (11.04.2012-30.04.2012). These surveys included only those villagers who were 
present in the village at the time of the survey. The number of locked houses constituted 
a small percentage of the total village, as depicted in Table 2.1 below, and would not lead 
to any systematic biases.  






Karaimedu (Aranthangi) 397 326 (82.11%) 71 (17.88%) 
Thirasu (Aranthangi) 469 359 (76.54%) 106 (22.60%) 
Madhabpur (Chinsurah) 289 269 (93.07%) 20 (6.92%) 
Bardhanagar (Chinsurah) 225 193 (85.77%) 27 (12.00%) 
Table 2.1: Number of households in selected villages/ hamlets in Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
Source: Household Level Village Survey Conducted in November 2011 and April 2012 
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The average percentage of households not covered is 20.24 per cent in Aranthangi and 
9.46 per cent for Chinsurah. In Aranthangi, the locked households were because the 
families had migrated out for work, mostly to the construction industry. In Chinsurah, a 
majority of the villagers who had migrated out of the village had done so for agricultural 
wage work in the neighbouring districts. This information was provided to me by their 
neighbours. The village survey covered basic questions on caste, the income category the 
respondents belonged to, different kinds of jobs they were employed in during a year, 
access to MGNREGS (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme), 
migration patterns and the amount of land owned, leased in and leased out. This first 
round of survey did not collect information on debt, as I was concerned more with 
occupations and land transactions. Debt is an integral part of the agrarian economy, and it 
required me to deal with it in a more nuanced manner, which I did through detailed 
interviews. Apart from obtaining data on the villages, I used this household survey to 
familiarize myself with the villages and the residents, and to identify possible respondents. 
As I walked around the village with a survey sheet, the respondents assumed that I had 
come from the Census Office. An outsider walking around the village with sheets of paper 
to fill up, this was their first point of association, as this was what they were most familiar 
with. However, in the course of conducting the survey I became a familiar face in the 
village, which helped, improve my mobility and accessibility. For the larger landholders I 
could fill out survey sheets only when a male member of the household was around. I was 
turned down in their absence, as the women, across castes, would tell me that they did not 
know how much land they owned or the amount that they leased out, as these were 
transactions that were handled either by their husbands or their fathers. It was only in 
single women-headed households, where women were at the forefront of all dealings, that 
they provided me with information.  
My study focuses on female labourers and cultivators, especially those who belong to the 
small and marginal farmer category. These female subjects constitute a majority of my 
interviews. During the course of these interviews, there were occasions when the male 
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members of the family insisted on staying, as they would tell me that the women did not 
have mūlai (Tamil) or buddhi (Bengali), to answer my questions.52 I saw this as an 
opportunity to gain some trust among the female labourers, where I insisted that I wanted 
them to answer the questions. I informed these men and the female labourers that as a 
woman I could understand their plight. A method I learnt on my previous field experiences 
(M.Phil and research projects) to counter such situations was to pose very general 
questions to my female respondents. These often included questions about their daily 
chores and routines, marriage experiences, education, their children, etc. During the 
course of these questions the male members would get bored and leave, allowing both my 
respondents and myself to engage more freely with each other, and to bridge the gap 
between them and me as the ‘outsider’. Such interactions brought to light sensitive issues 
of violence and harassment.  
As mentioned previously, my position in the villages was a dynamic one that fluctuated 
between being perceived as an insider and as an outsider, depending on the associations 
that were linked to me, my identity, my gender and my class (Rake, 2003). I was familiar 
with the caste structure and social norms of these regions, and I believed that this 
knowledge would allow me to navigate easily among the various caste groups in the 
villages. Despite this knowledge, my identity in the villages was carved out from my 
alliance with the landlords who were hosting me. This created a barrier with other caste 
and class groups in the villages. They were initially suspicious of me and my intentions, 
especially in Aranthangi as they knew that I maintained daily contact with the pradhan of 
the village. Despite various efforts to maintain my neutral position, I remained ‘trapped in 
networks of power’ (Burawoy, 1998: p. 22). This made negotiating with respondents of 
different class and gender difficult. However, to minimise the effect of such networks of 
power, I used different strategies that diversified the data collected- such as the household 
survey, and during fieldwork, by purposely choosing my clothing, by choosing specific 
ways of approaching different members of the household or for example, in Aranthangi, 
                                                          
52Both these terms mulai and buddhi mean brains, or grey matter, the usage depends on the context.  
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by interacting with female agricultural labourers with the assistance of the female self-help 
group member. These not only granted me access but also assisted me in carrying out 
detailed interviews, which is an important aspect of this ethnographic fieldwork.  
2.3.2.2 Primary Sources- Interviews 
In the second phase of my fieldwork I conducted detailed interviews, focus group 
discussions and participant observation, the last to study people in their daily lives 
(Burawoy, et al. 1991). The respondents selected for interviews were drawn out from the 
village level household survey. As mentioned previously, the respondents were 
interviewed through a snowballing method. However, the number of respondents 
interviewed was conditioned through a quota sampling method. Through quota sampling, 
the sample size for each of the categories of labourers and farmers selected (see Table 2.2), 
had similar distribution characteristics of the total population of the villages. The 
interviews in Aranthangi were carried out between December 2011 and April 2012, and in 
Chinsurah between May 2012 and September 2012.  
There are varying degrees of involvement under the method of participant observation 
(Jorgensen, 1989), and I sought to gather data through my daily interactions with 
respondents, as well as through in-depth interviews. Participant observation required me 
to be in the field for long periods of time, which simultaneously allowed for a process of 
periodic self-reflection (Ribbens and Edwards, 1998). I documented data by maintaining 
detailed field notes alongside interviews, which allowed for a close understanding of the 
fieldwork process. In the process of justifying my choice of place and subject each day, I 
sought to place my research within the larger theoretical frameworks. Participant 
observation became both an analytical and data collection tool (Dewalt and Dewalt, 1998).  
Though my focus was on agricultural labourers, I saw them in relation to other caste and 
class groups, so as to understand the complexity of interlocking transactions between 
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Table 2.2: Respondents selected from each caste and class group 
* The ‘classes of labour’ is a fluid category, which includes landless labourers, marginal, and even small 
farmers.  
I interviewed large landowners, medium landowners, small and marginal farmers, and 
agricultural labourers. As shown in Table 2.2, the classes of labour category comprise of 
landless labourers and small and marginal farmers. The focus of this study is on the classes 
of labour and the tied labour relations they enter into. The focus is not on the landed class, 
and hence are not differentiated as big farmers and medium farmers. Instead, I identify 
them as landowners who share certain common characteristics across the two regions. 
The landowners are employers of agricultural labour, they carry out multi-cropping, 
commercial agriculture and are money lenders. In the case of Chinsurah theses landowners 
are also act traders. The landowners own anywhere between 3 to almost 35 acres of land. 
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In order to differentiate between this broad range, I refer to those landowners who have 3-
9 acres as medium landowners, and those with more than 9 acres as large landowners.  
I recorded the interviews with the respondents’ (oral) consent. While recording, I 
simultaneously took notes of what I observed in the field. This process helps frame better 
questions for subsequent interviews and to a certain extent gave some control over the 
direction of the interview. However, at the same time, I kept in mind that I did not want 
this to become a structured interview process. Keeping the interview unstructured, open 
ended and flexible was necessary for me to understand the wide range of multi-scalar 
processes operating, which gave me an insight into the ways in which labour tying 
arrangements persist in agriculture.  
Interviewing the larger landowners, particularly the older generation gave me a sense of 
the multiple ways in which land and labour transactions took place in both regions over 
generations. The older generation of farmers reminisced about the past and spoke of their 
wealth and the respect they had in the village. In the process of conducting interviews, 
relationships of various kinds were established. Among the larger landowners, the older 
generation, always saw me as their daughter who would come and listen to their stories 
and complaints. They provided me with as much information as they could, explaining that 
they were forthright with me as they wanted to make my stay in the village as comfortable 
as possible and did not want me travelling through the village every day, especially in the 
heat and during the monsoons. Here is an instance of interpersonal dynamics of my 
everyday negotiations, with both place and patriarchal relations, which were in a constant 
state of flux. 
Interviews with younger farmers were always short and crisp. They provided me with 
details of landholding, the process that goes in to cultivating rice and other crops, the 
number of labour days required to cultivate different crops, etc. The conciseness of their 
replies was suggestive of the fact that they were more sceptical of my presence in the field. 
Even though I did establish myself as a researcher from the London School of Economics, 
they could not understand why I would want to know more about their livelihoods and daily 
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lives than the hard-core numbers and facts that they provided me with. Though the group 
of people interviewed belong to the land owning class, each of them is placed within a 
particular social, economic and political context that shapes their answers (Burawoy, 
1998).   
My age and gender infused kinship bonds with the landowners in both regions. The 
experiences were very different when I interviewed agricultural labourers. As an 
interviewer, I knew I was intervening in their lives, their space and their time. In this context 
the timing of the interview was very important. The only time the women respondents 
were free was after 2:30 in the afternoon. This was when they would return from the 
agricultural fields and begin cooking food for the family.  
In Aranthangi, I was given more time to talk to these women since it was a slow period in 
agriculture (February to April). In Chinsurah, the interviews were carried out during the 
paddy sowing and weeding period, which placed greater constraints on time and 
movement. This was partially resolved by revisiting the participants. This made them feel 
that I was concerned about them and not just another surveyor, like those sent by the 
government to conduct the census.  
As mentioned, in Aranthangi, I was able to access female labourers with the help of Tara, 
a 33-year-old Pallar self-help group worker. She introduced me to women workers, and 
through her everyday interactions and relations with women in the villages, I was granted 
access to their lives and histories. Discussions with these women revealed that labour tying 
arrangements were despised but were an omnipresent part of their lives. The labour tying 
arrangements were of short duration and terminated the moment the debt was repaid. An 
interesting aspect that emerged from these conversations was that labour tying was not 
completely debt driven; some labour arrangements were an outcome of obligations to the 
landowners, especially to access land for cultivation. The interconnected factor markets 
and domestic politics are seen to push women into exploitive work contracts, and at the 
same time constantly negotiated.   
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In Chinsurah, I lived with the largest landholder in Madhabpur. The first set of female 
kishens (agricultural labourers) I interviewed were labourers that worked on his land, and 
all they would want to tell me was that their employer was a good and kind man. However, 
these responses were not enough. I was able to break the stream of such responses after I 
met a female agricultural labourer, who was a staunch CPI (M) supporter and wanted me 
to know all the problems labourers have faced with the onset of the new government. This 
provided me with the much needed space to interact with other women workers, 
understand how they entered relations of debt, how these debts were repaid, the limited 
control over their earnings, and their survival strategies.   
However, towards the end of my fieldwork, the host family told me that I should not go 
back to her, as this particular female labourer came to them and demanded money on the 
pretext of providing me with all this information. When this demand was made, the host 
family informed her that I was like their daughter and that she would never take money 
from their own daughter so she could not do the same with me. Without providing me with 
the space for verifying or intervening, my host family had made the decision for me. 
Through ties of kinship, their stand on this situation contained my negotiation capacity 
and jeopardized my position as an independent researcher, and my capacity to make my 
own decisions.  
On the one hand kinship ties placed restrictions on my movement, on the other they drew 
benefits. In Aranthangi, when working with female agricultural labourers, they were very 
excited to know that I was part-Tamil. They would try and draw out possible kinship 
connections (Wolf, 1996). The Paraiyar labourers were particularly happy to know that I 
was not a Chettiyar (who the Paraiyars saw as their oppressors). Since I did not adhere to 
their caste sensibilities of dominance, they readily accepted me. I am fluent in Bengali but 
I am not as fluent in Tamil and required a field assistant. When I informed the respondents 
that I could not speak Tamil fluently, they would constantly try to interpret the questions 
and assist me in translating, especially in the absence of a field assistant. This meant that 
very often the meaning of what was said would be changed, providing multiple 
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explanations of what was being asked. Though this might be distracting, it did give an 
insight into the consciousness of the people and what they understood when the terms 
pannaiyal, bandha kishen or coolie and majdoor53 were used. Particularly in the case of 
pannaiyals, this gave me information about a practice that is shunned and looked down 
upon in the villages in Aranthangi. In Chinsurah, however, despite all attempts I was always 
seen as the “bodo shohorer meye” (big city girl). In order to counter this stereotype that was 
associated with someone from a big city, conversations were lengthened and made 
interesting over a cup of tea54.  
The entire process of carrying out interviews required me, as a researcher, to situate the 
respondents in a particular place and time. The fieldwork required a certain amount of 
planning. Moreover, the research question to be examined in the field deals with political 
issues that the participants were always trying to avoid. This unfolded in different ways 
during fieldwork in the different villages. For example, as mentioned, the animosity I faced 
from the large landholder in Aranthangi, who thought I belonged to the opposition party. 
In Chinsurah, the supporters of CPI (M) were very careful about what they said and how 
they behaved and interacted with other members of the village. This meant that more 
often than not, questions of political understanding and affiliations were evaded. On the 
other hand, those who are now TMC supporters were vocal about their disgust with CPI 
(M), and were hopeful of change and benefits to come from the current ruling party. This 
is where I feel that as a researcher of Indian nationality, I had an understanding of the social 
and political processes at play. This is important in order to understand the multiple 
knowledges that are continuously produced in the field (Burawoy, 1998).   
 
 
                                                          
53Panniyal and bandha kishen are terms used in Aranthangi and Chinsurah respectively to identify tied 
labourers and coolie and majdoor refer to daily wage work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah respectively. 
 
54 The practice of everyday conversations over a cup of tea is something that it culturally specific to West 
Bengal, even though it does take place in other regions as well.  
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2.3.2.3 Focus Group Discussions 
As the name suggests, certain specific issues were discussed with a targeted set of 
participants (Hennink, 2013). This was conducted in groups of four to six women labourers. 
I did not extend the group to male labourers because they tend to mute the voices of the 
women. In addition to this the larger landlords did not agree to participate in focus group 
discussions as they took time out for me for the interviews, and they believed that the 
focus group discussion would generate similar results. This is another instance of both 
power hierarchies and kinship ties placing restrictions on me as a researcher, and making 
the negotiation process difficult. For female labourers, the idea of the group was to create 
a comfortable environment for the women to participate and share their views (Hennink, 
2013: p. 2).  
 
Figure 3: Focus Group Discussion with female agricultural labourers in Chinsurah 
Source: Author’s own image, Chinsurah, (2012) 
 
What I observed was that within these groups, no one disagreed with the more vocal 
women. Some women even remained quiet through many of the questions that they had 
answered in great detail during their personal interviews. The purpose of creating a 
‘collective narrative’ instead of a ‘personal narrative’ (Hennink, 2013: p. 3) did not come 
through, especially when questions on labour tying were asked. However, the women did 
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engage more with discussion on wage rates, government benefits and their husbands who 
controlled their wages (this was a point of particular angst for women, especially in 
Chinsurah).  
The methods used to obtain information from the four village sites differed primarily along 
lines of gender and class. This resulted in varied responses, with women shying away, or 
the landowners trying to constantly negotiate with the interview process. There were 
constant negotiations with my gender and class but not caste, as I was often referred to as 
the big city girl. However, my position in the field raised ethical issues of conducting 
fieldwork; for example, I was often mistaken for a government official. This took place in 
the initial phase of fieldwork.   
2.4 Ethical dilemmas 
Ethics in social science research focuses on aspects of informed consent, maintaining 
anonymity and confidentiality of the data, and not exploiting unequal class positions 
(Bryman, 2012; Simpson, 2008).  
I obtained oral consent before recording any of the interviews. I explained to all the 
interviewees that these recordings were being used for my convenience, so that I could 
listen to the interviews at a later time, and at no point would they be broadcasted or given 
to anyone else.  
One of the main ethical dilemmas that arose from the field was how my entry from the 
“outside” into the villages and lives of women labourers raised their hopes and 
expectations that I would be able to offer them some respite and upliftment. A handful of 
women shared their stories of sexual exploitation at the hands of the landlords and wanted 
to leave the village with me, for they were sure that I would be able to get jobs for them as 
domestic maids in the city. In my efforts of downplaying the ‘power hierarchies in our 
inherent positionalities’ (Wolf, 1996: p. 19), I was placed in a situation where their hopes 
were pinned on my ability to actively bring about some change. Here, I was placed in an 
exploitative dilemma- I could not play upon their vulnerable positions and obtain the 
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information I wanted. Despite wanting to help them, as a researcher, I could not remove 
them from their setting. I have still, however, maintained contact with two women, who I 
do speak to occasionally to find out how they are but at no point creating any kind of false 
hope that I am here to reform their lives. To maintain the ethical neutrality of my research, 
at no point was the trust and hope of these women raised or adversely affected by me. In 
addition to this, I did not discuss these issues with my host family. This was done so as not 
to jeopardise the lives of these women who decided to confide in me, irrespective of how 
helpless I felt in the wake of such knowledge.  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the how the research was conducted following an ethnographic 
approach- conducting fieldwork in two districts and four villages. Data collection 
methodology includes participant observation, interviews, surveys and focus groups with 
female agricultural labours, tenants, large and medium landowners. As I have outlined 
here, one of the main challenges of fieldwork was to manage the different networks of 
power, and different identities and positionalities that I held or were attributed to me at 
the village sites. The complications faced as a researcher along gender, caste and class 
politics, are indicative of the same issues that I am researching to highlight the persistence 
of labour tying arrangements.  
The research, although a comparative study of two places, is not a comparative case study, 
nor is it a study to be seen in isolation. As the opening quotation suggests, the main aim of 
the extended case method is to reconstruct theory. Burawoy (1998: p. 24) calls this a 
process of double fitting, where at one end, complex situations and anomalies are 
moulded in order to fit a theory and at the other end, theory is then tailored to the case, 
recomposed to digest the anomaly. Female labour is identified through the category of 
classes of labour and their entry into labour tying arrangements is understood through 
Hart’s (1986b) analytical framework. Using this framework, I explore how labour tying 
arrangements are constantly reinforced in the daily lives of women workers in Tamil Nadu 
and West Bengal. The empirical analysis of data collected is explained in the following 
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chapters, identifying labour tying through relations with land, credit and state policies such 




Chapter 3: An Overview of Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the two field sites- Aranthangi and Chinsurah. 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 provide a socio-economic snapshot of the villages surveyed. Drawing 
on data from secondary sources, such as census records and information gathered during 
my survey, section 3.1 and3.2 look at Aranthangi and Chinsurah respectively. In section 3.3 
I identify the different labour relations found in the two regions, with particular reference 
to female tied labour. The labour relations discussed highlight the differences in type of 
payment, mode of payment, duration of labour contract. 
3.1  Aranthangi: A Description 
Aranthangi is a tehsil of the Pudukkottai district in Tamil Nadu. The district of Pudukkottai 
is surrounded in the north and west by Tiruchirappalli, in the east by Thanjavur and in the 
south by Madurai (Map 1). In 1948, Pudukkottai became a part of Tiruchirappalli district. In 
1974, the boundaries were redrawn and Pudukkottai was declared a district, with tehsils 
from both Tiruchirappalli and Tanjore. At present there are eleven tehsils in Pudukkottai- 
Alangudi, Gandarvakottai, Kulathur, Illuppur, Pudukkottai, Thirumayam, 
Ponnamaravathi, Karambakudi, Aranthangi, Avudaiyarkoil and Manamelkudi 
(Pudukkottai and Aranthangi are the revenue divisions).   
The two villages selected for field work are Karaimedu and Thirasu in Aranthangi tehsil. 
Karaimdeu is 25 kms and Thirasu is 33 kms from the Pudukkottai town. Karaimedu is 
broadly a linear settlement, lying adjacent to State Highway 26 (Map 3). Karaimedu is not 
a geographically continuous village. It is a revenue village55 with the panchayat 
headquarters located in Kariamedu. It consists of six different hamlets56: Kariamedu, 
Valathoor, Vallimalai Nagar, Jawahar Nagar, Kalvai Nagar and Chenguttai. Each of these 
                                                          
55 A revenue village is an administrative region with a defined border. The Census of India uses this as unit for 
data collection (Nagaraj, 2008). One administrative unit can consist of numerous hamlets.   
 
56 A hamlet, according to the Census of India (1961) is a habitation of persons, belonging to one caste, living 
separately from others. Hamlets are small in size, and have similar socio-economic characteristics, however, 
there is no official data available on these different hamlets.  (in Nagaraj, 2008: p. 34) 
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hamlets have a clear distinct geographical boundary that adheres to a clear caste division. 
Thirasu, which is located 8 kms from the State Highway, is adjacent to the reserve forest 
in the region and comprises two hamlets- North Thirasu and South Thirasu (Map 4). The 
panchayat headquarters are located in North Thirasu. The maps are devised from my 
travels in the villages and is based on information from the locals of the area. The physical 
layout of the villages clearly shows a clustering of caste groups, which reflect work groups 
and labour arrangements found in the villages. In Aranthangi, there is a distinct gender 
divide between agricultural and non-agricultural work, with more women carrying out 
agricultural tasks. Male non-agricultural wage workers find work in the Sugar Factory (this 
is the only factory in the Aranthangi sub-district which employs people from the 
neighbouring villages). They also find work as woodcutters, vendors, waiters (both within 
the village and in Pudukkottai town, some even travel to Chennai for this work), 
construction workers and drivers to name a few. Migration for non-agricultural work is not 
confined to state boundaries. A few male residents in two villages travel to the Gulf region 
for construction.  Before delving further into a socio-economic discussion of the villages, 
the following section provides a brief description of the physiology of the villages and 
agricultural production- a layout of the field sites.  
3.1.1 Physiology and Agriculture 
The Imperial Gazetteer of India (1909: 231) describes the region as an ‘undulating plain of 
barren or sparsely cultivated land interspersed with small but picturesque rocky hills some 
of which are crowned by ancient forts and temples’. Tamil Nadu is divided into seven agro-
climatic zones and Aranthangi, comes under the Cauvery Delta Zone. The soil type in the 
district is red loam. The land use pattern of the district shows that the majority of the land 








Land Use Pattern Extent in Percentages 
1. Wet Fields (Nanjei) 21.83 
2. Dry Fields  (Punjei) 38.86 
3. Forest 5.07 
4. Barren and Uncultivable 2.07 
5. Land Use for Non-Agriculture Purpose 26.53 
6. Cultivable Waste 3.09 
7. Pasture Lands 1.15 
8. Trees and Tope 1.38 
Table 3.1: Land Use Pattern of Pudukkottai District 





Figure 4: Layout of Village Karaimedu- Aranthangi 




Figure 5: Layout of Village Thirasu- Aranthangi 





The district is characterized by hot and dry climate where it receives an average of 919.4 
mm of rainfall in a year. Most of the rains are between October and November, during the 
retreating monsoons. This is also a period when the region experiences heavy cyclonic 
showers that originate in the Bay of Bengal (Ayyar, 2004). The main river that flows 
through this district is Vallar but the ones that sustain the population are numerous jungle 
streams that are replenished with the monsoon and cyclonic showers.  
The effects of the good monsoon and irrigation are observed in agricultural production in 
the two field village sites of Karaimedu and Thirasu in Aranthangi. The following is a crop 
calendar for a single fasli year in both Karaimedu and Thirasu.   
 
Figure 6: Crop Calendar for Karaimedu and Thirasu 
Source: Field Survey in Aranthangi, November 2011 
 
The two predominant crops in the region are rice (of the Samba variety) and sugarcane. 
The peak labour seasons, particularly for female labour, are during sowing and harvesting 
of rice, sugarcane, groundnut and maize. There are a few banana plantations in the villages 
which employ female labour during harvest time. However, as the image below shows, 
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there are no large plantation fields. Banana, coconut and even mangoes line the main 
paddy fields. This is indicative of landowners diversifying cultivation, and cultivating those 
crops that are less labour intensive. The move is to counter any labour shortage 
experienced in the region, especially with male outmigration.  
 
Figure 7: Making use of every square inch: Paddy fields in Aranthangi that are lined by 
coconut and banana plantations. 
Source: Author’s own image, Thirasu, Aranthangi, 2011. 
 
The labour shortages are primarily observed among male labourers. As discussed above 
this has introduced a change in the crops cultivated in the region. Sesame and groundnut 
are grown by female cultivators, who are either tenant farmers or are small and marginal 
landholders. The presence of female cultivators does not result in these women taking up 
male activities in farming. Certain activities such as ploughing are still considered a male 
activity. The shortage of male labourers is covered through floriculture, horticulture and 
eucalyptus plantations.  
 
Larger landowners have converted their punjei landholdings into eucalyptus plantations in 
both Karaimedu and Thirasu. The landowners require labour for sowing and felling the 
trees. Sowing of eucalyptus is carried out by female labour (see Figure 8). The felling of trees 
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takes place once every 3-5 years on an average. There is little or no maintenance of this 
land that is required. In addition, eucalyptus fetches farmers decent amounts where one 
ton of eucalyptus is sold at the rate of Rs.20, 000/-.  
 
 
Figure 8: Displacing Paddy: Large fields taken over by eucalyptus plantations. 
Source: Author’s own image, Karaimedu, Aranthangi, 2011. 
 
The organisation of space and agricultural production in the villages determines activities 
carried out in the region, and more specifically what the classes of labour in the villages do.  
3.1.2 Socio-economic descriptions of Aranthangi 
In this section I provide a description of the socioeconomic characteristics of the villages. 
The villages of Karaimedu and Thirasu, selected for this study, are predominantly Hindu 
villages. Thirasu is an all-Hindu village, whereas in Karaimedu 11 per cent of the population 




Figure 9: Distribution of Households based on Religion in Aranthangi. 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
 
The Pallars (Scheduled Caste) in Karaimedu are all Christians. The conversion to 
Christianity among the Pallars of Karaimedu is recent, dating back to approximately 30 
years. Some of the most recent records of such conversions took place in 2000-2001. 
Thirasu does not have any Pallars, and hence does not have a Christian population. 
Religious conversion is a means to escape oppressive realities faced by the lower caste 
groups within Hinduism. However, caste identities pervade religious identities. This is not 
to belittle the process of religious conversions that promise social upliftment. Instead, it is 
important to recognise that caste as an institution continues to operate irrespective of 
religion (Kannabiran and Kannabiran, 1991).  
The caste positions in the village have an overlap with class positions. Table 3.2 identifies 
































   
SL. 
No.  
Caste  Number of Households 
 Hindu General BC MBC SC 
1. Achari 8    
2. Ambalakar   487  
3. Brahmin 1    
4. Nadar  2   
5. Paraiyar    64 
6. Pillai 1    
7. Thevar  40   
8. Udaiyar  2   
9. Vallar  8   
 Christian 
11. Pallar    72 
 Total 10 52 487 136 
Table 3.2: Distribution of Caste Groups in Aranthangi 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
The numerically dominant class groups in both villages are the Ambalakars, who belong to 
the Most Backward Caste (MBC) category. The Ambalakars are the traditional landowners 
of the region. However, a majority do not continue to occupy this position in both 
Karaimedu and Aranthangi. The Ambalakars over time have had to sell their land.  In the 
two villages 70.89 per cent of the total Ambalakar population are marginal landholders, 
owning one acre of land or less. Only 10.59 per cent of this population own more than three 
acres of land. Approximately 19 per cent of the total Ambalakar population are landless 
labourers.  
The Ambalakars sold their lands to the Thevars, who are now the ruling elites in both the 
villages. The Thevars belong to the Backward Caste (BC) category. They came into this 
position of power not only through acquiring land but also with the Chettiyars (Brahmins) 
migrating out of the region. In Karaimedu and Thirasu, 57.57 per cent of Thevars are 
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marginal landholders, owning one acre of land or less. Around 40 per cent of the Thevar 
population own more than three acres of land.  
The Scheduled Caste (SC) group, Paraiyars and Pallars, own land but are predominantly 
labourers. As observed in Table 3.3, a majority of the Pallars and Paraiyars are marginal 
landholders. Owning such small quantities of land is insufficient for their survival, for which 
reason they turn to alternate occupations both within and outside of agriculture.  
Acharis in the villages belong to the traditional artisan caste. Like the Pallars and Paraiyars, 
the Acharis are marginal landholders but also look for alternate occupation outside of 
agriculture. The same holds true for the Nadars and Vallars. The single Brahmin household 
in the region belongs to a priest. He lives in Thirasu and performs his service in a temple 
that caters to both Thirasu and Karaimedu.  
 Landholding Size in Acres 
Caste 0 <1 1-3 >3 
Achari 0 1.17 0 0 
Ambalakar 0.44 58.39 9.64 1.46 
Brahmin 0.15 0 0 0 
Nadar 0.15 0.15 0 0 
Pallar 0 10.07 0.29 0.15 
Paraiyar 0.58 7.30 1.46 0 
Pillai 0 0 0.15 0 
Thevar 0.15 2.04 1.75 1.90 
Udaiyar 0 0.29 0 0 
Vallar 0.15 1.02 0 0 
Total  1.61 80.44 13.28 3.50 
Table 3.3: Percentage Distribution of Landholdings According to Caste in Aranthangi. 
                                   Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of land across the two villages. A look at the total highlights 
that a majority of the population are marginal and small landholders (80.44 per cent), 
distributed predominantly among the Ambalakars, Paraiyars and Pallars57. Only 3.5 per 
                                                          
57 The small, medium and large landholder categories I use in this thesis do not adhere to the categories used 
by the agricultural census. The census identifies five classes of farmers based on landholding- marginal (less 
than 1 hectare), small (1-2 hectares), semi-medium (2-4 hectares), medium (4-10 hectares) and large (above 
10 hectares).  Landholding (ownership of means of production) is an important criterion to identify the 
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cent of the total population owns more than three acres of land, where a majority is owned 
by the Thevars. There is one Pallar family (who identify themselves as Roman Catholics) 
who owns over 10 acres of land. This Pallar family owns the maximum quantity of 
cultivable land in the two villages. The one large landowner (Mannikam) who is a Pallar is 
an important employer in the village and occupies a position in the village council58. 
Ownership of land is an important indicator of determining class positions in the villages. 
As observed from the data collected, there is a broad overlap between caste and class 
positions in this region. In the absence of the upper caste, the Thevars, are the ruling elites 
of the region followed by the Ambalakars. The Ambalakars occupy socially dominant 
positions in the village and take up casual daily wage work to secure their livelihood.  
The overlap of caste and class in the region is further observed in the following table which 
identifies economic status in the village.  
  Economic Status59  
                                                          
different agrarian classes. However, in the present context, landholding is not sufficient to determine class 
status, and therefore, this has not been used in the thesis. In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the respondents 
reported holding very small quantities of land. However, what sets the farmers apart are the different 
activities they carry out, the labour hiring process, the level of mechanisation and the intensity of cultivation 
(Patnaik, 1976). For example, farmers with around 3-4 acres of land are categorised as large landholders 
because they carry out sericulture and horticulture. There are others who carryout multi-cropping which 
often includes a cash crop like sugarcane. There are those who own small quantities of land but generate 
income through non-agricultural work, such as the Brahmins in Chinsurah, who are employed as doctors and 
engineers. For these larger landholders, the land is cultivated by hired labourers. The marginal and small 
landholders cultivate very small quantities of land, they usually cultivate basic crops such as rice and or 
vegetables (as observed in Aranthangi and Chinsurah), the land is cultivated using family labour and they hire 
out their labour. The difference in the number of days of labour hired in and out, along with the ability to rent 
out land places farmers in different class categories. This is the basic premise of Patnaik’s (1976) labour 
exploitation criteria, where the difference between hired labour and rent help identify the exploited and 
exploiting class.  
58 Mannikam is able to generate multiple jobs in an agricultural year not only due to the large amount of 
cultivable land but also due to the diverse range of agricultural activities he engages with. These include rice, 
sugarcane, maize, banana, mango, musk melon and jasmine horticulture. He is also one of the milk 
distributors of the region. 
 
59  People in the village identified themselves as belonging to four categories of rich, middle, poor and 
poorest, based on the kind of house they lived in, whether this was a mud house, a concrete house, with 
concrete flooring or tiles or marble. Ownership of agricultural land, and dependence on agricultural work also 
determined which category they would place themselves in. Differences were also observed in the type of 
non-agricultural activity carried out. Those who were employed in government jobs placed themselves in the 
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 Caste Rich  Middle Poor  Poorest 
Achari 0 0 0.44 0.73 
Ambalakar 1.17 18.98 33.14 17.81 
Brahmin 0.15 0 0 0 
Nadar 0 0 0.29 0 
Pallar 0.15 0.29 4.96 4.96 
Paraiyar 0 1.17 5.99 2.04 
Pillai 0 0.15 0 0 
Thevar 0.15 3.50 1.75 0.44 
Udaiyar 0 0 0.15 0.15 
Vallar 0.15 0 0.44 0.88 
Total 1.75 24.09 47.15 27.01 
Table 3.4: Caste-Wise distribution of Households according to Economic Status in Aranthangi 
                                     Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
                                 *Percentages calculated on total population of Karaimedu and Thirasu. 
 
A majority of the Pallar and Paraiyar households, belonging to the classes of labour are in 
the poor or poorest categories. Ambalakars are distributed across all four categories- they 
are identified as the landowning class, and those who are marginal landholders and 
landless labourers. The Thevars identify themselves as middle income in the village, 
despite owning large amounts of land.  
Apart from the broad overlap of caste, the layout of the village shows how the caste 
divisions are manifested in the spatial division of the villages (Maps 3 and 4). In Karaimedu, 
the Paraiyars live in Jawahar Nagar and the Pallars live in Chenguttai. These are at the 
outskirts of Karaimedu’s boundary. Jawahar Nagar is located beside the Sugar Factory60 
and Chenguttai near a reserve forest. Both these villages are located at two ends of the 
main Karaimedu village. The Karaimedu village church is located in Chenguttai and it 
makes this village an important point of reference.  
                                                          
middle income category, whereas those who carried out casual daily wage employment referred to 
themselves as the poorest in the village.  
 
60 The Sugar Factory is a private limited company and is the only sugar factory in Aranthangi tehsil. This sugar 
factory has an important bearing upon the lives of the coolie workers as it provides them with alternate 




Figure 10: A typical tiled roof with straw walls of a Pallar house and a thatched roof and mud 
house of an Ambalakar in Aranthangi. 
Source: Author’s own image, Karaimedu, Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
 
The numerically dominant Ambalakars are located in Kalvai Nagar, along a kamma (lake). 
Valathoor, like Jawahar Nagar is the newest part of Karaimedu. Valathoor housed Pallar 
households61. Vallimalai Nagar and Karaimedu have a mixed population of Ambalakars 
and the dominant Thevars. Karaimedu village is the most prosperous of all other villages 
within the larger Karaimedu panchayat. The larger landowner, including the pradhan of 
the village, lives here.  
3.1.2.1 Employment 
Marginal, small farmers and landless labourers comprise a majority of the population in 
the two villages (82. 05 per cent). I identify these classes as the classes of labour. The 
classes of labour no longer depend on agriculture for survival. Instead, they take on 
multiple, often insecure and exploitative work, which can be both agricultural and non-
agricultural wage work. I observed the declining importance, primarily among male 
labourers, within the village. This is reflected in the census data, especially in the case of 
                                                          
61 Valathoor consists primarily of single women households and the elderly. This village came into being 
because of the philanthropist Gyanaprakasam, who identified the worse off population such as divorced 
women, women separated from their husbands, the elderly population who were abandoned, etc. These 
people were given 5 cents of land each on what is now Valathoor. The people with the help of the government 
were able to transfer the deeds to their name. The government had to buy the land from Gyanaprakasm and 
then give it to the villagers. In this land transaction, the villagers however, ended up with 3 cents of land 
instead of 5 cents of land. They do not know what happened to the other 2 cents of land but they do blame 
the government for this.  
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Thirasu. The following tables in Box 3.1 highlight the changes experienced by the labour 
force across the region. Thirasu witnessed a decline in the number of main cultivators and 
agricultural labourers (both male and female) from 2001 to 2011. In Karaimedu, the 
number of main cultivators more than doubled in the region for both men and women. 
However, at the same time, the number of male agricultural labourers dropped at a 
considerable rate. Female agricultural labourers witnessed a marginal drop for the same 
category.  
A close look at the data set provides information about the status of the worker. In Thirasu 
the decline in main workers from 2001 – 11 witnessed a simultaneous increase in the 
number of marginal cultivators and agricultural labourers. This is evident particularly for 
female marginal agricultural labourers, whose numbers increased from 3.03 per cent to 12 
per cent.  In Karaimedu, with the number of main cultivators more than doubling, a smaller 
percentage of workers remain as marginal cultivators and agricultural labourers.  
The census data highlights broad trends observed in the region. The data collected from 
the field sites provide further information on the kind of work the people of the village are 
engaged in. This is shown below, in Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 for female and male respondents 





























Pudukkottai (District), Tamil Nadu 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  59.98 41.02 59.18 40.82 
Main Workers 49.98 26.41 51.77 31.36 
Main Cultivators 23.99 12.08 18.79 10.18 
Main Agricultural Labourers 10.94 10.26 18.03 16.93 
Main Household Workers 0.99 0.77 0.69 0.47 
Marginal Workers 9.00 14.61 7.40 9.46 
Marginal Cultivators 2.03 2.91 1.31 1.22 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
5.51 10.57 4.12 6.50 
Marginal Household Workers 0.17 0.47 0.15 0.28 
 
Aranthangi (Sub-District) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  60.04 39.96 59.64 40.36 
Main Workers 49.52 24.28 52.91 30.60 
Main Cultivators 23.40 10.09 20.37 9.71 
Main Agricultural Labourers 14.34 11.37 20.02 17.30 
Main Household Workers 0.70 0.41 0.73 0.29 
Marginal Workers 10.52 15.68 6.73 9.83 
Marginal Cultivators 2.44 2.64 1.21 0.89 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
6.98 11.83 4.10 7.89 
Marginal Household Workers 0.15 0.50 0.09 0.21 
 
Thirasu (Village) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  54.62 45.38 50.45 49.55 
Main Workers 52.51 41.86 42.42 36.39 
Main Cultivators 32.37 22.67 26.40 20.52 
Main Agricultural Labourers 16.70 18.19 9.85 13.44 
Main Household Workers 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.19 
Marginal Workers 2.11 3.52 7.56 13.15 
Marginal Cultivators 0.17 0.33 0.14 0.19 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
1.49 3.03 6.31 12.10 
Marginal Household Workers 0.21 0.08 0.19 0.10 
 
Karaimedu (Village) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  55.16 44.84 47.14 52.86 
Main Workers 40.82 26.68 45.67 48.75 
Main Cultivators 17.00 11.48 35.18 33.29 
Main Agricultural Labourers 16.37 13.12 7.96 14.03 
Main Household Workers 0.29 0.10 0.15 0.15 
Marginal Workers 14.33 18.16 1.46 4.11 
Marginal Cultivators 1.79 1.84 0.15 0.31 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
10.41 16.03 1.15 3.61 
Marginal Household Workers 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.04 
Source: Census of India, Primary Census Abstract, Tamil Nadu, 2001, 2011 































































































































































Achari 0.44 0.15 0 0 0 0.58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ambalakar 23.21 4.96 6.72 10.51 11.97 12.85 0 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Brahmin 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nadar 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pallar 1.75 0.15 3.07 0.15 0.15 4.96 0.15 0 0 0 0.15 0 
Paraiyar 4.38 0.15 0.44 0.29 0.88 3.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pillai 0.00 0 0 0 0.15 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thevar 0.29 0.29 0.15 0 1.02 4.09 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Udaiyar 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vallar 0.44 0 0.29 0 0 0.29 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 
Total  30.66 5.69 10.66 10.95 14.16 26.57 0.15 0.29 0.15 0.29 0.29 0.15 
Table 3.5: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Different Occupations Taken up by Women 
in Aranthangi. 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Karaimedu and Thirasu. 
 
The data in Table 3.5 highlights the primary occupation female respondents identified with 
at the time of survey. The table shows that for women agricultural wage work emerges as 
their predominant occupation. This is the case particularly for Ambalakar and Paraiyar 
workers. Pallar women rely on a combination of agricultural and casual daily wage work. 
The casual daily wage work these women were employed in was Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) work. A large percentage of 
women (26.57 percent) across all caste groups identified themselves as housewives. For 
Paraiyar, Pallar an Ambalakar women, the reason they provide for not taking up any work 
is that their husbands send them money regularly. These women therefore, do not have to 
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worry out looking for jobs and can look after their families. Thevar women belonged to 
medium or large landowner households and did not participate in the labour force.  
The employment structure for men in both the villages, as seen in Table 3.6 below, has a 





































































































































Achari 0.15 0.29 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0 0 0.44 
Ambalakar 3.65 17.37 21.31 12.12 0.73 0.44 0.58 0.88 3.21 0.58 10.22 
Brahmin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 
Nadar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 
Pallar 0.44 7.30 0 0.15 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0 1.46 
Paraiyar 1.31 3.07 2.77 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 0 1.90 
Pillai 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thevar 0.29 1.02 0.15 3.21 0.15 0 0.15 0 0 0 0.88 
Udaiyar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.29 
Vallar 0.15 0.29 0.15 0.00 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0.44 
Total  5.99 29.34 24.38 15.62 0.88 0.73 1.17 1.46 3.80 0.58 16.06 
Table 3.6: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Different Occupations Taken up by Men in 
Aranthangi. 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Karaimedu and Thirasu. 
 
Table 3.6 clearly shows that the number of male labourers in agricultural wage work is less, 
engaging only 5.99 per cent of the total population. Men are involved in cultivation and 
casual daily wage which is separate from agricultural wage work. These figures indicate 
the movement of male labourers away from agricultural wage work. The category marked 
as others, accounts for 16.08 per cent of the population. This category includes jobs such 
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as working as a security guard, electrician, driver, bus conductor, cook, waiter, etc. to name 
a few. Another sector that employs male labourers is construction. Men who work in 
construction are Ambalakars, Pallars and Paraiyars. Though not large in number (3.8 per 
cent), the numbers are nonetheless significant.  
Male labourers place a tremendous amount of importance on moving away from 
agricultural wage work.  Male heads of households were asked to rank the kind of work, 






Achari 0.15 1.02 0 
Ambalakar 7.15 48.91 15.04 
Brahmin 0 0.15 0 
Nadar 0 0.29 0 
Pallar 1.75 8.18 0.58 
Paraiyar 2.19 6.42 0.73 
Pillai 0 0 0.15 
Thevar 0.44 1.90 3.50 
Udaiyar 0 0.29 0 
Vallar 0.15 1.02 0 
Total 11.82 68.18 20.00 
Table 3.7: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Work Most Preferred in Aranthangi. 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Aranthangi, 2011-2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Karaimedu and Thirasu. 
 
Table 3.7 highlights the work most preferred by household heads (usually men). Across all 
caste groups, men preferred non-agricultural work and cultivation to agricultural wage 
work. The inter-caste differences highlight that the majority of Thevars, who are the 
landowning caste in the region, prefer cultivation. A majority of Ambalakars, Paraiyars and 
Pallars in the region, who belong to the classes of labour prefer non-agricultural work to 
agricultural wage employment.  
A look back at Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 reveal that women take up a large portion of 
agricultural wage work in the region compared to men. Men are on the lookout for non-
agricultural jobs. At the same time, men who remain in agriculture are cultivators. With 
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more women involved in agricultural wage work that men, understanding the process of 
labour tying among the female labour force becomes all the more important.  
3.2 Hooghly: A Description 
The district of Hooghly is surrounded in the south by Howrah, in the west by Midnapore, in 
the north by Bankura and Burdwan, and in the east by Nadia and South 24- Parganas (Map 
4). The main river flowing through this region is the Hooghly. The headquarters of the 
district is in Chinsurah. The two blocks selected for the field sites are Polba-Dadpur and 
Pandua62. The district has four administrative sub-divisions- Chinsurah, Chandannagore, 
Srirampore and Arambagh. Polba-Dadpur and Pandua come under the Chinsurah 
subdivision (Hooghly District Profile, 2010-11). 
The two villages selected for field work are Madhabpur in Polaba-Dadpur and Bardhanagar 
in Pandua. Bardhanagar is 23 kms from Chinsurah railway station and the village is located 
along State Highway 13 (Map 5). Madhabpur is 19 kms from Chinsurah and is off the 
Durgapur expressway, part of National Highway 2 (Map 6). Both these villages are census 
villages which are located next to their respective Block Development Offices.   
As observed in Karaimedu and Thirasu, the physical layout of the villages in Chinsurah 
shows a clustering of caste groups. There are specific pockets which house the upper and 
lower caste groups, with very limited areas of interactions. If landowners need to find 
workers, they have to go to the Santhal (Scheduled Tribe) or Bauri (Scheduled Caste) basti 
(locality). In Chinsurah, in both villages, men are usually involved in non-agricultural work 
whereas women remain confined to agricultural tasks. Non-agricultural work in these 
villages is further segregated based on caste groups. The Barhmins are the most educated 
in the villages and usually work as doctors, engineers and lawyers (either in Chinsurah 
Town or in Kolkata). The Bagdi and Santhal men usually work as loaders, fruit vendors in 
local trains and busses, some find employment in neighbourhood retail stores, drivers, and 
many of them carry out MGNREGA work. Unlike in Aranthangi where it was predominantly 
                                                          
62 The region has numerous low lying tracts and rivers and the first group of people to inhabit the area was 
tribes belonging to the fishing caste, such as the Bagdis (Bengal District Gazetteer Hooghly, 1912). 
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women who took up MGNREGA work, in Chinsurah it is the men. A reason for this is that 
casual daily wage labourers in Chinsurah succumb to the seasonality and dearth of non-
agricultural employment available to them. Male labourers also do not want to carry out 
agricultural work, therefore in such instances they rely on MGNREGA work. Before 
examining the socio-economic characteristics of the two villages further, I first provide an 





Figure 11: Layout of Village Madhabpur- Chinsurah 




Figure 12: Layout of Village Bardhanagar- Chinsurah 






Hooghly falls under the sub-humid to humid soil agro climatic region, with temperatures 
ranging from 16oC to 36oC. The climate of the region is largely influenced by the monsoons. 
The district receives an average rainfall of 1374 mm (Hooghly District Profile, 2011). The 
maximum amount of rainfall occurs during the monsoons in August through till 
September. While Hooghly is the main river of this region, the Damodar River has an 
important bearing on the agrarian economy of the region with the Damodar Valley 
Corporation which was set up in 1948. The main soil of the region is alluvium (referred to 
as the Ganga riverine alluvium). The water logging conditions of the soil are conducive for 
cultivating paddy and jute.  
Land in this region, unlike in Pudukkottai, is intensively cropped. This is observed in the 
land use pattern for the district as a whole where a majority (64.9 per cent) of the land is  
Sl. 
No. 
Land Use Pattern Extent in Percentages 
1. Cultivable Area 69.49 
2.  Forest 0.16 
3.  Land Use for Non-Agriculture Purpose 28.10 
4.  Permanent Pastures 0.015 
5.  Cultivable Waste 0.42 
6. Land under Misc. Trees, Crops and 
Groves 
0.59 
7.  Barren and Uncultivable 0.03 
8.  Current Fallows 0.11 
9. Other Fallows 0.031 
Table 3.8: Land Use Pattern of Hooghly District 
Source: Agriculture contingency plan for District: Hooghly, Department of Agriculture and Co-operation (2011). 
The growing periods of the crops are kharif, rabi and an interim period of zaid-kharif and 
zaid-rabi. Irrigation in the district is used for rabi crops. Government irrigation is provided 
by the Damodar Valley Corporation dam. There is groundwater irrigation referred to as 
‘private mini’ and privately owned tanks and pukurs (pond). The main crops cultivated in 
this region are paddy (dhaan), potato (aloo) and jute (pāt). The agricultural calendar for 
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Chinsurah given below highlights the different kinds of crops grown in the region and their 
growing seasons.  
 
Figure 13: Agricultural Calendar of Chinsurah 
Source: Field Survey in Chinsurah, April, 2011 
 Paddy sown in this region is referred to as aman dhaan (also known as himantik). The 
sowing period for paddy, which extends from mid-May to mid-September refers to the 
sowing and transplanting periods. Paddy can be sown by a broadcast method, but farmers 
in the region prefer sowing it in a nursery and then transplanting it in the fields. It is during 
this period that most work is available in the region, particularly for female agricultural 
labourers. Each bigha63 of land goes through four ploughing prior to transplanting. 




                                                          




Figure 14: Transplanting Paddy in Chinsurah: Female dominated task with a male labourer to 
oversee the group. 
Source: Author’s own image, Madhabpur, Chinsurah, 2012. 
 
Potato has a much shorter sowing and harvesting period. Women only take part in the 
harvesting or weeding (mid-season) period for potato. This is a crop that predominantly 
employs men.  Jute, which is an important crop across the district, is cultivated in very small 
pockets in both the villages. The sowing and harvesting of jute are carried out only by male 
labourers. Female labourers usually help with tying of the jute stalks together, and with 
weeding, which is carried out two to three times in the growing period. The participation 
of women in jute is limited as it is considered to require a specific skill. As seen in the 
agricultural calendar, seeds are sown in May. Once grown, the stalks are cleaned, bundled 
up and steeped in a stagnant body of water (a process referred to as retting). After this the 
stalks are taken out, beaten, the fibre extracted, which is then sold. The very nature of the 
tasks excludes female labourers from this crop.  
Apart from rice, female participation is observed in vegetable farming. The vegetables are 
grown in the three months between harvesting of the rabi crop and sowing of the kharif 
crop, however with certain periods of overlap. Landowners in Chinsurah do not tend to 
engage in vegetable farming themselves, unless there is a large plantation. Vegetable 
farming in Chinsurah is carried out by female labourers, who sow, maintain and harvest the 
vegetable. The agricultural calendar shows an overlap with potato. However, with limited 
participation of women in potato, there is very little overlap of work for female labourers. 
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While women cultivate vegetables in this region, they do not sell them in the market. This 
process is carried out either by their husbands or the landowners. 
A comparison of the agricultural calendars in the two regions gives an indication of the 
amount of work available to agricultural labourers. Agricultural wage work in Chinsurah, 
especially for female labourers, is not only limited by lesser number of crops cultivated in 
the region, but also by the crop itself. Moreover, the caste positionalities also affect access 
to work, where women who belong to higher caste groups are socially constrained from 
carrying out any form of manual labour.  
The following section provides a detailed discussion of socio-economic background of the 
two villages, identifying the ways in which caste and class intersect, and the effects of 
these on employment.  
3.2.2 Socio-economic Background of Chinsurah 
The religious composition of the two villages are distinctly different. The predominant 
religious group in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar are Hindus. Bardhanagar has a negligible 
Muslim population, where 99.48 percent of the population are Hindus. In Madhabpur, 
24.54 percent of the population is Muslim and 75.46 percent are Hindus. Despite 
constituting a minority religion in this region, the Muslims are the landowning group in 
both the villages.  
Among the Hindus, landownership adheres to the caste structure, where the upper caste 
Brahmins are the landowners, with a few large landholders and a majority of them as 







Figure 15: Number of Hindu and Muslim Households in Chinsurah 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
 
 
Table 3.9 shows the different caste groups present in both villages. Though the Muslims do 
not adhere to a caste system, they do identify themselves with the different sects that have 
hierarchical underpinnings. For ease of understanding, I refer to them by their sect rather 
than clubbing them together as Muslims. The caste groups mentioned are how the 































Caste Groups Number of Households 
 Hindus General OBC SC ST 
1. Bagdi   72  
2. Bauri   84  
3. Brahmin 42    
4. Dom   12  
5. Goala 7 5   
6. Handi   11  
7.  Karmakar 9    
8.  Khoira    45 
9. Mahisya 20  2  
10. Moira 1    
11. Muchi   2  
12.  Oraon    6 
13. Sadgop 14  5  
14.  Santhal    57 
15.  Tanti 1    
 Muslims     
16. Kazi 6    
17. Mollah 1 2   
18. Sheikh 44 4   
19. Sunni 10    
20. Total 155 11 188 108 
Table 3.9: Distribution of Caste Groups in Chinsurah 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2011-2012 
 
The largest group of people in both the villages belong to the Scheduled Caste category 
(40.69 per cent), followed by the Scheduled Tribe (ST) (23.37 per cent) and the General 
caste (33.54 per cent). Some of the Goala, Mollah and Sheikhs recorded themselves as 
Other Backwards Castes (OBCs), and five Sadgop households recorded themselves as 
Scheduled Castes at the time of survey. These Sadgops were small landholders and did not 
work as agricultural labourers. The agricultural labourers in this village came from the SC 
and ST category.  
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Landholding Size in Acres 
0 <1 1 - 3 >3 
Bagdi 11.69 1.08 2.60 0.22 
Bauri 17.32 0.87 0 0 
Brahmin 0.43 4.11 5.63 1.08 
Dom 0.22 1.30 0.43 0.65 
Goala 0.43 0.00 1.08 1.08 
Handi 1.52 0.87 0 0 
Karmakar 0.22 0.65 0.43 0.65 
Kazi 0.22 1.08 0 0 
Khoira 9.52 0.22 0 0 
Mahisya 0.65 0.65 1.30 1.73 
Moira 0 0 0.22 0 
Mollah 0.43 0 0.22 0 
Muchi 0.43 0 0 0 
Sadgop 0 0.65 1.30 0.65 
Santhals 9.31 2.38 1.52 0.22 
Sheikh 0.87 3.25 4.11 2.16 
Sunni 0 0.43 1.30 0.43 
Tanti 0.22 0 0 0 
Total 53.46 17.53 20.13 8.87 
Table 3.10: Percentage Distribution of Landholdings According to Caste, Chinsurah 
                                 Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
 
Table 3.10 reveals that a majority of the population surveyed are landless (53.46 percent). 
The caste composition shows that a majority of the landless are Santhals (ST), Bauris (SC) 
and Bagdis (SC). The SCs and STs who own small plots of land, are also bargadars 
(sharecroppers). For a majority of these households, the land was given as gifts by the 
larger landowners (a more detailed discussion of is in Chapter 4).  
The medium landholders are primarily Brahmins. The large landholders which comprise 
the smallest section of the population are predominantly Sheikhs. Other caste groups such 
as Brahmins, and Mahisya, though smaller in number, also own such large quantities of 
land.  One particular Mahisya family reported owning 17 acres of land. These figures 
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highlight the shift in power from the upper caste Brahmins, as the ruling elites to the 
Sheikhs among the Muslims and the Mahisyas among the Hindus. 
The overlapping of caste and class identities in the village become clear in the following 
Table 3.11 which describes the economic status of households surveyed.  
Caste 
Economic Status64 
Rich Middle Poor  Poorest 
Bagdi 0 2.16 4.11 9.31 
Bauri 0 0 4.76 13.42 
Brahmin 2.81 4.33 1.73 0.22 
Dom 0.22 0.87 1.08 0.43 
Goala 1.08 1.08 0 0.43 
Handi 0 0 1.30 1.08 
Karmakar 0 1.08 0.87 0 
Kazi 0 0.65 0.65 0 
Khoira 0 0 2.81 6.93 
Mahisya 0.65 2.81 1.30 0 
Moira 0.22 0 0 0 
Mollah 0 0.43 0.22 0 
Muchi 0 0 0 0.43 
Sadgop 0 2.60 1.52 0 
Santhals 0.22 1.08 3.68 8.66 
Sheikh 0.65 6.93 2.60 0.22 
Sunni 0 1.30 0.43 0.43 
Tanti 0.00 0.00 0.22 0 
Total 5.84 25.32 27.27 41.56 
Table 3.11: Caste-Wise distribution of Households according to Economic Status in Chinsurah 
                                     Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
                 *Percentages calculated on total population surveyed in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar 
 
A majority of the population identify themselves as belonging to the poorest category. As 
with landholding, the Santhals (ST), Bauris (SC) and Bagdis (SC) belong to this category. 
Although the Brahmins are primarily medium farmers, a majority of them are identified as 
rich, possibly due to the diversification of occupation. The Brahmins, who are the most 
                                                          
64 Refer to footnote 59 for explanation on the different categories used.  
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educated in the villages, have now moved out of agriculture and are employed in high 
paying occupations, such as doctors, engineers and even government civil servants.  
The spatial manifestation of this class and caste divide is observed in the layout of the 
village (Map 5 & 6), with the Bagdis, Bauris and the Santhals living at the outskirts of the 
village. The only source of drinking water for these communities is a communal water tap. 
The Sheikh, Mahisya and Sadgop localities are surrounded by ponds, which is used for fish 
farming. Many of these ponds in the villages are private owned.  
 
Figure 16: A Santhal basti (locality) in Bardhanagar with mud floors and walls. 
Source: Author’s own image, Bardhanagar, Chinsruah, 2012. 
 
The caste positions and class positions determine access to certain economic activities in 
the villages. I discuss the different employment opportunities available in Chinsurah in the 
following section.  
3.2.2.1 Employment  
Marginal, small farmers and landless labourers constitute a majority of the population in 
Chinsurah (70.99 per cent). However, unlike in Aranthangi, where the diversity of 
occupations drew (particularly) male labourers out of agriculture, Chinsurah does not show 




Hooghly (District), West Bengal  
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  75.84 24.16 78.41 21.59 
Main Workers 66.34 11.83 64.11 10.86 
Main Cultivators 17.12 0.88 15.55 0.68 
Main Agricultural Labourers 17.46 5.35 19.94 5.80 
Main Household Workers 2.65 1.36 2.81 0.96 
Marginal Workers 9.49 12.33 14.29 10.74 
Marginal Cultivators 1.16 1.96 1.23 0.64 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
5.82 5.52 9.02 6.01 
Marginal Household Workers 0.28 1.78 0.65 1.44 
 
 Chinsurah (Sub-district) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  80.13 19.87 71.35 28.65 
Main Workers 69.02 13.42 59.54 15.68 
Main Cultivators 4.94 0.41 15.39 0.76 
Main Agricultural Labourers 8.40 4.03 26.79 11.51 
Main Household Workers 1.16 0.70 1.40 0.90 
Marginal Workers 11.11 6.44 11.84 12.97 
Marginal Cultivators 0.49 0.16 0.97 0.65 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
5.45 4.14 8.33 8.26 
Marginal Household Workers 0.23 0.33 0.28 1.66 
 
Bardhanagar (Village) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  64.16 35.84 71.48 28.52 
Main Workers 63.76 35.35 67.41 18.33 
Main Cultivators 10.30 4.75 22.59 1.11 
Main Agricultural Labourers 39.60 28.91 25.37 15.56 
Main Household Workers 3.76 0.40 0.00 0.37 
Marginal Workers 0.40 0.59 4.07 10.19 
Marginal Cultivators 0.40 0.00 0.19 0.56 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
0.00 0.59 3.52 9.26 
Marginal Household Workers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 
 
Madhabpur (Village) 
 Male 2001 Female 2001 Male 2011 Female 2011 
Total Workers  56.96 43.04 62.27 37.73 
Main Workers 46.09 1.30 62.27 28.94 
Main Cultivators 16.96 0.43 21.25 0.00 
Main Agricultural Labourers 26.06 0.87 34.80 28.57 
Main Household Workers 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marginal Workers 10.87 41.74 0.00 8.79 
Marginal Cultivators 6.52 7.39 0.00 0.00 
Marginal Agricultural 
Labourers 
3.91 22.17 0.00 0.37 
Marginal Household Workers 0.00 12.71 0.00 6.59 
Source: Census of India, Primary Census Abstract, West Bengal, 2001, 2011 
Box 3.2: Percentage of Different Categories of Workers to Total Workforce 
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The predominant occupation for men and women in Chinsurah is agricultural wage work, 
followed by cultivation for men and housework for women. These agricultural 
labourers/cultivators, identified as the classes of labour, are dependent on agriculture 
(whether wage work or cultivation). While male labourers do branch out and look for non-
agricultural work, this is almost absent for female labourers, as evident in the census data 
shown in Box 3.2. 
The changes observed over the ten-year period across the district, sub-district and villages 
show an overall increase in female agricultural labourers in region. The jump is particularly 
steep in the case of female (main) agricultural wage workers in Madhabpur. Bardhanagar 
witnessed a decline in the number of female (main) agricultural wage workers. The number 
of female cultivators in the two villages registered a decline. In comparison, male workers 
recorded an increase in both agricultural wage work and in cultivation. These trends are 
explained with fewer female activities available in agriculture in the region, and with 
increased competition for agricultural jobs with men. Table 3.12 below highlights this 






































































































































Bagdi 10.33 0.44 0 2.64 0 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.44 1.32 
Bauri 14.51 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.44 0 0.88 2.42 
Brahmin 0 0 0 2.42 0.44 0.22 1.10 1.32 0.66 3.08 
Dom 0.22 0 0.44 0.22 0 0 0 0.66 0.22 0.22 
Goala 0 0 0 0.44 0 0 0 0 0.22 1.10 
Handi 1.54 0 0.22 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0.44 
Karmakar 0 0 0 0.22 0 0.22 0.22 0 0.22 1.54 
Kazi 0 0 0 0 0 0.66 0.22 0 0 0.44 
Khoira 7.47 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 0.22 1.76 
Mahisya 0.22 0 0 2.64 0 0.66 0 0.44 0 0.88 
Moira 0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mollah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.44 
Muchi 0.44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sadgop 0 0 0 2.86 0 0 0 0.66 0 0.66 
Santhals 7.91 0 1.54 1.32 0 0 1.54 0.22 0.22 1.10 
Sheikh 0 0 0 3.52 0 0 0 0.66 0.22 5.93 
Sunni 0 0 0 1.32 0 0 0 0 0 0.88 
Tanti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 
Total 42.64 0.44 2.42 17.80 0.44 2.42 3.74 4.18 3.52 22.42 
Table 3.12: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Male Occupations in Chinsurah 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Madhabpur and Bardhanagar. 
 
                                                          
65  Respondents categorised as Others are much higher in Chinsurah (22.42 per cent) compared to Aranthangi 
(16.06 percent). A closer look at Table 3.12 reveals that a high percentage of Brahmins and Sheikhs occupy 
this category, whereas those from the laboring class are much less. The Brahmins are employed as railways 
attendants, electricians and school teachers. A large number of the Sheikhs migrate to Gujarat and 
Maharashtra for embroidery work. The Bauris and Bagdis usually find seasonal employment as loaders in 
retail markets and mills. However, this work is available for short periods of time and the labourers in 
Chinsurah continue to complain of a dearth of non-agricultural jobs in the region. In order to combat this 
problem, male labourers often carry out MGNREGA work. 
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The male agricultural labourers constitute a majority of the workforce. This category 
comprises of labourers from the Santhal, Bauri, Bagdi and Khoira (ST) community. Unlike 
in Aranthangi, construction does not feature as a prominent employment sector for male 
labourers. Moreover, very few male labourers are engaged in casual daily wage 
employment (0.44 percent), which indicates the dependence on agricultural wage work. 
Shopkeeping and vendoring are alternate occupations for male labourers in the region.  As 
observed in Table 3.12, a majority of male cultivators are Sheikhs, Mahisyas and Brahmins.  
Female occupations in Chinsurah show results similar to those calculated from the Census 












































































































































Bagdi 10.39 0.43 0 0.43 4.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bauri 15.15 0.22 0 0 2.38 0 0 0 0 0.22 0.22 
Brahmin 0 0 0 0.22 8.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dom 0.65 0 0 0 1.52 0 0 0 0.43 0 0 
Goala 0 0.43 0 0 2.16 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Handi 1.73 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Karmakar 0 0 0 0 1.73 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 
Kazi 0 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 0 0.65 0 0 
Khoira 6.49 0.22 0 0 2.60 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 
Mahisya 0 0 0 0 4.55 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 
Moira 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mollah 0 0 0 0 0.43 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 
Muchi 0.43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sadgop 0 0 0 0 4.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Santhals 10.82 0 0.65 1.08 1.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sheikh 0 0 0 0.43 9.09 0 0 0.43 0.65 0 0 
Sunni 0 0 0 0.22 0.65 0 0 0 1.30 0 0 
Tanti 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 45.67 1.30 0.65 2.38 45.24 0.22 0.22 0.43 3.46 0.22 0.22 
Table 3.13: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Female Occupations in Chinsurah. 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Madhabpur and Bardhanagar. 
 
The percentage of women engaged in agricultural wage work is marginally higher than 
men. In addition, though small in number, 1.30 percent of female labourers are engaged in 
casual daily wage employment. The casual daily wage employment identified by these 
women are MGNREGA work. This indicates that women in Chinsurah have limited access 
to MGNREA work (discussed in Chapter 6).  
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The number of cultivators recorded in this region is very small (2.38 percent). This is 
primarily because cultivation is not considered to be a female activity. Women who do 
participate do so in the capacity of unpaid farmers. This figure is higher than those involved 
in casual daily wage work. The reason for this is that even though it is not socially accepted, 
at the time of survey, female respondents identified themselves as cultivators.  
 A significant proportion of women are engaged in embroidery. Though spread across 
different caste groups, these women predominantly belong to Muslim households. This 
income generating activity does not require women to leave the premises of the household 
(a restriction of mobility put in place by the religion, and social position of the household). 
The local Self-Help Group Bandhan (discussed in Chapter 5) promotes embroidery among 
these women. Despite these multiple economic activities taking place in the villages, a 
majority of women identify with their gender ascribed roles of being a housewife. This is 
in lesser percentage among the classes of labour in comparison to the landed classes.  
As the data tabulated shows, a significant proportion of the classes of labour rely on 
agricultural wage work. This is reflected in Table 3.14 which identifies the work most 

















Bagdi 6.93 6.06 2.81 
Bauri 11.69 6.49 0 
Brahmin 0 3.90 5.19 
Dom 0.22 1.30 1.08 
Goala 0 1.08 1.52 
Handi 0.87 1.08 0.43 
Karmakar 0 1.30 1.08 
Kazi 0 1.30 0.00 
Khoira 6.49 2.81 0.22 
Mahisya 0.22 1.08 3.46 
Moira 0 0 0.22 
Mollah 0 0.43 0.22 
Muchi 0.43 0 0 
Sadgop 0 0.87 3.25 
Santhals 7.58 3.46 2.60 
Sheikh 0.22 3.46 6.49 
Sunni 0 0.65 1.30 
Tanti 0 0.22 0 
Total 34.63 35.50 29.87 
Table 3.14: Caste-Wise Percentage Distribution of Work Most Preferred in Chinsurah 
Source: Household Level Village Census in Chinsurah, 2012 
*Percentages calculated on total population of Madhabpur and Bardhanagar. 
 
The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes preferred agricultural wage work as this 
was work that brought in household earnings. Those who preferred cultivation belonged 
to the landowning classes. A significant number of respondents across all caste groups 
prefer non-agricultural work, as this work was associated with higher pay. Brahmins and 
Sheikhs constitute part of the skilled/ professional workforce and therefore, entry into 
non-agricultural work results in higher pay and higher status within the village community.  
This section discussed the socio-economic characteristics of the two regions. The different 
occupations can be placed within the hierarchy of wage labour proposed by Lerche (2010), 
who uses Bernstein’s concept of classes of labour. Formal occupations higher up in the 
hierarchy, are occupied by the upper castes/ ruling castes. Casual agricultural labourers are 
lower down in the hierarchy, and these are occupied by the lower caste groups within the 
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village society. These occupations are associated with low incomes which maintains the 
class and caste positions of the classes of labour. As observed in the data sets provided, 
and by Chen (2008, cited in Lerche, 2010), women are found at the bottom of this 
hierarchy, employed in low waged work. 
Within this labour hierarchy, there are differences observed in the two regions. Unlike in 
Chinsurah, Aranthangi does not show such a strong inclination to agricultural wage work. 
There is greater movement of men to non-farm activities. This vacuum created by men is 
filled by women who take up agricultural wage work and cultivation. The effects of these 
processes condition the nature of work available, the form of payment received, and the 
labour relation itself.  
The following section provides an account of the different agricultural wage labour 
relations observed in the region that vary with season and with crop.  
3.3 Labour Relations in Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
The primary focus of this thesis is on female labour, and this section delineates rural female 
labour relations in Aranthangi and Chinsurah.  The discussion in the previous section on 
agricultural crop cycles and economic activities of the region, provides an indication to the 
nature of work made available in the two regions, and how this is differentiated along lines 
of gender.  
Agricultural wage labour has specific tasks assigned to men and women, with certain 
periods of overlap. The wage rates obtained in each of these activities varies. The wage 
gap in agriculture is also found in other activities. Table 3.15 below provides information on 











Similar wages are observed for 
groundnut in Aranthangi and 
potato in Chinsurah 
Rs.80/-  to Rs.100/-per 
day 
Rs.80/- to Rs.100/- per 
day 
Chinsurah Rs.60/- plus two kilos 
of rice in kind 
Rs.120/- per day, bidi 
as payment in kind 
Aranthangi Harvesting (paddy) Rs.110/- per day Rs.300/- per day 
Men have to 
carry/transport 
bundles of rice to the 
granary                 
Chinsurah  Rs.60/- per day plus 
two kilos of rice 
Rs.150/- per day (no 
payment taken in 
kind) 
Aranthangi Sugarcane cutting leaves and 
stalks 
Rs.110/- per day Rs.180/- per day 
Chinsurah Potato sowing and harvesting - Rs.150/-per day with 
payment in kind 
tobacco, or bath oils 
Chinsurah Potato weeding Rs.60/- per day plus 
two kilos of rice 
 
Aranthangi Horticulture Rs.80/- per day - 
Aranthangi Ploughing – 1. Tractors 
                         2. Ox plough 
 
 Rs.350 /- per day 
Rs.300/- per day 
Chinsurah                          3. Power tillers  Rs.150/- per day 
Aranthangi Fertilisers Rs.100/- per day Rs.150/- per day 
Chinsurah   Rs.120/- per day 
Aranthangi Loading Rs.100/- per day Rs.250/- per day 
Chinsurah  Rs.90/- per day Rs.200/- per day 
Aranthangi Construction Rs.250/- per day Rs.350/- per day 
Chinsurah MGNREGA work Rs.100/- per day Rs.100/-per day 
Aranthangi  Rs.130/- per day Rs.130/- per day 
Chinsurah Shopkeeper (General Stores) Rs.7000/- per month Rs.7000/- per month 
Aranthangi  Rs.9000/- per month Rs.9000/- per month 
Aranthangi Driver 1. Auto rickshaw 
               
               2. Bus 
 Rs. 10,000/- per 
month 
Rs.7000/- per month 
Aranthangi Aaganwadi Worker Rs.2500/- per month - 
Chinsurah Domestic maid  
1. As bandha kishen 
2. Only working as maid 
 
One meal per day 
Rs.1500/- per month 
 
- 
Table 3.15: Wage structure and Wage Gaps in Aranthangi and Chinsurah. 
Source: Field Work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, 2011-2012 
Table 3.15 provides a description of some of the common occupations found in the two 
regions. Distinct wage gaps between women and men exist in occupations such as loading. 
The male wages are more than double in both the regions. The reason provided by 
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employers is that this work is tedious and hard, and women cannot put in similar amounts 
of physical effort as male labourers.  
A look at agricultural activities in the two regions reveal that there are certain activities 
that continue to remain male-specific tasks, such as ploughing. The wage rates were the 
same for male and female labourers in Aranthangi for sowing and weeding activities. 
However, with such low pay, men rarely participated in these activities – referred to as 
female activities. For similar activities in Chinsurah, there were differences in male and 
female wages. An explanation provided by male labourers and employers in the region is 
that female labourers take part of their wages in rice, as payment in kind. While this might 
seem a plausible justification, the total amount does not equal male wages. The price of 2 
kilos of rice, at the time of survey, came to a total of Rs.40/- which brings the total wages 
to Rs.100/-, still less than the male wages. 
During harvest season, male wages in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, is almost double that of 
female wages. The employers provide these high wages because the men have to carry 
bundles of grains to certain collection points. This is considered loading work; which men 
are more capable of doing than female labourers. Landowners feel that paying this amount 
to male labourers is profitable, as they do not have to pay extra for labourers to carry out 
exclusively loading tasks. Female labourers, in both the regions, were seen to carry out 
similar loading activities, but they do not receive any recognition as it is predominantly a 
male activity. Female participation in these activities is often understood as help that they 
provide to male labourers, who are members of their household. Consequently, female 
work participation is hidden due to their domestic relations.  
The wage payments received in the different occupations highlight how women continue 
to remain lower down in the wage hierarchy. The positions of female labourers in this 
hierarchy is further emboldened through the nature of work and the work contract, an 




3.3.1 Tied labour relations  
The type of work described above can be broadly divided into agricultural and non-
agricultural categories. This section focusses specifically on agricultural tasks, the nature 
of the work contract, and the ways in which I identify female tied labourers in Aranthangi 
and Chinsurah.  
The labour relations identified in the two field sites within female agricultural wage work 
are- a) casual daily wage labour engaged in agricultural work and b) permanent labour 
contracts- who have annual contracts with a particular employer. In Aranthangi, these 
annual contracts are not akin to the pannaiyal labour relations. The labourer in the annual 
contract works for the landowner and receives monthly wages. The respondents in 
Aranthangi reported that this form of labour relation was on a decline as they can make 
more money if they work for multiple employers/landowners. Though not a common 
labour practice, there are a few employers who still maintain these annual labour 
contracts. Permanent/annual contracts in Chinsurah, are determined through the nature 
of loan taken from the employer. Usually female labourers enter such relations often 
becoming bandha kishens. The different labour relations experience different degrees of 
unfreedom and labour tying. 
The wage structure in both the regions is more or less fixed. However, this is subject to 
change depending on the individual labourer relation or even on the work location. Those 
who work as tied labourers are paid less than the general wage rate.  
I identify tied labour as a labour arrangement where cash (or at times payment in kind) is 
lent out to a labourer. The determining factor is the repayment of the loan, which is done 
either through the extraction of labour service (see Ramachandran, 1990) or through 
labour time. Labour service can include both waged and unpaid activities. In labour time, 
the labourer works for a particular employer/landowner and repays the loan through 
reduced wages. The distinction between labour time and labour service is fluid, in that, 
labour time can include unpaid activities. While male labourers in both regions resist 
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carrying out any unpaid activity, the same is not true for female labourers. For female 
labourers, carrying out unpaid activities seems a natural extension of their gendered roles, 
activities that male labourers would never take up (Kapadia, 1995; Garikipati, 2009).  
In Aranthangi, I interviewed 35 women from the classes of labour (32 landless labourers 
and 3 marginal/small farmers). From these 12 female labourers had taken short-term loans 
from landowners that they were repaying at the time of survey. There were 21 female 
respondents who had taken loans from private money lenders, and were repaying this 
money through agricultural wage work. Two respondents reported that they were not 
working at the time. Three female labourers reported that they had taken much larger 
loans from private money lenders and landowners that they were trying to repay. At no 
point did any of the female labourers refer to themselves as tied labour, nor did they want 
to associate their current position to that of the traditional pannaiyal relation66.   
The pannaiyal is a fully attached labourer, who carries out both agricultural wage work and 
housework. This labour arrangement is an outcome of debt bondage. In Aranthangi, as 
recent at 2001, only men entered such labour relations. This gender composition has 
changed with male labourers moving out of exploitative agricultural wage labour. As a 
result, these positions are filled by female labourers (see da Corta and Venkatesharlu, 
1999; Garikipati, 2009). The traditional pannaiyal, tied to a landowner for long periods of 
time (sometimes over twelve years), is fast declining (see Heyer, 2000). This is evident from 
the data set where only 3 female labourers were caught up with long-term loan repayment. 
The more prominent tied labour relation identified in Aranthangi is an outcome of short-
term cash advances (see De Neve and Carswell, 2011). These cash advances result in more 
                                                          
66 Pannaiyal relations bring along with it a social stigma. This stigma is particularly strong among the 




monetised forms of debt that exist in casual daily coolie wage labour and in permanent 
labour67 relations.  
During the period in which female labourers are tied to the landowners, they receive 
reduced pay. The amount deducted from their daily earnings determined how quickly they 
could repay the loan. However, this reduced wage was not a fixed amount and varies 
according to the needs of the labourers. Female labourers in Aranthangi reported receiving 
wages as low as Rs.40/- per day and at times as high as Rs.80/- per day. There are times 
when the labourer does not take any reduced wage, which then prolongs the period of 
indebtedness. In Aranthangi, despite the loans, female labourers are not tied down to a 
single landowner. If no work is available with the current landowner, they have the 
freedom to go and work for other landowners. The female labourers also have the freedom 
to change their landowners by transferring their debt onto a new landowner68.  
The short-term loans reduce the period of tying for these female labourers. They only 
remain tied to the landowner until the loan is repaid. However, the very nature of the loan 
(short-term) results in these female labourers taking numerous loans during a single year. 
This keeps them tied for multiple periods of time in a year. In addition to short-term loans, 
the purpose of the loan also affects the labour relations. In Aranthangi, female labourers 
spoke of how they worked to repay loans taken by male members in their family. In 
addition, female labourers who are also tenant farmers borrow money for cultivation. Even 
though they borrow from multiple informal sources, the landowners still emerge as an 
                                                          
67 Only Pallars worked as permanent labourers in Aranthangi. This labour relation provided the Pallars with 
job security all the year round. Within this labour relation, the female labourers often took short-term loans 
that they repaid through their labour time.   
 
68 Male labourers in Chinsurah, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, restrict themselves to working in high 
paid jobs, and more importantly, do not want to engage in agricultural wage work. Moreover, the male 
labourers would prefer sitting at home rather than carrying out any low paid agricultural task. Male labourers 
in Aranthangi rarely ever take part in activities such as weeding (see Table 3.14), as they receive very low 
wages. When they do take part in such activities, it is because they have not obtained any work for a long 




important option for these labourers. Dependency on the landowner is created and/or 
maintained through credit and land relations (discussed in Chapter 4).   
In Chinsurah, the nature of the tied labour relation was different from that observed in 
Aranthangi. Out of the 36 female labourers interviewed, 19 identified themselves as 
bandha kishens, and the remaining 17 female labourers were indebted to the landowner 
(as an outcome of short-term loans). I interviewed one female marginal farmer who was 
indebted to a landowner. Unlike in Aranthangi, the female labourers relied on landowners 
for loans. In fact, the landowners were their first point of contact. Like the wage payments 
for these female labourers, loan payments were also taken in cash, kind or cash and kind. 
Female labourers took short-term loans to overcome any shortages they were 
experiencing at the time. These usually pertained to food shortages. Due to the fluctuating 
price of food commodities, female labourers take a large part of their loans in kind (this 
was usually rice).  
The repayment of the short-term loans came with the promise of obtaining work for a few 
days. These loans were repaid through labour time, and very rarely is any unpaid service 
drawn out from these women. For these casual daily wage labourers, repayment was 
confined to agricultural wage work. Like in Aranthangi, the short-term loans in Chinsurah 
results in the female labourer entering tied labour contracts multiple times in a year.  
In addition to these short-term labour tying processes, long term tied labour processes 
were also observed in Chinsurah. These tied labourers are identified as bandha kishens. 
Bandha Kishens in Chinsurah are women who are either SC or ST. The initial point of entry 
into such tied labour relations is the large loans. The bandha kishens work for reduced 
wages to repay the loan.  Despite having taken a larger single loan, the bandha kishens 
continue to take smaller loans throughout the year which keeps them indebted for longer 
periods of time. This labour relation shows the overlap between labour service and labour 
time. The female labourers carry out agricultural wage work and household chores for the 
landowner. The household chores are an extension of labour service, where these activities 
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remain unpaid. Bandha Kishens identify payments to these domestic chores with the one 
meal they are provided.  
Female labourers preferred the bandha kishen system as it provides them with work the 
entire year, at least at the landowner’s house if not on the agricultural field. This is 
particularly important as female labourers have to compete with male labourers for 
agricultural jobs in the region. The security of a job, coupled with easy access to loans for 
these labourers comes at the cost of reduced wages and reduced freedom. Recognising 
oneself as a bandha kishen is not accompanied by shame, unlike in Aranthangi. In 
Chinsurah, to be a bandha kishen is the easiest way for female agricultural labourers to 
secure work.  
A bandha kishen need not necessarily remain a labourer. Over a period of time, the 
landowner might lease land to the labourer. This process results in the bandha kishen 
working as both labourer and cultivator. This process is particularly important in the 
context of Chinsurah, where due to cultural/social constraints women do not generally 
cultivate land. The bandha kishen relation increases the dependency of the labourer upon 
the landowner through access of loans and land. However, while the labourer might 
recognise that they want to remain a bandha kishen, this takes place in the absence of any 
other feasible choice, particularly for female labourers.  
This section discussed the tied labour relations observed in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, 
among female labourers. A majority of the female labourers interviewed in Aranthangi 
were tied for short periods of time. In Chinsurah, there were female labourers who remain 
tied for both short and long periods of time. The nature of the labour tying arrangement is 
determined through credit, labour and land relations. In addition, the socio-political 
backdrop of the region further shapes the labour relations.   
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a brief outline of the socio-economic structures of the field sites. 
Tied labour arrangements in both regions emerge through a relation of debt. These labour 
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arrangements are generated out of indebtedness but the relation is not so simple or 
straightforward. Credit is one way to generate indebtedness. Credit and debt might ensure 
a pliant workforce but this labour relation needs to be understood through the social and 
political conditions that give rise to an indebted labourer. I identify these conditions 
through interlocking transactions of land, labour and credit and the effect of large state 
policies on labour relations.  
The following four chapters highlight the interlocking transactions between land, labour 
and credit and how each relation gives rise to indebted labour. The body of this dissertation 
explores the conditions through which tied labour is produced politically through a set of 
forces including state involvement, or its lack thereof. As a consequence, I show how in 
two different rice growing regions gender differentiated production politics and labour 







Chapter 4: Tenancy as a Route to Tied Labour? 
 
Gayathri, Prema and Indira, three Pallar agricultural labourers from Karaimedu were 
returning from the fields after sowing groundnuts. They went and sat in the church 
courtyard near their homes, discussing the day’s work with each other. This is an everyday 
practice of these women, where they take a break after work and share their stories before 
immersing themselves into household chores for the rest of the day. On this day, the 
women complained that the weather was becoming hot with each passing day, making 
their work all the more difficult. In the middle of their conversation, one of the women, 
Indira, jumped up and began shouting out to the younger girls to “go and catch the thieves”. 
We noticed a group of women in the forest adjacent to the church that Indira and other 
villagers were trying to chase away. “This is our forest land!” exclaimed Indira upon her 
return. “The women from the neighbouring village were trying to steal our firewood. This is 
all the land we are left with, we need to protect it and its resources. We were all marginal 
landholders once but with time we have had to sell our land to the urimaiyalars (large 
landowners). Today we work for them as coolie labourers and lease land from them. We are 
completely dependent on them. This is what the land reforms have done for us”.  
Pallar women in Chenguttai have not received any benefit from land reforms, apart from 
the panchayat allocating 2 acres of forest land to their village. The Pallars used to be 
marginal landholders but now do not own any cultivable land. Pallar women in Chenguttai 
and the Aranthangi region cultivate land through tenancy arrangements.  They believe 
that land reforms on its own are not sufficient and they need more benefits from the state. 
In Madhabpur and Bardhanagar villages in Chinsurah a majority of the tenant farmers are 
men, usually working as bhaag chaasis (share cropper). Female labourers cultivate land as 
unpaid family labour. In instances where I came across female cultivators, they had taken 
land on short-term lease to grow vegetable. Access to this land is determined through their 
labour relation with the landowners, as women in Chinsurah do not directly enter into a 
tenancy contracts.  
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The two regions have different routes to tenancy that are conditioned through socio-
political and cultural practices. However, in both instances, there is an interlocking of land 
and labour relations, where the access of one factor market affects the other. This chapter 
discusses how tenancy arrangements affect labour relations, and the multiple ways in 
which female labour is drawn into labour tying arrangements. I examine the various 
tenancy arrangements that exist in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, differentiated along line of 
gender, caste and class positions. The comparison highlights the extent to which female 
labourers can be understood as independent cultivators, or as labourers who cultivate land.  
As Indira mentions, all that land reforms have done for them is to generate the 
simultaneous growth of dependence and indebtedness.  Such a situation cannot be 
understood only along the effects of unequal assets (de Janvery, 1981) but needs to be 
understood as asymmetrical relations of power and dominance that continue to lie in the 
hands of larger landowners/rural elite, reinforced through interlocking transactions 
between land, labour and credit.   
Tenancy arrangements emerge as a choice available to women in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah, who belong to the classes of labour (and are looking for other means to secure 
their survival). A total of 35 female agricultural labourers and marginal landholders were 
interviewed in Aranthangi, out which 32 (91.42 percent) were engaged in tenancy 
arrangements. Chinsurah does not have a high number of female cultivators, as this is not 
considered a female task in the region. However, women do cultivate land along with their 
husbands.  
The high number of female tenants, especially in Aranthangi, is indicative of increasing 
polarisation of land holding within the backdrop of ‘progressive’ land reforms. The 
polarisation of land implies that relations of power and dominance continue to be 
maintained by the larger landowners. To what extent then do these processes place 
restrictions on the ways and means of survival of the classes of labour, and how does this 
affect the move to become independent female cultivators? 
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This chapter, in answering these questions discusses the interlocking transactions of land, 
labour and credit generated within the tenancy arrangements, and the extent of labour 
tying experienced by these female cultivators in particular.  
Sections 4.1 and 4.3 of this chapter explain the land and tenancy reforms that took place 
in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Sections 4.2 and 4.4 explain the tenancy patterns that 
existed prior to the introduction of land reforms, those that are still in operation in 
Aranthangi and Chinsurah, and how these arrangements result in attachment to land and 
in turn to the landowner. Chinsurah witnessed movement out of the bargadar relationship 
(by men) but this was not substituted by female bargadars. For women to cultivate land 
there was little or no option but to become bandha kishens. In Aranthangi, I observed that 
a large number of rural female labourers are tenant farmers, and are now indebted to 
landowners and moneylenders, where payment is extracted through labour time. This 
aspect is highlighted in Section 4.5, which uncovers how attachment, driven by tenancy 
arrangements, is a mechanism used by the capitalists to appropriate surplus.  
4.1 Land Reforms and Land Ceilings in Tamil Nadu 
 In Tamil Nadu, land reforms began in 1961, when the first land ceiling legislation allowed 
a family of 5 to own a maximum of 30 acres and for larger families to own up to 60 acres.  
However, a large quantity of land was exempted under this law:  land under plantations, 
orchards, coconut gardens, fuel trees, sugarcane cultivation, land donated under the 
bhoodan movement69 and up to 50 acres of land that was used exclusively for grazing. This 
meant that in reality there was very little land that could be recorded as surplus 
(Sonachalam, 1970). The 1972 revised law cut the land ceilings to 15 and 30 acres for small 
and large families respectively. Exemptions under the 1972 law included land that was 
converted into orchards or areca nut gardens before the 1st of July 1959, land used for fuel 
                                                          
69 Bhoodan refers to the Land gift movement started by Vinoba Bhave in 1951. A Gandhian, Vinoba convinced 
the village zamindar (landlord) (in Poochampally, Andhra Pradesh) to donate part of their land to the landless 
Dalit villagers who were agitating at that point of time. This is considered as one of the first land reform 
movements. However, it is criticised on the grounds of merely housing the landless since the rights of the 
land were not given up and this land could not be sold.  
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trees, sugarcane cultivation, dairy farming and lands owned by religious or educational 
institutions (Thangaraj, 2003: p. 15). Under the amended law, every son in the family could 
have a separate unit, which was one of the ways in which large landholders worked around 
the land ceiling70.  
At present, under the revised land ceiling act, the division of land based on yield and 
irrigation is as follows: 4.86 acres per individual for irrigated land with two crops (standard 
acre), 12.41 acres for irrigated land with one crop and 24.48 acres for dry land 
(www.indiaagronet.com). In both Karaimedu and Thirasu the landholders did not mention 
4.86 but 5 acres. They may have been rounding up figures for ease. However, this raises a 
question on whether or not landlords and the government officials are colluding in 
determining land ceilings.  
4.1.1 Tenancy Reforms in Tamil Nadu 
Tenancy reform legislations were important to secure tenancy rights. The first Act to be 
passed was the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act in 1955. This law set in place 
a platform upon which complaints about eviction, resumption of owners, continuance of 
leases and the restoration of land to evicted tenants could be addressed (Thangaraj, 2003). 
Sonachalam (1970) reports that despite this provision, twelve years after the enforcement 
of this Act, only 24, 555 complaints were filed in court. Protests were rare, as not much was 
done to disrupt the social order. Insufficient knowledge about the procedure of filing 
complaints in court and reluctance to get embroiled in such matters meant that tenants 
were evicted without much resistance (Singh, 2003).  
The first attempt to incorporate tenants into the land reform legislation was made in 1956 
under the Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act. This Act 
demanded the documentation of all tenancy arrangements and the maintenance of 
                                                          
70 The amount of land that could be owned varied with the different types of land, whether it was standard 
or ordinary. This meant that the quantity of land owned was determined through land usage. For those plots 
of land irrigated with two crops the ceiling was 15 standard acres. For ordinary acres the land ceiling was 
within a range of 12 to 60 acres. Within these limits set by the State Government of Tamil Nadu, farmers 
could own land under any permutation or combination. 
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reliable and complete records for the same. This was done in the hope of minimising the 
exploitative effects of oral leases (State Planning Commission 2005-06). Following this, 
the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants (payment of fair rent) Act was enforced in 1956, which 
puts forward a fair rent payable to the landowner by the tenant/cultivator. The cultivator 
has to pay 40 per cent of the normal gross produce or its equivalent for wet land cultivation. 
For wet land using lift irrigation, the stipulated rent is 35 per cent of the normal gross 
produce or its value in money. For any other type of land, the rent was 33 1/3 per cent of 
the normal gross value or its value in money (State Planning Commission 2005-06). The 
Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Act was amended in in 1980 and the rent was reduced 
from 33 1/3 to 25 per cent. 
In 1972, the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Arrears of Rent (Relief) Act was passed. This 
Act provided security to the tenants who were facing eviction on the grounds of non-
payment of the arrears to their rent. Under section 3 of this Act, if the rent for the current 
fasli71 year (from 1st July 1971 to 30th June 1972) was paid, all arrears of the rent would have 
to be discharged (Singh, 2009). Despite these provisions and amendments, I observed that 
in Aranthangi, tenants still paid around 50 per cent of their yield to the landowners (who 
were often the larger landowners), a rate for both wet lands and rain-fed lands. In fields 
irrigated with pump sets, the landowners received two thirds of the total produce. None of 
the tenants I spoke to had heard of the Act. A common explanation provided by some of 
the DYFI members in this area was that landlords did not want to lose out on the land that 
they owned and therefore withheld such information. However, when this was brought up 
with the small farmers, they had not heard of such a law. The landowners said they did not 
know about it well enough since this was not something that pertained to them directly. 
This is an example of how information that is provided by the state percolates down only 
to the large landowners, who pass on this information only if they think it necessary. 
                                                          
71 Fasli year refers to the harvest year.  
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Control over information further increases power in the hands of the landowners (who are 
also the ruling elite), securing their position within this village society.  
4.2 Tenancy Arrangements and Land Transactions in Aranthangi 
The threat of land reforms and the extension of rights to tenants resulted in many of the 
landowners taking their land back from their tenants and cultivating it themselves with the 
help of coolie workers (Mencher, 1978). This move does not mean that tenancy 
arrangements have been done away with. In Aranthangi, 36 of the 42 respondents, who 
are agricultural labourers and marginal landholders, lease land. However, these do not 
adhere to the traditional tenancy patterns.  
Tenancy has an important role to play, as not all land owned by landowners can be 
cultivated (this is either due size of the landholding or the distance of the land from the 
village). Under such conditions the landowners operate as rentiers and lease out land for 
cultivation, without the threat of losing ownership of land and simultaneously increasing 
the accumulation of capital. At the other end, the landless labourers and marginal farmers 
who enter into various tenancy agreements view this as a way of eking out a living and not 
being completely dependent on the landlord (Mencher, 1978). This view is contentious 
because, as we shall see, the degree of dependency varies with the kind of tenancy 
agreement one enters into. The villages of Karaimedu and Thirasu both showed a high 
incidence of tenancy arrangements. The following table shows the number of respondents 










Total Number of 
Respondents 
Lease in Land Lease out Land 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Large 
Landowners 
22.95% 1.63% 16.93% 0% 22.95% 1.63% 
Medium 
Landowners 
6.55% 0% 4.91% 0% 6.55% 0% 
Classes of 
labour 
11.44% 57.37% 6.55% 52.45% 3.27% 0% 
Table 4.1: Class Wise Distribution of Number of Persons Engaged in Tenancy in Aranthangi 
Source: Interviews carried out in Karaimedu and Thirasu from November 2011- March 2012.             
*Percentages calculated based on total number of respondents interviewed. 
 
A majority of the respondents belonging to the classes of labour (85.71 percent), lease land 
for cultivation. The large and medium landowners lease in as well as lease out land. How 
do we explain this movement towards tenancy, where on the one hand they act as 
“instruments of agrarian capitalism” (Hart 1986), and on the other, are mechanisms for 
tenants to escape usury? A closer look at field observations of tenancy patterns might be 
able to point to the divergent rationale in the study area.  
4.2.1 Ensuring Production and Controlling Land through Tenancy Arrangements 
Different tenancy patterns were observed in Karaimedu and Thirasu. Table 4.2 identifies 
these tenancy arrangements.  Sharecropping is one such tenancy pattern, locally referred 
to as vāram. In a vāram contract the share of the produce is 50:50 for irrigation either by 
tank, channel or spring canal. For ground water or ‘pump-set’ irrigated land, the 
landowners receive one third of the produce and one third goes to the owner of the pump-
set. The landowner is almost always the owner of the pump-set, which means that he 
receives two thirds of the produce. The break-up of the share of production is however, not 
so straightforward. This is because tenants often cover their production cost from loans 
borrowed from the landowner, generating relations of indebtedness and obligations 







Share of produce 
to tenant 
Investment  Caste Groups  Class 
Categories 
Vāram  50:50 for tank 
irrigation 
 
1/3rd for ground 
water irrigation (for 
groundwater 
 
1/3rd goes to the 
landlord,  
 
1/3rd to the owner of 
the tube well.  
(As they are 
generally the same 
people the landlord 
ends up with 2/3rd of 
the produce) 
Input cost borne by 







(in the village there 
was only one 
Roman Catholic 
family who were 




Al-vāram  After deduction of 
input cost profits 
are shared 50:50.  
 
Places with 
irrigation 3/4th goes 
to the landlord and 
1/4th to the tenant 
Input cost borne by 
landlord.  
 









Kuthagai Land rent paid to 
the landlord. For 
paddy- 3 sacks of 
rice for 100 kulis of 
land.  
 
For other crops- Rs. 
2000/- for 100 kulis 
of land 
 
Input cost borne by 
the tenant and the 
only payment that 
is made to the 










Otti Land mortgage -
monthly payments 
made till 
repayment of the 
loan amount 
Big landlords are 
also the ones who 
provide the loans 
and if the loan 
amount cannot be 
repaid, the land 




Table 4.2: Land Tenancy Arrangements in Aranthangi 
Source: Fieldwork in Aranthangi, November 2011- March 2012 
Very few landholders were involved in vāram tenancy arrangements, often being restricted 
to middle and larger landowners - Thevars, wealthy Ambalakars and one Pallar Christian 
who has over 50 acres of land in his and his family’s name. Leasing land under a vāram 
contract is one way to build on their existing landed capital. This land is usually rented from 
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absentee landowners, who are the Chettiyars in this village, and from those Thevar 
families, whose landowners are too old to work; or where there is insufficient manpower 
within the household to control and maintain the land. Chettiyar-owned land receives 
payment in the form of land rent. Thevars and Ambalakars receive land rent and a portion 
of the produce as money. These farmers have much greater control over what was to be 
produced as well as the quality of grain grown. 
The classes of labour had much less control over what to produce. The small farmers in 
Aranthangi complained about not being able to experiment with crops which could 
possibly get them higher yields and more money. Apart from reducing yields, another 
reason for a decline in vāram contracts in the villages is to do with a decline in labour 
availability.72 This has resulted in landowners shifting to al- vāram or kuthagai contracts.  
In al- vāram tenancy arrangements, the tenant provides only his or her labour power and 
maybe even the bullocks (this is rarely done as all farmers now use power tillers and 
tractors).  All other production costs are borne by the landowner. The payment received 
for cultivating land varies from place to place. After the initial cost incurred by the landlord 
is deducted, the profits are divided between the tenant and the landlord. As Mencher 
(1978) observed in Chinglepet, in lands with no or poor irrigation, one-quarter of the 
produce goes to the tenant and the remaining three-quarters to the landowner. The share 
of profit that the tenant receives is reduced if there is tube well irrigation. The large and 
medium landowners prefer al- vāram, as they believe that the tenants have an incentive to 
work better since they receive a portion of the produce. Moreover, the tenants would make 
use of the good fertilisers and seeds that are being provided by the landowners (Mencher, 
1978). In Aranthangi, it is usually marginal and small landholders who enter this 
                                                          
72 Labour is required for threshing, cleaning and boiling of rice. Threshing and cleaning can be done by 
harvesters, but only the large landowners have access to it and it is profitable for them to use. The larger 
population still uses family and hired labour to do these tasks. This is primarily carried out by women. 
However, with the gradual movement of women to work in the sugar factory, or with their husbands in the 




arrangement (primarily the Ambalakars and some Paraiyar households). In this contract 
the labour power is not restricted to cultivation alone but is utilised for threshing and 
cleaning of grains. Women are the key labourers who carry out this work, where it is 
treated as part of their coolie work and do not receive any extra payment for this labour 
time. This is usually the case when male tenant farmers are the cultivators, and their wives 
who accompany them, are unpaid workers. For women tenant farmers, threshing and 
cleaning of grains is a part of their tenancy contract. The amount of unpaid work is not 
challenged or taken up with the landlords as it ensures these labourers work for the next 
fasli year. The Paraiyars, in particular, prefer working for the landlords through such 
tenancy arrangements rather than working as agricultural labourers, as it provides them a 
sense of having moved out of the pannaiyal relationship.  
In both the tenancy patterns mentioned above, payment is dependent on yield. With 
agriculture becoming a far less sustainable occupation to remain in, a majority of 
landowners are turning towards kuthagai. From a total of 32 female respondents who lease 
land, 28 were involved in a kuthagai contract.  Under this system there is a fixed amount of 
land rent that needs to be paid to the landlords. This amount is paid irrespective of whether 
there is sufficient agricultural output or not. This system ensures fixed revenue from the 
land for landowners, irrespective of output and without any supervision of the tenant and 
crops (Mencher, 1978). In Karaimedu and Thirasu, women (Pallar and Paraiyar) entered 
such tenancy arrangements. Historically, women and landless labourers in the region 
engaged in this land tenancy due to the simplicity of calculation (Mencher, 1978). The 
notion prevails, and now kuthagai is synonymous with women's tenancy arrangements.  
Another important land transaction that underscores the process of polarisation of land, 
alongside the miniaturization of land, is otti (mortgage).  When a landowner (usually a 
small or marginal farmer) requires money for any pressing issue (as observed in the field), 
such as marriage expenses or medical expenses, the land is mortgaged to a larger 
landowner. The inability to repay the loan results in the landholders forfeiting rights to 
their land. Otti transactions were observed among Pallars and Ambalakars. At times when 
160 
 
the loan amount cannot be repaid, the borrowers continue to pay an interest on the loan 
amount to ensure continued ownership of land. These are very high interest rates with an 
average of around 10 percent per month.  
Entry into tenancy arrangements are differentiated along caste hierarchies and positions 
of privilege occupied within the rural society. During fieldwork, it was difficult to ascertain 
the landownership within these two villages (Karaimedu and Thirasu) on two counts. One 
that, the census records at the village level do not have a comprehensive caste-wise break 
up of landownership. Second, although this data can be found in the Block Development 
Office, or the patwari’s73 office, I was denied access to this data on three different counts74, 
having used three different sources to obtain this information. They provided me with the 
overall land usage within the village but did not give me information regarding individual 
land use. The concealing of information highlights the interlocking power relations 
between the landowners and local political structures; a mechanisms used by the rural elite 
to hold onto power.  
The importance of the different tenancy arrangements has changed over time. The most 
predominant tenancy arrangement in Karaimedu and Thirasu is the kuthagai contract. The 
Thevars’ control over land within the different tenancy arrangements has made them the 
economically and socially dominant community within this region. They are able to retain 
control over land not through one, but multiple tenancy patterns. Altering the traditional 
tenancy patterns (vāram and al- vāram) and withholding information to suit their needs 
                                                          
73 Patwari or Adhikari refers to the village accountant and is an administrative government position. The 
patwari keeps land use records at the household level for the villages under his/her jurisdiction 
74 The first time, I was denied access on the grounds of not having any permission to access these records. I 
then went to the village Pradhan and asked for permission. When I went back I was told that the information 
was too large and it was impossible to provide it on the same day, I tried to follow this up but was turned 
down. On my third attempt, I went with Sunderaj, a local headmaster of the village. However, this time I was 
told that they could not disclose such data to me as it was meant just for keeping a record for official 
purposes. It is here where the pradhan of the village stopped meeting with me personally, and would direct 
me to other local members in the village who did not have ability to persuade the Block Development Officer.   
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helps maintain the asymmetrical power relations. In doing so they ensure continuous 
production and surplus generation from their land.  
4.2.2 Capitalist Farmers and Multiple Tenancy patterns 
This section looks at the different tenancy arrangements identified among the landowning 
class.  
One of the largest landowners and capitalist farmers I interviewed in the village was 
Mannikam, a Roman Catholic who initially belonged to the Pallar caste. Mannikam is a 
retired Computer Engineering Professor from Arangthangi College of Engineering.  He 
claims to individually own only 10 acres in the village. However, numerous villagers both 
within Karaimedu (where he resides) and outside had informed me that Mannikam owns 
over 50 acres of land, which he had purchased. This information could not be verified in the 
interview with Mannikam so the following information gathered is based on the 10 acres 
in his name. Mannikam reported having both ancestral property and recently acquired 
property. He has a large family of nine siblings, and his father divided the property equally 
amongst the sons and daughters. His sisters got married and migrated to different regions, 
selling their share of the property to him. He cultivates around 6 acres of punjei land (dry 
land) and 4 acres of nanjei land (wet land), with around 2 acres kept aside for paddy 
cultivation. Initially he kept the rice for family consumption, where it would be threshed 
and boiled at home. Now with the dearth of labour, this has become a cumbersome 
process so he sells it immediately after harvest.  
 In addition to paddy, Mannikam cultivates a diverse range of crops including maize, 
vegetables, fruits, and sugarcane, and has invested in horticulture. In 2010-2011, he 
received profits from the sale of both watermelons and muskmelons, and therefore 
decided to grow more in this current year (2011-2012) by leasing 5 acres of land from one 
of his brothers. This land is generally dry and barren and Mannikam brings in water for 
irrigation. More importantly because it belongs to his brother, he is not concerned with 
splitting the profits. Even though land rent is paid because it is a transaction within the 
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family, leasing of land does not strictly fall into the four categories of tenancy patterns (but 
adheres more to a kuthagai system). Since retirement, he has been leasing land from other 
landlords, such as the Chettiyars and Thevars. While this is complete speculation from 
Sunderaj, who is an English teacher at the Aranthangi Local Matriculation School (which 
caters to Thirasu and Karaimedu), he insists “Mannikam has now bought most of the land 
that belonged to the Chettiyars, and is cultivating it as his own”.   
Prior to his retirement, Mannikam leased out land as his sons were studying at the time 
and it was difficult to manage the land with his work. This was an al- vāram tenancy 
arrangement that was given out to the permanent labourers75 who worked for his family.  
Mannikam claimed that the profits were split equally between them after the production 
cost and land rent were subtracted. This, however, seems to contradict the traditional al- 
vāram contract where the landlord receives three quarters of the yield produced. Splitting 
the cost equally under what seems to be an al- vāram contract is not profitable for 
Mannikam. The labourers never challenged this figure. Mannikam carried out all 
calculations and the labourers never questioned it as they did not want to lose access to 
land and their status as permanent labourers. The image of a benevolent master who 
‘apparently’ divides the produce equally, dissolves any contradictions or protests from the 
labourers.  
Among medium landowners, Senthil, a 40-year-old Thevar landowner, leases out most of 
land instead of cultivating it himself. He owns 3.5 acres and leases out 2.5 acres on kuthagai 
to two Ambalakar families. Senthil leases out land because 
“The agricultural land is very far from the village, it is becoming difficult for me to maintain it. 
The only crop that I grow is paddy but this is not sufficient to sustain my family. It is better 
that I give my land on lease when it is not being used. Over here we do not leave our land 
fallow. If there is anyone who can cultivate the land then we give it to them and get payment 
in the form of cash or kind.” 
                                                          
75 These are labourers who have been working for the same landlord’s family for generations. Their entry into 
this relation is not bound by debt. These labourers receive monthly payments and are expected to carry out 
agricultural wage work. The female permanent labourers carry out household chores as well.  
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The kuthagai land transaction places Senthil in a position of power and control compared 
to the Ambalakar families who take the land on rent. Without any investment from his 
side, he generates income from his land through land rent. Control by the Thevar caste 
does not stem from land ownership alone but is a result of dominant class accumulation 
(Pattenden, 2011). This might be reproduced in numerous ways but it creates relations of 
servitude and patronage over ‘classes of labour’.  
Thiruvan, a 29-year-old Thevar landlord, was introduced to me as the pradhan of the 
village. The officially elected pradhan for Karaimedu was his wife Sreelatha76. Sreelatha 
remains a mere figurehead, with her husband Thiruvan attending all meetings and even 
signing documents on her behalf.  The family of three (Thiruvan, his mother and his wife) 
have a total of 15 acres of land- 4 acres of nanjei, 10 acres of punjei and 1 acre of tottam. Of 
these, 5 acres is used for paddy cultivation alone. From the 10 acres of punjei land, 3 acres 
is leased out (approximately one acre to a Pallar family and 2 acres are shared between 5 
Ambalakar families). On the remaining 7 acres of punjei land, he grows eucalyptus and 
casuarina trees. Thiruvan was finding it difficult to maintain large plots of land due to the 
growing costs of production and labour shortage, prompting his decision to shift to 
fuelwood. He prefers the kuthagai contract as it is more profitable.  
Leasing 100 kulis of land for paddy cultivation gets Thiruvan 3 sacks of rice; for any other 
crop he gets a land rent of Rs. 2000/- per 100 kulis. He leases land only to those labourers 
who work for him (predominantly Pallars and Ambalakars). Thiruvan believes that his land 
will be well looked after because he leases it to families that he knows. For Thiruvan, it 
ensures a constant flow of income from the land. For the Ambalakars, the extension of 
privileged access to land extorts obligations. The relation of privilege and associated 
obligation is reinforced when the tenants are unable to pay the land rent. The land rent is 
                                                          
76 This is not a situation that is unheard of. During my numerous travels while working for the Centre for 
Women’s Development Studies this was a common phenomenon. The husbands of these wives would tell us 
that they are actually being good Samaritans, since their wives and women in general do not understand the 
political machinery and with the government forcing women to be elected, the best thing to do is to help 
them out in such a situation.  
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usually carried forward to the next year or collected through labour time, but does not 
withdraw the privilege of access to land. There is however, an implicit threat of withdrawal 
that commands discipline and control over the tenants and their labour.   
To the tenant, this practice of flexibility portrays Thiruvan as a kind and benevolent 
employer. However, the practice keeps the labourer indebted to the landowner for longer 
periods of time. The landowners ensure that the labourers continue to take land on 
kuthagai and that there is a constant flow of capital generated from land and labour.  
If tenancy is not possible, the rich farmers devise ways and means to extract surplus hold 
on to ownership. Kumar (Thevar and 32 years of age), from Thirasu, mentioned that 5 acres 
of land was in his name but his family owned 30 acres of land in total. For legal reasons the 
land was divided equally between his father and three brothers. He does not do any 
farming; instead it is his father and his elder brother who look after the land. They have 
around 15 acres of nanjei land, 10 acres of punjei land and 5 acres of wasteland on which 
they are currently growing eucalyptus. Over the last ten years there has been a sudden 
demand for eucalyptus. Farmers (larger landowners), find this profitable as they do not 
incur high costs apart from the initial investment of buying and sowing seeds. After four to 
six years, they get an average of 20 tonnes of wood from one acre of land, for which they 
get paid around Rs. 20,000/-. If they are able to keep the tress for a longer period of time 
they receive higher prices. This also means that they do not have to continuously monitor 
the lands given on lease, as Mannikam had to77. Growing plants like eucalyptus on land 
which would have otherwise been barren, generates further land rent for the landowners. 
Large landowners use various mechanisms to extract surplus from land. Within a system 
of continuous agrarian change, the rentier- tenant and employer-labour relationship is 
                                                          
77 Both Thiruvan and Kumar had one common complaint about growing eucalyptus- over time it was 
destroying the land it was grown in as well as the land adjacent to it. The government, in trying to preserve 
the forest in this region, has planted eucalyptus all around but they do not realize that they have created a 
“barren forest”. The villagers in general do not have a problem with eucalyptus plantations but many believe 
these plantations to be the cause of the sudden increase of monkeys in the region. The labourers did however 




affected by the way the tenancy arrangement operates. As seen in the case of Thiruvan’s 
workforce, there is an overlap of these two categories, where profits from production 
relations are further extracted through relations of hierarchy, dominance, and interlocking 
transactions of land, labour and capital. The following section, focusing on tenants and 
labourers, highlights various mechanisms through which tenants get embroiled in labour 
tying arrangements.  
4.2.3 Tenants and Labourers 
The previous section showed that landowners operate under numerous tenancy 
arrangements. Similarly, tenants do not confine themselves to tenancy arrangements; 
instead they shift between being tenants and labourers, very often for the same 
landowner. On Thiruvan’s land, a Pallar family operated in what seemed to be both an al- 
vāram and kuthagai contract. An oral contract was made out to Philomena (49 years old, 
Roman Catholic). The contract was handed to her and not her husband, despite his family 
having worked for two generations for Thiruvan’s family. Philomena’s husband is a 
woodcutter and does not do any agricultural wage work. The irregularity associated with 
woodcutting places the entire responsibility of bringing money home on Philomena. 
Philomena cultivates the land with the help of her two sons and works as an agricultural 
labourer on Thiruvan’s land because her husband could not repay a loan (due to lack of 
work and his constant state of inebriation). This situation extracted a scathing comment 
from Philomena about her husband, how- “he does not do any work, he is useless, and all he 
does is drink with the money I bring home”. The responsibility of repayment of the loan has 
fallen on Philomena. She is bound not just by her marital ties alone to repay this loan - 
failure to do so means that she might lose out on any daily wage work she gets by working 
on Thiruvan’s land. Philomena’s labour process and the struggles she undergoes is a result 
of an intersection between the domestic arena and ‘political patronage’ (Hart, 1991) that 
ties her husband to Thiruvan. This is a similar pattern observed by de Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu (1999) in Andhra Pradesh where the men were moving out of low-paying 
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exploitative wage work only for these positions to be filled by their wives, whose wages 
they subsequently relied on.  
Philomena cultivates crops grown after thaiye maas (the period between January to 
February in the Tamil calendar). Thiruvan provides inputs such as seeds and fertilisers78, 
and she needs to cover the cost of land rent and labour from the total produce. Philomena 
tries to rely mainly on family labour in order to reduce her costs.  Additional labour is 
required during sowing and harvesting, which is recruited from her locality. The labour 
hired is not paid any wages; instead they operate under a system of ‘obligation of 
reciprocity’79 (Guerin, et.al. 2012), where Philomena is obligated to work as a labourer on 
their fields when required. Philomena pays her land rent in kind; for every 100 kulis she 
pays Thiruvan’s family 3 sacks of rice, where each sack of rice weighs around 55-60 kilos. 
Therefore, for every acre of land that she cultivates, she pays 9 sacks of rice (approximately 
540 kilos of rice). Philomena does not want to be employed as a cultivator and coolie 
worker for Thriuvan. She finds the idea of working for a single employer restrictive.  
However, she does not have a choice in this matter as she has to pay off her husband’s 
debt.   
“If I do daily coolie work, I have the option of taking up a particular landowner’s work or not. 
There is a choice in this matter. In addition, this daily coolie work means that I can work for 
three different landowners and earn up to Rs.300/- in one day. Here I barely manage to make 
Rs.60-80/- in a day. In the situation I am in currently, I have to work on their [Thiruvan] land 
to pay off my husband’s debt. I have to grow what he tells me to and what he gives to me. 
After putting in all this effort I hardly make enough money to sustain my family.” 
Philomena’s decisions are conditioned and restricted by domestic household politics and 
work politics. Entering the tenancy arrangement enables her to repay her husband’s loan 
faster as it cannot be covered through coolie work alone. At the same time, the 
                                                          
78 Since Thiruvan is a member of the Panchayat Samiti (Block Development Office) he knows when the 
subsidised rates for the seeds and fertilisers are distributed at the Aranthangi Block Office. 
 
79 Guerin et al. (2012) refer to the term ‘obligation of reciprocity’ in the context of giving loans. I use this term 
to explain the system of payments made in labour time among people who belong to the same social class 
and caste group.  
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exclusionary labour arrangement with Thiruvan ensures job security. Philomena tries to 
meet her loan payments from the yield produced, but on occasions when this cannot be 
done, Thiruvan, extracts payment through Philomena’s labour time.  For Philomena, 
labour time is not restricted to agricultural wage work but extends to cleaning and boiling 
rice, for which she is not paid extra as it is considered to be a part of the daily wage work. 
The inability to meet land rent and loan payments is covered through her labour time, 
which exacerbates the exploitative work conditions. The interlocking of land, labour and 
credit binds Philomena to a particular work relation, with the employer placing restrictions 
on her movement and decision making capacity. Philomena’s access to land is dependent 
upon the labour relation and vice-versa, which often results in short-term/ long-term 
labour tying contracts. Labourers and tenants who belong to the Pallar and Paraiyar caste 
identify such exclusionary arrangements as re-enactment of the pannaiyal work relation. 
This is why Philomena prefers multiple coolie work contracts rather than only working for 
Thiruvan. 
Philomena and others like her complain about such labour tying arrangements but it is 
seen as the most convenient way for them to pay off debts. Their social positions have not 
allowed them to challenge and break away from these arrangements unlike the Paraiyars 
in Karaimedu. The Paraiyars broke away from the exploitive pannaiyal relationship almost 
forty years ago in Karaimedu and Thirasu, and now try and restrict their interactions with 
the Thevars to basic coolie work.  
A more distinct kuthagai system is observed with the Ambalakar family that leases land 
from Thiruvan. Kamlaveni is a 45-year-old Ambalakar widow. She has one son who works 
with her on the agricultural fields, and one daughter. Her family used to own one acre of 
land that they had to sell that off to meet her daughter’s wedding expenses. She currently 
takes 200 kulis of land (0.67acres) on kuthagai. From this land she gets approximately 20-
25 sacks of rice when there is good rainfall, and 15-16 sacks of rice otherwise.  The land rent 
that she pays varies with every crop that she grows. The payment is in kind for rice, where 
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she has to pay Thiruvan 6 sacks of rice. For sesame, she leases the land for three months 
and has to pay Rs.3000/-. According to Kamlaveni, she takes land on kuthagai because-  
“The Thevars and Chettiyars do not want to do any agricultural wage work, which is why they 
give their land on lease. All they do is while away their time and get income from our efforts 
and from lending money”.   
Kamlaveni displays a great sense of angst and distrust when she talks about the 
landowners. A reason for this is that the Ambalakars were historically the land owning 
caste in this region. Many of the Ambalakars in both villages have lost their land to the 
Thevars through unserviced loans or mortgages. This has altered their class positions vis-
à-vis the Thevars. A manifestation of this animosity is witnessed in the reluctance to enter 
into monetary contracts with Thevar landowners. In order to meet cultivation expenses, 
Kamlaveni has borrowed approximately Rs.12000/- from one of her neighbours. She did 
not want to borrow this amount from the landowner, as this would mean fewer grains for 
her. Money borrowed from a neighbour can be paid back gradually either through 
payments in cash or kind. At no point is she under any obligation to work for her neighbour. 
If her neighbour does require extra labourers to work on their field, she does the work and 
the amount is deducted accordingly. Borrowing from the same member of the caste group 
means, “money is being exchanged amongst equals”.  
In Kamlaveni’s contract, the landowner gives the land and tractor (in both the villages there 
are 5 people who own tractors) on rent. The cost of pesticides, seeds and labour are borne 
by Kamlaveni. She is derisive about the change in the relationship between the landowner 
and the tenant-  
“Previously, I remember that the landlords would work alongside with us and help us out with 
work. Now they are only interested in getting the money from us, that is all.”  
Kamlaveni describes a vāram contract that was previously more prominent in this region. 
While she prefers the kuthagai system, as she believes it grants a greater amount of 
freedom, she would like the landlord to be more involved. In wanting the 
landowners/rentiers to help with cultivation, Kamlaveni suggests a change in the power 
relations that has now been established between the landowner and the tenant. This 
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clearly highlights the social construction of meaning associated with certain acts- 
especially between the Ambalakars and the Thevars as they used to be landowners and 
would like to be treated with the same respect. 
Where Kamlaveni prefers greater involvement of the landlord, Rajathi (Thiruvan’s mother) 
puts forward a conflicting image of the landowner-tenant relationship. According to 
Rajathi, the landowners cannot ask the tenants what they are doing with the land once it 
is leased out, “they grow whatever they want to grow but the first crop is always rice.” Rajathi 
presents a skewed representation of power and control over land. The landowners 
maintain control through inspection and generating consent with the promise of land and 
work. The threat of withdrawing land from the tenant, instils a sense of fear, where 
displeasing the employer would result in loss of agricultural wage work as well.  
The landowners keep the labour force controlled and disciplined through the extension of 
privileges and compulsory payments towards land rent. According to Kamlaveni, if the 
landowners are entitled to approximately 6 sacks of rice, this amount has to be paid even 
during periods of poor yield. 
“If the promised amount is 6 sacks then we have to pay them this even if we get only 6 -7 sacks 
of rice from the land. There is no negotiation on this matter. If there is no produce, we still get 
the land in the next season but we have to now make two sets of payments. The landlords 
always find a way of getting their money. They come and check to see that we are doing our 
job properly. When we can’t make the payments they tell us things like- we should have added 
more fertilisers, or that we delayed the sowing of the seeds and the fault lies with us for not 
starting the process on time and not on the adverse weather conditions. On the other hand, if 
the entire village suffers from crop failures then we are not told anything”. 
Similar conditions of compulsory payment operate for both large and medium 
landowners. While Thiruvan, as a large landowner, extracts land rent payment through 
labour time, this was not the case for Bhoomi, (32-year-old, Pallar labourer) who works for 
an Ambalakar medium landowner. At the time of survey, Bhoomi could grow only 13 sacks 
of rice out of which 6 sacks had to be paid towards land rent. She did not have the option 
of substituting her labour for payment as the medium landowner did not require her labour 
time.  Bhoomi might find the terms of contract harsh; however, the landowner’s inability 
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to recruit labour prevents Bhoomi from becoming a tied labourer. Though Bhoomi does 
not get embroiled in a labour tying arrangement, at no point does her dependence upon 
the landowner decline; she remains at his beck and call in order to have access to cultivable 
land.  
The terms and conditions upon which different tenancy arrangements are reached 
determine the degree of freedom experienced by the tenants. Where Philomena entered 
the tenancy relationship due to heavy indebtedness, for Kamlaveni, it is an alternate 
occupation to daily coolie work. The ability to lease in land operates on the premise on a 
previously existing relationship with the landowner. For Philomena, the relationship was 
established through labour ties, and for Kamlaveni and Bhoomi, it was established through 
cultivation.  
4.2.3.1 Otti Contracts and Labour Tying:  
Al- vāram and kuthagai are two common tenancy patterns observed in both Karaimedu 
and Thirasu, where the terms and conditions often tend to overlap due to the interlocking 
transactions of land, labour and capital. Another form of land transactions prevalent in 
Aranthangi is otti. Otti is a system of mortgaging the land and has repercussions on labour 
relations. The following are examples of how otti shapes the relationship between the 
landowner and the tenant.   
Vasanthi, a 37-year-old Malayalee woman, is married to Kannan (Ambalakar), who works 
as a waiter in Chennai80. Just before the birth of her first daughter, her father-in-law had 
to give one acre of the land they owned on otti in order to relieve some of the pressures of 
debt. After 6 years of paying interest on the land they sold it off to Vassan (Thevar 
landowner) who had taken it on otti. Three to four years after this transaction, Vasanthi 
                                                          
80 Theirs is the only case of a love marriage in this village of a man to an upper caste woman from a different 
region. Kannan met Vasanthi in her hometown near Thiruvanthanapuram, where he works in a highway 
restaurant. Vasanthi is ten years younger than him and they eloped to get married. She has not met her 
parents since her marriage because she knows they will not approve of their marriage, as she is an upper 
caste Nair who has married a backward caste Ambalakar.  
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found out that the land was sold due to her father-in-law’s gambling problem. Nobody in 
the village wants to give their family any land on lease due to this reputation, forcing 
Vasanthi to go for daily coolie work despite her poor health. She works for two landowners 
and is at their beck and call just so that she can meet the loan payment. Her ill health and 
infrequent remittances from her husband do not help her state of indebtedness. An 
outsider to the village and family, Vasanthi is coerced into exploitative, low paid coolie 
work so that she can repay any current loans and the loan taken by her father-in-law. 
Vasanthi’s entry into an exploitative (short term) tied labour arrangement is similar to 
Philomina’s case, where the entry is conditioned by familial relations- loans generated by 
male members of the family. In both cases the responsibility of repayment is thrust on the 
women of the household. Garikipati (2009) and da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) 
observed instances of women’s decisions, mobility and freedom being constrained due to 
family relations in Andhra Pradesh. 
Vasanthi’s is not the only case where land on otti was eventually sold off to the landowner. 
Small and marginal farmers in Aranthangi spoke of having to eventually sell their land on 
otti, so that they could meet family wedding expenses.  
Yet, not all small and marginal farmers sell off their land. Some like Rajalakhshmi (52-year-
old Ambalakar) mortgaged her land for Rs.15000/-, so that she could get her daughter 
married. For the past fifteen years she has continued to pay the mortgage on her land. Her 
daughter-in-law wants her to sell it off but she refuses to do so because-  
“This is our land; this is the only form of monetary security left for me and my family. If I give 
this away, then I will be left with nothing.” 
Rajalakhshmi and her husband gave their land to a Thevar landlord family (Murugan who 
owns 10 acres of cultivable land) at an interest rate of 3% per month. Rajalakshmi was 
unable to gather the principal amount of the loan, and she continues to pay a very high 
interest rate on the land. Retaining ownership of land is extremely crucial for Rajalakhshmi 
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as it provides her with a sense of security.  In order to meet mortgage payments, she leases 
200 kulis of land from the same Thevar landlord81.  
Throughout her interview, Rajalakshmi kept referring to the leased land as her own land, 
since all effort to cultivate it is made by her and not the landowner. However, the extent to 
which she has control and access to her land is restricted. Her husband had taken loans 
from Muragan’s family and lost the land to them, as he was not able to pay back the loan. 
This is why she believes that the land that she currently cultivates on kuthagai is land that 
belongs to her family. She believes that by repaying the loan, the land can come back to 
her. However, the negotiations for this process will take place between her husband and 
the landowner, excluding Rajalakhshmi and her toil.  
Rajalakshmi’s daughter-in-law is completely against holding onto this land and upon 
further enquiry revealed that when Rajalakshmi is unable to meet her interest payments, 
she substitutes money for her labour time (receiving reduced wages). Due to her age, 
Rajalakshmi is unable to go and work for Murugan at times, which is when her daughter-
in-law goes in her place. This is another case of female labour being substituted for loan 
payments. However, here the daughter-in-law is forced to take up low paying agricultural 
wage work because of her mother-in-law, and not due to a male member in the family.  
Both Rajalakshmi and Vasanthi are in exploitative work contracts due to debt. This is not 
debt that was generated by them, but that that they married into. The case of 
Rajalakshmi’s daughter-in-law shows how the debt Rajalakshmi was married into has been 
transferred on to her daughter-in-law. These instances are a clear example of how 
marriage in itself is an indebted relation where female labour is exchanged and 
                                                          
81 Along with paddy she grows sesame and urad daal (pulses), which are referred to as kodai kaalam velachal 
(summer crops), and are sown only if they receive a good amount of rainfall. For the landlords, income from 
the land is not restricted to land rent alone. In most cases, water for irrigation is taken from the same 
landlords as they are the ones who own the pump sets. Rajalakhshmi pays Rs.100/- for every hour of water 
that is used on her land. For the kodai kaalam velachal, she requires around two to three hours of water and 
for paddy this goes up to four to six hours. Along with paying for water the tenants need to pay for diesel, 




appropriates through obligations, such as Vasanthi carrying out coolie work to repay her 
father’s-in-law debt or Rajakshmi paying off her husband’s debt. The labour of these 
women is used to sustain the livelihood of the household, beyond which they are not 
allowed to participate (for example, Rajalakshmi is not allowed to negotiate the terms of 
the otti contract). Restrictions placed on these women in the domestic sphere are mirrored 
in the work sphere, generating exploitative work contracts.   
The need to not feel bound and dependant on one landlord is very strong amongst the 
Ambalakars. In order to move away from Murugan’s household, Rajalakhshmi, does coolie 
work for other landlords. She tries to finish the work on “her” land as quickly as possible, 
especially during peak season (October to December), and then does coolie work on others’ 
land. This is done to earn extra money so there is some, though limited, form of savings, 
since work is available to them only for six months in a year.  
Taking up tenancy arrangements comes with the prospect of higher incomes and escape 
from exploitative labour relations. However, this is underlined with the implicit threat of 
withdrawal of land and work. According to Rajalakhshmi- 
“The larger landowners do not want to do any agricultural wage work. They do not have it in 
them to stand in the sun and work for eight hours every day. These larger landowners come 
to us and tell us it is beneficial for both parties if we cultivate the land for them. I do not see 
how that is possible since they take away most of what we produce; we cultivate their land 
and earn their living. We do not have a choice in the matter. We have to involve ourselves in 
such work otherwise we will not have any work and no means of survival. If we do not cultivate 
their lands properly, we will not get their land for the next year” 
Like Rajalakhshmi, there are several others who oscillate between being a wage labourer 
and a cultivator. While these positions vary seasonally, these are positions they occupy for 
their entire lifetime (Lerche 2010). Being able to cultivate land, or having some form of 
property rights, is considered as upward class mobility. On the other hand, the degree of 
oppression and exploitation that is faced by the tenants, whether they are landless 
labourers, marginal and small landowners, affects their overall position in both social and 
economic terms. The landowners ensure the continued efficiency and productivity of the 
land, not with the establishment of the tenancy reforms but through coercive methods and 
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the fear of eviction, which pushes the tenant to work harder (Banerjee et al. 2002). 
Through Rajalakhshmi’s account, the reduced bargaining power between the tenant and 
landlord is a result of unavailability of work and an indebted relation between the two82. 
This pushes the ‘classes of labour’ into a state of continued and increased dependency 
upon the landowning class. 
4.2.4 Survival and Exploitation  
The different tenancy arrangements and land transactions observed in Aranthangi are 
conditioned by hierarchical power relations (whether in the market or social strucuture), 
and hence cannot be explained away as vestiges of traditional patron-client relations. Over 
time, in Aranthangi, kuthagai has replaced vāram contracts- a move understood to 
generate greater control over land and the surplus generated from it. However, be it 
kuthagai or vāram, the assurance of obtaining land and access to loans depends on 
whether or not tenants maintain “good relations” with the landowners. The “good 
relations” create conditions for labourers to be tied down to a particular employer, where 
it can be long-term as in Philomena’s case, or short-term like Rajalakshmi’s daughter-in-
law. Whether short-or long term, tied labour in Aranthangi is treated as synonymous to 
pannaiyal labour. Older forms of pannaiyal labour in Aranthangi have disappeared. No 
longer is a pannaiyal labourer a male labourer, where he and his family work under 
conditions of indebtedness and slavery. The ‘new’ tied labour relations are short-term in 
nature, predominantly carried out by female labourers, whose husbands or family are not 
tied along with them merely by association. However, it is important to mention, that 
while they might not necessarily call it pannaiyal in the villages, there is still a sense of 
shame that is attached to this labour relation.  
In Aranthangi, the presence of pannaiyal labour is not discussed freely as this labour 
relation is said to bring shame upon the family- a point made vocal among the Paraiyar 
                                                          
82 The dearth of jobs is a result of numerous factors, one being that the medium landowner leasing out the 
lands are not being able to obtain sufficient returns. This is very similar to Newbery’s (1977) arguments that 
since rural labour markets fail to guarantee jobs at a consistently fixed rate, these sharecropping contracts 
are used to mitigate such labour uncertainties. 
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households. In Aranthangi, the younger generation only knew of the pannaiyal relation as 
a taboo and older generation expressed great pleasure in being able to move away from 
such oppressive work conditions. As one of Rajlakhshmi’s neighbours Kumari mentioned:  
“We will not work for only one landlord, even if that means having to sacrifice getting work 
all year round. Working for just one person makes us feel like slaves. There is a much greater 
sense of freedom if we can move out and work for multiple landlords because here we are 
choosing the work available to us.” 
So deep seated are the scars of exploitation faced by the older generation of agricultural 
wage workers that they are constantly looking for ways to prevent themselves from 
entering similar situations of exploitative control. However, the labourers recognise that 
there is no guarantee that any alternate occupation they look for will be devoid of 
exploitation.  
Sreelatha, a 49-year-old Christian Pallar worker, has been a tenant farmer for a Thevar 
medium landowner for over 12 years. She takes 1 acre of land on lease, on which she grows 
rice, ragi (finger millet), groundnuts and tuar daal (lentil). In the previous fasli year the total 
output from the land was only fifteen sacks. Out of this amount, her total payment as land 
rent to the landlord was nine sacks of rice, leaving her with only six sacks of rice that she 
sold to a private buyer at the rate of Rs.750/- per sack. This amount was not sufficient to 
cover the cost of inputs and the labour that she employed. She had borrowed money to 
buy fertilisers, seeds and pesticides. Sreelatha is now in debt since she cannot repay the 
local moneylender from whom she had borrowed money. Her total borrowings were for a 
sum of Rs. 10,000/-, and she has to pay Rs.250/- per month for every Rs.1000/- borrowed. 
Her son and her husband who works in Chennai as a construction worker are helping her 
pay off the debt. When she cannot make her payments, she borrows money from her 
neighbours and landowner. Conditions of indebtedness push her towards working under 
highly exploitative conditions. However, this alone is insufficient to cover costs, as work is 
available only six months in a year. Sreelatha is under severe debt due to her dependence 
on rice alone. It is unthinkable for her to take up maize cultivation under such conditions. 
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She blames this on the fact that none of them have their own land and are working as 
tenants.  
“If we had our own land we could experiment but on leased in land we have to be very careful 
as our main concern is meeting all the payments. We are the ones who are cultivating the land 
and we are the ones who cannot experiment. This is why the region has not been able to 
prosper in the past ten to twelve years.” 
Sreelatha’s main concern is with survival, which is tied to the ability to meet all payments. 
The high land rent which is not proportionate to the output, adds to the total payments 
she needs to make. The fact that having to pay a large land rent that is not proportionate 
to the output highlights the importance of ownership of land. Sreelatha is caught in a cycle, 
where tenancy was a move away from pannaiyal (or similar) work, but indebtedness draws 
her back to the landowner and exploitative work. Turning down the work would result in 
rising debt coupled with the threat of withdrawal of land.  
The dynamic and interlocking transactions between land and labour present themselves 
as a means of survival for female labourers and cultivators. The kuthagai contract in 
Aranthangi operates more as an al- vāram contract, which results in taking multiple loans 
from the landowner. The loans can be paid off through labour time, which subjects the 
female tenants/labourers to the employer’s beck and call. The terms and conditions of 
work are further conditioned through caste and familial relations, leaving the female 
tenant/labourer with limited scope for negotiation. The traditional patron-client ties, 
where the labourer was the employer’s responsibility, do not exist (Breman (1974) 
identifies this as the process of depatronisation) clearly identifies in his process of 
depatronization). However, both the labourer and employer utilise pre-existing relations 
to obtain work and land, which draws attention to the transformation and continuation of 
social and political structures of patronage, tying the tenant and labourer to land.  
4.3  West Bengal Land and Tenancy Reforms 
Land and tenancy reforms had different areas of focus in West Bengal, with greater 
emphasis on re-distribution of land and cultivators. One of the first land reform acts to be 
passed in West Bengal was the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act in 1953, under which 
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the state took away all the rights of the intermediaries (Kumar De, 1994: p. 9-10). This Act 
tried to dilute the concentration of power that lay with the zamindars and the 
intermediaries, but it did not address the redistribution of land. The large landowners were 
able to retain their land through the process of benami - transferring land in the names of 
their relatives or even in religious and charitable trusts that were run by them (Kumar De, 
1994).  
Alongside the redistribution of land, the rights of bargadars were safeguarded with the 
West Bengal Bargadars Act of 1950. Under this Act there was a limit to the amount of 
produce that was payable to the landlords. The bargadars could only be evicted if they 
could not cultivate the land or used the land for non-agricultural and personal purposes; 
when the land is not cultivated by the bargadar, if the bargadar fails to tender a share to 
the landowner; and if the landowner evicts the bargardar from the land for personal 
cultivation. If, however, within the next two years of eviction, the landlord is unable to use 
the land for personal cultivation then under the prescribed authority (in this case the Junior 
Land Revenue Officer) the landowner has to sell it first to the bargadar and if the bargardar 
does not want to purchase it then it can be sold to someone else (Kumar De, 1994). 
The West Bengal Land Reforms Act of 1955 was designed to prevent concentration of land, 
especially under the practice of benami. A ceiling of 25 acres was imposed on land 
ownership. This excluded homesteads, that is, orchards, and land held by religious and 
charitable institutions (Bhaumik, 1993). The Land Reforms Act went through numerous 
amendments from 1955 and 1969, especially with regards to bargadars (sharecroppers).  
The following amendments were made- a) the landowner shall receive half of the gross 
produce if he supplied the plough, manure, cattle and seed. In other cases, the proportion 
of output shall be 40 per cent; b) the place of threshing shall be decided mutually by the 
bargadar and the landowner; c) if the produce of any land cultivated by a bargadar is 
harvested and taken away forcibly by a landowner, the bargadar shall be entitled to recover 
from such owner the share of the produce due to him or its money value; d) the landowner 
shall be entitled to terminate the barga if the land cultivated  under his personal cultivation 
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does not exceed two-thirds of the total land (excluding homestead) owned by him’ 
(Bhaumik, 1993: 43). Despite these amendments, concentration of land could not be 
checked and the 1955 Act brought along with it the eviction of bargadars. Records show 
that the highest number of bargadars was evicted during 1958-67 (Bhaumik, 1993). The 
major defect in the Act was the landowner’s right to cultivate the land if it was within the 
stipulated ceiling limit. The bargadars who were evicted were then re-employed as 
agricultural labourers, thereby finding loopholes that helped the landowners evade the 
land reform Act (Bhaumik, 1993).    
The proper re-distribution of land was addressed with the West Bengal Land Reforms 
Amendment Act of 1975 which ‘provided for the rights and obligations of ryots, prevention 
of accumulation of landholdings by non-agriculturalists, control and regulation of the 
produce sharing system of cultivation, and introduction of a rational system of assessment 
of land” (Kumar De, 1994: p. 10)83. According to this amended Act, a ceiling on land was 
set between 6-17 standard acres, where a standard acre refers to 1 acre of irrigated land 
and 1.4 acres of other areas.   
There are always loopholes to any Act and the landowners used this to their advantage. 
The zamindars and the moneylenders exploited the economic dependence of the landless 
labourers and bargadars through a system of loans referred to as dadan, where they were 
charged very high interest rates. In order to repay the loan, they entered tied labour 
arrangements, where the labourers are referred to as dadan workers. This left the 
labourers indebted and dependent upon the landlords without much scope of coming out 
of this relation (Kumar De, 1994). 
 
                                                          
83 If a ryot was an unmarried adult person there was a ceiling of 6 acres, if the ryot had a family of more than 
2 and less than 5 members then they were allowed a maximum of 5 standard acres, if the ryots family 
consisted of more than five members then along with the 12.3 standard acres each additional member of the 
family was allotted an excess of 1.23 acres but at no point could it cross a total of 17 acres irrespective of the 
size of the family (Kumar de 1994: 10). 
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4.3.1 Left Rule and Land Distribution 
The win of an electoral majority by the Left Front Government in West Bengal heralded 
the onset of a new outlook towards rural development. Where Tamil Nadu was focussing 
on technological advancement, West Bengal looked towards structural changes in the 
form of land distribution and security of tenure. The Left Front Government in West Bengal 
came to power in 1977, and addressed the loopholes in the various land reform and tenancy 
Acts. The government shifted focus from landowners to sharecroppers, where they 
attempted to safeguard their claims. One of the major amendments to the tenancy reform 
in 1977 was the way ‘personal cultivation’ was defined. Previously, bargadars were evicted 
on the grounds that landowners were reclaiming their land for personal cultivation. With 
the amendments made in 1977, the only way a bargadar could be evicted was: if he or his 
family members resided near the land, if the principal source of income for his household 
was from the land, and if he or his family members cultivated the land. If a bargadar was 
evicted, the landlord would have to provide a receipt of the transaction, otherwise they 
were liable to a fine of Rs.1000/- or imprisonment of up to 6 months (Bhaumik, 1993: p. 47).  
The Left Front Government worked towards giving ‘land back to the tiller’ through 
Operation Barga. This remains one of the most effective and successful land reform 
measures undertaken by the government in West Bengal.84  It is unmatched by any other 
land reform that took place in the country, as it worked to restructure the hierarchical 
power base within society, that is, give more power to the poorer sections of society 
(Kumar De, 1994).  
Operation Barga introduced an effective process of safeguarding the rights of bargadars 
by recording and registering their names. The land reforms sought to distribute land that 
                                                          
84 The reason for this success was the ability of the Left Front government to create a strong and effective 
cadre base. The Left Front government brought together bargadars, agricultural labourers and small farmers 
under one group that constituted around 75 per cent of the total agricultural population in the state. This 
group comprised of their political support base as well. The Left simultaneously tried to build a friendly 




was held in excess of the ceilings, to the landless labourers. The reforms looked at the 
setting up of financial institutions such as banks for the bargadars and pattadars so that 
they could have easy access to agricultural implements and inputs (Kumar De, 1994). The 
land reform package under the Left Front government sought to provide homesteads to 
landless cultivators, village artisans and fishermen, impose stricter ceiling provisions, and 
establish a cohesive machinery to ensure the proper functioning of land reforms all the way 
down to the Gram Panchayat level (Kumar De, 1994: p. 22).  
Operation Barga brought with it a shift in insecurities from tenancy of the bargadar to 
tenure of the landlord. Operation Barga was introduced with the objective of removing 
inequality in landholdings, allowing for rural class mobility by doing so (Rawal 2001). 
Operation Barga recorded a total of 1.2 million sharecroppers from 1978-81 and gave them 
their hereditary right to cultivation, and procuring a fair deal in their crop share. In addition 
to this, around one million acres of vested land was distributed amongst 2.5 million 
landless labourers and marginal peasants; and homestead plots were distributed amongst 
half a million households (Bandyopadhyay, 2003). 
The programme is not without its flaws however, as the recording of bargadars has not led 
to a change in their economic condition or their access to modern agricultural inputs 
(Rudra, 1981: A 65). The post-recording phase witnessed a trend of non-participation, 
where Operation Barga did not demolish but further perpetuated tenancy patterns (Rudra, 
1981). While the programme allows for user rights on the land being cultivated, there are 
no ownership rights, making its sale difficult (Majumdar, 2003). The criticisms levelled 
against Operation Barga find resonance with the movement out of bargadar arrangements 
into land rent tenancy arrangements (theke), in both Bardhanagar and Madhabpur. 
4.4 Tenancy patterns in Chinsurah - Controlling Ownership of Land 
The landowners in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar in Hooghly are Muslims and Brahmins85. 
The Muslims have larger landholdings than the Brahmins, and in addition to farming, many 
                                                          
85 The Brahmins are identified by their surname Haldar. 
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are artisans, doing embroidery work. However, the mainstay of their income comes from 
agriculture. The livelihood of Brahmins is not dependent on agriculture as they are 
employed in high-end government jobs such as doctors, teachers, and electrical engineers. 
The agricultural labourers who belong to SC/ST category rely on agricultural wage work, 
tenancy and casual daily wage employment.  
Caste Category Total Number of 
Respondents  
0 Acres 1-2 Acres >3 Acres 
General 155 129 (27.92%) 17 (3.67 %) 9 (1.94%) 
OBC 11 9 (1.94%) 2 (0.43 %) 0 (0%) 
SC 191 181 (39.17%) 10 (2.16%) 0 (0%) 
ST 105 83 (17.90%) 22 (4.76%) 0 (0%) 
Table 4.3: Caste-Wise distribution of Land Leased 
Source: Village Survey, Bardhanagar and Madhabpur, May 2012. 
*Percentages calculated from total number of respondents 
 
The regions have different tenancy arrangements, however, it is not a dominant land 
transaction among the classes of labour. Table 4.3 shows the number of households who 
lease land for cultivation across different caste groups. This table shows that across all 
caste groups a majority of the population does not lease land. The ST population that 
leases land is 4.76 percent and SC is 2.16 percent. Those who belong to the General 
category, in particular to the large landowning class, lease large quantities of land (above 
3 acres), of which the highest amount is 7 acres, leased by a Muslim landowner from 
Madhabpur. Irrespective of the type of tenancy arrangement, only a small proportion of 
the population engages with it. The distribution pattern is indicative of agricultural 
labourers wanting to move out of sharecropping. Despite this movement, landowners are 
constantly looking for various means to secure their land. As cited by Hanstead and Brown 
(in Majumdar, 2003), and as observed in the course of my fieldwork, the Brahmin 
landowners (medium landowners) sold a portion of their land to the bargadar (this was 
usually 25 percent of the land), so that the bargadar relinquishes rights to the rest of the 
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land. It should be noted here that unlike in Aranthangi, women are not at the forefront of 
tenancy arrangements.  
Ratan, a 55-year-old Brahmin landowner owns 8 acres in Bardhanagar. He has sold 
approximately 2 acres of his land to Amol (45-year-old Santhal agricultural labourer) 
whose family has worked for Ratan’s family for over three generations, and continues to 
do so. This transaction is not seen as a move to secure Ratan’s land, but is instead regarded 
as a benevolent gesture.  
“We have given him this land for his own use. He has been working for our family for such a 
long time and we know he will look after the land well. It has become all the more important 
for him to have this land after he met with a terrible accident which damaged his left leg 
completely. He needs some security and in addition to this he needs to keep working otherwise 
his leg will never heal completely...He is a very good worker and comes when we call him. 
However, we do feel that after giving him this land he does not listen to us as much, and does 
not come when expected.” 
Ratan, despite selling the land, views it as a gift that he has given to Amol. Deals such as 
these are viewed as being ‘mutual and voluntary’ (Majumdar, 2003: p. 5147). However, the 
extent to which they are actually voluntary and the matter of choice involved is debatable.  
Proclaiming this land transaction as a gift creates an obligation for Amol. Amol, who now 
owns land, is still at the beck and call of Ratan, in lieu of obtaining agricultural wage work, 
and being called first for service. Can this process then be viewed as a reinforcement of 
interlocking transactions? The labourer-employer relationship is not done away with by 
the sale of land. Amol relies on Ratan to cover cost of production to cultivate his land, and 
for any immediate loan that is required.  
Since the sale of the land, Amol cultivates the land for himself and continues to work as an 
agricultural labourer for Ratan. He has ceased to operate as a bargadar but he continues to 
perform his duties for Ratan. Ratan comes across as a benevolent landlord making it all the 
more difficult for Amol and his family to turn down the work, which many a times is not 
restricted to agricultural wage work. In addition to this, the fact that Ratan paid for Amol’s 
medical expenses has left him and his family indebted to Ratan. Amol’s wife, apart from 
working as an agricultural labourer for Ratan’s, carries out both threshing of rice and 
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household chores for him.  Moreover, in order to purchase the land Amol had to borrow 
the money from Ratan, further adding to his debt. This is why Amol, despite having land 
of his own, continues to work on Ratan's land in order to pay off the debt. The interlocking 
nature of obligation and debt has resulted in continued allegiance and servitude towards 
Ratan by not only Amol but also his entire family. The landowners, under such 
circumstances, retain a much larger share of the land and do away with bargadars without 
losing control of the labour force. The table below highlights the different tenancy patterns 
prevalent in both Aranthangi and Chinsurah, where a single landowner or tenant can be 



















Share of produce 
to tenant 
Investment Caste Groups Class 
Categories 
Bhaag Chaas Share of produce is 
50:50 after 
deducting the cost 
of production. 
 
This can range from 
year-long land 
lease to 3 months. 
 
Year-long leases 




are carried out by 
bhaag chaasis.  
Landlords provide 
input costs and have 
greater control over 
what is produced. 
 
The tenants behave 
like the utbandi86 and 













Theeke Land rent paid to 
the landlord  
Land on theke is 
generally given for 
vegetable (katra 
fasal) and potato. 
 
Land rent is 
Rs.3000/- per bigha  
Input cost is borne by 
the tenant and 
landlord only receives 
payment in land rent. 














Bandha Kishen Tied labourer, payment is received in cash 
and kind. Though not a tenancy pattern, it is 
important because women rarely become 
bhaag chaasis with movement of their male 
counterparts out of agriculture. Instead they 
become bandha kishens. Bandha kishens are 








Table 4.4: Land Tenancy Arrangements in Chinsurah 
Source: Field Work in Chinsurah, May 2012 to September 2012 
                                                          
86 Utbandi tenant are referred to as tenants-at-will, due to which they were always at the mercy of their 
landlord 
87 Gulo tenants did not have any security and they paid land rent, which was a portion of their produce that 
was not in cash. 
88 A sanja tenant is one who is required to pay a fixed rent to the landlord in kind. 
89 Krishani system was one where the landlord provided everything except the labour and the krishani was 
heavily indebted and not in a position to repay the loans in his entire lifetime, leaving him in a state of ‘semi-
feudal bondage’ (Dasgupta, 1984a:A4). The krishani was attached to a single cultivator and was a bargadar 
because he received a share of the produce and not a fixed amount for the produce (Newaj and Rudra, 1975: 
A 23). krishani is not identified by this name any longer. With similar patterns of indebtedness, they are now 
referred to as bandha kishen and most of them are female agricultural labourers.  
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4.4.1 Tenancy patterns in Chinsurah 
The landowners and labourers in Chinsurah both spoke of a decline in the number of 
bargadars. Tenancy patterns observed in Chinsurah were short term sharecropping called 
bhaag chaas (sharecropping) and theeke (receiving land rent).  In bhaag chaas, the cost of 
production90 is deducted, and the produce is divided equally, even though as per the 
tenancy amendments, three quarters of the produce is supposed to go to the tenant.  In 
theeke, the landlord does not make any payments towards the initial cost of cultivating the 
land. The entire cost of production is borne by the lessee. Unlike in Aranthangi, where land 
was leased out for an entire year, in Chinsurah, the crops determine when land can be 
leased out and under what tenancy pattern. In Chinsurah, land is almost never given on 
bhaage or theeke for rice. The landowner cultivates such land. During the potato-growing 
season, land is leased out on bhaage and on theeke for vegetables. Chinsurah observed 
multiple tenancies within a fasli year.  
Shankar Haldar, a 40-year-old Brahmin medium landowner, owns approximately 7 bighas 
(unit of land measurement) of land. He gives 3 bighas of land on bhaage for cultivating 
sesame. The bhaag chaasi only provides the labour, and Shankar provides all other input 
costs. After deducting the input cost, the total produce is divided in half between him and 
the bhaag chaasi. By providing the input cost, Shankar has much greater control on the 
crops and the fertilisers that are used on his land. By leasing his land on bhaage, Shankar 
ensures that the tenant is looking after the land. Shankar is vigilant about his land and 
keeps a constant check on it. This is important to not only ensure maximum yield but to be 
recorded as a cultivator as well. The bhaag chaas arrangement, apart from being yield 
productive, is a mechanism through which the chaasi’s labour is also brought under 
control. The bhaag chaasi cultivates the rented land and any other land that belongs to the 
landowner. The bhaag chaasis in the two villages in Chinsurah were men. However, unlike 
                                                          
90 This at times might be completely or partially borne by the landlord, depending upon whether the tenant 




in Aranthangi, control over labour is not restricted to the chaasi but extends to other 
members of their family, usually female labour. There is no long-term tying in this 
arrangement but the dependence on the landowner (generated through access to land for 
cultivation and agricultural wage work) makes it difficult to pull away from such tenancy 
arrangements. For women, even though they cultivate land and are tied to their husband’s 
obligations and debts, their primary identity remains that of a labourer.   
Azhar, a Muslim landlord (Sheikh and 48 years old) with a total of 28 bighas of land (9.3 
acres91), leases out 12-14 bighas of land for potato and vegetables in the rabi period. Paddy, 
the aman variety is grown in the kharif months and during this period no land is leased out. 
For potatoes (January to March) approximately 12 bighas is leased out on bhaage. Azhar 
provides seeds and fertilisers, and the labour is provided by the bhaag chaasi. The 
bargadars cultivate the land all year round, with similar payment schemes as that of the 
bhaag chaasi. The payment made is in kind. For every bigha of land, he gets 12 sacks of 
potatoes (each sack of rice is 60 kgs), totalling to 720 kilos of potatoes. He does give out a 
small portion of land on bhaage for the entire fasli year. On 5 bighas of land, Azhar has 4 
registered bargadars working for him. Vegetables are cultivated on theeke contracts. In 
theeke contracts, payments are made towards land rent, and therefore are not taken in 
kind. For 1 bigha of land he gets around Rs.3000/-. He has been leasing his land out for the 
past five years.    
“The leasing out of land started four to five years back because of the lack of labour. 
Previously, I had plenty of labourers to work on the fields with me. But now there is a shortage 
of labour, I do not get sufficient labourers to work on my land... How can I work on my land on 
my own? It is not possible. It is for this reason that I lease out the land to 4 or 5 different people. 
I will not leave the land fallow and run at a loss. I do not have to take responsibility for the 
crop and they have to make their payments to me. I cannot demand more if they make a profit 
and similarly, if they make a loss it is of no concern to me. I will get my pay either way.” 
Despite multiple tenancy patterns, especially with bargadars, Azhar’s statement highlights 
the decline in relations of patronage. The relationship is now more profit seeking, where 
                                                          
91 In Chinsurah 3 bighas equals 1 acre of land and 7.5 bighas equals 1 hectare 
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he does not take on any liabilities or responsibilities of the bargadars.  No longer are such 
relations of patronage important to maintain social hierarchy (see Breman, 2009); instead, 
employers/landowners are concerned with accumulation of capital.  
Interested in profit making, Azhar and other landowners like him believe that it is more 
profitable to lease land on theeke rather than on bhaage contracts. A theeke arrangement 
means that the landowner receives land rent, an assured payment, without having to incur 
any cost of cultivation. Moreover, in a theeke contract, Azhar is under no compulsion to 
lease out land to the same family if they are unable to generate profit. Theeke tenants, in 
comparison to bargadars, have greater choice and independence as in principle they do not 
have to borrow from the landowner. Bargadars on the other hand, rely on the landowners 
for input costs, their connections with government mills and wholesale retailers, for 
cultivation and sale of their produce. The dependence upon the landowner is a mechanism 
through which control over land and resources is maintained.  
The theeke and bhaage tenancy patterns are short-term in nature. This is encouraged by 
landowners so as to protect their landownership. On the other hand, agricultural labourers 
and cultivators want to move away from the long-term bargadar system as they find it 
exploitative.  Asok, a 45-year-old Santhal, does not have any land of his own, leases land 
from Shafiq (a 47-year-old Muslim landlord who is also the largest landlord in the entire 
village with a total of 142 bighas of land). He says: 
“I do not want to become a bhaag chaasi. I prefer taking the jamin (land) on theeke. At least 
here we get the profits of the produce and only need to make payments towards the cost of 
the land. If I was a bhaag chaasi, I would have to give half of what I produce to the landowner. 
It is my effort but someone else is reaping the benefits just because they have the land. 
Moreover, as a bhaag chaasi I would become like a slave to the landowner, the work never 
stops in the fields and I would be compelled to do their bidding.  I do not want that for myself 
or for my family.”  
Asok’s statement highlights the asymmetry in cost sharing, contrary to the equal cost 
sharing depicted by the landowners. While the landlords account for the cost that is 
incurred by them, there is no equivalent payment made towards the effort of the labourer. 
The landlord deals with tangible input costs and an increase in them will ensure a greater 
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share of the produce. Here is a situation where the landlord and the bargadar both prefer 
theeke over bhaage, but for very different reasons. The landlord prefers theeke to ensure 
the constant, fixed flow of income. The bargadar on the other hand, wants to be in a 
situation where he has greater control over the produce and only has to pay land rent. A 
reason for this is that the tenant, despite working as a bargadar for many years, continues 
to remain in the same position of indebtedness (Bhaumik, 1993). Asok recalls that in 1985, 
there were 100 registered bargadars from his locality alone but today there are only 15. The 
decline in the number of bargadars over the years is result of increasing indebtedness 
experienced in farming. In addition, the bargadar relation is considered exploitative and 
men do not want to be a part of this unequal relation.  
The decline in bhaag chaas in this region can be attributed to women not replacing male 
cultivators. While men move out of agriculture, a majority of women take up non-
agricultural work or continue to work as agricultural labourers as opposed to cultivators. 
Cultivation and tenancy remains a male domain. Unlike in Aranthangi, women have not 
become forerunners of such land transactions, and remain confined to work that is socially 
acceptable to them. In the two villages, out of a total of 16 respondents who leased in land 
for bhaag chaas, only one of them was a woman.  
Jharna, a 50-year-old Bauri woman, carries out bhaag chaas on approximately 4 bighas of 
land. The tenancy patterns alternate not only with the crop but with every passing year as 
well. She grows niranjan rice (medium quality of rice), sesame and vegetables. For rice, the 
landlord provides the seeds and fertilisers and in return, she gives half of the produce after 
deducting the cost of the inputs. For vegetables and sesame, she needs to pay a land rent 
of Rs.2000/- per bigha. This value is lower than the village rate of Rs.3000/- per bigha 
because she leases in land from the same landowner that her family has worked with for 
over two generations. The relation suggests continuity in paternalistic relations. 
Jharna cultivates land on bhaage and theeke, but has to borrow money from the very same 
landowner. The loan amount is repaid through labour time. The frequency of loans 
required for everyday expenses and cultivation keep Jharna indebted to the landowner. 
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The best way she sees fit to repay the landlord is by becoming a bandha kishen. Jharna is 
both cultivator and agricultural labourer but the primary identity she ascribes to herself is 
that which is most socially acceptable- a bandha kishen. Working as a bandha kishen 
provides Jharna with security of tenure and agricultural wage work. If a comparison is 
drawn between Aranthangi and Chinsurah, female cultivators and labourers work under 
exploitative conditions in both regions. However, in the former, it is indebtedness 
generated through land that drags women into pannaiyal work. In Chinsurah, as it is not 
socially acceptable for women to be forerunners of land transactions and cultivation, they 
become bandha kishens so that they can lease land, a process which increases their 
dependence and indebtedness towards the landowners.  
Jharna was identified as the only female respondent who was cultivating land on her own. 
Other female respondents reported cultivating land on tenancy that was passed on to 
them by male members of their family. Sabita, a 39-year-old Khoira (ST) agricultural 
labourer cultivates land on theeke and on bhaag chaas. Her husband had taken land 1 bigha 
of land on bhaag chaas. His failure to meet his payments for one fasli year left him indebted 
to the landowner. In order to pay off the loan, he works as a fruit vendor on the local trains. 
Sabita on the other hand, now works as a bhaag chaas on this leased land. In order to meet 
payments, she has taken land on theeke, in the hope that vegetables can give her higher 
revenue and help her pay off her husband’s loan. Cultivating land on bhaage and theeke 
requires investment, which Sabita cannot make with her earnings from agricultural wage 
work, or from her husband’s income. In order to cultivate land on both bhaage and theeke 
she relies on money from the landowner. She considers this as her loan, which she pays off 
through labour time as a bandha kishen. Sabita, cannot opt out of the bhaage contract, as 
she is bound by familial relations- her husband. This relation, because of the loan taken by 
her husband, reinforces her decision to become a bandha kishen.  
Sashti, a 25-year-old Bagdi labourer, had a similar story to narrate. Jharna and Sabita 
cultivate land that belongs to a larger landowner. Sashti on the other hand, helps her 
husband cultivate land that belonged to a medium landowner. Sashti’s husband is a bhaag 
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chaasi and did not migrate in search of non-agricultural work. However, he has taken loans 
from the medium landowner, and from a large landowner, in order to meet production 
costs. Sashti’s husband had to borrow from two different sources because he could not rely 
on the medium landowner for money. The transaction was more business-like with proper 
interest rates. Her husband was unable to pay the loan amount borrowed from both 
landowners. Payments to the medium landowner were negotiated, often delayed, but 
paid. In order to escape high interest rates, payments to the large landowner were made 
through labour time- Sashti’s labour. Sashti has now worked as a bandha kishen for two 
years (at the time of survey). Apart from paying off the loan amount, working as a bandha 
kishen has granted access to future short-term loans and grains. The bandha kishen relation 
is an exclusionary labour arrangement, which grants privileges at the cost of reduced 
wages and longer working hours, often including unpaid work.  
Sashti and Sabita are cases where female agricultural labourers become bandha kishens to 
pay off their husbands’ loans. The female agricultural labourers enter exploitative work 
contracts and take on the burden of repaying loans. The ability to substitute female labour 
with such great ease places limited restrictions on the male cultivators and labourers, 
where they continue to have greater freedom to shift to non-agricultural work and pass on 
their debt to their wives.  
4.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter discussed how tenancy arrangements are a profitable option for large and 
medium landowners, where they can maintain control and generate surplus from land. For 
the classes of labour, tenancy is another mechanisms of survival. The ability to enter a 
tenancy arrangement, for the classes of labour, depends on existing relations of 
indebtedness, obligation, and at times, the unquestioning loyalty of the labourer that is 
passed on through generations of servitude. Traditional patron client relations have given 
to way to transactions of rent and profit, notwithstanding that this takes place alongside 
relations of power determined through social hierarchy and social obligations. In both 
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Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the transaction was not restricted to the exchange of land but 
shaped labour relations as well, one ending up being dependent upon the other. 
Labour relations are exclusionary in nature where certain privileges are extended in order 
to secure labour. These privileges can be in the form of credit, land and even the privilege 
of first call for agricultural wage work. In Aranthangi, tenants reported that they were not 
compelled or coerced in any way to meet payments. This never instilled any fear of them 
losing land, as the defaulted amount could be carried forward in the next fasli year. There 
is no explicit threat of withdrawal of land. The assurance of land increased both 
dependence and indebtedness towards the landowners. Among female tenants in 
Aranthangi, the loan was often paid through labour time, where they remained tied for a 
short period of time to a particular landowner. The moment they paid off the loan they 
were free to work for another employer.  
In Chinsurah, loans or defaulted land rent payments were paid through female labour time. 
As shown in the case of Sashti and Sabita, their entry into tenancy arrangements was to 
repay their husband’s loans. While these women are drawn into these exploitative 
relations, their husbands move out in search for better paying non-agricultural jobs. In 
order to manage the debts, these women become bandha kishens, which provides them 
access to further loans, agricultural wage work and land. Along with their labour time, 
tenancy emerges another avenue to repay loans. For the bandha kishens, repayment of the 
loan extracted through labour time is not confined to agricultural wage work but extends 
to unpaid domestic work that they carry out for the landowner.  
Rudra (1982) identifies tenants under such a system as being farm servants in disguise, 
where they get paid in kind as a share of the crop, instead of being paid fixed wages. 
However, apart from the difference in mode of payment, after the Bonded Labour System 
(Abolition) Act of 1976, labourers in general recognise that doing non-farm work for the 
landlord indicates bondage of some form and particularly in Aranthangi, have tried to step 
away from this. This was expressed in a forceful manner especially amongst the Paraiyars. 
Even the Pallar and Ambalakar agricultural wage workers did not want to be associated 
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with pannaiyal work. Despite the resistance, conditions of indebtedness determine the 
severity of labour tying experienced by the classes of labour.  
In Chinsurah, female labourers became bandha kishen in order repay loans. There was no 
shame attached to being a bandha kishen unlike in Aranthangi with pannaiyals.  In 
Chinsurah, where as a rule women do not partake in tenancy arrangements, the bandha 
kishen relation provides them access to cultivable land.  
The labourers in Aranthangi and Chinsurah are not devoid of choice. They have the choice 
to enter or refrain from tied labour arrangements; however, they are not free from the 
obligations and privileges that are extended to them by the landowners and their 
husbands. Coupled with their caste position, this keeps them in a situation of 
indebtedness.  
Indebtedness, and the determination of who enters labour tying arrangements is 
generated through asymmetrical power relations between the employer and labour, and 
gendered positions within the household and wider family/ kinship group. Respondents 
like Jharna who came from female-headed households entered tenancy contracts and 
became bandha kishens to support their dependents. Others like Sabita, Sashti, 
Rajalakshmi and Kamlaveni, often became tied labourers to pay off debts that were not 
theirs but that of a male family member. Female labour is readily and easily substituted for 
male labour when it comes to repayment of loans. Female labourers in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah enter exploitative working conditions. Kuthagai contracts and the resulting 
indebtedness lead to labour tying arrangements. The access of land to female labourers in 
Chinsurah through theeke or bhaag chaas is made possible through labour tying 
arrangements. The persistence of such exploitative tenancy patterns and labour tying 
arrangements is because these female labourers are bound by their duties and obligations, 
not only to the landowner but also to their family. These relations impinge on the ability of 
female cultivators to operate independently.  
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In an environment riddled with insecurities for the smaller and marginal landowners, and 
the agricultural labourers, tenancy emerges as a thin veil of protection to secure 
livelihoods- an apparent move to help people improve their lives. However, labourers, 
tenants and farmers are operating in a system where power relations are skewed in favour 
of larger landowners, binding the labourers into relations of privilege, obligation and ever-
increasing debt.  
This chapter discussed how relations with the land generate debts that result in labour 
tying arrangements among the female classes of labour. These debts are an outcome of 
interlocking transaction of land, labour and credit. In the following chapter I examine the 




Chapter 5: Labour Tying and Credit Relations: Interlinkages of Land Labour and 
Credit 
 
Parvati, a 35-year-old Ambalakar woman in Thirasu (Aranthangi, Tamil Nadu), had 
returned home after cutting sugarcane and was cooking food for her family. She is one of 
the few labourers who work in sugarcane fields. She does this because her husband had 
taken a loan from a Thevar landowner, and is now working to pay off the amount, and at 
the time sugarcane paid more than rice. She complained of insufficient wages and that she 
had no savings to invest in her own land (200 kulis). “I always have to look out for other 
sources of money. First, I go to my neighbours, then to informal money lenders, and finally, if 
all else fails, I go to my employer.”  Formal credit institutions do not figure in her list of credit 
sources. Going to a bank requires her to produce collateral, and the only asset she owns is 
her land which she does not want to lose. She prefers borrowing money from informal 
credit sources so that she can retain ownership of the land. As mentioned in Chapter Four, 
91.42 per cent of female respondents who belong to the classes of labour are tenants. 
Parvati’s concerns and complaints are typical responses among female labourers and 
cultivators.  
Sampa a 29-year-old Bauri agricultural labourer, in Bardhanagar (Chinsurah, West Bengal), 
is in debt because her husband does not contribute regularly to household expenditures. 
According to her: “My husband does not work. Where do I get money from when I need it? I 
have to go to my employer, and if that means I have to work as a bandha kishen, so be it. How 
many times can I ask my father or neighbours for money? We are all in the same position; 
there is only so much that they can give.” Sampa does not consider going to a formal credit 
institution or an informal money lender. She prefers working as a bandha kishen so that 
she has access to work and loans from her employer.  
Described above are two very different instances of credit, used for very different 
purposes. Parvati relies on other sources of credit in order to meet daily expenses and cost 
of production in cultivation. Sampa’s husband who is a casual daily wage labourer, cannot 
get regular work and therefore, rarely contributes towards any household expenses. 
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Sampa considers herself to be the only working member of the family, and would prefer 
to work as a bandha kishen than rely on her husband’s earnings or on irregular casual work, 
so that she can provide food for her family. Even though both these women require loans 
for very different reasons, the conditions that push them to the landowner and into labour 
tying are dominated by patriarchal/gendered familial relations, and their class positions 
that draw them into exploitative low paying work. The financial conditions of the family 
affect the severity of the tied labour relation. This draws attention to the different ways in 
which female labourers get into parallel situations of tied labour.   
This chapter examines different credit relations- a necessity that emerges in order to cover 
income and expenditure gaps that arise out of seasonal fluctuations within a fasli year 
(Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2001; 2002; 2006). Credit relations are important for 
landowners/employers as it generates a stable and servile labour, which are strengthened 
through relations of deceit, compulsion and obligations (Srivastava, 2005: p.8). Labourers, 
under situations of dwindling agricultural wage work, are constantly trying to find ways to 
secure their livelihood, which pulls them into exclusionary labour arrangements. Credit is 
one such way of ensuring survival for the classes of labour. In the period of neoliberal 
development, the sources of credit accessible to the classes of labour has changed. Access 
to formal credit institutions are limited in number in rural areas and access is determined 
through class positions (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2001). For poor households, 
credit is accessible through informal sources, which is often usurious in nature. 
This chapter asks how accessibility to different sources of credit generates indebtedness 
among the classes of labour. Indebtedness does not automatically imply the creation of 
tied labour; these are influenced by relations of privilege, obligation and gender/familial 
power relations. This chapter uncovers how interlocked markets of land, credit and labour, 
and asymmetrical power relations within the domestic and work space compels the female 
classes of labour to take up usurious credit and exploitative work conditions that can lead 




Section 5.1 in this chapter highlights the fragmented nature of formal rural credit 
institutions in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Despite credit reforms, inaccessibility to 
formal credit institutions raises questions about how access to credit is produced 
politically. The access to banks in Aranthangi and Chinsurah is limited primarily to large 
and medium landowners. The marginal farmers and agricultural labourers depend on 
informal sources of credit. The changing geography of banking has affected access to 
formal credit sources and intensified class inequalities. Section 5.2 discusses land-credit 
and labour-credit interlinkages, and the various ways in which they generate indebtedness 
among the classes of labour. Credit is an important survival tool in rural society and 
therefore, there are multiple reasons for taking loans which generates indebtedness 
towards the borrower. The inability of banks to extend loans to the classes of labour is 
compensated by informal lending sources.  
Section 5.3 examines the presence of multiple sources of credit in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah, the pattern of borrowing, and how the classes of labour are drawn into relations 
of debt- through interlocking transactions of land, labour credit, and domestic politics. 
Despite the presence of multiple sources of credit in Aranthangi, female labourers enter 
tied labour relations primarily through land-credit interlinkages. As observed in Chapter 
Four, women (especially in Aranthangi) enter tenancy relations. Therefore, apart from 
everyday consumption loans, women need loans for the purpose of cultivation as well. In 
Chinsurah, cultivation is not considered the primary occupation of female labourers and 
are, therefore, drawn into tied labour relations through labour-credit interlinkages. An 
overarching factor in both regions which pushes women into labour tying arrangements is 
domestic politics, where they are paying off their husband’s debt.  
 Labourers are constantly on the lookout for cheaper, less usurious sources of credit. Self-
help groups (SHGs) in rural India that are micro-finance institutions have provided an easy 
source of credit, especially for women. Though effective, especially in the case of 
Aranthangi, these groups remain contained in particular localities and communities, and 
their effects remain localised. The disparate effects of SHGs are discussed in Section 5.4. 
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Self-help groups can be used as an instrument to help labourers out of indebted relations. 
However, the localised nature of SHGs, and the overt emphasis on enterprise, does not 
allow female labourers to utilise the micro-finance institution to their advantage and relive 
their debt. This brings in to question many of the debates that surround microfinance and 
empowerment of poor women. The scanty benefits of SHGs places limits on the extent to 
which dependence on informal sources of credit are reduced. The limited effects of SHGs, 
in turn has repurcussions on the burden of loans and their repayment, of which a 
disproportionate share falls on the female classes of labour.  
5.1 Credit Institutions forging Credit relations 
Indebtedness is considered one of the reasons why labourers enter tied labour 
arrangements. According to the National Sample Survey Organisation report on 
‘Indebtedness of Farmer Households’ (59th Round 2003-2004), of 89.35 million Farmer 
Households 43.42 million (48.6 per cent) are indebted. In Tamil Nadu 74.5 per cent of the 
farmer households are indebted compared with West Bengal where the level is 50.1 per 
cent. There are numerous ways in which labourers and cultivators enter relations of debt. 
The kind of creditor, whether banks, employers or private money lenders, they interact 
with, is a reflection on how well institutionalised forms of credit operate. 
Rural credit societies in India have been around for over 100 years since the enactment of 
the Co-operative Societies Act in 1904. This Act attempted to address the issues of 
farmers’ indebtedness and poverty (Bansal et al. 2012) by reducing farmers’ dependence 
on informal sources of credit. Initially, the Act only allowed the registrations of banks and 
credit unions but in 1912 it was amended to include all societies, credit or non-credit, at 
urban and rural centres (Rayudu 1991). Rural Credit Cooperatives today consist of both 
long-term and short-term credit institutions. This operates on a three-tiered structure, 
with the Primary Agricultural Co-operative Banks (PACBs) at the village level, District 




5.1.1 Rural credit Societies 
In Tamil Nadu, there are 4474 PACBs (TNAU Agritech Portal: Banking and Credit) and 5229 
PACBs92 in West Bengal (Department of Cooperation, Government of West Bengal) that 
makes credit available to farmers. These institutions provide credit to farmers and make 
agricultural inputs, such as fertilisers, available to them (see Table 5.1). These banks provide 
both short term and medium term credit for a period of 12 to 15 months and 3 to 5 years. 
For the two villages of Karaimedu and Thirasu, the nearest PACB was 18 kms from the 
villages in the town of Aranthangi. For Madhabpur and Bardhanagar the nearest PACB was 













                                                          
92 “Out of total 5229 PACBs, 2228 are mobilizing deposit. Although godowns are available in more than 3000 
PACBs and fund is available in deposit-mobilising PACBs, only 1792 PACS are distributing fertilizer, 504 
PACBs are involved in seed business and 371   PACBs are marketing agricultural produces.” (Department of 
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Loans for agriculture and allied 
sectors to DCCBs 
1 1 
Table 5.1: Cooperative Banks and Rural Credit Services in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal 
Source: TNAU Agritech Portal Banking and Department of Cooperation, Government of West Bengal 
The DCCB is located at the district headquarters, which is at Pudukkottai and Hooghly 
townships. Along with undertaking normal commercial banking services, the main 
function of these banks is to provide loans to primary credit societies (see Table 5.1). Tamil 
Nadu has 23 DCCBs and around 717 branches in the rural areas to serve the PACBs (TNAU 
Agritech Portal: Banking and Credit). West Bengal has 17 Central Co-operative banks 
across the 14 districts and they have a total of 361 branches (Department of Cooperation, 
Government of West Bengal). The State Apex Cooperative Banks channelize resources to 
the DCCB and PACBs where funds can be used for both agricultural and non-agricultural 
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purposes (TNAU Agritech Portal: Banking and Credit)93. Table 5.2 below provides a synopsis 
of the rural credit providing bodies in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal.  
Despite this tiered credit structure, most institutions continue to perform poorly. The 
percentage share of crop loans fell from 74.9 per cent in 1975-76 to 33.2 per cent in 2005-
2006 in short term credit. For long term credit the drop was much steeper from 61.2 per 
cent to 6 per cent (Radhakrishna, 2007). Reduced access to formal credit institutions 
coupled with the change in policy on expansion, allowed banks to shift their loss-making 
branches to more viable areas (from 51.2 per cent of the total in 1996 to 45.7 per cent in 
2005), in the 1990s (Satyasai, 2008) . This was realised with banks shifting to urban areas, 
and marked with the entry of foreign banks, which increased competition (Satyasai, 2008). 
Post 1990, banks had to show profitability. In doing so the targets, they set for the ‘weaker 
sections’ were rarely met, which furthered dependence on landowners and informal 
money lenders (Satyasai, 2008: 391). The uneven distribution of the credit cooperatives 
further aggravates the problems faced with access to and utilisation of credit 
cooperatives94.The next section looks at the fragmented terrain of banking and the way it 
affects farmers in Aranthangi and Chinsurah. 
5.1.2 Accessibility to Banks 
Unequal access to formal credit institutions is evident not only between different agrarian 
classes but amongst the landed class as well. In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the dominant 
                                                          
93 Under the Cooperative Credit structures there are 15 schemes that have been implemented. One of the 
schemes pertaining to agriculture includes the waiver of agricultural loans. As of 31.3.2006, the Tamil Nadu 
government was to waive the crop loans of farmers in order to get them out of the debt trap (TNAU Agritech 
Portal: Banking and Credit). Drawing from this initiative of the Tamil Nadu Government, the Government of 
India, under the Agricultural Minister Sharad Pawar, implemented the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt 
Relief Scheme (ADWDRS), in 2008. Under this scheme, a debt waiver/debt relief of Rs. 65,318.33/- crore was 
granted to 3.69 crore farmers. Along with this Rs. 51,340.47/- crore was released to lending institutions as 
reimbursement. 
 
94  Seven states -Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu- account 
for 78 per cent of the total short term credit of cooperatives (Report of the Expert Group on Agricultural 
Indebtedness 2007). This explains why the average loan per household in 2003 was much higher in Tamil 
Nadu at Rs. 23,963/- compared to West Bengal which was Rs. 10,931/- (NSSO, Situation Assessment of 
Survey of Farmers, 2003) 
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(Thevars and Muslims) landowning class has easy access to bank loans and got timely 
information about receiving subsidised goods. This information helped them register their 
names with government stores and obtain these goods at the earliest. In 1998-99, the 
Government of India introduced Kisan Credit Cards to make borrowing easier for farmers; 
there is a fixed amount determined by landholding size and the farmer can use it towards 
production needs (Ministry of Finance 2007)95. Despite this, very few farmers spoke of 
having owned a card. In Aranthangi, the medium landowner only knew of the government 
providing some form of compensation when there was any crop failure.  
In Chinsurah, Anwar, a medium landowner said that the only benefit a chaasi could get is 
if they had a Kisan Credit Card, and not everyone had one. Agricultural loans were provided 
based on the crop; for one bigha of land for potato Rs.1000/- was provided and for rice 
Rs.2000/-. He did not have a Kisan Credit Card and had only recently heard of it. He was 
under debt as his loans would not be waived, which meant that he had to borrow money 
from private money lenders and from large landowners to try and make his payments. The 
indebtedness of the farmer further pushes them into trying to secure cheap labour that 
results in exploitative work conditions.  
 Shafiq, who is the largest landlord in Madhabpur, applied for a Kisan Credit Card, which he 
obtained from a national bank at the town headquarters. This card as it works as an 
insurance cover against any unforeseen problems. However, out of the 25 farmers 
interviewed only 4 owned a Kisan Credit Card, none of the others knew whether they were 
eligible for it and where to get it from. Moreover, Shafiq was the only landlord who was 
well informed about the benefits of the Kisan Credit Card.  
All farmers in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar spoke of how in order to access the service of 
the bank, it was very important to know “someone”.  Shafiq knew the bank manager 
because of his ties with the Krishi Vigyan Centre. Shafiq passed the information that he 
                                                          
95 The scheme was implemented throughout the country by the public sector commercial banks, apex banks 
district banks and regional rural banks. At the all-India Level, the government bodies had been able to 
distribute only 642 lakh cards (Ministry of Finance 2007).  
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had to Anwar, as they are friends.  For a majority of the medium, small and marginal 
farmers, information almost never percolates down. Unless accessibility to formal 
institutions is altered, efforts made by the Agricultural Ministry (such as the Rs.52,000 
Crore Farm Debt Waiver Scheme) or even by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Developm 
ent  (reduced the interest rate on direct refinance to cooperative banks by up to 0.60 per 
cent in 2014) will remain confined to certain areas and certain sections of the people (The 
Economic Times, 2013a; see Chavan, 2007).  
5.1.3 Informal Rural Credit 
Non-institutional sources of credit accounts for a large section of loans taken within 
agriculture. The table below shows the different sources of credit that farmers and rural 
labour have access to.  










1. Money Lenders 
2. Traders 









0.4 % 10.74 % 
6.4 % 18.4 % 
Table 5.2: Sources of Credit in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal 
Source: NSSO Situation Assessment of Survey of Farmers, 2003,                                                                                              
Note- the sources of non-institutional credit mentioned in the table are based on relative importance of the 
source in both regions. 
 
 It is interesting to note from the table, that in Tamil Nadu private money lenders form an 
important source of credit. Whereas in West Bengal, there is a far more equitable 
distribution among the three categories. The NSS report highlights that credit from money 
lenders or other informal sources was accessed by small and marginal farmers, whereas 
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institutional credit was for medium and large farmers (NSSO Situation Assessment of 
Survey of Farmers, 2003).  
The importance of non-institutionalized credit sources varies with different land holding 
classes. NSSO Situation Assessment Survey of Farmers 2003 report shows that in Tamil 
Nadu, 80.9 per cent of those who own less than 0.01 hectares of land have access to non-
institutional credit, whereas only 25.7 per cent of those who own between 4-10 hectares of 
land are under non-institutional forms of debt. West Bengal projects a different picture, 
where 76.6 per cent of households who own less than 0.01 hectares of land have access to 
non-institutional credit, at the same time 78.7 per cent of households who own between 4-
10 hectares of land are under non-institutional debt. These figures suggest that it is not the 
diversification of crops or the mechanisation of farming that result in the indebtedness of 
farmers but rather the ease of access to institutional and non-institutional sources of 
credit. This can be explained by the changing geography of banking with public sector 
banks moving out of the region. In West Bengal, despite capital input made by the state96, 
banks have failed to perform properly, and lending to the small farmer has not improved 
(Ray, 2013). In Chinsurah, medium landowners were not aware of the state benefits 
available to them. This flow of information and access to credit operates along class lines 
with medium, small and marginal farmers having reduced access to formal credit sources, 
which perpetuates the existence of multiple credit sources and indebtedness. 
The shift in the geography of banks witnessed a change in the composition of those who 
could access loans from banks. The importance of informal sources of credit, at the state 
level was observed in the two field sites as well. Table 5.3 identifies the respondents in 
Aranthangi and Chinsurah who tried accessing banks for the purpose of loans and received 
them.  
 
                                                          
96 The Bangiya Gramin Vikash Bank received Rs.265 crores and the Paschmin Banga Gramin Bank received 
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44  3  
4.67% 
 
Table 5.3: Respondents who Accessed Banks for the purpose of Cultivation 
Source: Field Work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, November 2011 to September 2012.  
*Percentage values are relative to total number of respondents surveyed across all classes.  
 
In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, of the total classes of labour, only 9.67 per cent and 4.67 per 
cent respectively, of the total population had access to banks. Some of the respondents 
reported that they had received loans from the bank but had to provide securities in the 
form of land or jewellery. Receiving these bank loans reduce the borrower’s dependence 
on informal credit sources marginally, but it does not necessarily do away with them. Loans 
from informal sources are taken along with bank loans. However, the majority of those 
who belong to the classes of labour, not having access to banks, highlights the continued 
dependence of the classes of labour on informal sources of credit. Table 5.4 shows the 
different sources of informal credit accessed by the classes of labour.  
 Total No. of 
Respondents 
among Classes of 
Labour (landless 
labourers only) 
Landowners Private Money 
Lenders 
Others 












Table 5.4: Sources of Informal Credit among Classes of Labour 
Source: Field Work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, November 2011 to September 2012. 
In Aranthangi, private money lenders emerge as an important source of credit, a trend 
similar to the state level data shown in Table 5.2. In Chinsurah, landowners, emerge as an 
important source of credit for the classes of labour. Traders are also an important source 
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of credit, however, as studies in West Bengal have highlighted, most of the traders are 
landowners themselves (for further details see Harriss-White, 2008), a trend witnessed 
during my research as well.  
A reason for the different credit sources in Aranthangi is because the classes of labour do 
not want to borrow from the landowner and get tied down to them, and therefore go to 
them as their last resort. The same is not true for Chinsurah, where limited access to credit 
sources for women draws them to the landowners. Labourers in both regions rely on 
informal sources of credit and in doing so have multiple credit relations with landowners, 
money lenders, traders, neighbours etc. The following section discusses the different 
credit interlinkages in the two regions and how it generates indebtedness among the 
classes of labour. 
5.2 Credit Interlinkage and Indebtedness 
Indebtedness experienced by the classes of labour, through relations with informal sources 
of credit, adds to the growing asymmetry of power between the lender and the borrower. 
This asymmetry highlights that these market exchanges are not impersonal, rather they 
are conditioned by relations between the borrower and lender (Acharya, 2000).  
There are credit interlinkages with the market, land and with labour. Within the land-credit 
relation, “input cash” is a dominant form of interlinkage (Bhaumik and Rahim, 1999). The 
landowner provides input in the form of seeds or fertilizers, or even tractors, and the 
borrower cultivates crops and returns the lender (in this case the landowner) a payment in 
cash or kind after the harvest. The interlinkage borne out of the input-cash relation, 
expresses itself differently in different tenancy arrangements, whether on bhaage in 
Chinsurah or on vāram or al- vāram in Aranthangi. The tenancy patterns, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, operate through certain privileges that are extended to the tenant 
by the landowner. The privileges determine access and availability to land and credit.  
Bhaumik and Rahim (1999) argue that indebtedness generated through “input cash” is 
more prominent in agriculturally developed villages. Relations of indebtedness cannot be 
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explained through economic deterministic arguments of agriculture being advanced or 
backward. There is a ubiquity about indebtedness, i.e. they can occur in agriculturally 
advanced or backward regions. What is important about indebtedness is the unfreedom it 
generates and these need to be understood through relations of selectivity and exclusion. 
The privileged access to loans generates relations of obligation which can coerce female 
labourers into labour tying arrangements (see section 5.3 for a detailed discussion).   Based 
on these relations of power, an input-cash interlinkage can be more exploitative in a theeke 
or kuthagai contract compared to sharecropping. As I have identified in the previous 
chapter, the loan amount in a theeke and kuthagai contract is often extracted through 
labour time, especially on the part of female agricultural labourers. Labour tying 
arrangements are more visible when the landowners/lenders, have a monopoly power over 
the terms and conditions of work and loan contracts, which renders the tenant/labourer as 
a “passive accepter” (Bhaduri, 1986 in Acharya, 2000). Such conditions were observed in 
Chinsurah, where the landowner becomes the first point of contact for loans, and female 
agricultural labourers become bandha kishens, in order to access these loans.    
The second type of interlinkage is “cash-labour” (Bhaumik and Rahim, 1999) - the 
landowner/lender offers cash that is paid off through labour service. Labour service 
generally pertains to agricultural wage work; however, there might be a crossover to other 
kinds of work as well. This is a common occurrence among female agricultural labourers 
who are not in a position to turn down work out of fear of future unemployment. The 
fundamental reason behind this occurrence is the shortages in income created with male 
migration to non-farm work and coercions that women undergo due to familial/gendered 
relations97. Such everyday exploitative contracts did not face severe resistance from 
female agricultural labourers in Aranthangi, as this was a move to secure land and work, 
and to do so they had to maintain “good work relations”. In Chinsurah, the female 
agricultural labourers reported that they do not want to antagonise the landowners, as 
                                                          
97 As described in Chapter 5, women tenants and labourers entered periods of short term tying not only due 
to personal loans, but were repaying loans taken by male members of their family.  
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they feel obliged that landowners have shown them preference and given them work. 
Whether working on the assumption of security or privilege, two very different realities 
culminate in indebtedness.  
The cash-labour-credit contract is short term in nature, and as observed in both Aranthangi 
and Chinsurah, these loans are taken when agricultural labourers do not have any work 
and cannot afford to buy food for a particular period in time. The loan amounts vary from 
Rs.300/- to Rs.1500/-. In Aranthangi, the labourers believed, that unless it was used for 
cultivation, borrowing large sums of money was seen as a process that would tie them to 
the employer/landlord for longer periods of time.  In Chinsurah, out of a total of 36 female 
labourers interviewed, 19 (52.77%) were bandha kishen (a significant number from my 
sample). These 19 women had voluntarily become bandha kishens in order to have greater 
job security and freer access to loans from the landowner. The reason they gave for the 
increased dependence on the landlord was the lack of access to banks and that the 
relationship with the landowner provided other benefits. The landowner extends privileges 
and through obligations ensures a constant supply of a docile and disciplined workforce- a 
process which is self-reinforcing particularly in the case of Chinsurah.  
5.2.1 Loans and Rising Indebtedness 
This section looks more specifically at the different reasons for taking loans that result in 
different interlinkages. The reasons for taking loans are manifold and range from health, 
to ceremonies and functions (among which one of the most important are marriages), food 
and cultivation, to identify a few. Table 5.5 highlights the different reason for borrowing 
money as identified by the respondents in Aranthangi and Chinsurah.  As the table shows, 
the reasons for taking loans can range from everyday consumption, for which loans are 






Reasons for Loans Large Landowner Medium Landowner Classes of Labour 
Aranthangi Chinsurah Aranthangi Chinsurah Aranthangi Chinsurah 
Total respondents 
interviewed 
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Table 5.5: Class-Wise Distribution of Reasons for Taking Loans in Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
Source: Field Work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, November 2011 to September 2012.                           *Percentages 
calculated according to total respondents in each class category.  
Across all classes, marriage, ceremonies and functions were identified as one of the most 
important reasons to borrow money98. However, in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the classes 
of labour borrowed money from private money lender and landowners, along with 
pledging their gold in order to meet marriage expenses.  For the classes of labour (over 95 
per cent), a large portion of their debt was generated through everyday expenses. The 
importance of certain factors for taking loans, identified in the field areas, find resonance 
in State-level data as well. According to the NSSO report (2003), consumption expenditure 
is reported as one of the most important factors for taking loans (34 per cent and 25 per 
cent respectively for Tamil Nadu and West Bengal).  
Bhaumik and Rahim (1999) argue that everyday consumption loans is an interlinkage 
found in the backward villages. However, consumption loans taken in the form of cash or 
kind is an important survival strategy (Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2006). 
Therefore, these consumption loans cannot be understood and explained in the context of 
existing in “pre-capitalist societies”. As observed in the field sites, consumption loans are 
taken at much greater frequency as the period of repayment is short-term. The frequency 
                                                          
98 While marriages take place occasionally, ceremonies and functions are a yearly affair and incurs high 
expenses. For the purpose of representation, the two categories are clubbed together.  
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of loans and ease of access make landowners and private money lenders important and 
reliable sources of credit. In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, borrowing from landowners 
presents itself as a mechanism to secure cheap labour and to discipline the workforce; 
therefore, by controlling credit they control the labour force (Bardhan, 1983).  
Credit transactions are not restricted to monetary transactions alone but can be in kind, 
such as in grains or labour time. Guishyam, a 65-year-old Brahmin landlord, from 
Bardhanagar, who owns 12 bighas of land, says,  
“I do not sell all the rice that I grow. It is stored in the dhaner gola (granary). This rice is for the 
consumption of my family. Since the wage payments are partly made in rice, I pay the 
labourers with this rice. There are times when labourers come to me and ask me for rice directly 
instead of cash because they might not have sufficient money to buy rice. It is mainly the 
women who come and ask for rice and pay it off by working in the farms for me.  This is why 
it is necessary to keep large quantities of rice stored at home.” 
For Guishyam, storing rice is very important, as this is used not only for self-consumption 
and wage payments but as credit transactions as well. Taking loans in the form of grains, 
is treated as an advance payment by female agricultural labourers. Female labourers take 
advance payments in kind to overcome any current food shortage that they might be 
undergoing. Moreover, female agricultural labourers prefer payments in kind as they have 
limited control over their earnings. Receiving payments in kind (as food grains) ensures 
food in the house; whereas wages in cash are taken by their husbands. Despite being wage 
earners, female labourers have very little control over their earnings. Taking grains 
presents itself as a way to overcome weaker negotiating capacities with their husbands, 
and ensures food in the household.  
Supriya, a 45-year-old Santhal female agricultural labourer in Madhabpur, brings home 
rice from Guishyam, and stores it so that even if there is nothing else to eat at home, there 
is always some rice. On occasions, when she has brought home money, she was forced to 
give whatever portion of the money her husband demanded (which he usually used to 
purchase alcohol), and there was nothing that she could say or do to get out of this 
situation. Storing rice is as important for labourers like Supriya, as it is for landowners like 
210 
 
Guishyam. Rice is not utilised for self-consumption alone among labourers. Within her 
locality, Supriya, and other labourers like her, either sell rice to their neighbours or barter 
it for other goods and services. 
Debt generates economic vulnerability which is heightened through domestic politics. 
This is observed in the case of Supriya who has very little control over her daily earnings, 
as she has to give a portion, or at times the entire amount to her husband. Availing of 
interest-free consumption loans in the form of rice grains keeps her indebted to Guishyam. 
Supriya's husband’s demand over her earnings aggravates the economic vulnerability of 
the household, especially when the money is not used to meet household expenses.  
For female agricultural labourers, usurious rates of interest are not extracted in the form 
of cash but through numerous forms of labour service, for example, Supriya working as a 
bandha kishen. A transaction of this nature places restrictions on the labourer to transact 
with another employer (Harriss-White, 2008). Landowners look to accumulate capital in 
various ways (rent, profit, interest), and they increase their profits through indebtedness 
of the classes of labour, which is often initiated by the limited access to formal credit 
institutions.  
The ease of access to these loans and the resultant dependence (that leads to further social 
control) on landowners has placed restrictions on the freedom of the classes of labour, and 
their choice in entering labour tying arrangements. Under the currently existing pannaiyal 
or bandha kishen relations, indebtedness inflicts labour management through interlocking 
transactions and by extracting services99. In Chinsurah, among the Bauris and Bagdis, 
female agricultural labourers would extend their labour service beyond agricultural wage 
work. They would carry out certain household chores for the landowners and their 
payment for such tasks would be one meal. Along with reduced wages for agricultural 
                                                          
99 This was observed by Ramachandran (1991) in Gokilapuram, where those within bonded relations and out 
of bonded relations continued to carry out labour services of various kinds, which at times was unpaid as well. 
211 
 
wage work, the female labourers carried out unpaid domestic chores for the landowner, 
and this was understood as a way to repay loans. 
Sarbari, a 65-year-old female Bagdi widow, is an agricultural labourer. Due to her ill health 
she cannot work in the fields for long hours and finds it difficult getting work, as most of it 
is taken up by the younger workers. Her husband used to work for Guishyam and now she 
works for him. She turns to Guishyam for loans due to the lack of work and her inability to 
work for long hours. She repays this amount by working for Guishyam as a domestic maid 
in his house. She prefers this set up because she does not have to stand in the “chemical 
infested water” and in the hot sun the entire day to earn her living. In Sarbari’s case, she is 
able to negotiate the kind of work she does for Guishyam through labour relations which 
existed because of her husband. However, even though she can negotiate work, she 
unable to negotiate her wages.  
Koel, a 42-year-old Bagdi labourer, works for Hussain (a medium landowner). She takes 
loans, but only in the form of rice grains. These loans are repaid through agricultural and 
domestic work. Koel receives reduced wages for agricultural wage work but she never 
reduces the rice component of the wage. She relies on such loans to ensure food in the 
household because like other female wage labourers in this village, Koel complained about 
her husband not making sufficient contributions to household expenses. Koel’s access to 
everyday consumption loans is through Hussain and this leaves her at his beck and call. 
She carries out domestic work for Hussain and at times has to go and work in Hussain’s 
brother’s house as well. She cannot refuse to work for Hussain’s brother as it could result 
in withdrawal of the privileges that Koel receives. Koel knows Hussain’s family and chooses 
to work for him as a bandha kishen to ensure that she has work, the privilege of first call 
from the landowner, and access to advance payments and loans. Koel does not keep an 
account of the amount of loan repaid and relies on the calculations provided by the 
landowner.  
Male agricultural labourers repay loans through labour time but this is confined to 
agricultural wage work. For female agricultural labourers, the extension to non-
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agricultural housework seems a natural transition. It is ’natural’ because of gendered 
socialisation and expectations that women will carry out female tasks. Female labourers 
reported that landowners did not have to give them one meal a day, as they were paid for 
the agricultural wage work they carried out, and domestic work was seen as payment 
towards the loan. They were grateful for the meal provided, which is not viewed as 
payment but as an act of benevolence by the landowner. Moreover, if these women bring 
their children along, the landowner provides them with food. Under such situations, none 
of the female agricultural labourers I interviewed, questioned carrying out housework for 
the landowner, unlike in Aranthangi, where carrying out housework implied becoming 
“pannaiyal labourers”.  Female agricultural labourers in Aranthangi, who took loans from 
and were tied to particular landowners, tried to keep the period of tying short-term. The 
labourers kept a much clearer account of the amount borrowed and returned – a process 
almost absent among the bandha kishens in Chinsurah.  
This section discussed the different reasons for taking loans. As discussed in the beginning 
of this chapter, the loans are obtained through informal sources of credit for the classes of 
labour. The following section provides a discussion on the different informal sources of 
credit, how they generate indebtedness, and result in tied labour arrangements.  
5.3 Informalisation of Credit and Increasing Indebtedness 
Borrowing from landowners tantamount to exploitative work contracts. This is one of the 
reasons that female labourers in Aranthangi took loans from private money lenders. As 
seen in Table 5.4 and according to the NSSO (2003), apart from friends, relatives and 
landowners, informal money lenders are an important source of credit. More often than 
not the informal money lenders are landowners themselves. The reason for this 
dependence on informal credit lies not with access but with the frequency of loans required 
and the collateral that can be provided (Swaminathan, 2012). The varying rates of interest 
from different sources affect the degree to which borrowers rely on them. Moreover, the 
caste and class of the borrower determines their access to the type of credit source 
(Ramachandran and Swaminathan 2006). The terms and conditions of the loan are 
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determined by the informal money lender. In turn much higher rates of interest are 
charged and these interest rates vary across individual and households (Ramachandran 
and Swaminathan, 2001). In Aranthangi, borrowing from landowners was considered the 
last resort by agricultural labourers. Pallar and Paraiyar labourers believe that relying on 
the landowner for credit entails exploitative work conditions that could push them into 
becoming pannaiyals. Borrowing money from landowners is always the last resort for the 
classes of labour in Aranthangi as is reflected in Table 5.6 below:  
Source of Credit Aranthangi Chinsurah 
Money Lender 20   47.61% 13     29.54% 
Private Trader 8    19.04% 10     22.72% 
Employer/ Landowner 2       4.76% 12     27.27% 
Neighbour 7     16.67% 9       20.45% 
Self-Help Group (SHG) 5     11.90% 0               0% 
Table 5.6: Number of Respondents from the Classes of Labour (including Small and Marginal 
farmers) accessing different Sources of Informal Credit Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
                     Source: Field work in Aranthangi and Chinsurah from November 2011 to September 2012 
Respondents were asked to identify their primary source of credit. In Aranthangi, the 
majority of the respondents belonging to the classes of labour rely on informal money 
lenders followed by private traders. In Chinsurah, most of the respondents chose to go a 
landowner, followed by a money lender and private trader. Unlike in Aranthangi, none of 
the respondents in Chinsurah borrowed money from SHGs. 
 Cultivators, especially those who have leased in land, borrow money from traders to cover 
input costs. During harvest time, irrespective of the price of grains offered in government 
mills or in the market, borrowers have to sell their produce at the rates set by the trader. 
The loan amount is then deducted from the money that the cultivator receives. This is a 
system where the petty traders indirectly coerce procurement from female cultivators 
through credit relations (Harriss-White, 2008). These petty traders are able to extort 
money, control the borrower, and generate marketable surplus. The existence of such 
“polarised exchange relations” ensures greater power in the hands of the trader (Harriss-
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White, 2008: 292). In Aranthangi, these petty traders are Thevars, and the female 
agricultural labourers are Pallars, Paraiyars and Ambalakars.  Kuthagai tenants prefer 
engaging with petty traders, especially since the tenants do not want to become indebted 
to landowners by borrowing money from them.  
The traders work in wholesale retail markets, and work with the aim of securing sizeable 
quantities of produce to trade in the market. Female tenants have limited mobility when it 
comes to transporting grains to the market. These traders buy the produce directly from 
the fields, relieving the female tenants of additional transportation costs. The female 
tenants consider direct sale to the trader an easy and profitable method, as they do not 
have to deal with the market directly, nor do they have to worry about storage.  
Arunitha, a 40-year-old Ambalakar woman from Karaimedu, cultivates her land (100 kulis 
of her own and 300 kulis of leased in land), and sells her produce: 
“The rice that is harvested is collected by a private trader. I do not go and sell it in the market 
nor do I go and sell it in the government mills. I have to sell it at the rate set by him; currently, 
he is buying rice at the rate of Rs.750/- per sack. I get a loan amount from this trader to 
cultivate the land and in order to repay the loan I have to sell it to him; I cannot sell it to the 
government. I do not have to pay any interest on this amount... These businessmen do not 
mind giving us large sums of money. The previous time I received Rs. 10,000/-. They do not 
mind waiting for three months [the growing period for paddy] to get their money back. I do 
not have to pay any vaddi (interest) on this amount. Getting loans like this is actually very 
easy for me, and if the need arises I can always ask for more. If I take only half of the amount 
then the remaining amount can be added to the following year, or the next crop that I will 
cultivate. There is a great deal of flexibility to this loan.” 
The loans, described by Arunitha, are packaged as flexible, easily repayable and with no 
interest. While this loan package might be more desirable for Arunitha, than borrowing 
from a large landowner, she and others like her are not free from relations of indebtedness. 
The fact that petty traders carry forward the defaulted loan amount, places limits on the 
freedom of the cultivator to shift occupation or even traders, and sets the space for 
accumulation of loans. In order to repay the amount, cultivators need to rely on other 
sources of credit- if they are money lenders then they succumb to high rates of interests 
and if they are landowners, then the female tenants end up working as tied labourers till 
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the loan is repaid. Such was the case with Preetha, a 28-year-old Pallar cultivator, from 
Thirasu, who leased in 200 kulis land from an Ambalakar landowner. Preetha is indebted 
to both the private trader and the landowner. She therefore, only cultivates those crops 
that the trader wants her to cultivate leaving very little scope for experimenting with crops 
that could fetch her higher yield and income. In addition, she works on the landowner’s 
horticultural fields as well as sugarcane plantations to reduce and eventually repay her 
loans. Indebtedness propagates relations of dominance and obligation between the 
borrower and the lender with the subsequent polarization of power in the hands of petty 
traders and landowners (Harriss-White, 2008). 
The need to cultivate land brought cultivators like Arunitha and Preetha to the petty 
trader, and becoming indebted to the petty trader does not allow them to move out of 
their tenancy arrangement with the landowner. To ensure that land is available for 
cultivation every year, the classes of labour are entwined in interlocking transactions 
between landowner and tenant.  Arunitha, despite working as agricultural labourer to pay 
off her loan, does not consider herself tied to the landowner, as there was no direct 
monetary transaction between the two to bind them. At the same time, it is not easy for 
her to break ties with the rentier/employer. Preetha, like Arunitha is drawn into an 
elaborate land-labour-credit nexus with the landowner and private trader. She is tied to 
the landowner, however, as this is short-term, which ends once the loan is repaid, she does 
consider herself a pannaiyal labourer. In the cases mentioned above, whether the classes 
of labour consider themselves tied or not, indebtedness and dependence (direct or 
indirect) upon the landowner continues, which affects labour relations and the terms and 
conditions of work.  
In Chinsurah, there is less clear distinction between landowners and traders. The larger 
landowners in the two villages work as aratdars (traders). The intersecting roles of rentier, 
employer and trader, places restrictions on the ability of the classes of labour to negotiate 
tenancy and work contracts. Those who lease in land, sell their produce to the same 
landowner. Bargadars in Madhabpur find this arrangement to be exploitative, where they 
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do not have the freedom to sell the produce in the market. This is one of the reasons why 
bargadars in this region want to move out and take up either non-farm employment or 
work as agricultural labourers.  
Very few female labourers in Chinsurah take up cultivation but many reported that they 
were either directly or indirectly indebted to the landowner for the purpose of cultivation.  
Sudeep, a 40-year-old Santhal from Madhabpur, is a bhaag chaasi who cultivates potatoes 
and sesame. He has borrowed money to meet his production costs from Sanjay, a Brahmin 
medium landowner, who along with being a source of credit for Sudeep, leases out land to 
him. Sudeep looks after all aspects of cultivation and trade. His wife, Ruma, apart from 
helping him cultivate, is paying off his loans by working as an agricultural labour for Sanjay. 
There is no direct restriction placed upon Ruma’s labour, however, due to the time 
constraint, she remains tied to Sanjay for a fixed period of time. Ruma is not directly 
involved in the tenancy arrangement drawn out by Sanjay but she still remains indebted 
and tied to him. The fact that Ruma is paying off her husband’s loans, places restrictions 
on her ability to negotiate work contracts, which leads to labour tying arrangements. Here 
is a case where female labour is easily substituted to pay off loans taken by the male labour. 
This is similar to cases of tied harvest and tied labour relations identified in Andhra Pradesh 
(da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999). The familial relations and power relations create 
barriers, which makes it difficult for female labourers like Ruma to exit the work contract. 
This section focussed on the role of traders and how they generate indebtedness among 
the female labourers and tenants. In Aranthangi, with the female traders remaining 
indebted to the private traders, their dependence on landowners (while diminishing 
marginally) is not done away with, as they still require access to land, which often draws 
them back into a relation of debt. In Chinsurah, with landowners also working as traders, 
the requirement of the classes of labour for loans and access to land and the market, 




5.3.1 Money Lenders, Credit and Indebtedness 
This section will look at indebtedness generated from private money lenders. The private 
money lenders provide high rates of interest and at the same time reduces dependence on 
landowners. However, this section argues that a lot (primarily landowner dependence) is 
conditioned on the local availability of money lenders and the extent to which their interest 
rates are easily payable.   
Private money lenders constitute an important source of credit (see Table 5.6), however, 
they deliver loans with high interest rates and a collateral.  In Aranthangi, the collateral 
was gold. Pledging of gold is the most sought after way to obtain credit.  
Manasi, a 33-year-old Ambalakar female agricultural labourer from Karaimedu, has three 
children (5, 7 and 12 years old). Her husband works in Chennai and cannot send money 
regularly to the family. She fell sick in 2010 and needed Rs.5000/- for her treatment. She 
pledged some of her gold jewellery at a local pawn shop, at an interest rate of 3 per cent 
per month. Although remittances from her husband did help in repaying the loans, they 
were irregular. Thus it was her earnings from the Sugar Factory, where she received 
Rs.100/- per day as a casual daily wage labourer that was her primary source of income. 
Although this seemed an easy and simple transaction, she could not always pledge her 
gold for money, as this is the only savings she has. The Sugar Factory work and remittances 
are both irregular sources of income, and while she used these to pay off a large loan, she 
still had to turn to the landowner for smaller everyday loans. The high rates of interest on 
the loan amount placed restrictions on Manasi’s ability to borrow smaller sums of money 
from a private money lender. Under these conditions she turned to the landowner to 
access everyday consumption loans in exchange for labour time. Despite the presence of 
multiple sources of credit, the dependence on the landowner persists, particularly for 
female agricultural labourers.  A reason for this is the ease of accessibility and no or 
negligible rates of interest. For female agricultural labourers in Aranthangi, an easily 
accessible credit source is of primary importance. Private money lenders in this region are 
working to make their services more accessible, but with this come higher interest rates.  
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Sumathi, a Paraiyar marginal landholder and agricultural labourer from Thirasu, borrows 
money from a local money lender who is from Aranthangi.  
“This person comes from Aranthangi on a motorbike almost every week, and asks everyone 
around the village if they need money. For every Rs.100/- that is borrowed we have to give 
Rs.25/-. This is a 25 per cent interest rate. I recently borrowed Rs. 500/- and now have to pay 
Rs. 125 per week in order to repay the loan. There is a receipt we get for proof of having taken 
the loan. This small piece of paper costs Rs. 15/-, which we have to pay…I had to take this loan 
because at that time when I needed the money I was not working for anyone.” 
These informal money lenders are called “motorbike vaddikkaran (money lenders)”. They 
are known for their timely payment of money and very high interest rates. They travel 
through the villages every week to collect and lend money. These money lenders are highly 
accessible and go door to door. Despite their high rates of interests these money lenders 
did not become less preferable. The money lenders provide a choice/ alternate credit 
source for the female labourers, particularly for Paraiyar women who do not want to 
become pannaiyal labourers by borrowing money from landowners. Paraiyar and Pallar 
agricultural labourers prefer borrowing money from these motorbike vaddikkarans, but 
the loans granted can be highly extractive. In such situations, the need to repay the loan 
pushes labourers to take up any kind of work for any kind of pay. For female labourers, 
agricultural wage work is the most easily accessible. To maintain this accessibility, the 
labourers need to maintain “good relations” with the landowners.  
Sumathi belongs to the Paraiyar community and does not want to enter into exploitive 
labour relations. She told me how the Paraiyars fought to get out of the pannaiyal relation 
40 years ago, and under no circumstances would she want to get back into such a relation. 
She works her way around this situation by borrowing money from the landowner but 
treats it as an advance. She receives reduced wages as the borrowed amount is deducted 
from her wages. Sumathi believes that if she does not treat the borrowed sum as an 
advance payment then she would have to be at the beck and call of the landowner.  
Clearing an advance with a landowner does not mean that the labourer can operate 
independently of the interlocking transactions between land, labour and credit. Debt 
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reinforces relations of exclusivity that places restriction on the labourers but allows 
landlords to improve capital accumulation. For labourers, not accepting the terms and 
conditions could result in removal from the job. Hence these loans, taken by labourers, like 
Sumathi, where they believe they have the capacity to choose, operates simultaneously 
along with the fear of not wanting to jeopardize their relationship with the landowner, so 
as to ensure a continuous flow of agricultural wage work and income. On the one hand, 
she does not want to give into an exploitative relation that would affect her freedom as a 
labourer and as a Paraiyar woman. On the other, her decision to take a loan maintains 
exploitative relations with the landowner. Indebtedness generated from multiple sources 
of credit creates conditions that tie the labour into exclusionary arrangements, where, 
depending on the degree of indebtedness they might become pannaiyals or bandha 
kishens- the extreme end of the labour tying continuum.  
This section highlighted how in Aranthangi, the availability of private moneylenders does 
not necessarily ensure movement away from tied labour relations. This aspect is dealt with 
in greater detail in the following sections that focus on pannaiyal labour and bandha 
kishens, the role interlocked markets and gendered relations play in enforcing tied labour 
relations.  
5.3.2 Credit relations and Pannaiyals 
As recently as 2008, men were employed as pannaiyals in Aranthangi, where they carried 
out both agricultural and housework. As pannaiyals, the men had to stay on landowner’s 
premises. This scenario has now changed. These erstwhile pannaiyal men have repaid their 
loans and moved out, or they have replaced their labour with that of any other female 
labour within their household. Women who are pannaiyals, work the entire day and come 
back to their own homes. Women’s entry into this work is a result of increasing amount of 
debt taken primarily by their husbands, coupled with their husbands’ withdrawal from the 
pannaiyal arrangement. This is prevalent amongst Pallars and Ambalakars in Aranthangi. 
This process is indicative of how asymmetrical power within gendered/ familial relations, 
has the woman exploited domestically as well by landowners.  
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The respondents in both the villages in Aranthangi were not very vocal about the presence 
of pannaiyal labour. They preferred talking about it as an occurrence in other villages 
especially in Thanjavur. Revathi’s (Ambalakar labourer) father-in-law (Ramesh), until 
recently (in 2010) worked as a pannaiyal for a Thevar landowner. Ramesh cannot work due 
to his old age and health, for which reason his son (Revathi’s brother-in-law) is working in 
his place. Ramesh entered this relationship fifteen years back because he needed a loan to 
build a house his family currently live in. He works as a farm servant restricting himself to 
agricultural wage work alone. He does run a few errands for the landowner but never 
carries out household chores. Revathi’s brother-in-law received a short term construction 
contract in Pudukkottai in 2010. Revathi has taken the place of her brother-in-law. She 
does not identify herself as a pannaiyal even though she works in that contract. She sees 
this arrangement as short term, which will be terminated once the loan has been repaid or 
if her brother-in-law returns. The pannaiyal relationship itself has undergone 
transformation, where it is binding till the loan amount is paid, and at no point does it tie 
down one particular individual.  However, familial obligations push women to accept 
exploitative work contracts, where they have limited negotiating capacity.  
Revathi mentioned instances of women also being employed under similar situations. 
Along with agricultural wage work, they carry out household chores. Unlike, the men, none 
of the female pannaiyal labourers stay in the landowner’s house; they work the entire day 
but return to their own homes. Women cannot stay back in the landlord’s place as they 
have their own familial obligations and staying back at the landlord’s house will have 
repercussion on their character and integrity as women. Women who generally enter these 
pannaiyal relations tend to be Pallars. Revathi did show me some Ambalakar households 
that had female pannaiyal workers but they were not willing to talk about this. For these 
women, debt (often familial) is the primary reason they enter such contracts, which pushes 
them into relations of servitude. The time period for the pannaiyal contract is debatable, 
as it depends on when the loan is repaid. The wages received by a pannaiyal is much lower 
than the wages received by a casual daily wage labourer; Rs.55/- compared to Rs.100/- for 
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daily wage labourer. These reduced wages mean that the period of repayment is longer. 
The landowner decides how much work is to be done and how much is to be deducted.  
Kanan, an Ambalakar marginal farmer, who had worked as a pannaiyal in a Mudaliyar 
household for 12 years says: 
“I never knew how much was being deducted every month from the amount that had to be 
repaid. The landlord would tell me the amount…that is all I knew. If I would have done the 
calculations myself, I would not have had to work for so many years… It is very difficult work. 
I used to work from five in the morning, clean their cowshed, clean and check the tractor, 
supervise the labour and work in the field along with them. I had to do whatever work they 
asked of me. In return for one day’s work I would get three meals. If this is what I was paid 
daily, it was next to impossible to repay the landlord. My wife helped me out here by working 
as a coolie worker and she saved money to help me repay my debts…Now that I am out, I 
know that I would never get into it again.” 
Kanan recalls being tied down to one landlord and, therefore, had no other source of 
revenue. Kanan was the pannaiyal labourer and the debt was not repaid by him but by his 
wife. His wife, despite being a daily coolie wage labourer did not have any control over her 
earnings. Instead, her earnings were controlled by the Thevar landowner. Kanan’s wife was 
indirectly tied to a loan, which was taken by her husband. The landowner was able to 
control both Kanan and his wife’s labour by providing a loan and by remunerating the debt 
by food.  
Presented here are two conditions of pannaiyal work relations. The labour arrangement 
itself has undergone transformations, where it directly does not tie an individual labour 
and his entire family. In the two cases women are drawn into pannaiyal work since they 
have taken on the burden of repayment of loans taken by their husband’s or other male 
members in the family. For both the women, the debts are transferred onto them. Revathi 
worked in a pannaiyal labour contract and Kanan's wife worked multiple labour contracts 
to repay the loan. The two cases highlight the unfreedom experienced by female 
labourers, where both are repaying loans taken from a landowner but this results in limited 
control over their earnings. Whether direct or indirect, a combination of economic 
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vulnerability and domestic politics, draws these female labourers into labour tying 
arrangements.  
5.3.3 Dadan and the Bandha Kishen  
Chinsurah displays an unconcealed reliance on landowners for money. All female 
agricultural labourers, whether, they are Santhals, Bauris or Bagdis, cannot survive without 
borrowing from landowners. Female agricultural labourers borrow from the same 
landowners they work for. A reason they stated for this dependence, was that it was very 
difficult for them to get loans from banks, especially for the small amounts that they 
frequently required100. There are private money lenders but they are few and far between, 
and do not have a proper network like that observed in Aranthangi. Moreover, the high 
interest rates deterred people from taking loans. Instead of getting subsumed under 
usurious rates of interest, the labourers preferred taking interest free consumption loans 
from landowners. The increasing dependence on landowners is one of the reasons why 
labourers in Chinsurah ‘voluntarily’ become bandha kishens. The interest free loans 
coupled with job security, makes it an easier way to ‘channel’ female agricultural labourers 
into such labour tying arrangements.  
The loans that are taken from landowners are interest-free and are primarily for the 
purpose of self-consumption. Money is returned through a payment system referred to as 
dadan, where repayment is done as an imputed wage rate. In Chinsurah working as a 
bandha kishen emerges as an easily accessible option for female agricultural labourers, 
particularly in a situation where their husbands do not regularly contribute to household 
expenses.   
 
Minoti, a 23-year-old Santhal woman works as a bandha kishen where her current 
economic and social standing (that of being a Santhal widow) has compelled her to take 
                                                          
100 The accessibility to bank loans and schemes did not restrict itself to agricultural labourers but extended 
to other classes of farmers. Medium landowners know very little of the schemes provided to farmers. In both 
the villages there were only 4 large landowners who had access to the Kisan Credit Card. 
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on this role. She has two children aged 5 and 3 (she got married when she was 15 years old) 
and says: 
“Such a relationship [bandha kishen] is beneficial for me, otherwise who will give me work, 
who will feed my children. There is no compassion for women like me. Men just think that 
because I am alone they can do whatever they want with me. I feel safe to know that whenever 
I have any problems I have someone to go to- a roof over my head.” 
The underlying situation has created conditions which have reduced her negotiation 
capabilities generating unfreedom. The daily wage is Rs.60/- with 2 kgs of rice, and Minoti 
receives Rs.20/- with one kg of rice and one meal a day. Her task on the agricultural field 
includes transplanting, weeding, maintaining the bunds and harvesting where she carries 
out both dhaan kata and dhaan tola. Along with agricultural wage work she has to do 
housework at the landowner’s house, where she gets paid one meal. The assurance of the 
job restricts her ability to challenge the terms of the contract. However, she benefits from 
this relation where in time of need, particularly for medical expenses, she can avail of 
interest free loans which she pays off by working for the landowner. The landowner’s 
paternalistic relation to Minoti penetrates the social life of the village community (Rudra, 
1982: 254). Minoti believes that she is better off working as a bandha kishen because she is 
provided both economic and physical security. As she is a widow, the landowner provides 
her with the necessary security. While Minoti’s case might present itself as a specific case 
of a young widow, hers is not the only bandha kishen relation.  
 
Aarati, a 29-year-old Bagdi agricultural labourer, works as a bandha kishen for a Muslim 
medium landowner. Along with agricultural wage work, as a bandha kishen, she cleans the 
landowner’s house, looks after his vegetable garden, and tends to his goats and hens. 
Aarati’s husband works as a loader in Chinsurah town and is one of the few labourers who 
work on jute fields; the declining importance of jute in the region has increased his reliance 
on non-farm work. Due to her husband’s irregular income, Aarati decided to become a 
bandha kishen to access loans, grains and work all year around. She does not find working 
as a bandha kishen exploitative as she receives work, food, clothes and other gifts from her 
employer. Aarati has enrolled her son in a private school and has taken a loan from the 
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landowner to pay the fees. The labour relation has allowed her to access the loan and not 
be dependent on her husband’s income. Easier access to certain benefits and terms of 
payment of loans presents the bandha kishen relation as an obvious choice for Aarati. Here, 
borrowing is associated with aspects of patronage, and with it the female labourer is drawn 
into multiple costs that are both financial and social (Guerin et al. 2012). For the female 
labourers in Chinsurah, a way to pay these costs is to become a bandha kishen.   
  
In both Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the borrowers who took loans from the landowner 
preferred receiving stunted wage instead of repaying the amount borrowed. Labourers 
find payments made through labour time exploitative but is considered to be the surest 
way to make the payment. The labourers in Chinsurah and Aranthangi might borrow the 
money but the calculations of the loan were maintained by the landowner, with there 
being no fixed amount for deduction. For example, in Aarati’s case, she borrowed a total 
of Rs.3000/-. She receives Rs.100/- as daily wage. Her loan cannot be repaid in thirty days 
because the amount deducted depends on what she needs and how much she needs on a 
particular day. These calculations are maintained by the landlord, a similar aspect 
observed in Kanan’s case. The landowner, by controlling wages controls the labour 
contract, and therefore, what might begin as a simple labour time transaction, transforms 
itself in a labour tying arrangement, whether short term or long term- whether it results in 
pannaiyal labour or not.  
5.4 Self-Help Groups: An Alternative Livelihood Apparatus 
The previous sections covered aspects of loans and non-institutionalised credit sources 
and the conditions that create labour tying. Moreover, it looked at how female labourers 
play an integral role in repayment of loans, whether they are individual loans or loans taken 
by male members of their family. In light of this added responsibility of debt repayment, 
institutions (such as microfinance institutions) that focus on women, help with their 
savings and encourage self-employment, have an important role to play. This section 
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focuses on the role of Self-Help Groups in the two regions and the extent to which they are 
able to alleviate women’s burden to debt repayment. 
 Amidst the poorly functioning banking structure within the country, Self-Help Groups 
(SHGs) have emerged as one of the methods through which female labourers in particular, 
can save and have access to loans. SHGs as a financial source too should not go unnoticed, 
as women are now in the forefront of monetary transactions (Guerin et al. 2012). Women 
now have access to productive loans even though the use of the loan and control over the 
loan does not necessarily lie with them (Sengupta, 2013). The extent to which SHGs have 
developed varies from region to region.   
Aranthangi has a well-developed, organised and properly functioning SHG, whereas in 
Chinsurah, it remains confined to certain pockets and inaccessible to many. The push 
towards micro-finance in rural areas grew in the 1990s’ liberalisation period which 
introduced credit rationing (Guerin 2012). SHGs created partnerships with banks and 
NGOs and without much resistance, became widely accepted as an alternate source of 
income and savings (Guerin et al. 2012).  
Aranthangi has a properly functioning SHG- the Pudukkottai Multipurpose Social Service 
Society (PMSSS), established in 1988. PMSSS is government funded and has numerous 
branches spread across different villages. In Karaimedu and Thirasu there are around 8 
small SHGs with a total of over 600 participants and they are trying to introduce more 
women to the group. The SHGs reported to and received their funds from PMSSS. The 
SHG branch in Karaimedu ‘Vaigai’101  consists primarily of Christian (Pallar) women. The 
group began in one of the smaller villages in Karaimedu that has a dominant Christian 
Pallar population, and has now spread to other places. 
                                                          




 Vaigai receives loans from the bank and the SHG-bank linkage102 relies on the 
performance of the SHG. Neetha, a 38-year-old Christian (Pallar) woman, is in charge of 
the proper functioning of the SHG. She monitors the Aranthangi block and looks after 150 
groups. The different groups are formed locally and then demand credit support from 
PMSSS. Neetha has been working in this position for the past ten years and been a part of 
the SHG for 17 years.  
“I have to take care of Aranthangi. Where I left you yesterday, there were some problems with 
the street lights and I had to go and report the problem. I have also dealt with problems related 
to water availability and with roads in the villages. We have taken out mass rallies in order to 
resolve the matter. I also deal with problems at the individual level where, I help the people in 
the village to get work and help in their work as well.” 
The SHGs come with the promise of providing work for women and resolving everyday 
problems. Revathi, an Ambalakar woman who is also an agricultural labourer, is a member 
of this group. She was taken to PMSSS and taught how to weave baskets, make soap and 
dye cloth. There are usually 15 women in one training group and once the training is done, 
PMSSS gets them orders, which they then sell in the market103.  
Neetha oversees this job and she is the one who goes to get loans sanctioned from the 
bank104. Getting the loan is a very tedious process. Once the loan amount is sanctioned, 
groups of women are assembled and trained. She trains nine women who then train 
another set of nine women each.  
                                                          
102 The SHG-Bank linkage programme was initiated as an Action Research Project in 1989. The idea behind 
this linkage is to provide ‘thrift linked credit to member of the SHG’. This allowed for greater flexibility in 
accessing loans and improves the bank outreach to different groups (Report on the Expert Group on 
Agricultural Indebtedness; Ministry of Finance, 2007). 
 
103 Currently, due to the “good performance of the group” the State Government via PMSSS has sanctioned 
a total of Rs.1.5 lakhs for making sanitary napkins. All members in the groups are being trained, and their 
first order is to make 25,000 sanitary napkins. 
 
104 Neetha believes that because this entire project is government funded, these groups need to function and 
be trained properly, and she is in charge of ensuring this. If the group performs well, then they can get some 
recognition. According to Neetha ‘honesty’ is the best way to function and that is why despite being offered 
numerous commissions from people she does not take them. She does not want to get into any trouble when 
the government audits the records. If, however, food is offered, then that is taken and shared amongst the 
members of the group. The performance of the SHG and her image is of utmost importance to Neetha. 
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Members who join the SHG pay Rs.50/- per month, this is a minimum amount and they are 
free to pay more. The more they put in, the greater is their interest amount that they 
receive. Currently Vaigai has a savings of Rs.65, 000/- and this helps with the overall 
ranking of the SHG. For female agricultural labourers, SHGs provides easily accessible and 
repayable loans and avenues for savings and investment for these women.  
Vani, a 39-year-old Paraiyar woman, is one of the few women in the area who has a life 
insurance policy in her name. The only way she was able to do this was with the savings 
generated through Vaigai. At the time of survey, Vani had taken a loan of Rs.5000/- at an 
interest rate of 1 per cent. The problem women face with loans from the SHG is that they 
are granted loans only on the 15th of every month. In order to meet pending payments, 
Vani borrowed this amount from a private money lender, which she repaid once she could 
access the money through Vaigai. The lower interest rates make it much easier for her to 
repay the borrowed sum from the SHG.   
Apart from micro-finance, the SHG-bank linkage allows members to set up micro-
enterprises. Usually groups of 3-4 people come together to start a business. In such 
situations, these groups have to provide a detailed account of expenditures and how they 
are going to repay loans. In the case of Vaigai, Neetha oversees the functioning of these 
groups and ownership of the business is rotational to avoid any problems that might arise 
with only one person making all decisions. These groups have to be audited and the bank 
manager grants loans if the SHG is able to operate properly and generate money. The 
start-up loans can range anywhere between Rs.20, 000/- to one Lakh. The SHG, apart from 
this, works with the local balwadi (pre-school) to get as many children enrolled, helps in 
construction of roads and providing water tanks during periods of severe water 
shortage105. The SHG in Aranthangi carries out both financial and infrastructural duties 
along with operating micro-finance institutions, where they provide loans with reasonable 
                                                          
105 Apart from facing water shortage particularly in the summer months, the local reserves of water were 
contaminated after the Sugar Factory was set up. The SHG worked with the panchayat and were able to get 
the owners of the Sugar Factory to provide tankers for the villagers. 
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rates of interests that are unencumbered by interlocking transactions and ties of 
patronage and duty to the landowner.  
SHGs emerge as an alternate source of credit for the female labourers. However, the 
presence of an SHG does not do away with the kaleidoscopic terrain of borrowing present 
within the rural context. One of the reasons for this is that most loans are taken for the 
purpose of marriages/ ceremonies household expenses, etc. and they are seldom income 
generating loans (Guerin et al. 2012, Kalpana, 2008). Neetha’s statement about proper 
functioning NGO revolves around aspects of savings, profits and micro-enterprise, for 
which reason the SHG controls the loan amount withdrawn, and whether it should be given 
for a particular purpose or not. This explains why, despite the intricate network of SHGs in 
Karaimedu and Thirasu, only 5 out a total of 42 respondents who belong to the classes of 
labour, would go to a SHG as their primary credit source.  
The SHGs’ attempts at women’s empowerment, does not displace the entrenched power 
relations in place (Sengupta, 2013). The money from SHGs is used to pay of pre-existing 
loans (either theirs or their husbands), for house repair works, etc.106, with very little being 
re-invested back to the woman. In such a context, the microfinance institution falls short 
of its goal to bring about women’s empowerment.  
SHGs in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar were not a visible financial option for the classes of 
labour. In the two villages there were no respondents who were members of SHGs. Some 
of the women (especially amongst the Bagdis) did know that there was a SHG called 
‘Bandhan’ in the village. None of the female labourers interviewed were part of this group. 
They did not believe that the SHG could generate money and savings for them. A reason 
for this distrust was that members, who belong to Bandhan, consisted of Muslim women 
from medium landowner households. The class and religion of the women who ran the 
SHG, brought along with it, a sense of distrust among the female labourers. The female 
labourers believed that investing/ saving money in Bandhan would be like placing their 
                                                          




savings in the hands of their employers. They would rather have control over their money, 
on how it is saved, and spent.  These female labourers preferred hiding money from their 
husbands, than save it in Bandhan. The non-participation of female labourers in the SHG 
places restrictions on their ability to save. However, as noted in the case of Aranthangi, the 
presence of an SHG does not ensure control over earnings for these female labourers (see 
Basu, 2006).  In Chinsurah, in order to have some form of control over their savings and 
earnings (especially since male members constantly place demands on their earnings), 
women labourers take payments in kind.  
For Muslim women from medium landowner households, Bandhan proved to be a lucrative 
enterprise. Bandhan has set up a profitable embroidery micro-enterprise, where a majority 
of its members carried out chikan107 embroidery work on bed sheets and curtains108. 
Embroidery was their source of income, which allows them to combine employment with 
childcare responsibilities (Menon et al. 2009). This SHG works both as a micro-credit and 
as a micro-finance group; however, it caters only to a particular group and class within the 
village society in Chinsurah. The fragmented nature of this SHG brought along with it 
alienation and distrust amongst the larger marginalized section of labourers. The lack of 
access to a properly functioning SHG pushes the female labourers to take loans from 
landowners, money lenders, shopkeepers, etc.  
In both Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the primary role of SHGs is to ensure easy loans to the 
members. While their micro-finance responsibilities have been successful, they have not 
been able to bring about any structural change with improvements in the livelihood of 
households (Guerin et al. 2012, 2013; Sengupta, 2013). In both regions, efforts to build up 
micro-enterprises, as a move towards non-agricultural self-employment is thwarted by the 
tight control of banks on SHGs, the degree of competence, which is tied to social 
constraints, and of people understanding the risk in starting their own business (which is 
                                                          
107 This refers to a traditional style of embroidery that originates from Lucknow.  




why many prefer working as wage labourers) (Guerin et al. 2012).  Not all members operate 
under risk-averting tendencies. SHGs have a group of women (or men) who are creating 
rotational lending facilities to help pay off debts (see Morgen and Olsen, 2011). The 
respondents in Aranthangi in particular, view this as a way to pay off their debts and in turn 
be liberated from any ties resulting from indebtedness generated through the landowner-
labour relationship. SHGs and micro-finance in particular have created a platform for 
female agricultural labourers to take matters of credit in their own hands. SHGs in reality, 
do promote short term relief of debts but simultaneously puts in place a system that 
promotes debt dependency by allowing its members to constantly renew their credit 
(Morgen and Olsen, 2011). Moreover, the focus of SHGs on enterprise to promote business 
is not widespread and such localised efforts defeat the purpose of transforming and 
making a more efficient financial borrowing terrain, particularly for the classes of labour.    
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed different credit sources and relations observed in Aranthangi 
and Chinsurah. The two regions show a varied and differentiated financial landscape. 
Formal credit sources that are supposed to provide payable interest rates and flexibility are 
fragmented and inadequate. The lack of services and rigidity of institutions extends across 
the labour and landed class, which varies along region, class, caste and gender. For this 
reason, there continues to exist a vibrant informal sector, where loans are procured 
through high rates of interest that give rise to an ‘elaborate structure of coercion’ 
(Ramachandran and Swaminathan, 2001: p. 2). Coercion, both economic and social, 
observed among the classes of labour, creates an acute dependence upon the landed class. 
This dependence creates a credit relation, where the associated social cost, restricts access 
to and control over land, ties labour down and in certain instances build political 
allegiance109 (Guerin et al. 2012).  
                                                          




The relationship of the classes of labour (borrowers) with employers (lenders) in a sense is 
a transformed patron-client relationship. In the cases mentioned, relations of privileges 
that accompany credit taken from landowners, keeps the labour ‘cheap and manageable’ 
with low paying jobs, and establishing a link which allows for ease of access to family and 
kin labour110. The landed class, extends these benefits to certain groups which keeps the 
labour fragmented. The female classes of labour understand this process as maintaining 
good relations with the landowners, which grants them access to land, credit and work. 
While this process can be understood as being mutually beneficial the underlying 
asymmetrical power relations generate exploitative terms and conditions of repayment 
and work for female labour.  
The Central Government has put in place a three tiered credit system- the Primary 
Agricultural Co-operative Banks (PACBs), Central Co-operative Banks at the district level 
and State Apex Co-operative Banks. These rural cooperatives provide loans for varying 
durations and supplies farm inputs such as fertilisers. The Central Government introduced 
the Kisan Credit Card scheme to enable farmers to access loans with greater ease. 
Government documents scream praises for the way in which the state has expanded both 
banking and rural credit facilities across West Bengal and Tamil Nadu. However, despite 
these provisions and expansion of banking and credit facilities, the question still remains 
as to who has access to these provisions. In both Aranthangi and Chinsurah it was large 
landowners like Mannikam and Shafiq who had access to rural banks and the Kisan Credit 
Card. Despites its implementation in 1999, marginal, small and medium landowners did 
not know about the Kisan Credit Card. Even among the large landowners it was only a 
handful that had Kisan Credit Cards and knew what it was about. Information regarding 
state benefits such as the Kisan Credit Card, which provides flexible loans to farmers, 
remains confined to a handful who belong to the dominant class, and who know 
“someone” in banks and government institutions. The fragmented nature and access to 
                                                          
110 Brass (1999) refers to this as the ‘ruling class ideology’, where there is only a transfer from the client to the 
patron rather than there being any redistribution (see also Breman 1974, 2007). 
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banks has increased the dependence on the informal sources of credit and with it 
asymmetrical power relations.  
Credit relations discussed in this chapter are not simple loan transactions. Instead, they are 
differentiated along the lines of gender, caste and class. Labourers and tenants take loans 
from landowners they have ‘good relations’ with. Similarly, landowners prefer giving loans 
to those labourers they know. Good relations with landowners, act as collateral. 
Landowners in both the regions often spoke of how there were instances when labourers 
did not return loan amounts. In such situations, because they knew the labourer, 
landowners can get the money back through another family member’s labour- usually 
women. Similarly, for labourers and tenants, because they knew the landowners, they 
could negotiate how and when the loan amount could be returned, for example, 
repayment of loans through labour time.  
Dependence on landowners for loans and other subsequent benefits is here to stay even if 
access to formal credit sources is improved for the rural poor. However, the inaccessibility, 
observed in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, affects both tenancy and labour relations. Limited 
access to formal credit facilities means that they get their loans from informal sources. 
These informal sources include private money lenders such as motorbike vaddikkaran or 
pawnbrokers to whom (mainly women) they pledge gold. Gold loans or mortgaging land 
is not long term solution to obtaining loans, as these are the only assets that they are left 
with and which are used to meet marriage expenses in the family. Losing out of these 
limited assets results in the relative depletion of resources among women, who already 
own/have so little in their name. Private money lenders have very high rates of interest, 
which might be a reason not to take these loans. However, for the Paraiyars and 
Ambalakars, borrowing from a private money lender provides a sense of freedom of 
choice, and a space away from interlocking credit relations that can tie their labour to a 
particular landowner. Similarly, borrowing from neighbours, provides respite from the 
landowners, even if it means having to justify their expenditure or be bound to an 
obligation of reciprocity (Guerin et al. 2012).  
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The other side of this reality is that the high rates of interest become increasingly difficult 
to pay. In order to repay such loans, the borrower turns to the landowner where they enter 
labour tying arrangements until the loan is repaid. The frequency of loans taken and rate 
of payment makes it difficult to decipher and specify a particular period of tying. A labourer 
can be tied to landowner multiple times in a single fasli year, or maybe even tied for a 
period of two to three years. Despite the length of time, female agricultural labourers refer 
to the labour tying period as ’short term’ as it only lasts till repayment of the loan. 
Landowners, on the other hand, extract labour from a docile and disciplined workforce. 
Landowners would prefer this arrangement where the labour is compelled to work in order 
to pay to off the loan. Whether the amount is big or small, extending loans is an employer 
strategy used to their benefit. 
In Chinsurah, there is limited accessibility to formal credit sources but this was not 
complimented by numerous informal credit sources. The most important relationship that 
emerged was that with the landowner, the most easily accessible credit source in this 
region. For female agricultural labourers, landowners do not only provide loans but extend 
job security, protection for the family, etc. particularly for bandha kishens. However, this 
relationship was predicated on the lines of debt, and once the amount was paid, any 
benefits that came along with it ceased as well.  
One of the most important benefits for female bandha kishens in Chinsurah was that they 
had access to land. Women were not at the forefront of land transactions and becoming 
bandha kishens provided them the opportunity to cultivate land either on bhaage or theeke. 
The selective benefits that accrue to bandha kishens, increases labour manipulation as well 
as dependence on the landowner (Hart, 1986b). The dependency on landowners is 
therefore sealed through the work, credit availability and land.  
The story of credit in both these regions highlights an important aspect- that the burden 
of repayment falls on the shoulders of women. This burden of repayment is also mirrored 
in the basic principles of microfinance institutions. SHGs focus on the ability of the woman 
to save, and in the process there is a romanticisation of female-only savings and credit 
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associations and their ‘social capital’ solidarity. In this process, little attention is paid to the 
amount of control women have over loans. Aranthangi had a very vibrant SHG with focus 
on self-employment and setting up businesses. The SHG was composed of women who 
primarily belonged to the classes of labour category, and therefore, it operated keeping 
their interests in mind.  In Chinsurah, the experience was quite the opposite.  The work 
Bandhan carried out had localised effects, catering to the needs of a particular class- 
women who belonged to medium landowner households. This left out the much larger 
classes of labour, who have very little savings to begin with. For this reason, they continue 
to borrow from landowners. In addition to this, the overt focus on enterprise by SHGs 
restricts the extent to which they can actually transform indebtedness experienced by 
female agricultural labourers.  
This chapter engaged with the predominant credit relations that women from the classes 
of labour engaged with. Women became indebted and tied down due to individual loans 
or loans taken by a male member of their family. Women took individual loans in order to 
cover for shortages in household expenses, since their husbands or other male members 
in the family could not contribute regularly. The familial and gendered relations in the work 
and domestic spaces manufacture conditions where women face the double burden of 
work and the burden of debt.  The exploitative burdens imposed on women, particularly 
on those who belong to the classes of labour, solidifies their dependence on landowners 
(albeit in varying proportions), where female labourers receive low pay and carry out a 
range of non-remunerative tasks, which places limits on their ability to repay debts.  
The different credit relations in both Aranthangi and Chinsurah result in tied labour 
relations that vary in duration, mode of payment, nature of work, etc. The ability of the 
female labourer to negotiate these contracts varies with power relations at the village-
level. In addition to micro-level processes, the bargaining capacity of female labour is 
conditioned through macro-level polices as well. This is discussed in the following chapters 
that explore the effects of social-welfare policies such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
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Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Public Distribution System (PDS), and 







Chapter 6: National Rural Employment: Transformative Impact on Female Labour 
Relations 
 
Guishyam, a 65-year-old Brahmin landowner from Bardhanagar, owns 5 acres of land. He 
showed me how aman paddy is cultivated in this village and the amount of labour he 
requires for each task. On our way back from the fields I come across a large pond being 
dug right in front of his house. At least 45 labourers, both men and women, were digging 
and carrying mud. Guishyam informs me with much disdain that all the workers here are 
doing MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) work. 
MGNREGA provides a total of 100 days of wage employment to a rural household. 
Guiysham understands that the government is trying to make provisions for improving the 
livelihoods of labourers, but he does not consider MGNREGA work as work. He blames 
MGNREGA work for the labourer’s rising demands and growing laziness. Just then 
Saswati, a 45-year-old Bauri agricultural labourer, calls out to me. “Kemon aacho maa111 
(How are you my dear)? I have got MGNREGA work today and so has my daughter-in-law. 
You seem to have brought us good luck…You must come to our house for tea when you finish 
your work.” Like Saswati, many others eagerly wait to get MGNREGA work. It is an 
additional source of income sanctioned by the government- a break for the labourers from 
agricultural wage work. Guishyam tells the labourers, in what he perceives is jest that he 
wished they would show as much enthusiasm when they come and work in his fields.  
The introduction of MGNREGA, often rallied as India’s anti-poverty intervention, brought 
along decent minimum wages and equal pay for women (Jha & Gaiha, 2012). Employers 
and labourers perceive MGNREGA to be easy work with high pay, and this has provided 
labourers with the opportunity to demand an increase in wages and the choice to opt out 
of ’grueling’ agricultural wage work if demands are not met (Carswell & De Neve, 2014; 
Jeyaranjan, 2011). Employers/landowners concede to the labourers’ demands because 
now they face the additional threat of labour shortage, a common complaint made by 
                                                          
111 Maa is used as a term of endearment and does not necessarily refer to mother, or mother figure alone.  
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landowners in Aranthangi and Chinsurah (see chapter 4).  
MGNREGA work has gradually worked into the everyday lives of labourers and for female 
labourers in particular (Jeyaranjan, 2011). As a result, growing resistance exists amongst 
labourers who demand higher wages in agricultural wage work and ask for better work 
conditions. Despite creating such opportunities, MGNREGA is still seen as the fall-back 
option by the labourers (Drèze & Oldiges, 2009). This is often due to irregularity of work, 
the type of work (usually digging and carrying mud) and benefits that labourers receive. 
The irregularity of MGNREGA work is evident in the all India figures, which shows a decline 
in the average person days of employment per household from 46.83 in 2009-20 to 32 in 
2011-12. At the state level, the numbers fell from 28 to 14 days in West Bengal and from 58 
to 34 days in Tamil Nadu (Jha & Gaiha, 2012). Such drawbacks often limit the extent to 
which programmes such as MGNREGA can serve as effective tools of transformation in 
rural society.  
This chapter shows the extent to which MGNREGA, as a social protection policy, has 
transformed labour relations in Aranthangi and Chinsurah. MGNREGA, introduced by the 
state, came with the promise to provide an alternate source of employment, which would 
relieve labourers from debt (at least partially). The effects of MGNREGA are not 
experienced uniformly across all regions. In Aranthangi, the proper functioning of 
MGNREGA has reduced labourers’ dependence on landowners for jobs by emerging as an 
alternate source of income (see Carswell & De Neve, 2014). In Chinsurah, political 
clientelism governs the disbursal of MGNREGA work, and therefore, dependence on 
landowners continues. The policy is effective in one region and not in another. This 
indicates how interactions of MGNREGA policy with local power relations is contingent on 
the particularities of gendered class power and state politics. This chapter examines how 
MGNREGA is a part of a set of power relations that help negotiate labour relations, more 
specifically tied labour arrangements.  
Section 6.1 looks at whether, if at all, MGNREGA is altering labour relations in Aranthangi 
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and Chinsurah, and compares these to state-level and all-India trends. Data collected 
highlights the magnitude of MGNREGA’s success (measured through ownership of cards 
and female work participation) in the two regions. In this section, I ask whether or not 
MGNREGA has tipped the [asymmetrical] balance of power in favour of labourers, 
particularly for women, in light of its success.  
Despite the clear advantages of MGNREGA, the programme suffers from problems of 
corruption, and its operation is encumbered by the rural realities of social hierarchy and 
asymmetrical power relations (Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010). Local bureaucracy and political 
clientelism affect how MGNREGA is implemented and work is distributed. Section 6.2, 
therefore, explores how local elites, using their political power, manipulate the MGNREGA 
scheme to control labour relations and dissent.  The two sections in this chapter highlight 
how labour relations and wage conditions are an outcome of interactions of the rural elite 
with the local bureaucracy. This chapter uses MGNREGA to return to the larger argument 
about how labour tying arrangements among women labourers result from interactions 
between micro-level process and macro-level policies.  
6.1 MGNREGA and Labour Relations: 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), now renamed the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), enacted in 2005, 
under the UPA (United Progressive Alliance) government, is one of its flagship welfare 
programmes. The first phase of the programme was initiated in 200 of the least-developed 
districts in the country in 2005, later spreading to other districts (Chakraborty, 2007; Jacob, 
2008). This scheme, with its primary focus on the rural population, made provisions for 100 
days of employment per rural household in unskilled work. The scheme aimed to ensure 
year-round employment, as agriculture could only provide a maximum of 250 days of 
employment (Jacob, 2008; Jha & Gaiha, 2012). The goal of MGNREGA was to extend 
livelihood security and alleviate poverty by providing employment security to rural 
populations (Chakraborty, 2007; Jeyaranjan, 2011). The introduction of minimum wages, 
especially in the absence of work, easy work in terms of both time and energy spent and 
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the opportunity to step out of agricultural wage work, has altered labour-employer 
relations, often working to the benefit of the labourer (Carswell & De Neve, 2014).  
One of the biggest successes of MGNREGA is the increase in female work participation. 
The percentage of women working in MGNREGA increased from 47.07 in 2011 to 50.22 in 
2014 (MGNREGA website). In 2006-07, Tamil Nadu had the highest participation of women 
in MGNREGA (Drèze & Oldiges, 2009). In Tamil Nadu, in 2011 female participation in 
MGNREGA stood at 65.79 percent, which increased to 79.74 percent in 2014. Female 
participation in West Bengal increased from 35.02 in 2011 to 39.39 percent in 2014 
(MGNREGA website). Female participation trends, mirrored at the village level, suggests 
the extent to which female labourers can negotiate work and tenancy contracts with 
landowners, an issue to which I return below.  
Another transformative aspect of the MGNREGA can be understood by examining the 
number of jobs cards issued. The number of jobs cards issued increases annually, however, 
a discrepancy exists in the total work allotted in different states. The total number of job 
cards issued at the national level in 2011-12 was 1.25 Crores. A total of 83.71 Lakh job cards 
were issued in Tamil Nadu and 112. 23 Lakhs in West Bengal. The total number of 
households that worked in 2011-12 in Tamil Nadu was 63.43 Lakhs and in West Bengal it 
was 55.16 Lakhs. These figures highlight the unevenness of distribution of work, where 
75.77 percent of households received MGNREGA work in Tamil Nadu and only 49.14 
percent of households with job cards received work in West Bengal. With this preliminary 
data alone, one can see that Tamil Nadu has experienced a far more successful 
implementation of MGNREGA than West Bengal. The relative success of MGNREGA in 
Aranthangi affects the ability of female labourers, in particular, to negotiate agriculture 
labour contracts, compared to Chinsurah. The following sections explore the relations of 
class dependency and ‘success’ of MGNREGA in the two field sites.  
6.1.1  MGNREGA, Labour Benefits and Labour Control: 
Locals refer to MGNREGA job cards as ‘noor naal valey cards’ in Aranthangi and eksho diner 
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kaaj in Chinsurah. Both these terms translate as 100 days’ work, the phrase that 
popularised MGNREGA work. Regional political parties and the gram panchayat (village 
council) work to ensure the proper distribution of job cards. At the time of survey, 52.4 
percent of all households had job cards in Karaimedu, 89.9 percent in Thirasu, 70.63 
percent in Bardhanagar and 81.86 percent in Madhabpur. 
Similar to the state-level trends discussed in the previous section (6.1), the more 
widespread distribution of MGNREGA in Chinsurah is attributed to the CPI (M) party (Kohli, 
2009). The CPI (M) were in power at the time of implementation in West Bengal, and 
ensured their cadre support through MGNREGA job cards. The difference observed 
between Karaimedu and Thirasu, at the time of survey, stems from the policy change 
which required MGNREGA workers to have bank accounts. In Karaimedu, respondents had 
to hand in their cards to be updated for the purpose of making new bank accounts, as all 
monetary transactions would now take place through banks. Official records show 
improvement in MGNREGA distribution and implementation in both regions. The 
following tables draw on data from official MGNREGA records in the four villages over a 























MGNREGA work in 2014 in Karaimedu 
Total number of Active Job Cards 452 
Total number of Active Workers 506 
SC workers as a percentage of Total Workers 0.59 
  
Progress recorded in Karaimedu 
 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 
Total No. of HHs completed 100 days of Wage Employment 7 96 21 
Total HHs who Worked 403 378 458 
% of Men Worked 5.11 7.19 21.95 
% of Women Worked 94.98 93.98 78.05 
% of SC Worked 1.11 1.16 0.1 
 
MGNREGA work in 2014 in Thirasu 
Total number of Active Job Cards 727 
Total number of Active Workers 913 
SC workers as a percentage of Total Workers 1.31 
 
Progress recorded in Thirasu 
 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 
Total No. of HHs completed 100 days of Wage Employment 4 13 0 
Total HHs who Worked 613 633 803 
% of Men Worked 12.34 22.54 34.64 
% of Women Worked 87.66 77.45 65.36 
% of SC Worked 1 1.06 2.09 
 
Source: MGNREGA Website: http://www.MGNREGA.nic.in/netMGNREGA/home.aspx  [Date Accessed 
12.06.2015] [HHs= Households]. 























From the data sets above, we see that MGNREGA work has increased female participation. 
However, when we compare the two regions, we see that a large percentage of men do 
MGNREGA work in Chinsurah than in Aranthangi. A reason for this lies in the type of work 
MGNREGA work in 2014 in Bardhanagar 
Total number of Active Job Cards 3933 
Total number of Active Workers 5923 
SC Workers as a percentage of Total Workers 23.97 
ST Workers as a percentage of Total Workers 24.69 
 
Progress recorded in Bardhanagar 
 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 
Total No. of HHs completed 100 days of Wage Employment 0 11 0 
Total HHs Worked 2372 3638 3910 
% of Men Worked 71.9 71.35 69.07 
% of Women Worked 28.1 28.65 30.93 
% of SC worked 20.6 24.04 19.38 
% of ST worked 24.89 25.33 20.19 
 
MGNREGA work in 2014 in Madhabpur 
Total number of Active Job Cards 3702 
Total number of Active Workers 5571 
SC Workers as a percentage of Total Workers 40.57 
ST Workers as a percentage of Total Workers 23.42 
 
Progress recorded in Madhabpur 
 2013-14 2012-13 2011-12 
Total No. of HHs completed 100 days of Wage Employment 0 38 6 
Total HHs Worked 3105 3374 3143 
% of Men Worked 58.2 61.98 61.31 
% of Women Worked 41.8 38.02 38.69 
% of SC Worked 45.63 42.45 41.76 
% of ST Worked 24.98 25.16 28.11 
 
Source: MGNREGA Website: http://www.MGNREGA.nic.in/netMGNREGA/home.aspx  [Date Accessed 
12.06.2015] [HHs= Households]. 
 
Box 6.2: Chinsurah 
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the population engages with. From the village census survey, in Chinsurah, 42.64 percent 
of the total male population engages in agricultural wage work alone. In Aranthangi 5.99 
percent of the male population performs agricultural wage work, and 31.91 percent 
engages in both agricultural and casual wage work. The figures suggest greater availability 
of non-farm work, which is accessed by male workers in Aranthangi. In addition, many 
male workers in Aranthangi choose not to do MGNREGA work as they receive higher 
wages in non-farm work (see also Carswell and De Neve, 2014: p.571). For male workers 
with limited agricultural wage work and non-farm work in Chinsurah, MGNREGA presents 
itself as an important source of income.  
The gram panchayat distributed MGNREGA work to reach a majority of the Dalit 
community. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of job cards among different caste groups in 
Aranthangi and Chinsurah.  
Caste Job Cards No Job cards  
ASARI 5 (62.5%) 3 (37.5 %) 
AMBALAKAR 388 (80.16%) 96 (19.83%) 
PALLAR 41 (58.57%) 29 (41.42 %) 
PARAIYAR 34 (53.96 %) 29 (46.03 %) 
THEVAR 17 (42.50 %) 23 (57.5%) 
UDAIYAR 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
VALLAR 1 (25%) 3 (75%) 
PILLAI 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
NADAR 1 (50%) 1 (50%) 
Table 6.1: Caste Wise Distribution of Job Cards in Aranthangi 
                                                     Source: Village Survey in Aranthangi, November 2011  
                                                      *Percentage calculation based on total respondents 
 
Ambalakars, who belong to the Most Backward Caste (MBC) category, is the numerically 
dominant caste group in Karaimedu and Thirasu. Of the total Ambalakar population, 80.16 
percent are registered workers and have job cards. Among the SCs (Pallars and Paraiyars), 
50.06 percent of workers are registered workers and have jobs cards. These figures reflect 
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the official MGNREGA statistics of the two villages (see Box 6.1). While a majority of 
workers who carry out MGNREGA work are women, 43.94 percent of those who belong to 
the Dalit community do not have job cards. MGNREGA might have helped increase 
agricultural wages for female labourers in Aranthangi, however the lower participation 
rate among Dalit female labourers raises questions on the effective distribution of 
MGNREGA work and the extent to which it has transformed the bargaining capacity of 
Dalit female labour.  
Chinsurah’s distribution of job cards is far more equitable, as highlighted in Table 6.2. 
Caste Job Card No Job 
cards  
Caste Job Card No Job 
cards  
BAURI 69 (95.8%) 3 (4.16%) KAZI  1 (16.66%) 5 (83.33%) 
BAGDI 81 (96.4%) 3 (3.57%) KHOIRA 42 (93.3%) 3 (11.53%) 
BRAHMIN 20 (47.6 %) 22 (52.38%) MAHISYA 16 (72.72%) 6 (27.27%) 
DOM 9 (75%) 3 (25%) MOIRA 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
GOALA 3 (25%) 9 (75%) MOLLAH 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 
HANDI 8 (72.72%) 3 (27.27%) MUCHI 2 (100%) 0 (0%) 
KARMAKAR 4 (44.44%) 5 (55.55%) MURMU 4 (100%) 0 (0%) 
ORAON 6 (100%) 0 (0%) SADGOP 10(52.63%) 9 (47.36%) 
SANTHAL 52 (98.1%) 1 (1.88%) SHEIKH 16 (33.33%) 32 (66.66%) 
SUNNI 2 (20%) 8 (80%) TANTI 0 (0%) 1 (100%) 
Table 6.2: Caste Wise Distribution of Job Cards in Chinsurah 
Source: Village Survey in Chinsurah, April, 2012 
Of the total SC population (for example, Bauri and Bagdi) 89.5 percent and 96.1 percent of 
the ST (for example Santhal) population have job cards. Despite the proper distribution of 
cards and higher minimum wage rates in Chinsurah, one off the biggest problems the 
region faces are the lack of funds, which affects MGNREGA work availability. 
Notwithstanding these problems, MGNREGA work made available to caste groups lower 
down in the social hierarchy, enables the Dalit community to break away from relations of 
‘subordination, discrimination and exploitation’, characteristics of agricultural wage work 
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(Carswell & De Neve, 2014: p.573).  
In Aranthangi, Paraiyar female agricultural wage workers associated MGNREGA work with 
perceptions of independence, dignity and decent work, which allow them the opportunity 
to not rely on landowners for work and subsistence (Carswell & De Neve, 2014; see also 
Khera & Nayak, 2009). Aside from increased agricultural wages in Aranthangi, MGNREGA 
became a yardstick to place other demands (see Jeyaranjan, 2011).  Female labourers 
demanded for ‘tiffin’ (a meal). Landowners now provide agricultural labourers with meals 
even if they deduct the amount from workers’ daily wages. Despite the deductions in 
wages, MGNREGA has provided female labourers a platform upon which they can 
negotiate their labour contracts.  
MGNREGA however, is not without problems. MGNREGA has not fulfilled its claims of 
providing 100 days of employment per household. When comparing the two regions, 
Aranthangi performs much better than Chinsurah. During the period of 2011-2014, 2012-
13 had the highest number of households who completed 100 days of employment. While 
the numbers dropped in the following year, no households completed 100 days of 
employment in Chinsurah (see Box 6.1 & Box 6.2). I obtained similar results from the villages 
surveyed where only 13 households in Aranthangi reported having worked for 100 days and 
only one household in Chinsurah had worked for a maximum of 75 days in 2010-11. 
Therefore, while Chinsurah might have better distribution of MGNREGA job cards among 
the Dalit community, Aranthangi has more work availability. The effects of work 
availability observed in the two regions are discussed below.  
6.1.1.1 MGNREGA, Wages and Labour Relations: 
MGNREGA introduced decent minimum wages for unskilled work, with MGNREGA wage 
rates set at Rs.119/- for Tamil Nadu and Rs.136/- for West Bengal (MGNREGA website). 
Apart from these wages, MGNREGA is attractive work because, apart from being ’easy’ 
work, work is available in the panchayat, or labourers are transported to work sites. A key 
attraction of MGNREGA for female labourers is that it is government work and with this 
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comes reliability and regularity of work that, does not constrain women by caste and 
community norms (Khera & Nayak, 2009). Female labourers in Aranthangi do not feel that 
they will suffer from caste discrimination, as anyone with a job card has equal access to 
work. However, the most important factor is the provision of equal pay for men and 
women and decent wages. An impact of the MGNREGA wage structure is the increase in 
female agricultural wages (Carswell & De Neve, 2014; see Heyer, 2012). Jeyaranjan (2011) 
shows that in Tamil Nadu female wage rates increased from Rs.40 in 2007 to Rs.80/- in 
2010 (p. 69). Aranthangi showed a similar increase in female wages from Rs.65/- in 2009 to 
Rs.100/- in 2011. The agricultural wages are affected by other factors, such as village-level 
power relations (Carswell, 2013). This was witnessed in the case of Chinsurah, where wages 
increased in Madhabpur from Rs.50/- and two kilos to rice in 2010 to Rs.60/- and two kilos 
of rice in 2012. Bardhanagar did not increase its agricultural wages, which indicates that 
even though MGNREGA creates pressures on agricultural wages it does not always result 
in an increase. 
Agricultural wages for female workers in Aranthangi experienced simultaneous increase 
with the increase in MGNREGA wages. The higher MGNREGA wages attract female 
labourers and this often creates labour shortages, especially during the sowing and 
harvesting period. When MGNREGA work and agricultural wage work overlap (especially 
during a period of peak labour demand in agriculture), landowners offer wages equal to or 
higher than MGNREGA wages. Sumangali, a 45-year-old Ambalakar woman reported: 
“The urimaiyāḷar are giving us these wages because they have realised that the government 
is giving us work and so now they call us for work saying that they will pay the same.”  
 
MGNREGA wage in Aranthangi is Rs.100/- and during periods of peak labour demand 
agricultural wages offered are Rs.110/- , higher than the MGNREGA wage but lower than 
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the government established rate of Rs.119/-112.     
Landowners use the mechanism of providing agricultural wages equal to or higher than 
MGNREGA wages to secure labour, especially during periods of peak demand. The 
landowners do not approve of the wage hikes. Landowners such as Mannikam 
(Karaimedu) and Aatmanathan (Thirasu) complain of how workers receive far more pay for 
the amount of work they do, arguing that labourers are becoming lazy yet, constantly 
demanding higher wages.  Aatmanathan, a 52-year-old Ambalakar medium landowner, 
owns 2 acres of nanjei land and 3 acres of punjei land. Along with this, he has leased 2 acres 
of land113 where he cultivates sugarcane. According to him, the onset of MGNREGA work 
has made farming more difficult and labour availability presents one of the biggest 
problem he faces.  
“I do not want to remain a farmer. There is no future in it. But in the end, what are we to eat? 
We cannot eat money can we? That is why I still continue with farming. I blame this situation 
on the Central Government, on their MGNREGA scheme. The 100 days work does affect 
agricultural work. All the work coincides when we need labourers the most, especially during 
harvesting time. The government can give them work when there is no agricultural work, 
these labourers can then go and work, get their wages and come back and work for us.” 
As the councillor of Thirasu, Aatmanathan cannot take a direct stand against MGNREGA. 
However, throughout his interview, while not openly discrediting MGNREGA, he did blame 
MGNREGA for the crisis farmers face in Thirasu and neighbouring villages114.  
Aatmanathan’s fears mirror those articulated by Mannikam (large landowner in 
Karaimedu), associating arrogant behaviour of labourers with MGNREGA work 
availability. According to him, labourers will only work if they earn the same wages they 
                                                          
112 MGNREGA wage rate offered in Aranthangi is lower than the official rate set by the state government. 
The lower MGNREGA wage rate is indicative of underlying corruption taking place in Aranthangi, however I 
could not gather sufficient information regarding this. 
 
113 Aatmananthan maintained that he had 5 acres of land but later on during the course of his interview he 
says that the 2 acres of leased in land was land that was brought as dowry by his wife.  This highlights the 
many ways in which farmers try to hide the amount of land that they own.  
114 Aatmanathan’s His direct attack on the UPA government that introduced the scheme could not be ignored 
as he is an elected councillor of AIADMK that belongs to the opposition coalition party (NDA). 
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receive from MGNREGA work.  
“They come and tell me that if they are getting Rs.100/- with MGNREGA where the work does 
not require them to stand in the sun and work all day, then why should they do tedious 
agricultural wage work for less pay. If I want them to come and work on the land then I should 
give them the same wages. This has not only soured the landowner-labourer relationship but 
at the same time has made these labourers lazier and more demanding”. 
Mannikam reminisces about the labour relationship that used to exist in this village. 
Labourers did not talk back, they did all the work allocated to them and they did not worry 
about when they finished work, but rather were more concerned about finishing their 
work. In the current situation, labourers want to run home the moment the clock hits 2:30 
pm. According to him, labourers lack sincerity and have no loyalty towards the land they 
work on and landowners they work for. Since the demand for wage increases has stemmed 
from the introduction of MGNREGA work, landowners feel that they are not providing 
‘appropriate wages’ for agricultural wage work. Despite objections, MGNREGA has 
compelled landowners to pay higher agricultural wages.  
The introduction of MGNREGA in Aranthangi has, to a certain extent, challenged the 
existing order of social control. Pallar, Paraiyar and Ambalakar female agricultural 
labourers - have used MGNREGA wages as a justification to demand higher wages. They 
found MGNREGA work less tedious to agricultural wage work and it paid more. For female 
labourers, MGNREGA emerged as a more viable option, with greater flexibility of work. 
The choice presented to the female labourers created pressures on landowners, forcing 
them to increase wages. Landowners interpret such wage demands as ‘disobedience’; 
something they never faced 15-20 years ago. MGNREGA helped give female labourers a 
platform upon which they could place their demands. Female labourers make such 
demands not through massive revolt, but through more subtle forms of ‘sabotage and 
evasion’ (Scott, 1985:31). Female agricultural labourers made complaints about the kind of 
work they had to do, or at times they did not complete the task that was fixed for a day, a 
process referred to as foot dragging by Scott (1985:31). Despite the presence of MGNREGA 
and the subtle forms of revolts it has allowed women to take, the ever- present threat of 
249 
 
replacing their labour with migrant labour exists. For this reason, female labourers did not 
want to engage in larger organised movements, as they feared being dismissed. This fear 
of dismissal among the female labourers indicates the importance that agricultural wage 
work has in their lives115.   
The subdued forms of resistance, expressed by female agricultural labourers, paves the 
way for them to place their demands without sabotaging or breaking off ties with their 
employers. The systematic implementation of MGNREGA in Aranthangi has provided 
women with a choice to look beyond agricultural wage work and the ability to negotiate 
wages. While the gender gap in wages has not decreased (male workers get paid double 
of female wages), women now get paid more for agricultural wage work because of 
MGNREGA.  
MGNREGA in Chinsurah was introduced in its second phase in 2008. As observed in both 
state-level and village-level data, job cards were distributed in an organised manner 
throughout the region. In Madhabpur and Bardhanagar, 98.1 percent of Santhals, 96.42 
percent of Bauris and 95.83 percent of Bagdis had job cards. Despite the even distribution 
of cards, a very small percentage female workers participate in MGNREGA work (see Box 
6.2). The poor participation of women makes it difficult for them to negotiate agricultural 
wages.  
A majority of MGNREGA workers in Chinsurah are men, and while MGNREGA did help 
increase their wages from Rs.100/- to Rs.135/-, female wage rates increased from Rs.50/- 
to Rs.60/- (along with 2 kilos of rice) in Madhabpur. In Aranthangi, a majority of MGNREGA 
workers are women, because men are engaged in non-farm activities, where they 
migrated out for work and received higher wages than MGNREGA wages. This was not the 
case for male workers in Chinsurah, who had limited job opportunities in non-farm activity 
                                                          
115 A solution for the landowners to combat the problems of the demands in wages is to hire migrant labour. 
However, this labour is not available year-round and keeping migrant labourers in the long run would 
increase the landowner’s expenses, as they have to provide food and shelter to these workers. Moreover, 
ever-present threat of hostility towards the migrant population by the local population exists.  
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and relied on MGNREGA as their alternate source of income. Unlike in Aranthangi, where 
female labourers associate increases in agricultural wage with MGNREGA, the same does 
not hold true in Chinsurah. The reason for this is the limited participation of women in 
MGNREGA in Chinsurah, which provides them with limited work options116.  
Reduced access to MGNREGA and limited choices for work affect the ability of female 
labourers to negotiate their work contracts.  Reena, a 30-year-old agricultural labourer, has 
gone for MGNREGA work (maybe) two or three times in 2010-2011. Every time MGNREGA 
work comes to her village, her husband goes for this work, while she continues to work for 
her landowner who provides her with a stable job. By taking up seasonal agricultural wage 
work, Reena does not want to jeopardise her stable agricultural employment, when her 
husband can seemingly do so, and so her actions potentially support the persistence of tied 
labour.  
Saswati, a 38-year-old Bagdi women, only goes for agricultural wage work when her 
husband does not go. She prefers MGNREGA work because she does not find it as taxing 
and tiring. However, she complained about the irregularity of work.  
“Last year I received only 30 days of work. How is one supposed to survive with such little 
work? Which is why, even though I prefer MGNREGA work, I stick to agricultural wage work, 
because the landowners I work for give me work for longer durations and I am assured wages 
and grains.” 
Reena and Saswati have limited access to MGNREGA work due to gendered positions in 
the household. They only go for MGNREGA work if their husbands do not take up this 
work. In addition, Saswati recognises that although the limited number of days of work in 
MGNREGA does not increase the burdens of debt and survival, it does not help reduce it 
either. Female labourers in Chinsurah, therefore, remain confined to agricultural wage 
work. Due to the lack of alternate jobs and savings no decrease is observed in female 
                                                          
116 This is not to imply that the region does not experience any wage increases. The wage increase observed 
at the time of survey was an outcome of a two-day strike called by all labourers during peak paddy sowing 
season.   
251 
 
labourers’ dependence on agricultural wage work and landowners.  
Apart from lack of access to MGNREGA work, bargaining for wage increases is particularly 
difficult for female labourers as part of their wages are in kind. Payments made in kind 
leave room for much ambiguity when it comes to estimating increases. The payment made 
in grains is calculated according to the fluctuating price of grains. While the price of rice 
fluctuates in the market, the portion of rice received in wages remains constant. 
Landowners often quote higher market prices to justify not increasing wages. Rahim, a 
Muslim medium landowner from Madhabpur, did not approve of the current wage hike. 
According to him- 
“If the labourers had not gone on a strike we would have not increased their wages. When the 
price of rice increases we do not reduce the quantity of rice they receive. Why do they not take 
this aspect into consideration before making such demands, and stopping work altogether?”  
Rahim, and others like him, expect labourers to accept the wages given. Landowners 
believe they assign just wages and should not be challenged. Landowners complained that 
apart from labourers becoming lazy, MGNREGA made it difficult for them to control 
wages. In Chinsurah, while female labourers had limited bargaining power, landowners 
feared that labourers would demand higher wages based on MGNREGA wages. The 
landowner’s fears reveal that MGNREGA wages in Chinsurah affect agricultural wages 
(though MGNREGA was not cited as the cause of wage increase), albeit in a limited manner 
for female labourers.   
The effects of the MGNREGA scheme on female labour relations differ across the two 
regions. The causes for this difference identified in this section are conditioned through 
familial and gendered relations at the workspace, the manner in which the scheme is 
implemented and operated, availability of non-agricultural work, and the ability of the 
female labourer to access the benefits of MGNREGA. The following section looks more 
specifically at the problems associated with the implementation of MGNREGA and how 
this affects labourer and employer strategies.  
252 
 
6.1.2 Obstacles to MGNREGA  
This section identifies that the implementation of the programme itself differs in the two 
regions. The way the scheme is implemented has different effects on the nature of work, 
timing of work, payment of work and so on. All these affect the extent to which female 
labourers, in particular, can rely on MGNREGA work to free up their labour and move away 
from exploitative work relations.  
While having a relatively positive effect on agricultural wages, MGNREGA is vulnerable to 
social hierarchies and power relations (Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010). Corruption is one of the 
biggest problems that plagues MGNREGA. Corruption is witnessed at multiple stages, 
with bureaucracy, banks and cash transactions (wage payments).  
MGNREGA offers unskilled work, often with very little variation in the type of work. 
Workers in Aranthangi broadly defined MGNREGA as ‘mann vettre valey’ (mud digging 
work). A wide range of jobs were offered in Aranthangi, from building and repairing 
metalled roads, afforestation of wastelands, expansion and maintenance of lakes and 
building of new ponds. Different kinds of work were distributed among the different 
villages in Karaimedu and Thirasu panchayats. The availability of different jobs in these 
two panchayats explains the greater number of days workers are employed in MGNREGA. 
In Chinsurah, MGNREGA work was restricted to widening, maintaining and digging new 




Figure 17: MGRENA Work: Digging a Pond in Chinsurah 
Source: Author’s own image, Chinsurah, August, 2012 
 
Labourers in Chinsurah complained of the dullness of MGNREGA work. The lack of a 
variety of jobs explains the inability of households to obtain close to 100 days of work. Table 
6.3 shows the number of days of work obtained under MGNREGA in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah.  
No. of Days of Work Respondents in Aranthangi No. of Days of Work Respondents in Chinsurah 
Number  Percentage Number Percentage 
<25 46 9.38 <20 94 30.92 
25-50 387 78.97 20-40 105 34.53 
50-75 37 7.55 40-60 100 32.89 
>75 20 4.08 >60 5 1.64 
Table 6.3: Number of Days of MGNREGA Work Received in Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
Source: Village Survey in Aranthangi and Chinsurah 2011-12 
The table above signals the better implementation of MGNREGA in Aranthangi, with more 
work availability. The greater availability of work explains why MGNREGA has a greater 
impact on agricultural wages in Aranthangi than Chinsurah, because not only is more work 
available, but different kinds of work that help improve the negotiating capacity of female 
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agricultural labourers. For female labourers in Chinsurah, dependence on landowners for 
work does not decrease because of their reduced access to MGNREGA.  
Despite the positive effects of MGNREGA in Aranthangi, 10 percent of Ambalakar and 
Paraiyar respondents did not receive job cards, because at the time they were issued, the 
concerned women either worked in the sugar factory or had migrated out with their 
husbands for construction work. These women believe that they did not receive 
MGNREGA cards because they do not keep close ties with the pradhan. In addition, Pallars 
in Thirasu complained about the ‘richer people’ taking away their MGNREGA job, which 
they say explains why they got less than 100 days of work. Maryam, a 40-year-old Christian 
Pallar woman complained: 
“These rich people will always get all the money because now they are taking up most of the 
MGNREGA work. There should be an age and income/wealth threshold, which limits who 
comes to work for the MGNREGA. It is not that they do not have money, they just feel that 
they should not sit idle, it is like time-pass for them- where they come and work and take our 
money…These wealthy people cannot do agricultural wage work, they lease out their land 
and because they do not know what they want to do with their time, they do MGNREGA 
work.” 
Maryam felt that the government created MGNREGA jobs for people like her and not the 
rich landowners. Due to lack of proper checks and balances, and because she still had to 
obtain agricultural wage work from the same landowners, she and others in her position 
could do nothing about the situation117. These sentiments were voiced amongst several 
Paraiyar households. Conditions of reduced work in MGNREGA reinforces the dependence 
on landowners for agricultural wage work, even though labourers were able to demand an 
increase in wages.   
Along with access to work, MGNREGA work suffers from issues of non-payment and 
siphoning off money (Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010, Carswell, 2013, Jha &Gaiha, 2012). In 
Aranthangi, as mentioned above, the MGNREGA wage rate was set at Rs.119/- at the time 
                                                          
117 Marayam blames the rich landowners for taking up MGNREGA work. As observed in the field, it was 
women from medium landowner households who take up NREGA work. The work is considered easy and 
dull, for which reason, only female members of the household do this work.  
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of survey. However, none of the respondents mentioned receiving this amount. 85.89 
percent of the total households who received MGNREGA work reported receiving Rs.100/- 
and 14.11 percent received less than Rs.100/-, where some respondents received amounts 
as low as Rs.75/-. Respondents attributed the reduced wages to tea and snacks provided 
by the landowners. Such high deductions of Rs.20-30/- for snacks seem improbable, 
especially since the labourers receive only one cup of tea and 2 vadas (snack). The cost of 
this within the village is Rs.10/- and in Pudukkottai town is Rs.15/-. The visible person 
responsible for this is the labour supervisor who monitors the rosters. However, this 
statement could not be verified as no proof existed of how the labour supervisor, who 
belongs to the same class as other MGNREGA workers, managed to siphon money.  
Chinsurah had a similar story, where the state allocated wages were Rs.136/- and workers 
received Rs.130/-. A total of 64.14 percent of the household allocated MGNREGA work 
received Rs.130/-, with two respondents receiving Rs.128/- and Rs.100/-, and 34.53 percent 
of the population received Rs.136/-. Workers in Chinsurah reported deductions in their 
MGNREGA wages because of the tea and snacks provided. However, this does not explain 
how a part of the MGNREGA workforce received wages in full. Compared to Aranthangi, 
the provision of wages is properly implemented, as none of the respondents in Aranthangi 
reported receiving the government set wage rate of Rs.119/-.  While the provision of tea 
and snacks might justify reduced wages, the workers did not know that, as per government 
rules, money exists for tea and snacks, and this amount should not be deducted from their 
wages. The particular instances of reduced wages in Aranthangi and Chinsurah indicates a 
continuous process of corruption taking place at the local level.   
In order to curb corruption in MGNREGA, the state government introduced a change 
where all monetary transactions take place through banks. The gram panchayat opened 
bank accounts for MGNREGA workers, but this was not done in a systematic manner (see 
also Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010). The respondents in both Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
complained about the time lag in receiving payment. Female labourers, in particular, they 
cash payments that they could put to use immediately. In Chinsurah, women did not want 
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their wages sent to the bank, as this meant that they had limited control over their money. 
Bank accounts were not made in the name of the women, but the card holder, who almost 
always is the husband. This meant that while it was the woman who worked, her husband 
reaped the benefits of her earnings. Women in Chinsurah complained that their husbands 
kept some of the money for their own expenses, which created shortages in household 
expenses. On occasions when the account was made in the woman’s name, she had 
difficulty taking time out to go to the bank to collect the money. In both Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah, women complained of the high transportation costs they had to incur in order 
to get their money. Therefore, the policy moves to reduce corruption within the 
MGNREGA scheme has in a sense, been short-sighted. The scheme only focuses on issues 
pertaining to the household level, without taking into consideration familial/gendered 
relations that can have an effect on female participation in the scheme as well as female 
earnings.   
In Chinsurah, respondents had worked for 30-45 days in 2011-12 and not received 
payments due to the introduction of banks. The new rule introduced by the Central 
Government, where money would be transferred directly into the worker’s bank accounts 
had delayed payments.  Jharna, a 56-year- old, Bauri agricultural labourer said,  
“We have never received 100 days of work in the last five years. But this year I have worked 
for 41 days and this is the maximum I have worked in a long time. I have worked but not 
received the money as yet. Now the next season of work is about to start and I have not been 
paid for the previous set. What is the point of this work? If I had got the money, then I would 
have been able to buy some rice for the house. God alone knows when I will receive the 
money.”  
Delay in payments and not knowing when the money will come has pushed female 
labourers like Jharna to gradually depend on landowners for work and immediate 
remuneration.  In addition, Jharna does not have access to the money, as the bank account 
is in her husband’s name and he will go and collect the money. Not having received 
payments for MGNREGA work, Jharna has to rely on loans that she accesses through 
landowners. Even though Jharna did not want to work as a bandha kishen, the failings of 
257 
 
MGNREGA have now drawn her into a bandha kishen relation, which she finds more 
feasible. 
Respondents in Chinsurah and Aranthangi expressed apprehension about bank transfers if 
the money was not deposited by them but the pradhan, as this resulted in a loss of control 
over their earnings. In addition, delay in receiving payment is further triggered through the 
numerous processes these MGNREGA workers have to go through. These include a 
waiting period for receiving an account payee cheque and a delay in depositing money, 
which leads to delays in being able to withdraw the money (see Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010; 
Carswell and De Neve, 2014). Moreover, while the purpose of bank transfers is to prevent 
intermediaries from siphoning money, workers complained about the lack of proper rural 
banking facilities and the distances they had to travel to access the local banks. Structural 
inconsistencies, such as monetary transfers, affect both access to MGNREGA work and its 
benefits. Therefore, the extent to which workers can actually rely on MGNREGA for 
livelihood survival is affected. 
This section discussed the obstacles that hindered the effectiveness of MGNREGA and the 
restrictions it placed on female labour in the two regions. The obstacles identified were to 
do with local level implementation or policy recommendations. The effectiveness of 
MGNREGA is also controlled through local-level power relations, seen particularly with the 
relationship of the rural elite with the local bureaucracy. These power relations determine 
employer strategies that affect labour relations, particularly with respect to tied labour.  
6.2  Social Protection Measures, Power and Politics  
The successful implementation of MGNREGA is measured through the distribution of job 
cards and increase in female workers (see Box 6.1 & Box 6.2). The successful implementation 
of MGNREGA is attributed to an extensive and effective bureaucracy (Jeyaranjan, 2011). 
The bureaucratic system keeps the programme away from the local elites (Carswell & De 
Neve, 2014), which explains their derision towards MGNREGA work and workers. 
However, the local elites are not completely isolated from the entire process. Their 
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relationship with local bureaucracy affects the way MGNREGA work is distributed 
throughout the region.  
In Thirasu, a majority of the workers only received 30 days of employment. The reason 
being that in January 2012, farmers in Thirasu marched to the Additional Central 
Assistance Scheme office (ACA)118 to resolve the problem of labour shortage arising from 
MGNREGA work overlapping with agricultural wage work. The ACA, administrative 
department at the district level, allocates MGNREGA work for a particular village. 
According to Aatmanathan, the purpose of the scheme (MGNREGA) is to “help people in 
the village but what the government does not realise is that it adversely affects farmers”. 
Landowners have strongly averse sentiments towards MGNREGA work and consider it 
detrimental for their growth.  Aatmanathan, along with other landowners in the region, 
approached the District Collector and demanded a re-scheduling of dates for MGNREGA 
work. The District Collector agreed to their demands and now she does not sanction any 
MGNREGA work during the monsoons, diverting labour back to the farms. Landowners, 
with their direct access to state bodies, politically manipulate the distribution of 
MGNREGA work to the classes of labour.  
A repercussion of this move is that the number of days of work available to labourers is 
altered. The BDO (Block Development Office) needs to spend its required budget. With 
work being curtailed in Thirasu, MGNREGA work gets diverted to other villages within the 
block. This move might prove beneficial for labourers in other villages who receive work 
closer to 100 days. However, for female labourers in Thirasu, the fewer days of MGNREGA 
work shifts their reliance on to agricultural wage work and their dependence on 
landowners. Here, labourers lose out on obtaining all or close to 100 days of work, as it gets 
distributed and diverted to other places.  
                                                          
118 This scheme is now named the National Agricultural Development Programme that looks into 
development issues of agricultural land holding, number of fallows, the soil condition, technology utlised and 
that which can be used to improve production, and animal husbandry (Reported by the councillor, 2012).  
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In this case, the District Collector works for and with landowners to change and alter dates 
for MGNREGA work. The ‘famers movement’, as it is referred to in the village, was made 
possible because the District Collector was within easy reach of these farmers through 
Aatmanathan’s political connections. This move benefitted the landowners in Thirasu who 
resolved the problem of labour shortage during periods of peak labour demand. For female 
labourers, on the other hand, the move away from agricultural wage work gets thwarted, 
affecting any additional benefits they could have received from MGNREGA.  
Aranthangi exhibited a tie up of the bureaucracy with the local elites. Maryam, a Pallar 
from Thirasu, was concerned about how MGNREGA work went to the so-called rich 
people, instead of coming to her or others like her. In Karaimedu, a few Paraiyar 
households complained about not having received job cards because they do not maintain 
close links with the pradhan. Studies show that MGNREGA’s overall success in Tamil Nadu 
is attributed to the bureaucracy acting independently from local elites (Carswell & De 
Neve, 2014). However, as evidence from the field shows, in Aranthangi MGNREGA does 
not work independent of the social power relations that exist in rural society. Instead 
periods of overlap occur where the social protection policy is drawn into the asymmetrical 
power relations that dominate rural society.  
As observed in the case of Aranthnagi, manipulations do take numerous forms. In the case 
of Chinsurah, this was observed through the distribution of job cards and work availability. 
Purnima, a 32-year-old Bauri agricultural labourer, complained of how, despite providing 
the panchayat with all the necessary details and registering herself in the panchayat and 
tehsildars office almost a year back, she has not yet received her card (something all new 
applicants, both in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar, complained about). A majority of these 
workers are Bauris who are still CPI (M) supporters. Purnima believes that she is targeted 
by the administration due to her political allegiance. Chinsurah, as in the rest of West 
Bengal, experienced political upheaval; the TMC removed the CPI (M) in power for 34 
years. The change in political power brought along a change in political allegiance among 
landowners and labourers. Labourers like Purnima, who continue to be loyal to CPI (M), are 
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left out, or often receive state benefits last.  
Shakuntala from Madhabpur had similar complaints about the pradhan, a TMC cadre. She 
believed that the pradhan keeps her away from receiving state benefits because he knows 
that she staunchly supports CPI (M) supporter. Despite having a job card, she was not 
allotted any work in 2011 by the labour supervisor or the panchayat. Exclusion from 
MGNREGA work leaves little choice of work for female labourers in Chinsurah. The 
dependence on agricultural wage work for female labourers results in labour attachment, 
where labourers become bandha kishens in order to secure jobs and avail of credit services 
from the landowner.   
Shakuntala’s story sheds light on an important aspect of political clientelism, which the 
TMC and CPI (M) are accused of. Not all those who demand MGNREGA work obtain it, 
which means that the distribution of job cards is not a process free from corruption, but 
dependent on building ties with the local authorities and local elites (see Dutta et al. 2012). 
Das’s (2015) work on Cooch Bihar, West Bengal, highlights how political affiliation and 
extending support to the local political party resulted in labourers receiving more work. 
Those who belong to the opposition party, such as Shakuntala, receive less work or none 
at all. In Bardhanagar, Santhal households who were politically active and TMC supporters 
reported receiving more work in MGNREGA. 
 Subroto a, 28-year-old Santhal labourer, recently became a labour supervisor, which 
fetches him a higher wage. Subroto got this job because he is a TMC party worker. When 
CPI (M) was the local ruling party he rarely got more than 20 days of work, let alone work 
as a labour supervisor. As a labour supervisor, he now ensures that all those from his 
locality get work. Subroto’s political alliance with the local ruling party (TMC) provided him 
with higher paying work where he ensures that other TMC supporters and party workers, 
especially those in his locality, get work. Political clientelism works in the favour of certain 
groups (in this case it is the Santhals of Bardhanagar) providing them with greater access 
to MGNREGA work and wages.  
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This section identified how relations between the rural elite and local bureaucracy 
manipulate MGNREGA implementation in Aranthangi and Chinsurah. The scheme itself is 
subject to relations of political clientelism, as observed in Chinsurah. This relation steers 
the policy away from its objective of equal welfare to all. Manipulations of the scheme and 
attributes of political clientelism, impacts the ability of female labourers to negotiate their 
contracts and the nature of labour resistance. This aspect is addressed in the following 
section.   
6.2.1 MGNREGA, an Aid to Agricultural Labour Movements?   
The instances of manipulation in Aranthangi and Chinsurah affect the implementation of 
social protection programmes, such as MGNREGA. The purpose behind this programme is 
to reduce rural labourers’ dependence on agricultural wage work, reduce migration to 
unskilled work and reduce indebtedness that draws labourers into exploitative work. All of 
this is to be achieved by providing each household with 100 days of employment in a year. 
The number of days of work available places limits on the transformative capacity of the 
scheme. The comparison of Aranthangi and Chinsurah, highlights the differentiated way 
in which MGNREGA can bring about changes in labour relations. However, with over 53.1 
percent of the population in Aranthangi relying on agricultural wage work, the dependence 
on landowners and agricultural wage work remains hard to diminish. In addition to this, 
the higher wages that accompany agricultural wage work, pushed up positively as a result 
of MGNREGA work, might affect the ability to repay loans, but this increase in wage does 
not necessarily imply that fewer loans will be taken. The cost of living and the nature and 
purpose of the loans are determining factors. Dependence on agricultural wage work and 
on the landowner maintains relations of debt (as explained in Chapters 4 and 5). Female 
labourers in Chinsurah faced the problem of poor implementation and men taking up 
MGNREGA work. To secure work, female labourers relied on debt obtainable from 
landowners, often drawing them into bandha kishen work relations.  
Under a more successfully running MGNREGA in Aranthangi, how does this policy affect 
female agricultural wage workers, their relations of debt and labour tying? Debt is used as 
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mechanism to control and discipline labour (Brass, 1990; Srivastava, 1998; De Neve, 1999; 
Kapadia 2001). Within agricultural wage work, labourers enter relations of debt through 
numerous ways. MGNREGA, as observed in the field, might reduce the debt amount, but 
it does not do away with debt relation altogether, often due to increase in production costs 
and household expeses. MGNREGA does however, provide a space for female labourers to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of work.  
Bhanumati, a 45-year-old Ambalakar woman from Thirasu, works as an agricultural 
labourer for an Ambalakar landowner. She currently works for this landowner to pay off 
her debt. Bhanumati worked for almost 55 days in 2010-11 on MGNREGA work. She 
worked for the landowner and carried out MGNREGA work. According to Bhanumati, the 
landowners remain only concerned with getting their money back and they do not care 
how she returns it. However, she had to negotiate the days she could do MGNREGA work, 
in a way striking a balance between the two jobs. Bhanumati considers MGNREGA very 
valuable and would not want to sacrifice that for agricultural wage work. If the landowner 
she has taken a loan from does not agree to her doing MGNREGA work, then she can go 
to another landowner and transfer the debt on to him, and pay off the previous landowner. 
Bhanumati continues to remain indebted, but she enters a labour tying arrangement with 
sufficient capacity to negotiate wages and work.  
Female wage labourers, like Bhanumati, who entered labour tying arrangements reported 
being able to negotiate their wages, the amount of MGNREGA work they did and the 
amount of loan they paid off. The female labourer’s ability to negotiate wages and work 
contracts stems from the MGNREGA policy, which provides female labourers with 
flexibility to repay loans. For landowners, faster repayment of loans results in a loss of 
power and control they have over the labour force, which often results in landowners 
conceding to the demand of the labourer. The relation of debt itself is necessary for 
landowners to try and maintain control over labour. De Neve’s (1999) work on power-loom 
workers explains a similar debt relation, where employers do not want the labourers to 
repay loans so that they have some hold over the workers. As described in Bhanumati’s 
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case, relations of debt, and labour tying arrangements are maintained, but MGNREGA has 
provided female labourers with a choice, which gives them the ability to walk away from 
agricultural contracts.  
The increase of wages and bargaining capacity in Aranthangi are outcomes of MGNREGA 
but negotiations and transactions take place at a more individual level rather than through 
a much larger process of labour collectivisation. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
female labourers could negotiate work contracts through practices of everyday resistance 
such as foot dragging, or refuse to come to work if they did not receive wages comparable 
to MGNREGA wages. Labourers in the village site mentioned the absence of labour 
movement in the region for over 20 years. Limited presence exists of the communist party, 
with the MLA from Pudukkottai, at the time of survey, belonging to CPI (Communist Party 
of India).  None of the labourers belonged to any agricultural labour union in Aranthangi. 
Aatmanathan119 (landowner) and his nephew are the only Left party supporters in 
Aranthangi. However, since Aatmanathan and his nephew belong to the landed class, the 
issues that they raise and fight for pay very little attention to the needs of the labourers. 
This observation is contrary to studies carried out in the region (such as Gough, 1981) which 
highlight the important role played by the Communist Party in Thanjavur, which revived 
the labour union, extracted decent wages and set proper working hours for labourers 
(p.419)120.  Aranthangi, a taluk which belonged to Thanjavur prior to the formation of 
Pudukkottai, now has no or a little remnant of this past.  
                                                          
119 Aatmanathan is a CPI supporter and until recently was the only CPI representative. The people in the 
village supported him because he was liked by them and not because they were convinced on ideological 
grounds. The current pradhan in the village was an AIADMK candidate, and had not taken any initiative to fix 
roads or water problems that the villagers complained about. AIADMK was quick to recognise this and 
approached Aatmanathan to contest elections. The party realised that he would be a good candidate. 
Aatmanathan was as strong CPI supporter but die to the inactivity of the party. He decided to join AIADMK. 
Aatmanathan’s nephew is currently an active member of DYFI the youth wing of CPI (M).   
 
120 Gough’s study on Thanjavur’s agricultural labour union, showed the presence of Pallars and Paraiyars, 
often excluding poor peasants and labourers who were non- Brahmins. The constitution of the labour union 
resulted in rifts between different caste group, but despite these flaws, the union was able to bring about 




In Chinsurah, as discussed earlier, the positive or transformative effects of MGNREGA on 
rural female labour is far more restricted. The mean number of days of MGNREGA work 
received in Chinsurah is 22.59. The village-and state-level data highlights the limited 
participation of women in MGNREGA. With limited number of days of work and men 
taking up MGNREGA work, female labourers in Chinsurah have limited choice and little 
with which they can negotiate with. Moreover, with men being the beneficiaries of 
MGNREGA work, they make all agricultural wage negotiations. Reduced access to 
MGNREGA work leaves women workers trying to secure jobs outside the programme. By 
becoming a bandha kishen, women workers secure their job. The ability to negotiate these 
labour relations rests on individual employer-employee relations. There is limited policy 
effect of MGNREGA on bandha kishen wages and work contracts. However, as a caveat, it 
is important to mention a process of labour collectivisation I observed in Chinsurah.  
On the 3rd and 4th of June 2012, agricultural labourers in Chinsurah went on strike. 
Labourers stopped work during the peak sowing period for paddy. The entire country at 
this time was reeling under the effects of delayed monsoons. One of the Bagdi female 
labourers described the land as dry and stiff as a taant saree- “Maati ta shukiye taant hoye 
jachche”121. The labourers were demanding a wage hike from Rs.50/- and 2 kilos of rice to 
Rs.65 and 2 kilos of rice. The strike was called at a crucial juncture during paddy 
transplantation. For landowners in Chinsurah, a delay in transplanting would result in 
increased costs of production due to extensive use of tube well irrigation or they would 
suffer from major crop loss.  All agricultural labourers (Bagdi, Baduri, Santhal and Sadgop 
communities) participated in this strike.  
The process of labour collectivisation in the region united all caste groups for the singular 
purpose of wage increase. However, the effects of such collectivisation operates in a 
sporadic and fragmented manner. In Madhabpur, the strike provided a space for 
                                                          
121 This translates as the land had dried up like taant. Taant refers to the traditional Bengal handloom weave, 
which when purchased is very stiff because of the starch in it.  
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negotiation between the landowners and labourers. The labourers wanted to increase 
wages to Rs.65/- and 2 kilos of rice. The strike resulted in a wage hike to Rs.60/- and 2 kilos 
of rice. Shakuntala, a 50-year-old Santhal agricultural labourer, reported that this 
happened because people came together to try and resolve the problem, and they did not 
concern themselves with which caste or religious group participated. A group of labourers 
collectively put forward these demands. According to her, the villagers have learnt how to 
put aside their differences and come and work together, all made possible by the CPI (M). 
This sentiment was expressed forcefully among Bagdis and Santhals. Shankuntala and 
others from her community believe that because of the CPI(M) their wages over the last 
40 years increased from 50 paisa and one ser (950 gms approximately) of rice to Rs.60/- 
and 2 kilos of rice. According to Shakuntala: 
“CPI (M) has given us food, shelter, clothes and they opened schools for us. They gave us the 
will to come together and recognise and fight for our rights. That is how we can fight for our 
wages even now.” 
After Shakuntala voiced her opinions about CPI (M), other respondents did the same and 
did not hesitate to identify themselves as CPI (M) supporters (more so after they realised 
that I was not a threat to them). Bauri and Santhal labourers believe that they were better 
off with CPI (M) in power as they had a redressal mechanism. The current pradhan belongs 
to TMC, and they believe, that he neither cares nor does he listen to anything they have to 
tell him. Female agricultural labourers, especially Bauri women, continue to have strong 
political allegiance to CPI (M), as had CPI (M) brought them together as labourers, which is 
why they can fight for their basic rights even in the absence of a party majority.  
Labourers in Bardhanagar did not witness similar success in agricultural wage increase. 
Wage rates of agricultural labourers stayed at Rs.50/- and 2 kilos of rice. According to 
Shantilal, a 56-year-old Bauri agricultural labourer and bargadar, the reason behind the 
failure of the strike lay with reduced negotiating capacities of the labourers. When 
labourers demanded increased wages, employers said that they would increase the wages 
to Rs.75/- and 2 kilos of rice, but on the condition that the labourers could not ask for a 
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wage hike for the next five years. Shantilal expressed his frustration and anger at the 
landowners: 
“How is someone supposed to survive with this meagre sum for the next five years? Do they 
not see the way the prices of things are increasing? Leave aside food costs; the price of one 
lungi has gone up from Rs.80/- to Rs.140/- in less than six months. How are we to clothe, feed, 
and educate our children?” 122 
Under the condition placed by the landowners, the labourers withdrew from the strike, and 
decided to place their demands at another time. However, no guarantee exists that the 
same would not happen in the future. Shantilal believes that the reason the strike did not 
result in a success in Bardhanagar is the shifting of allegiance from CPI (M) to TMC.  The 
lack of backing from CPI (M), with its subsequent removal, has left agricultural labourers in 
a situation of trying to fight without any support. This represents one aspect of 
organisation in the village, the other is that TMC representatives have created a strong 
network of alliances amongst Santhals and Oraons in Bardhanagar but the party plays little 
emphasis on the working conditions of workers. The lack of emphasis on the rights of 
agricultural wage workers, especially female workers, is not a problem specific to TMC. 
The CPI (M) were heavily criticised for their focus on issues of land, which united the 
sharecroppers, middle and poor peasants, leaving aside agricultural labourers (Omvedt, 
1978: p. 392).  Moreover, CPI (M) cadres now belong to the opposition party, with no 
pressure from the parent body to contain strikes and mediations, which TMC cadres have 
to consider (see Rogaly, 1998). The change in political power in Chinsurah has merely 
resulted in a swapping of roles between TMC and CPI (M). The workers in Bardhanagar, 
who belong to TMC, were pacified and the strike was done away with. 
Given the varied nature of implementation and functioning of MGNREGA, the purpose of 
                                                          
122 Shantilal is an ex-CPM cadre and fears that his association with the party will not let him gain access to 
jobs in the village. During the course of his interview, one of the landlords came to call on the neighbour. 
Being within earshot of the landlord, Shantilal changed his story about demanding wages. He said that what 
the landlords had decided on was right because as labourers demanding a wage increase every year just 
soured the relationship between the two. This was, when the need was great they knew that the landlords 
would increase their wages.  
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this section served to highlight the effects of MGNREGA on female labour resistance. The 
very nature of resistance varies in the two regions. MGNREGA was more effective in 
Aranthangi, where it gave female labourers the ability to make demands, something 
absent in Chinsurah. For women labourers in Chinsurah, labour resistance takes place at a 
much larger scale, and only when men and women of all caste groups collectivise.  
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined one of the country’s biggest social protection policies, 
MGNREGA, and the extent to which it has transformed labour relations and altered 
dependence upon agricultural wage work and landowners in Aranthangi and Chinsurah. 
The evidence indicates that the transformative effects of MGNREGA are varied. In 
Aranthangi, a majority of workers who access MGNREGA belong to the Most Backward 
Caste (MBC) category and Dalits, within which a majority of the workers are women.  
Availability of MGNREGA work presented female workers with a choice between 
agricultural wage work and MGNREGA work. This choice created a platform upon which 
female labourers could negotiate their labour contract. MGNREGA wages, as noted in 
other studies on Tamil Nadu (Jeyaranjan, 2011; Heyer, 2012), affected an increase in 
agricultural wages. In addition to wages, benefits that labourers received in MGNREGA 
were now demanded in agricultural wage work, such as ‘tiffin’. The improved bargaining 
capacities and wages in Aranthangi, were observed in labour tying arrangements as well. 
MGNREGA might not have done away with relations of debt and the resulting labour tying 
arrangements, but it did assist in the process of repayment of loans. This was done as 
MGNREGA created an additional source of income for female labourers. The ability to 
repay loans alters power relations between the landowner and labourer (De Neve, 1999). 
The change in power relations allows female wage labourers who are tied to particular 
landowners, whether for a short or a long duration, to negotiate for comparatively higher 
wages, and better working conditions and duration of work. For example, female labourers 
who enter labour tying arrangements restrict themselves to agriculturally related tasks 
and work only during the day for the landowners. MGNREGA wages also allowed for 
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individualised forms of labour resistance to take place, a phenomenon, usually witnessed 
among women labourers in their labour groups (see Kapadia, 1996).  
Chinsurah presented a different picture, with weaker distribution of MGNREGA work in 
the villages. The distribution of job cards does not match the availability of work in the 
region.  In addition, the dearth of non-farm work and movement of men out of agricultural 
wage work has resulted in men becoming the primary beneficiaries of MGNREGA work in 
Chinsurah. With fewer women involved in MGNREGA, the effects on female agricultural 
wages is limited, affecting their ability to negotiate wages. The dependence on agricultural 
wage work and relations of debt draw female labourers into bandha kishen relations. 
Unlike in Aranthangi, MGNREGA in Chinsurah did not have any effect on female labour 
resistance. Despite the drawback in Chinsurah, MGNREGA still presented itself as an 
alternative to agricultural wage work.  
The local elite/landowners in Aranthangi and Chinsurah responded to MGNREGA work as 
having a negative effect on agricultural growth. In Aranthangi, in particular, landowners 
complained of labour shortage, labourers ‘becoming lazy’ and not coming to work if wages 
are not equal to or higher than MGNREGA wages. The landowners are not however, quiet 
bystanders to these demands made by the labourers. The landowners, especially in 
Aranthangi, through relations with the local bureaucracy managed to alter the number of 
days of work the village received, so that it did not coincide with harvest work. However, 
in this process MGNREGA work was diverted to other regions and labourers in Aranthangi 
received fewer days of work. Manipulation of this kind does not help in reducing the 
dependence of female labourers on agricultural wage work and its associated debts.  
Chinsurah witnessed manipulations in MGNREGA with the distribution of job cards. A 
significant part of this distribution was determined through political allegiance, with TMC 
supporters receiving first preference. Shakuntala believed that her association with the CPI 
(M) is the reason for not receiving MGNREGA work.   
The two cases highlighted in this chapter show that MGNREGA and its transformative 
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effects are far more successful in Aranthangi than in Chinsurah. The lower caste female 
labourers, who were at the beck and call of landowners, can now negotiate work contracts 
(Carswell & De Neve, 2014), even those in labour tying arrangements.  
One reason for the successful implementation of MGNREGA in Aranthangi is the state 
government’s commitment to an effectively running social policy programme. Heyer’s 
(2012), study on Tamil Nadu, shows how policies such as PDS, housing schemes and SHGs 
have brought about improvements in the lives of especially Dalit women. The two ruling 
parties, DMK and AIADMK have constantly worked towards improving and increasing 
provisions to the people, and MGNREGA is one such important other social provision 
(Carswell & De Neve, 2014).  
MGNREGA was implemented with the primary goal of reducing poverty. In its attempts to 
do so, MGNREGA has moved beyond a ‘technical bureaucratic issue’, transforming itself 
into a platform for protests and campaigning (Lerche, 2010; p.75). The result is a number 
of indirect outcomes of increasing wages and the ability to negotiate work contracts, 
whether they are casual or tied labour contracts. As discussed through this chapter the 
intended effects of these are partial in nature. MGNREGA operates in contexts shaped by 
social power relations that limit its capacities to alter rural dependencies decisively.  
While MGNREGA has altered the position of labourers in the rural labour market, it has had 
little effect on their relationship to the state (Caraswell & De Neve, 2014). A closer look at 
state policies, and how it works for the benefit of the rural elite, highlights how macro-level 
policies and relations between the rural elite and local bureaucracy affect labour tying 
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Shoumik, a 56-year-old Sadgop bargadar from Bardhanagar was worried that he would not 
get any returns from his aubergine plantations this year. To make up for the loss, both he 
and his wife would have to take up agricultural wage work.  Shoumik does not like working 
as an agricultural labourer and blamed the pradhan of the village for his state. According 
to Shoumik, “if the pradhan had ensured that PDS (Public Distribution System) functions 
properly, my family would not be in this state of hunger, and indebted to the landowner for 
work, food and loans. He made so many promises during elections but we have received 
nothing, not even a decent number of days of MGNREGA work!”  
Kannusami, a 38-year-old Ambalakar, labourer from Karaimedu, did not voice similar 
complaints about his pradhan, Thiruvan. Thiruvan is considered a good pradhan because 
he has effectively distributed MGNREGA cards in the village, keeps the villagers informed 
about PDS supplies and even informs Kannusami’s wife, who had leased in land from him, 
about the subsidies available in the market. Kannusami’s only complaint was that the 
ration shops should be kept open for longer hours so that labourers do not lose out on a 
day of work to procure grains. 
Presented here are two different cases of how the panchayat and pradhan operate in the 
two village sites. In both cases, the efficiency of the pradhan was important for the proper 
implementation of policies and schemes, and the disbursal of beneifts. The role of the 
pradhan in permitting access to social welfare schemes places a tremendous amount of 
power in his hands. Kannusami’s wife, a kuthagai tenant, was able to get information about 
available subsidies because Thiruvan had passed it on to her. The pradhan in Bardhanagar 
did not pass on any such information to his tenants. The implementation of rules-based 
welfare programmes is conditioned by clientelistic/patronage relationships (see 
McCartney & Roy, 2015). The clientelistic/patronage relations are determined through 
relations of land, labour and credit. Kannusami’s wife relies on the land and information 
provided by Thiruvan. The lack of access to state benefits makes Shoumik and his wife 
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dependent on landowners for agricultural wage work.  The relation of the classes of labour 
with agricultural wage work, landowners and local bureaucracy highlight altering labour 
market relations and at the same time underline unchanging relations of labour and the 
state (Carswell & De Neve, 2014).  Encounters with the state and even access to certain 
state benefits follow certain channels: local political representatives from similar caste 
groups or the local elite.  
This chapter explores the relationship of the local bureaucracy with the rural elite and 
labourers in determining labour/employer strategies. With particular emphasis on PDS and 
MSP (Minimum Support Price), this chapter looks at the extent to which implementation 
of welfare policies is determined through networks maintained by the local bureaucracy 
and rural elite. This chapter argues how these networks generate relations of obligation 
and privilege that draw female labourers in particular, into tied relations, either through 
labour or tenancy, generating debts and dependency. I address PDS and MSP policies in 
this chapter as my research showed these as particularly useful ways of engaging local 
encounters with the state in the field sites.  
This chapter addresses the questions raised in the following manner.  Section 7.1 explores 
the ways in which PDS operates in Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the extent to which 
labourers’ dependency on landowners is challenged, and how relations of debt (a reason 
for tied labour arrangements) are transformed. A comparison of Aranthangi and Chinsurah 
hints at a reduction in dependence on landowners with a more efficiently running PDS. 
Section 7.2 examines the state provision of minimum support prices and how different 
agrarian classes access this state policy. MSP and PDS operate in very different ways in 
Aranthangi and Chinsurah, not because of the way the policy is formulated but the manner 
in which it percolates down to the classes of labour. Section 7.3 uncovers the different 
patterns of encounters that the classes of labour and local elites have with the state. Within 
the context of pro-poor policies, this section examines the effects these encounters have 
on the labour-landowner relationship.  
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7.1 Public Distribution System- Ensuring Food Security 
Agricultural Price Policy tried to resolve the drought and famine conditions that hit India 
in the mid-1960s. There were three primary areas of focus: providing food grains for the 
Public Distribution System (PDS), ensuring reasonable prices for the consumer and 
producer both, and the adoption of new technology (Deshpande, 2008). The public 
distribution system was introduced in India in the 1960s and has been regularly modified 
since. There are different phases in the history of PDS- a) in the 1960s PDS was first 
implemented as a selective rationing scheme, catering to particular cities. This phase was 
marked by import of food grains to support PDS; b) the second phase was marked by the 
country reeling under the effects of a food crisis. During this period PDS became a 
universal food distribution programme; c) the third phase is the post-liberalisation period 
where PDS was distributed in a targeted manner to the income-poor population 
(Swaminathan, 2008: p. 3). The implementation of Targeted PDS (TPDS) focused only on 
certain income-poor groups, a categorisation based on the poverty line. This led to a large 
section of the poor being left out of this scheme, along with a complete downsizing of the 
amount of grains received by the state (Khera, 2011: p. 10). TPDS identified two income 
categories: Above Poverty Line (APL) and Below Poverty Line (BPL). In 2001, a third 
category was introduced called Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY), which identified the poorest 
of the poor households. Some states tried to rectify the problem of a large number of the 
poor being left out, and transformed their TPDS structure to a universal PDS model 
(Swaminathan, 2008; Khera, 2011). Today, Tamil Nadu is the only state that has a properly 
functioning universal PDS model while other southern states have a quasi-universal model 
(Vydhianathan & Radhakrishnan, 2010; Khera, 2011). West Bengal still follows the TPDS 
structure (PDS website: http://www.pdsportal.nic.in).  
Khera (2011) in her study on PDS categorises the Indian states according to the 
performance of a properly functioning PDS. These are functioning states, reforming states 
and languishing states. Tamil Nadu falls in the category of a functioning state and West 
Bengal in the category of a languishing state (p. 12). As noticed in the case of MGNREGA 
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in Chapter 6, implementation of PDS in Tamil Nadu was also far more successful than in 
West Bengal. By doing away with the APL and BPL categories, the state ensured greater 
accessibility to benefits, yielding positive effects on the livelihoods of the classes of labour.  
7.1.1 PDS within a Functioning State  
In Tamil Nadu, as per the government guidelines, no household is supposed to be more 
than 2 kms from a shop. This guideline has resulted in numerous fair price shops, where 
each of the FPSs have an average of 800 card holders (Swaminathan, 2008). The well-
structured PDS in Tamil Nadu was spurred by the failure of the rationing facilities laid out 
by the Congress government (Venkatsubramanian, 2006). After the 1967 elections, when 
the Congress was defeated by DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), subsequent 
improvements were made to fair price shops (Venkatsubramanian, 2006).  
AIADMK (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) came to power in 1977, and food 
policy played a pivotal role123. During the two consecutive terms of AIADMK, the number 
of fair price shops rose from 9,300 in 1977 to 17,536 in 1982 (Venkatsubramanian, 2006). 
Despite losing the elections in 1996, AIADMK increased the amount of free rice that could 
be obtained from the ration shops from 12 to 20 kilos, and reduced prices of all 
commodities sold in FPSs. When DMK came to power, it could not reverse this policy. 
However, this resulted in rising costs for the state government in procuring food grains 
under the new PDS scheme (Venkatsubramanian, 2006)124.     
Tamil Nadu has one of the most well managed Public Distribution Systems (Vydhianathan 
                                                          
123 The governor in 1977 addressed the goals of food policy: “The objective of the government will be to 
ensure a remunerative price for the grower and reasonable price for the consumer by eliminating the scope 
for exploitation of the middle men. The policy that will be followed by the government will neither be 
completely producer-oriented nor consumer-oriented, but essentially people oriented and will aim at 
reconciling the interest of the producer and consumer. It will be my governments endeavour to build up a 
network of retail points in the public sector including the co-operative sector to ensure equitable distribution 
of essential commodities at reasonable prices. We propose to extend the scheme of fair price shops so that 
each of about 16,000 revenue villages will have at least one Fair Price Shop in the village itself” 
(Venkatsubramanian, 2006: p. 273). 
124 Studies show that political supremacy in this region clearly rests on the ability to successfully implement 
PDS (Widlund, 2000; Carswell &De Neve, 2014). 
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& Radhakrishnan, 2010).  A look at the NSS data on household consumption of rice (2007) 
shows that 88.95 percent of the rural population in Tamil Nadu consume rice from FPSs 
(with 78.90 percent of all households consuming rice from FPS). The consumption of wheat 
from FPSs is lower at 40.15 percent and 30.17 percent respectively. A well-managed PDS 
was observed in Karaimedu and Thirasu (Aranthangi) as well.  The FPS in both villages were 
open for 6 hours when stocks would come in. Information about prices of commodities was 
always updated and put on display outside the shop to ensure that everyone in the village 
knew when and what products would arrive as well as their prices (Figure 18). In Karaimedu, 
the day I went to meet the pradhan Thriuvan, he was in a meeting with other members of 
the panchayat and the FPS dealer discussing the list of goods that the village was expecting 
to receive the following month. Thiruvan is extremely proud of the way PDS operates in 
his village and he puts in his share of the effort to ensure that the FPS operate properly. 
Thiruvan’s involvement in the FPS is because it is managed by the panchayat. This is a 
feature unique to Tamil Nadu, where there are no private run FPSs. Instead, around 96 
percent of FPSs are run by the co-operative sector and the remaining FPSs across the state 
are managed by panchayats and SHGs (Swaminathan, 2008).  
 
Figure 18: Writing on the wall: The front wall of the ration shop in Karaimedu specifying 
quantities of item sold and the price of goods. 
                                   Source: Author’s own image, Karaimedu, Aranthangi, November, 2011. 
                                      *The first three items are three varieties of rice that are free.  
 
Respondents in Karaimedu and Thirasu, across all castes and classes, had no complaints 
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about the way PDS operated in the villages. Villagers praised the current AIADMK 
government for providing them with 20 kilos of rice free of cost. Provision of free rice 
comes as a boon to the classes of labour, since open market price for the same quality of 
rice is Rs.19/- per kilo (see Heyer, 2012; p. 101). A reduction in household expenses on food, 
helps the classes of labour with savings or even diversion of money for other purposes such 
as their children’s education. In addition to free rice, card holders can buy 3 kilos of sugar, 
5 litres of kerosene, common rice is sold at a rate of Rs.2/- per kilo and Grade A rice is sold 
at Rs.3.75/- (the market rate for this variety of rice is Rs.40/-). By providing universal PDS 
and subsidised rates of goods, the Tamil Nadu state government ensures higher 
consumption of food grains (such as rice), especially among the Dalits (Heyer, 2012; Basu 
& Das, 2014).  
A properly functioning PDS comes with the promise of reducing poverty and along with 
this, it establishes a network of political allegiance among the poor in the villages. Selvi, a 
50-year-old Christian Pallar woman, who has five children, has a ration card and she gets 
15 kilos of rice free.  
“Initially, I used to get ten kilos of rice, now because they (panchayat) can see that my children 
are growing up; they are giving me 15 kilos of rice.”  
The 15 kilos of rice allocated to Selvi helped her negotiate the number of days she could 
work, which helps her to free up her labour and to be less dependent on agricultural wage 
work, for example, taking work in the sugar factory when available.  Selvi is entitled to 20 
kilos of free rice, however, she deems this allotment of 15 kilos of rice to her as the 
panchayats attempt of redressal for her daily livelihood struggles.  
The involvement of the panchayat did affect her party affiliations.  Selvi supports the 
current pradhan who is a DMK party member. However, in the 2011 assembly elections she 
voted for AIADMK, as a vote for change.  Selvi, during her interview, kept cursing her 
decision of choosing AIADMK, because the change in government brought along with it an 
increase in the prices of commodities, especially transport, which has affected her mobility 
and increased household expenses.  In the next round of elections, she wants to vote for 
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DMK because she believes that DMK will tend to her needs, just as the pradhan who also 
supports her financially (i.e. the pradhan provides Selvi with work) has done.  
In providing a well-functioning PDS and wage work, Selvi feels obliged to work for 
Thiruvan (pradhan), especially in light of the fact that she voted for AIADMK. The pradhan 
ensures a properly functioning PDS, and in Selvi’s case he provides her with work. The 
pradhan is perceived as someone who is just and benevolent. In addition, the pradhan’s 
affiliation to the DMK party affects Selvi’s party affiliation. Therefore, Selvi’s sense of 
obligation and duty towards the pradhan, coupled with him giving her work, secures not 
only her vote but her loyalty towards DMK125. Moreover, the relations of obligation 
internalise attributes of loyalty and discipline of her labour.  
Despite being considered a taboo, Selvi works for Thriuvan as a tied labour for short 
periods of time. Selvi does not consider this labour relation exploitative or demeaning, as 
it was in the case of traditional pannaiyal relations. Selvi’s case highlights a few aspects, 1) 
despite not receiving the complete quota of 20 kilos, the increase in rice helped Selvi free 
up her labour days; 2) the increase in PDS affected her perception of the institution and 
Thiruvan, who ensures the efficient functioning of this institution; 3) the positive impact of 
PDS reflects on Selvi’s work allegiance, and 4) this determines her political allegiance. 
Work and political allegiance work hand in hand to secure Selvi’s labour, loyalty, and on 
occasions even ties her labour to the Thiruvan.  
Respondents constantly praised the efficiently running PDS in Karaimedu and Thirasu. 
However, the PDS is is not without problems. One of the biggest problems faced by PDS 
is that of diversion or ’leakage’ of crops (Himanshu & Sen, 2011; Khera, 2011). One of the 
primary reasons for diversion identified by Khera (2011) is the difference in open market 
and PDS prices; very often dealers are known to sell PDS rice or wheat in the open market. 
While I did not collect information on the ways leakages to PDS take place, I did ask 
                                                          
125 The social relationship with the pradhan at the ground level, in a way marks out the entry of particular 
political parties (Corbridge et al. 2005). 
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respondents the amount of goods they received from FPSs, and the extent this helped 
them free up their labour. 
PDS card holders in Karaimedu and Thirasu were allocated 20 kilos of free rice, but not all 
families received this amount. Additionally, despite being allocated 5 litres of kerosene a 
month, none of the respondents received more than 3 litres. While Selvi registered an 
increase in the amount of rice she received, others complained of low stock.  
Manjula, a 32-year-old Paraiyar agricultural wage worker, borrowed money from a Thevar 
landowner to make up for shortages in PDS supply and now works for the landowner at 
reduced wages (Rs.60/- per day). Manjula has three children, and her husband is a maistry 
(builder) in Pudukkottai. She gets 15 kilos of rice instead of 20, 2 litres of kerosene instead 
of 5 and 1 kg of sugar instead of 2. Manjula did not blame the ration shop for the reduced 
stock, instead she put the blame on herself. The time constraints she faced due to work 
and familial responsibilities did not allow her to collect the ration goods on time.   
“It is not the fault of the ration shop; they can only give what they have. If they have the stocks 
they are willing to give the right amount. The grains arrive anytime from the 1st to the 15th of 
every month, if we want an entire quota then we have to get there early. On most occasions, 
this is not possible with work and time constraints.”  
As Manjula mentioned, most of the food grains and other commodities such as kerosene, 
tuar daal and urad daal (pulses) are sold out by the 15th of the month. The shortage of food 
grains and oil from FPSs results in Manjula relying on food purchased in the open market. 
The higher cost of food increases her debt, and its repayment draws her into debt relations. 
Manjula’s loan from the landowner is short-term, where she is not tied for long periods of 
time. She reported borrowing money approximately 6 times in a year (due to shortages in 
food), from a private moneylender and a landowner. Money borrowed from a private 
money lender is paid off with the help of her husband’s income that comes in 
intermittently. However, she needs to constantly ask her husband for this money. There 
are times when he cannot send the money due to lack of funds. There were occasions when 
Manjula’s husband refused to send money because she took a loan without his permission. 
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In such situations the repayment of loans falls completely on Manjula. In times like these 
Manjula turns to the landowner for work and for money to repay the money lender. The 
loan from the private money lender is transferred on to the landowner. Money borrowed 
from the landowner is repaid through her labour time. Therefore, Manjula, enters multiple 
tied labour contracts with the landowner through relations of debt. The repayment of 
loans takes place through labour time, particularly female labour time.   
 For Manjula, the most regular and probably the only encounter with the state, is through 
the ration shop. She does not question why she receives reduced quantities of grains and 
commodities from the ration shop, and in doing so she does not question the state. The 
information that she receives is that there is a lack of stock. In her understanding, the state 
has made provisions of 20 kilos of rice but this cannot be fulfilled due to a lack of grains. 
She and many like her are sent home with the promise that they will receive the balance 
amount once stocks arrive. However, over the past six to seven months (prior to time of 
interview in 2012) she had not received any balance amount from the ration shops. In order 
to overcome these shortages, Majula relies on existing relations with the Thevar 
landowner, which she can fall back on when required, thereby affecting her dependence 
on the landowner and agricultural wage work.  
Vidya, an Ambalakar agricultural wage worker reported a similar story. She receives free 
rice under PDS, which has helped bring down her household expenses. 
“If I get free rice it means that I am spending less on food to feed my family. The money I earn 
can be spent on other things like school fees, books, etc. I can even have savings so that I don’t 
have to keep borrowing money for small things.” 
Vidya recognises that in providing free rice to families, the PDS can bring about substantial 
improvement in her financial capacities. However, she had a similar complaint as Manjula, 
about limited stock. When she does not receive the full quantity of ration goods, her 
household expenses increase, especially since all her four children go to a private school to 
study. At the time of the survey, Vidya had taken a loan of Rs.1800/- from a motorbike 
vaddikaran in order to meet her increased household expenses. She had bought 35 kilos of 
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rice at a rate Rs.22/- per kilo. The loan from the motorbike vaddikaran has accumulated 
interest and Vidya is paying this off through agricultural wage work and remittances she 
receives from her husband.  Vidya has entered a relation of debt but not directly with the 
landowner she works for. She maintains good work relations with the landowner and relies 
on these wages to pay off the loan. Though not directly tied, Vidya’s dependence on 
agricultural wage work does not allow her to free her labour. Vidya does not confine herself 
to the motorbike vaddikaran and on occasions has borrowed money from a landowner. 
Like Manjula, she enters multiple short duration labour tying contracts in a year to pay off 
her loan, especially when taken from a landowner.  
Female respondents in Aranthangi spoke of shortages in PDS stock, and not receiving 
sufficient information about it. To combat this, the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation 
(TNCSC) has introduced a system of disseminating information to customers about stock 
in their local FPS through an SMS (Short Message Service). This process is said to keep the 
customer informed about stocks beforehand and improve transparency in food 
distribution (Kumar, 2009). However, this scheme had not arrived in either in Karaimedu 
or Thirasu. Respondents believed that once this scheme would be put in place their 
villages, the problem of receiving incomplete stock would go away.  
From the discussion above and as observed in other studies, it is clear that in Tamil Nadu 
PDS is well implemented (Khera, 2011; Heyer, 2012), and has provided agricultural 
labourers with the opportunity to free up their labour days (see Heyer, 2012). However, 
amid this success story, there are flaws in the operation of PDS which create/enhance debt 
relations among female agricultural labourers. These debt relations, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, increase dependence on agricultural wage work and landowners. The labour 
tying arrangements in Aranthangi are however, not long-term, and female labourers are 
only tied till the loan amount is repaid. While the labour relation itself is exploitative, the 
fact that it is short term and based on the ability to repay the loan enhances the bargaining 
capacity of the female labourers (De Neve, 2014). However, these interactions are shaped 
by relations of obligation, privileges and loyalty that internalise docility and self-discipline.  
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The following section looks at the effects of PDS in Chinsurah, which presents a drastically 
different picture than Aranthangi.  
7.1.2 Ambiguous Efficiency of the Food and Supplies Department in Chinsurah 
According to Khera’s (2011) classification, West Bengal is a ‘languishing state’. In this 
category, the performance of PDS is very poor and has high rates of diversion, without 
showing any improvement over time. Unlike Tamil Nadu, West Bengal follows TPDS, 
which was introduced to provide BPL cardholders more affordable rates of subsidised food 
(Khera, 2011; Balani, 2013). According to the NSS report (2007) on household consumption 
of grains from PDS in rural West Bengal, 22.50 percent of households who belonged to the 
bottom 30 percent, and 12.80 of the total population consumed rice from FPSs. Wheat 
consumption was relatively higher with 24.53 percent of households who belonged to the 
bottom 30 percent consumed wheat, with 14.42 percent of the total population, procuring 
wheat from FPSs. These figures, when compared to Tamil Nadu are extremely low, with 
barely a quarter of the rural population in West Bengal accessing PDS.  
In the case of West Bengal one of the central reasons for this is diversion of grains from 
PDS (Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008; Khera, 2011). The Department of Food and Supplies 
blames the high rates of diversion of FPS goods on the nexus between the dealers and local 
panchayat, which was believed to have been strengthened during CPI (M)’s reign 
(Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008). The current Food and Supply Minister of West Bengal, 
Jyotipriya Mullick, put forward a solution, to do away with individual dealerships and 
engage self-help groups and co-operatives to run the ration shops (The Statesman, 2012).  
This move would result in reduced state accountability and function. The TMC in the 
process absolves itself of basic state responsibility, without addressing the problem of 
poorly functioning ration shops126.  
                                                          
126 Another reason for reduced grains in the PDS stems from lack of proper storage facilities. In 2012, food 
stocks had increased to 80 million tonnes creating massive storage shortage. Unlike in previous years, in 
order to avoid the problem of rotting grains, the Central Government had decided to provide an additional 5 
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Apart from claims of diversion, another problem that plagues West Bengal’s PDS is the 
high cost of grains, though still lower than open market prices. In Chinsurah, 10 kilos of 
Annapurna rice (low grade) is provided free of cost, the price of rice for BPL and AAY card 
holders is Rs.2/- per kilo, wheat for AAY is Rs.2/- per kilo and for BPL is Rs.5/- per kilo. The 
PDS also allots the amount families can receive, for example AAY card holders get one kilo 
per week of rice, BPL and AAY families receive only 500 gms of massor dal per month at a 
price of Rs.42/- per kilo. Compared to Aranthangi, families in Chinsurah not only pay more 
for grains bought in FPS but they receive smaller quantities as well.  
The ration shop in Madhabpur and Bardhanagar is open only for two hours in a day from 8 
am to 10 am. On most occasions it is shut, even on days it is scheduled to be open. While 
carrying out field work in Madhabpur, I walked by the ration shop every day to get to the 
Santhal and Bagdi basti (locality). In the one month of working in this area I saw the FPS 
open on only three days. The reason often provided by the dealers is a lack of stock. 
However, what is noteworthy in this case is that the FPS is open only for those two hours 
when labourers are working in the fields127. For the workers to avail of FPS grains, they 
would have to forego one day (or maybe more, if they are asked to return another day) of 
work. The PDS in Chinsurah, is riddled with numerous problems of poor stock, small 
quotas, and leakages of grains. As observed in the case of Thiruvan, where he as the 
pradhan, and other panchayat members were actively monitoring the PDS, there is no 
form of social monitoring in Madhabpur or Bardhanagar, an issue that plagues the entire 
state (Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008).  
                                                          
million tonnes of food grains for those families living below poverty line (Parsai, 2012a) 




Figure 19:  Ration Shop in Madhabpur that opens for two hours from 8am to 10 am 
                         Source: Author’s own, Madhabpur, Chinsurah, May, 2012. Unlike in Karaimedu, 
                              the ration shop has no information on stock and price of commodities. Information 
                              about FPS goods are written in rosters and maintained by the FPS dealer.  
 
Agricultural labourers counter the poor provisions in stock by taking wage payments in 
both cash and kind (a system which is done away with in Aranthangi). Female agricultural 
labourers in Chinsurah very often take short-term loans from landowners in kind, which is 
usually rice. They prefer loans in kind, as this means that they can get food to their families 
immediately (as discussed in Chapter 5). Moreover, female agricultural labourers do not 
find cash loans (for the purpose of food) helpful, as they would have to purchase grains at 
a higher market price, and bringing home cash would often result in having to give a 
portion of it to their husbands. Among Santhals, Bauris and Bagdis, storing rice is 
beneficial for the family and is often used to barter goods and give loans to neighbours, as 
mentioned by Supriya, a Santhal agricultural labourer (see Chapter 5). ‘Rice loans’ taken 
from landowners are paid off through labour time, and those from neighbours through 
cash. Due to the frequency with which these loans are taken, female agricultural labourers 
in Chinsurah prefer to remain as bandha kishens to have greater/easy access to these loans.   
Apart from lack of stock in FPSs, marginal landholders and landless labourers in Chinsurah 
reported problems associated with their ration cards. With the government revising the 
APL and BPL categories, many Bauris and Bagdis were issued APL cards. They want to 
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revert back to BPL cards as it is very difficult for them to purchase food grains at the market 
price, and what they receive from the ration shops is not sufficient.  The higher cost of food 
(in FPSs and the open market) results in an increase in household expenditure. For Bauri 
and Bagdi women, this situation results in increased dependence on landowners for loans 
(taken in kind) and on agricultural wage work.   
The picture is not very different for those who are BPL card holders. Shanti Bauri (55- year-
old agricultural labourer in Madhabpur) has a family of seven members and has three BPL 
ration cards. With the BPL card, she receives rice at Rs.2/- per kilo. However, the total 
amount received is not sufficient for her family. She is supposed to receive a total of 9 kilos 
of rice per month but actually receives only 3 kilos. She is also supposed to get 5 kilos of 
wheat per person at the rate of Rs.14/- per kilo but she and other family members are 
turned away on grounds of insufficient stock. On average, Shanti’s family receives merely 
one kilo or even 500 grams per person (a total of 3.5 to 7 kilos per month). The only option 
available for survival is to take payment in kind and borrow either grains or money from 
the landowner. She borrows grains from Shafiq and works for him on his land, to combat 
the rising cost of living.  
“There are no savings. How can I have any saving?  For ration (grains) I spend Rs.30/- every 
week. For clothes I need to spend money. Now-a-days one saree alone costs Rs.250/-. Food is 
a necessity and so are clothes.” 
Shanti carries out both agricultural and housework for Shafiq. Her financial dependence 
on Shafiq gives him greater control over her labour. Within this indebted relation, Shanti 
works as a bandha kishen, not only to pay off the loan but to also do away with the 
uncertainty associated with access to food via PDS. Female agricultural wage workers like 
Shanti believe that this is the best way for them to secure their livelihoods, as this provides 
assurances of a constant supply of food for them and their family.  
As mentioned above, agricultural labourers in Chinsurah complained of being wrongfully 
excluded from the BPL category. Bhattacharya and Rana (2008) refer to this as ‘exclusion 
errors’, where almost 30% of the APL population in West Bengal come under this category 
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(p. 68).  This error further highlights the corruption prevalent in PDS in West Bengal. In 
Bardhanagar, Smriti Rai, a 34-year-old Bauri female agricultural labourer, said that it made 
no sense to her that she had an APL ration card and her father-in-law a BPL ration card. 
She was informed that in order to change this she had to deposit some money and provide 
some documents. She applied for a change in ration card three months back, and has not 
received it as yet. People at the panchayat office as well as the FPS dealer are now asking 
her to give them more money to expedite the matter. Mitra (2007), in her report on North 
24 Parganas district in West Bengal, observed similar episodes of FPS dealers extorting 
money from villagers to make ration cards.  Smriti blames the village pradhan for her 
current situation. With the increasing cost of food, and her husband’s irregular 
remittances, she has borrowed both money and grains from a landowner. Though not in a 
typical bandha kishen relationship, Smriti remains tied (for short durations) to the 
landowner, so that she can pay off these loans.   
The pradhan of the village is a Brahmin landlord. He has both social and political power but 
his non-participation in the matter pushes her away from approaching him. His inefficiency 
raises questions on his political legitimacy. Her encounters with the state are through 
corrupt officials and a non-participating pradhan. These encounters have forced her to 
think about bringing the CPI (M) back to power. Smriti and her neighbours agreed that-  
“The CPI (M) should come back. Didi’s (TMC) government should not come back, forget about 
paribartan128, we can’t even get our ration cards.”  
The inefficiency of the pradhan and his reluctance to take on any role, forces the villagers 
to reconsider their decision of electing a TMC led government. This is unlike what was 
observed in Aranthangi, where the pradhan’s efficiency altered Selvi’s political allegiance.  
Rupa, a 23-year-old Bauri agricultural labourer, had a similar story, where she too did not 
receive a ration card. Rupa firmly believes that the pradhan, who is a TMC (Trinamool 
                                                          




Congress) supporter and member, is intentionally delaying the process, as she and her 
family members are CPI (M) supporters. She also reported that other Bauri members who 
worked for the pradhan had applied for ration cards at the same time as her and had 
already received their cards while she is still waiting. In order to overcome food shortages, 
Rupa borrows grains and money from landowners. Rupa’s story clearly highlights the 
alignment of village politics and party politics. The pradhan’s influence in the matter 
creates conditions where female labourers like Rupa secure their livelihood through 
insecure means.  
Observations from Chinsurah highlight the lack of any social monitoring (Bhattacharya & 
Rana, 2008) from the pradhan and the panchayat. A reason for the disinterest of the 
panchayat and other local elites is attributed to TPDS, where the beneficiaries of the 
scheme are only those who live below the poverty line. This has made the rest of the 
population, especially the local elites indifferent to any of the problems associated with 
TPDS (Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008). Under these conditions, making PDS universal, as 
done in Tamil Nadu, would ensure participation of people across all social classes and 
proper implementation of the scheme.  
Respondents in Aranthangi and Chinsurah complained about shortages in food supply 
from FPSs. With better implementation of PDS in Aranthangi, respondents could free up 
their labour days, and take loans that were short term in nature. In fact, the proper 
provision of food grains from PDS provided female agricultural labourers with the 
opportunity to free up their labour days. In Chinsurah, the low quantity provided, and the 
irregular supply created pressures on household expenses, which resulted in female 
agricultural labourers entering labour tying arrangements that last for longer durations 
because of the numerous loans taken from landowners. The problem with low or no stock 
is associated with varying degrees of corruption between the local panchayat and dealers 
and the state’s ability to procure grains. State procurement of grains take place according 
to the Minimum Support Price (MSP) policy. The following section looks at the way MSPs 
operate in Aranthangi and Chinsurah and their effects on tied labour arrangements.   
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7.2 State Allotted Subsidies and Technologies: Minimum Support Price 
One state policy which protects farmers big and small, is the Minimum Support Price 
(MSP). The MSP concerns itself with the procurement of food grains where the 
government has not set a limit or target but kept it open-ended (Balani, 2013). MSP does 
not consider the cost of production alone, but the risks involved in cultivation, changes in 
input prices, trends in markets prices, demand and supply of commodities, cost of living 
index, general price index and fluctuation of prices in international markets (Deshpande, 
2008: p. 95). Based on the manner in which MSP operates, the country is divided into three 
regions. The first is Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Haryana, where MSP operates in an 
effective manner without causing much distress to farmers. The second division comprises 
of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and West Bengal, where the time-lag is 
extremely large, making the policy ineffective. The third category includes Tamil Nadu, 
Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh where MSP works effectively only for a certain region or a 
group of farmers or for certain crops (Deshpande, 2008). West Bengal, as observed in the 
case of NREGA and PDS has a poorly operating MSP system in place compared to Tamil 
Nadu.  
The primary crop for procurement in West Bengal as well as Tamil Nadu is rice, followed 
by potatoes and pulses respectively. Despite differences in the way MSP operates across 
the two states, between 2008 and 2012, the cost of farm inputs increased tremendously. 
There was a 30 per cent increase in the cost of fertilisers, 8 per cent in pesticides, 20 per 
cent in farm power, 34 percent in diesel oil for tractors and 44 percent in diesel oil for pump 
sets.  Food inflation rose from 10.49 percent to 10.74 percent between April 2012 and May 
2012. This led the Central Government to increase the MSP for paddy from Rs.1080/- in the 
previous year to Rs.1250/- per quintal for common variety. The MSP for urad daal was 
raised by Rs.1000/- to Rs.4300/- (Parsai, 2012b). This move, while encouraging farmers to 
sell to the government in order to cover input costs, will lead to a further hike in inflation 
(Parsai, 2012a). Raising the MSP is often criticised as a move to appease the farm lobby, 
and this move adds to the already increasing cost of food. In addition to inflation, the rising 
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cost of food grains is because of the introduction of private buyers such as Reliance and 
Mahindra (Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008). The introduction of private buyers results in 
reduced procurement from the Food Corporation of India, repercussions of which are felt 
on farmers’ livelihoods and the amount of cereal and grains that are made available to 
FPSs.  
MSP as a state policy has the ability to shape the market, i.e. the actions of the state 
determine access to goods and grains sold in the market (Corbridge, et al. 2005). By 
shaping the market, state policies benefit those who are already market oriented (the 
petty capitalist and medium farmers) and have marketable surplus (Brass, 1994). The 
result is growing inequalities between larger landowners and marginal farmers due to 
limited access to state prices and subsidies. In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, marginal farmers 
and tenants were able to access state procurement prices through networks with larger 
landowners.  
In Karaimedu and Thirasu many of the landless labourers cultivate land on lease (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). Twenty-eight respondents spoke of leasing land from larger 
landowners and none of them had access to subsidised farm inputs. These cultivators had 
to sell their produce to private traders in order to try and pay off rising debts. This creates 
a situation where the cost of production increases but return from the yield is at a lower 
value than that stipulated under MSP. 
In Aranthangi, a majority of Ambalakar, Paraiyar and Pallar women lease land from the 
richer Ambalakar and Thevar households. Their ability to sell their produce in government 
mills is governed by the information that they receive. Information that lies with the 
pradhan is easily accessible to larger landowners in the village, however, these channels of 
information almost never percolate down to the marginal farmers. Information channels 
usually follow kindship relations and at times party connections. None of the respondents 
in Aranthangi reported receiving information through political channels. However, it 
cannot go unnoticed that those respondents who did receive information had similar 
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political party allegiances129. This relation is suggestive of the network of local political 
parties with the local elite, along with their endeavour to maintain political power and 
loyalty. 
The lack of flow of information about government procurement mills excludes a large 
section of the classes of labour and particularly female tenants. Female tenants in 
Aranthangi want to reduce their dependency on landowners, and turn to private traders 
for the sale of their crops. This affects the amount of information female tenants receive 
from landowners as the private sellers make the most of the situation where their mobility 
makes it easier for female cultivators to sell their produce to them. Under such an 
arrangement women cultivators do not have to worry about transportation costs but do 
receive higher prices for their grains, making it difficult to increase profits (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). The control of private traders over female cultivators in particular in 
Aranthangi, diminishes any access to state controlled MSPs.  
Sreelatha, a 49-year-old Christian Pallar (case discussed in Chapter 4), relies on the private 
trader to purchase rice from her. Selling grains to the private trader is important for 
Sreelatha as she sees this as a mechanism of reducing dependence on the Thevar 
landowner. She is dependent on the landowner for land but does not want to increase her 
dependence any further with the landowner controlling her income from the sale of grains. 
However, cultivators like Sreelatha are caught in a web, where they sell grains at lower 
rates to the private trader, which does not help in freeing themselves from multiple 
relations of debt easily. There is growing debt with the private moneylender, which is then 
paid off through loans from the landowner and repayment through labour time. Sreelatha 
might not work as an agricultural labour for the same landowner from whom she leases 
land, but directly or indirectly she forges relations of debt with her employer, private trader 
and lessor.  
                                                          
129 In Aranthangi, respondents who received information about government mills were DMK supporters and 
respondents in Chinsurah who sold grains in government mills were AIADMK supporters. 
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The poor channels of information were observed in Chinsurah as well, where the large 
landowners who had “connections” with the local bureaucracy (Block Development 
Officers), received information about when government mills were going to be set up. For 
example, Shafiq (male petty capitalist) from Madhabpur and Ramesh (male medium 
farmer) from Bardhanagar, knew the Block Development Officer (BDO). For Shafiq it was 
through KVC (Krishi Vigyan Centre) and for Ramesh, the BDO was his brother-in-law. 
Shafiq and Ramesh both reported sharing information about when government mills 
would be set up, to other famers in their villages. However, on closer observation, this 
information was usually received by family, friends, and occasionally a bargadar. The 
information was occasionally passed on to female theke tenants, who also worked as 
bandha kishens.  
In the case of Chinsurah, the flow of information is delineated through kindship, caste and 
labour relations. Unlike Aranthangi, female cultivators do not sell their produce to private 
traders; all sales take place via the landowner (who on occasion is also the trader), or their 
husbands would sell it to private traders. Female cultivators do not have direct control over 
the sale of their produce. A majority of female theke tenants obtain land through the 
bandha kishen relation, which makes them dependent on the landowner for land, wage 
labour and credit. Female theke tenants indirectly access government mills through the 
landowners they work for.   
As discussed earlier, information regarding when government mills are purchasing grains 
almost never percolates down to sharecroppers and theke tenants (male). These tenants 
sell food grains to the next available private buyer at lower prices, often making it difficult 
for these tenants to break even and come out of their debt. Recognizing this, the West 
Bengal Government (under CPI (M) rule) established Large-Sized Multi-Purpose Co-
operative Societies (LAMPS) to rescue local workers from exploitation by private traders 
(Mazumdar, 1989). These societies are meant to work in the interests of the subaltern 
classes and to transform hegemony. However, since this is a project from above and not 
the ground level, it is fraught with numerous bureaucratic problems (Mazumdar, 1989).  
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Farmers in Aranthangi and Chinsurah acknowledge that MSP, as a state policy offers them 
higher rates for grains and vegetables, however, these are not without problems.  Apart 
from not receiving information, those who could sell their grains at government mills 
complained of the time lag in receiving payments. Farmers could not immediately sell their 
produce in government mills but were allotted specific days when this could be done. The 
delay in sales created a problem of storage. When the crops were sold, they were given 
cheques, and the time taken to obtain the cheques and cash them, further increased the 
time lag (in Chinsurah, this process took almost 45 days). Under such conditions, small and 
marginal famers, especially in Chinsurah, prefer to sell their produce directly in the open 
market through private buyers. This situation also reduces the amount the government is 
able to procure for FPSs.  
Another factor leading to a decline in procurement quantities by the government is the 
entry of large corporates such as Reliance and Godrej, who now directly buy stock from the 
farmers. The move to promote agri-business has resulted in a decline in procurement 
targets set by the state government, which further increases shortages in FPSs 
(Bhattacharya & Rana, 2008). In the case of Chinsurah, any decline in the procurement 
grains for PDS does not directly affect the large and medium landowners, as they are now 
offered competitive market prices for the goods. Instead the classes of labour are affected; 
those who rely on goods from fair price shops for their daily survival.  With the growing 
unpredictability of MSPs and FPSs, [female] labourers in Chinsurah look for means to 
secure their livelihood, often resulting in them taking up work as bandha kishens.   
The universal PDS model in Aranthangi on the other hand, ensured involvement of all caste 
and class groups in villages, which ensured relatively better access to government mills, 
and a properly functioning FPS. In comparison to Chinsurah, female agricultural labourers 
in Aranthangi are less dependent on landowners and on agricultural wage work with better 
implementation of welfare policies. 
This section looked into the ways in which PDS and MSP operate in the two regions and 
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how they generate relations of dependence, privilege and obligation. The relations result 
in women entering (either voluntarily or through coercion) tied labour arrangements to 
counter growing debts.  
The following section deals more closely with the relationship of the local bureaucracy with 
the rural elite. These relations affect the classes of labour and their encounters with the 
state, which affects labour-landowner relationships. 
7.3 Encounters with the State and Labour Dependencies  
PDS and MSP are two large scale welfare based programmes introduced by the state. 
However, as seen particularly in the case of Chinsurah, these policies succumb to 
patronage politics and corruption, where contrary to the policy, the benefits are not 
received by the entire target population. The relationship of the local elites with the state 
and the manner in which the labourers encounter the state are very different. As 
discussions in the previous sections highlighted, different agrarian classes interact with the 
state (through local bureaucracy and policies) in various ways. These encounters and 
interactions with the state are often seen to be driven through what Harriss-White (2003) 
refers to as ‘everyday forms of communalism’ (p.75). Under these ‘everyday forms of 
communalism’, the actual beneficiaries are determined through relations of class, caste, 
gender and religion (Harriss-White, 2003). For example, petty capitalists who belong to a 
higher caste have greater access to bank loans or government mills than a female 
agricultural labourer who is a Dalit or belongs to any other lower caste.  
There are different ‘geographies of the state’ formed through different interactions.  
Drawing from my observations and interactions with respondents in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah, I map out different encounters with state apparatuses between a female 
agricultural labourer who belongs to the classes of labour, and a petty capitalist. (The 




Figure 20: Encounters with the State: Female Agricultural Labourer and Large Landowner 
 
The figure above draws from evidences mentioned in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. As the figure 
highlights, large landowners have direct routes to the local government/bureaucracy and 
interactions increase for those who are already in political positions. For example, Thiruvan 
in Karaimedu is a large landowner and the pradhan of the village. His interactions are not 
restricted to the panchayat but extend to other local government bodies such as the BDO, 
MLA office, etc. Rural female labourers interact with the panchayat, FPSs and very recently 
government banks because of MGNREGA. Interactions of female agricultural labourer (or 
the classes of labour in general) with the bureaucracy takes place fundamentally through 
the local elite, their husbands, or male members of their household. In both cases, 
interactions with the state are initiated through men.  Interactions with, and dependency 
on the local elites help maintain the asymmetrical power relations in rural society.  
Large 
Landowner 




The power relations are complex and not unidirectional, i.e. effort and allegiance are not 
drawn only from the classes of labour to local elites. The local elites also need to maintain 
good relations to retain power, as these undergo transformation with the introduction of 
welfare schemes that work in favour of the classes of labour. The efforts to maintain the 
balance of power is often done through interpersonal relationships.  
In Aranthangi, the AIADMK government has set up co-operatives for farmers to improve 
access to subsidised goods. However, the tehsildar determines the effective functioning of 
these co-operatives. According to Aatmanathan from Thirasu, the tehsildar registered him 
as a periya vevasaey (large landowner) rather than a siru vevasaey (small landowner). 
Consequently, he did not receive the free fertiliser sprinkler that was distributed to siru and 
kuru (marginal) vevasaeys. Aatmanathan reported that he could have used his position as 
a councillor to get his name shifted to the siru vevasaey list and possibly get the tehsildar 
transferred. However, he decided against it and did not change his name from the list. 
Aatmanathan uses his current predicament to maintain power between him and his 
labourers. The villagers envision Aatmanathan as a fair and just person, and it is of primary 
importance to him that he maintains this image in order to hold on to his political and 
economic power within the village.  
Labourers who work for Aatmanathan are provided with both physical security and job 
security. He employs approximately 25 labourers out of which 5 lease in land from him, and 
in a year around 10 labourers borrow money from him. Due to Aatmanathan’s political 
connections he receives information about subsidies which he uses to his benefit and 
passes on to a few of his kuthagai tenants. Through these relations Aatmanathan controls 
and manages his labour and tenants, extracting work and allegiance. For Aatmanathan, 
this is a point of accumulation of labour that lies outside the economic understanding of 
capital. Labourers who work for Aatmanathan in exclusionary labour arrangements avail 
of benefits, such as easy access to land, work and subsidies. Aatmanathan’s relationship 




Saraswati, one of the Ambalakar labourers who work for Aatmanathan does not consider 
herself to be a tied labourer (or more specifically a pannaiyal). Instead, she works in what 
she understands to be a mutually beneficial relationship that provides her access to loans 
and land for cultivation. Saraswati repays the loans, and does not feel tied down to 
Aatmanathan. She considers Aatmanathan to be a just employer, and through this 
longstanding relation is able to access benefits. In 2011, Saraswati had borrowed money 
from Aatmanathan on three different occasions and was able to repay all the loans through 
her labour time. Despite the benefits extended to Saraswati, the relationship itself places 
limits on her labour time and she could not go and work for another employer. 
Aatmanathan is her link to the state and state benefits. However, despite this, even though 
she does not consider herself tied, she is in fact, tied in certain respects, and certainly 
undervalued and constrained.  
In Chinsurah, Shafiq evoked similar sentiments among labourers who worked for him. 
Shafiq was not an elected member of the gram sabha but the sense of growing distrust 
expressed by labourers in the village against the pradhan led them to place their trust in 
Shafiq, who was envisioned as a benevolent and just employer. Shafiq is a large landowner 
and employs over 60 labourers in a fasli year. He has connections with the Krishi Vigyan 
Centre, and BDO, and is one of the few landowners who has a Kisan Credit Card. Shafiq has 
ten female bandha kishens who work for him. Along with this he maintains good relations 
with other female agricultural labourers and is an important source of interest free 
consumption loans for many of his labourers. Shafiq’s position in the village and his image 
made villagers turn to him to resolve their problems and obtain certain benefits and 
privileges. The labourer’s dependence on Shafiq moves beyond interest-free consumption 
loans and extends to everyday decisions.  
Shafiq is able to control the large number of labourers and bandha kishens who work for 
him through the economic and social positons he occupies that generates consent and 
ensures a pliant workforce. One of the ways in which Shafiq accomplishes this is through 
the extension of loans but refers to it as ‘helping the labourers’. Shafiq helps his labourers 
295 
 
and other villagers when they need money for a medical emergency, need to get their 
ration cards, and he has helped some of his labourers by providing school fees for their 
children, and so on. The ‘help’ encompasses daily loans required by labourers and 
assistance in other matters as well. Moreover, during the most important festival of Durga 
Puja, Shafiq ensures that he provides gifts to his labourers, and in doing so, becomes more 
approachable to them. As De Neve (1999) points out in the case of Tamil Nadu, by 
extending loans and ensuring that the labourer is in debt, Shafiq is able to control the 
workforce, or at least able to maintain the asymmetrical power relations. The process of 
control operates alongside aspects of compassion that further strengthens bonds of trust 
with his labourers. Like Aatmanathan, Shafiq is the link to state benefits for female 
labourers. Through this link the labourer is drawn into relations of obligation, loyalty and 
labour tying.   
Both cases in Aranthangi and Chinsurah highlight that landowners do not follow traditional 
patron-client relationships, but are able to draw out services through various mechanisms 
of control (which also include attributes of compassion). Moreover, Shafiq and 
Aatmanathan act as important points of contact/ mediators between the state and the 
classes of labour, strengthening relations of dependency and power. The positions of 
power are however, not set in stone but are in a process of constant flux. For example, in 
Aranthangi, the successful implementation of welfare schemes frees up labour time and 
increases the ability of female labourers to pay back loans. This keeps the relations of 
power in a constant state of flux, with the landowners constantly looking for ways to 
control labour. In Chinsurah, the poor operation of MGNREGA, PDS and MSP makes 
dependence on the landowner for work and loans a common occurrence, where female 
agricultural labourers in particular enter the bandha kishen relations, at times voluntarily, 
to secure their livelihood.  
7.4  Conclusion  
This chapter discussed how pro-poor state policies and the interactions of the local 
bureaucracy with the landed elite create conditions of dependency and labour tying.  
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Female labour in particular, are drawn into the dependent relations through interlocked 
factor markets, and more importantly through relations of power that determine 
encounters with the state. This chapter shows that in the Indian context, with growing 
importance on pro-poor policies, power relations and dependencies are maintained 
through the relationship between the rural elite and the local bureaucracy.  
De Neve and Carswell (2011), highlights how political parties maintain supremacy through 
the proper implementation of broad based, development focussed agendas (p.205). The 
success, particularly witnessed in Tamil Nadu, is due to the shift from 
patronage/clientelistic policies to broad based application of polices (McCartney & Roy, 
2015). PDS in Aranthangi follows a universal distribution model, where larger quantities of 
grains are provided free to ration card holders compared to Chinsurah which continues to 
follow a targeted approach and charges relatively higher prices for grains. That said, the 
state governments in Aranthangi and Chinsurah are both working with the intent of 
poverty alleviation.  
Despite the larger development agendas set by the state to alleviate poverty, the policies 
themselves are completely enmeshed within local power relations and local party politics 
(Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010; De Neve & Carswell, 2011). The alignment of village level and 
caste politics affects the way policies are implemented. For example, Rupa had not 
received a ration card and blames this on the pradhan’s inefficiency. The pradhan’s 
inefficiency, while a common complaint among all respondents, is further accentuated for 
Rupa and similar cases like hers, as they are all CPI (M) supporters. In Chinsurah the 
relationship between local village level politics and party politics resulted in opposition 
party supporters not receiving ration cards or receiving erroneous ones. In Aranthangi, 
with political party supremacy resting on the performance of development polices, the 
pradhans work in close contact with FPS dealers to ensure the proper distribution of food, 
minimising the effects of corruption. This was observed in the case of Selvi, who had 
decided that she wanted to vote for DMK in the next assembly elections.  
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A similar set of linkages was observed in the case of MSPs. Access to MSP and government 
procurement is dependent upon the networks and connections that farmers have with the 
pradhan and panchayat samiti. In Aranthangi and Chinsurah, the landowners, especially 
those who had connections with the pradhan, were able to gain access to government 
procurement agencies. The passing on of information takes place along lines of kinship ties 
and political relations.  
Selling grains at the government MSP rate has its advantages for farmers. However, 
female cultivators in Aranthangi preferred using private traders. The private traders 
reduced the burden of transportation, and payments (less than the market rate) were 
received promptly. In addition to this, female tenants in Aranthangi do not want to rely on 
landowners more than they have to. These female tenants rely on landowners for land, 
and at times credit, and they do not want landowners to control their earnings as well. Any 
relation of debt entered into with the landowner is repaid immediately. The female tenant, 
is however indirectly dependent on the landowner for land. The indebted relation with the 
private trader makes it difficult to break away from dependencies created through tenancy 
relations. In Chinsurah, female cultivators are not in the forefront of tenancy arrangements 
and those who have obtained land through tenancy arrangements were able to do so 
through the bandha kishen relationship. Under such conditions female tenants depend on 
landowners for land, work and credit.  
The differentiated way in which in PDS and MSP operate, both in Aranthangi and 
Chinsurah, resulted in creation of debt, albeit in varying proportions. Female labourers and 
cultivators devise numerous ways to work around the exploitation that accompanies 
relations of debt. As observed in Aranthangi, the ability of female tenants to accomplish 
this rests on the success of welfare policies and schemes. Female labourers in Aranthangi 
are able to put up stronger fronts of resistance than in Chinsurah due to the proper 
implementation of welfare schemes like PDS and MGNREGA, which creates tensions in 
the landowner-labourer relationship (see De Neve & Carswell, 2011). The landowner 
devises ways to combat these tensions and secure labour. The landowner maintains power 
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and control over the labourer through relations of debt, obligations, and connections with 
the bureaucracy. Landowners, in the process of making themselves more approachable 
and portraying themselves as fair and just employers, secure labour loyalties, iron out the 
tensions and maintain debt relations. For those who belong to the classes of labour, 
maintaining good work relations is important, where in addition to providing access to 
work, land and credit, landowners provide indirect access to state apparatuses. All these 
networks of relations emphasise the importance of the nexus between labourer, 
landowner/local elite and bureaucracy.   
As discussed in this chapter, the successful implementation of PDS in Aranthangi has 
improved the bargaining capacity of female labourers. At the same time local elites and 
the bureaucracy remain silent on the high rates of corruption in PDS observed in 
Chinsurah, or the inaccessibility to MSP and government procurement agencies for the 
classes of labour. The silence of political parties and a general disengagement of the local 
elites is suggestive of state complicity.  Despite the implementation of welfare-based 
schemes, their success is dependent on local level politics and power relations. Therefore, 
while the focus of the state has shifted to pro-poor politics, it is the political clientelism and 
relations of patronage operating at the ground level that determine the transformative 
capacity and effectiveness of welfare policies. These conditions affect relations of debt, 







The stated objective of this thesis was to investigate the persistence of labour tying 
arrangements in agriculture in India. This study refutes the binary understanding of the 
semi-feudal and deproletarianization thesis. In this research, labour tying arrangements 
are not viewed as pre-capitalist relations, and while these labour relations might not be the 
most preferred labour arrangement within capitalism, it is identified as an important 
mechanism to generate surplus. I argue that the presence of labour tying arrangements 
needs to be understood through multi-scalar power relations that are contingent upon 
gendered class power and state politics. These power relations constitute what I refer to 
as a ‘regime of labour tying’ which is characterised by cheap [female] labour, subsumed 
under debt and found working in poorly paid jobs.  
I have identified these labour relations across four villages in the southern state of India in 
Tamil Nadu and the eastern state of West Bengal130. The aim was to compare how multi-
scalar power relations operating in the two regions, under distinct and diverse socio-
political conditions, create labour tying arrangements. The study identifies tied labourers 
as those who are indebted to a landowner/employer, primarily through loans in cash and 
kind. Within these relations labourers work to repay loans, and therefore, wages received 
are lower than casual daily wage employment. Consequently, it restricts their ability to 
repay loans which extends the period they remain tied. The focus in this research was on 
female tied labour in agriculture. In light of the increasing feminisation of the agricultural 
workforce, female labourers are left with the burden of breadwinning and securing the 
survival of their families (see Lerche, 2010). Within this context it becomes important to 
identify how rural female labourers constitute the lowest position in the wage hierarchy 
with little chance of upliftment.  
In this concluding chapter I discuss the key findings of this research and highlight 
contributions made in this study, its limitations and potential areas of further research.  
                                                          




Addressing the Question 
Studies that examine the changing nature of unfree (tied) labour relations in India, often 
identify how their numbers are on a decline (Bardhan and Rudra, 1981; Heyer, 2000; 
Jodhka, 2014). Bardhan (1983) in his study on West Bengal observed that a decline in 
agrestic bonded labour was accompanied by an increase in labour tying arrangements, 
strengthened through capitalist development. Tied labour arrangements can range from 
long-term attachment to short-term seasonal contracts, and therefore, their presence 
should not be dismissed as a relic of semi-feudalism (Bardhan, 1983, 2001). However, 
Bardhan (1983) explains the presence of tied labour in agriculture as an outcome of 
imperfect markets, where these contracts are prevalent in tight labour markets. Rudra 
(1992) steps away from Bardhan’s economism, and attributes the presence of tied labour 
arrangements to being a product of social control. Studies by Ramachandran (1991) and 
Athreya et al. (1990) show how local power relations extort labour servitude and generate 
unfreedom. Breman’s (1976; 1996; 2007) work in South Gujarat highlights the 
transformations and adaptations of bonded labour, where the labour contracts are now 
monetised in nature. Brass (1990), explains unfree labour relations as an outcome of 
capitalist development, but rejects Bardhan and Rudra’s notions of voluntarism. Brass 
(1990) draws on relations of debt bondage as a mechanism to cheapen and discipline the 
workforce, and supress the formation of class-consciousness.  
These different studies highlight the complexity and diversity of rural labour arrangements 
within agrarian capitalism. However, their explanations still succumb to the dualism of 
capitalism versus pre-capitalism, and that these relations are an outcome of labour tight 
and/or labour slack seasons.  In order to move away from this dualism, I use Hart’s (1986a) 
theoretical framework which identifies the presence of labour tying arrangements as an 
outcome of multi-scalar power relations, how they work at the village level, and the effects 
and interactions with wider macro-economic and political processes (such as the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme). I identify macro-level processes 
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through state welfare policies and how their implementation and transformative effects 
on labour relations is contingent upon interactions of the ruling elite with the local 
bureaucracy. Using this theoretical framework helps answer my central question- how and 
through what mechanisms do labour tying arrangements persist? 
I have explored this question through Bernstein’s category of classes of labour, with 
emphasis on rural female labour. The classes of labour is a dynamic category, where class 
formation is conditioned through non-class attributes such as gender, caste, and kinship. 
Using the category of classes of labour draws the analysis away from reductionist methods 
of class identification, such as ownership of land. This is important as it recognizes that 
labour is extremely mobile, engaging in a range of activities and occupying different 
production relations within agrarian neo-liberalism. 
I have found in this study that labour tying arrangements emerge out of a diverse range of 
relationships: the labour and employer, the nature of interlocked contracts and the role of 
state policies, all of which shape labour and employer strategies. In using Bernstein and 
Hart, my research identifies that rural female labour enter into insecure and oppressive 
labour tying relations, conditioned through relations of power at both the micro and macro 
level. I noted instances where tied labour under different circumstances operated as untied 
(or so called free labour), ascribing a kind of fluidity between these labour relations. The 
fluidity and persistence of this labour relation is therefore, an intrinsic part of capitalist 
development in agriculture, resulting in what I refer to as a regime of labour tying.   
To understand these processes, I conducted field work across two states in India. I chose a 
total of four villages- Karaimedu and Thirasu in Aranthangi131, Tamil Nadu and 
Bardhanagar and Madhabpur in Chinsurah132, West Bengal. The data collection methods 
were carried out in two phases. The first phase was a household level village survey where 
a total of 685 households were covered in Aranthangi and 462 households in Chinsurah. 
The second phase of the fieldwork consisted of semi-structured interviews, across 
                                                          
131 Refer to Figures 4 and 5. 
132 Refer to Figures 11 and 12. 
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different classes. In Aranthangi, I interviewed 15 large landowners, 4 medium landowners, 
and 42 respondents who belong to the classes of labour. In Chinsurah, I interviewed similar 
number of people- 14 large landowners, 5 medium landowners, and 44 from the classes of 
labour.  
From the data collected in these two field sites on tied labour relations, I identify three 
domains of transactions through which labour tying is forged. These are identified as 
tenancy relations, credit relations and interactions with macro-level process (observed 
though state policies). These three domains constitute my empirical chapters in this thesis. 
The following sections are organised as per the main empirical chapters, discussing the key 
findings of this research and placing labour tying within the larger political economy 
debate to point at the contributions thus made.  
Key Findings: Female Labour Tying and Interlocking Transactions 
Labour tying arrangements identified in Aranthangi (Tamil Nadu) and Chinsurah (West 
Bengal) are very different. Female labourers in Aranthangi are tied for shorter periods of 
time in an agricultural year, lasting only up to the repayment of the loan. If the labourer 
makes arrangements for the money, she ceases to be a tied labourer upon repayment of 
the loan. The shorter durations imply that a labourer can be tied multiple times in a year 
depending on the frequency of loans she takes. This system of labour tying is very different 
from the traditional pannaiyal relations that existed in the region. The traditional pannaiyal 
relation, also an outcome of loans, kept the labourer tied for longer durations of time. 
Respondents reported that the period of tying could last an average of five to twelve years 
and at times even an entire lifetime. Moreover, it was usually men who entered such 
relations and women accompanied their husbands as unpaid family labour (see Heyer, 
2000). 
Only female labourers in this region become tied labourers. Most male labourers consider 
agricultural wage work degrading due to the low wages and the oppressive conditions of 
work, and therefore, migrate out in search for higher paid non-agricultural work. Very few 
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female labourers are currently tied to landowners for longer durations. Those who were 
tied were repaying loans that their husbands had taken, who have now moved out of 
agriculture all together. This phenomenon is similar to observations made by da Corta and 
Venkateshwarlu (1999) in Andhra Pradesh, where male labourers experience freedom 
from tied labour at the cost of female labour (also see Kapadia and Lerche, 1999).  
In Chinsurah the predominant tied labour relation identified was bandha kishen. The 
bandha kishen relation is different from the traditional krishani system that existed. The 
krishani was an indebted male labourer who was also a bargadar. He cultivated land and 
carried out agricultural wage work for the landowner. The krishani remained indebted for 
life, where it was not only his labour but also that of his family which was appropriated. 
The bandha kishen relation identified in Chinsurah was predominantly female. Entry into 
such relations did not result in the appropriation of male labour from their families. Male 
workers, as in Aranthangi carried out non-agricultural work, were bargadars, and if in 
agriculture, restricted themselves to higher paid male activities.  
Female bandha kishens belonged exclusively to the Bagdi (SC), Bauri (SC) and Santhal (ST) 
communities. Unlike in krishani, bandha kishens were not given land for cultivation (on 
most occasions), since farming is not considered a female activity in the region. However, 
access to land for the purpose of cultivation for female labourers was ensured through the 
bandha kishen relation. The period of tying in a bandha kishen relation depends on the 
ability of the female labourer to repay the loan, which she usually does through labour 
time. Unlike in Aranthangi, where female tied labourers tried to restrict their activity to 
agricultural wage work, bandha kishens, carry out agricultural wage work as well domestic 
chores for the landowner (which is often unpaid). Bandha kishens in Chinsurah identify this 
labour relation to be beneficial as it provides them with job security and access to loans- 
both essential for the survival of the classes of labour.  
Apart from bandha kishens, female labourers in Chinsurah were tied for shorter durations 
as well. These female labourers borrowed everyday consumption loans from landowners 
and repaid this through labour time. The shorter periods of tying were identified among 
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female labourers who would migrate out for work, or had received more MGNREGA work 
in a particular year, which helped increase their household income. These loans were taken 
to cover any immediate shortage. However, multiple occupations are not something that 
is available every year and, there are times when these very same women become bandha 
kishens in order to secure their survival. 
As is the case with female tied labourers in Aranthangi, the burden of debt and 
responsibility of repayment of the loan lies with the woman. While male members engage 
in higher paid non-agricultural work, their contribution to household expenditures remains 
limited. The precariousness of work has created individualized and contractualised 
relations of labour tying. The following section deals with tenancy patterns and the 
creation of tied labour relations  
Tenancy 
Labour tying in both districts—Aranthangi and Chinsurah—was identified through 
relations of privileges and obligations that generate debt. The first set of relations are 
identified through tenancy cultivation among rural female labour. Tenancy in both regions 
is considered a lucrative option for larger and medium landowners. One of the mechanisms 
to ensure surplus is through tenancy that generates relations of debt and creates 
dependency upon land and the landowner that reinforces asymmetrical power relations at 
the village level.  
In Aranthangi, the predominant tenancy pattern is kuthagai – a tenancy pattern engaging 
women. Within the region, Pallars (SC), Paraiyars (SC) and Ambalakars (MBC) entered 
such tenancy relations. Land was leased from the larger landowners, mainly Thevars (BC) 
and Ambalakars. Tenancy cultivation for the classes of labour is considered as a process of 
social upliftment – a move away from agricultural wage work which is deemed 
exploitative. However, access to land for the purpose of cultivation is determined through 
familial relations with the landowner, often established through generational ties with the 
landowning family.  
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Female tenants have access to land through these familial ties. In the case of Philomena, 
as discussed in Chapter 4, tenancy relations are used to repay loans. The loan was taken by 
Philomena’s husband. However, with her husband moving out of agriculture, the 
responsibility of repayment of the loan falls on Philomena. Even though she wants to 
remain a casual daily wage earner, the familial relations restrict her mobility, forcing her to 
become a tenant farmer. The transfer of loans onto the female labourer is a common 
practice in the region, where debt keeps the women dependent upon and tied to the 
landowner. Da Corta and Venkateshwalru (1999) identify a similar practice in Andhra 
Pradesh, and refer to this process as ‘tied harvest’.  
While tenancy is viewed as a mechanism to improve household income, there is a 
continuous requirement of loans for tenant farmers to successfully cultivate their land. 
Women who belonged to the classes of labour borrowed from numerous sources including 
the landowner. In Aranthangi, despite men migrating out to higher paid jobs, it was found 
that they made limited contribution towards payment of individual loans taken by women. 
Therefore, female labourers were constantly looking for alternate sources of credit as they 
did not want to tie themselves down to a particular landowner and hence took loans from 
private traders and money lenders. The private traders are flexible with their loans. 
However, the inability to repay the loans places restriction of the female tenant farmers to 
move out of agriculture. Tenancy therefore, does not reduce dependency on land and 
hence the landowner. Such asymmetrical power relations create obligations towards the 
landowner, who can extract surplus through land and labour.   
Tenancy cultivation comes with the obligation of carrying out agricultural wage work for 
the landowner. Even though female tenant farmers do not want engage with agricultural 
wage work, they still need to carry out this work to access land- the interlocking of land 
and labour relations. Therefore, these female tenant farmers become labourers in disguise 
[similar to observations made by da Corta and Venkateshwarlu (1999) and Garikipati 
(2009) in Andhra Pradesh and Rudra (1982) in West Bengal]. These relations place limits 
on their (female labour) ability to look for other work or move out of agriculture altogether.  
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Chinsurah displayed a different gendered division of work. Unlike in Aranthangi, there are 
no formally recognizable female tenants in the region. Farming is not considered a female 
activity, and the tenants identified in this region were primarily men. Within the region, 
tenancy is not a common practice among the classes of labour, where only 4.76 per cent of 
STs and 2.16 per cent of SCs lease land from the total sample. Agricultural labourers within 
this region, particularly male labourers, want to move out of agriculture and more 
specifically, out of sharecropping. The two important tenancy patterns observed in 
Chinsurah are bhaage and theeke. Unlike in Aranthangi, land is not rented out for an entire 
year. Landowners cultivate rice and usually give their land on bhaage for potato and theeke 
for vegetables. Both the bhaag chaasi (farmer) and the theeke tenant require frequent 
loans for cultivation. The male tenants who were seen to borrow money from the 
landowners, repaid the loan in kind (harvest), or with their labour and that of their wives. 
In Chinsurah, landowners extracted loyalty from the male and female labourer through 
these loans and access to land.  
Female labourers in Chinsurah operate not only as unpaid farmers but as tenant farmers in 
guise, an arrangement made possible through the bandha kishen relationship. The labour 
relation that keeps the female labourer tied to the landowner extracts certain privileges. 
The bandha kishen is given access to land and loans for the purpose of cultivation. Loans 
required for the purpose of cultivation are taken from the landowner. As a result, this 
increases the overall loan and burden of debt that the bandha kishen repays through labour 
time and harvest crops (kind). This entire process keeps the bandha kishen tied to the 
landowner for longer periods of time. These relations place numerous constraints on her 
labour time and on her ability to move out and look for better paid work. Moreover, in a 
context of limited work options for female labourers, bandha kishen emerges as a means 
to secure employment.  
As discussed, the two regions display different kinds of labour relations. Interestingly, in 
Chinsurah, the ability to enter tenancy relations is conditioned through the bandha kishen 
relation. In Aranthangi, women enter tenancy relations and consider this to be a positive 
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move away from agricultural wage employment. However, the female tenants are drawn 
into debt relations in order to cultivate land, where repayment takes place through their 
labour time. Female labourers consider short term labour tying as one of the conducive 
mechanisms of loan repayment. While tenancy cultivation, as I witnessed in Aranthangi, 
provides alternate employment avenues, it does not necessarily result in greater freedom 
of choice for female labourers. Once drawn into tenancy cultivation, the debts generated 
from these relations makes it difficult for female labourers to move out of tenancy 
cultivation with much ease.  
Credit 
Credit relations in Aranthangi and Chinsurah need to be understood through the much 
larger policy changes in rural credit that has taken place with neo-liberalism. Liberalisation 
policies implemented in the country resulted in a change in the rural banking sector 
(Chavan, 2007). The state cut back rural credit and was providing land to the marginalized 
at the same time. The paradox of the situation cannot be more apparent, as these farmers 
began to rely on informal credit in order to cultivate land, owing to increasing 
inaccessibility to banks. The loan transactions I identified in the two regions are 
differentiated along lines of gender, caste and class.  
Different sources of borrowing vary along social lines, which is observed in both 
Aranthangi and Chinsurah. The state has set up a three tiered rural credit structure. These 
rural cooperatives provide short and long term loans for farmers and supply farm inputs 
such as fertilizers at subsidized rates. In addition to this, the Central government has 
introduced the Kisan Credit Card to help farmers access loans with greater ease. Despite 
these provisions, access to rural credit remains confined to a handful of the rural elite, 
occasionally filtering down to medium farmers and very rarely small farmers. Access to 
formal credit is usually determined through farmers knowing ‘someone’ in the banks. For 
smaller farmers, this takes place via the rural elite. The fragmented access to credit 
heightens the asymmetrical power relations, and the manifestations of these are 
witnessed among informal credit relations.  
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In Aranthangi, a large number of the respondents rely on money lenders, followed by 
private traders. The landowner is always the last choice for loans as labourers do not want 
to replicate the traditional pannaiyal labour relation that labourers have fought hard to exit 
from. One of the common informal sources of credit are the motorbike vaddikkarans 
(money lender) and pawn brokers. These informal sources offer credit at very high interest 
rates. While this can be a deterrent for the labourers, Paraiyars and Ambalakars prefer 
borrowing money from them as it provides an avenue to reduce dependence upon the 
landowner (see Guerin et al. 2012). However, the usurious rates of interest of the private 
money lenders and the frequent requirement of loans among the classes of labour does 
not decrease the dependence on landowners.  
 Dependence on informal sources of rural credit varies in Chinsurah from Aranthangi. A 
majority of the respondents preferred going to landowners to avail everyday consumption 
loans compared to private money lenders. Female labourers borrowed money from 
landowners, and responsibility of repayment of loans often lay with the woman of the 
household. In order to have easier access to loans, these women decided to become 
bandha kishens, where they carried out agricultural wage work and unpaid domestic work 
for the landowner.  
As in Aranthangi, the responsibility of repayment of loans in Chinsurah lay with the woman 
of the household. Women in Chinsurah complained about how their husbands would not 
work, but would take a portion of their income (usually spent on alcohol). The female 
labourer’s limited control of her earnings has resulted in dependence on agricultural wage 
work for survival. Female labourers in Chinsurah have tried to regain control over their 
earnings by continuing to take a part of their wage in kind. Moreover, the everyday loans 
that they take are usually in kind (rice), unless money is required for a specific purpose. 
Taking loans in kind is preferred as it protects these women from the vagaries of the 
market and from their husbands’ usurpation. However, in the process these loans tie the 
female labour to either short-term tied labour arrangements or bandha kishen relations.  
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A disproportionate burden of loan repayment falls on the shoulders women workers. Even 
though involvement in Self-Help Groups (SHG) and micro-finance networks attempted to 
alleviate poverty and reduce dependence on agricultural wage work, these institutions 
could not dislocate the deeply ingrained power networks in society (Sengupta, 2013; 
Guerin et al., 2015). In Aranthangi, women who borrowed money from SHGs, did so mainly 
for the purpose of consumption (see Sengupta, 2013). In Chinsurah, on the other hand, 
female labourers were not a part of the local SHG, and thus they depended on landowners, 
private money lenders and neighbours.  
Both Aranthangi and Chinsurah displayed dependence on varying sources of credit. 
Female labourers in both regions enter tied labour relations due to individual loans or loans 
that were taken by male members of their household. The familial and gendered relations 
placed the burden of work and debt on these women. The cyclical manner in which debt 
operates in the lives of these women results in women receiving lower pay within tied 
labour relations, and further places limits on their ability to repay loans. These women 
were not, however, passive recipients within credit transactions but were actively 
negotiating their work relations. The negotiating capacities of these women are also 
shaped by the implementation of state-led social welfare programmes. The following 
section discusses this in greater detail, highlighting how interactions with the rural elite 
and macro political and economic forces affects not only implementation of these policies 
but also the bargaining capacity of the female labourer. 
State Policies and Social Welfare 
The thesis examined the impact of one of the country’s biggest social protection policies, 
the MGNREGA. The evidence in this thesis points towards the differentiated way in which 
MGNREGA was implemented in the two regions and the transformative impact it had on 
the livelihoods of those who belong to the classes of labour.  
In Aranthangi, MGNREGA job cards were distributed among the Dalits and the poor 
Ambalakar households. A majority of these MGNREGA workers were women. The 
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availability of MGNREGA work presented the women with an alternative to agricultural 
wage work. As documented by other studies as well (Heyer, 2000; Jeyaranjan, 2011; 
Carswell and De Neve, 2014), the successful implementation of MGNREGA in the region 
resulted increased participation of women and subsequently enhanced the bargaining 
capacity of female labourers. Female labourers were able to demand higher wages in 
agriculture bringing it at par with MGNREGA wages. In addition to increased wages, 
female labourers received meals and medical benefits that they now demand in 
agricultural wage work. These demands were made through individualised forms of 
resistance such as foot-dragging (see Scott, 1987).  
Female labourers, especially among the Paraiyars, perceive MGNREGA work as 
government work, which is associated with ideas of independence, dignity, freedom from 
caste discrimination, equal pay and decent work. Thus, MGNREGA presents an 
opportunity for female labourers to reduce dependency upon landowners (see Khera and 
Nayak, 2009; Carswell and De Neve, 2014).  Landowners on the other hand feel that the 
introduction of MGNREGA has made labourers lazy, and therefore the increased wages 
they receive for agricultural wage work is not appropriate.  
I also observed the influence of MGNREGA among female tied labourers in Aranthangi. 
The landowners would have to accommodate MGNREGA in their work schedules if they 
wanted to keep the labourers. If their demands were not met, instances were noted where 
female labourers had the option of shifting employers and transferring their debt onto the 
new employer. MGNREGA has not obliterated indebted relations, but has provided female 
labourers with improved bargaining capacities. 
The effects of MGNREGA on female labour were different in Chinsurah compared to 
Aranthangi Despite the distribution of job cards to poor households, it was mainly men 
who took up MGNREGA work in Chinsurah. Female labourers, had limited participation in 
MGNREGA work. Reduced access to MGNREGA did not allow female labourers to 
negotiate their wage, as was observed in Aranthangi. As a result, dependence on 
agricultural wage work and consequently on the landowner was not reduced. Studies on 
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MGNREGA in West Bengal, has confined its analysis to the panchayat level. This empirical 
evidence highlights how the benefits of MGNREGA are differentiated along the lines of 
gender.  
A comparison of the two regions shows that MGNREGA created changes in the hierarchy 
of social control, more so in Aranthangi than Chinsurah. However, the rural elite are not 
silent bystanders in this entire process and wield a certain amount of control that stems 
out of their class positions and interactions with the local bureaucracy. In Aranthangi, for 
example, landowners, and their connections with the local bureaucracy, shifted the dates 
of MGNREGA work so that it did not coincide with harvest work. This would have been a 
profitable condition for the labourers if the number of days of work they received in 
MGNREGA would remain the same. However, as described in Chapter 6, the villagers were 
not compensated for the number of days lost. I observed similar manipulations in 
Chinsurah, where labourers who belonged to the current ruling party, Trinamool Congress 
(TMC), received job cards and MGNREGA work, whereas those who belonged to the 
opposition party were left out. Respondents who are Communist Party of India Marxist 
[CPI (M)] supporters spoke of how they received more work when the party was in power. 
The effects of political clientelism is, thus, evident within this region (Das, 2015). 
MGNREGA would have helped increase household income and reduce dependence on 
loans but this does not take place in Chinsurah due to local political clientelism. Such 
conditions create pressures for female labourers to hold on to their agricultural 
employment, even if in tied labour arrangements.   
The reason for the successful implementation of MGNREGA in Aranthangi is the state 
government’s commitment towards effective implementation of social policies. I observed 
this for PDS in the region as well, which brings me to my second social welfare policy. Tamil 
Nadu is the only state in India to have universal PDS structure. The successful 
implementation of PDS determines political dominance in the region, and provides female 
labourers the ability to negotiate their work contracts and helps free up their labour days 
(see Heyer, 2012).  
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Chinsurah, which follows a targeted PDS model, suffered from numerous problems. 
Respondents in the region complained about not receiving ration cards and those who had 
received ration cards were wrongly allotted Above Poverty Line Cards (APL). Here, again, 
distribution of ration cards was channelled through networks of political clientelism. 
Additionally, fair price shops in Chinsurah were found to suffer from corruption, where the 
shops are open for a limited period and suffers from pilferage, which leaves the villagers 
with little access to ration goods. This situation forced households to spend more towards 
food, which resulted in female labourers taking loans in kind (rice) from landowners, which 
kept them tied. In Aranthangi, shortages in ration goods was not associated with pilferage. 
During periods of shortage, instances were noted where female labourers borrowed from 
neighbours and landowners, where the latter resulted in labour tying until repayment of 
the loan. However, unlike in Chinsurah, the efficient functioning of PDS in Aranthangi did 
provide female labourers the opportunity to move away from agricultural wage work.  
The third social policy discussed in this thesis is Minimum Support Price (MSP). MSP set by 
the state government, holds particular significance for small farmers, as it allows them to 
cover production costs. However, as observed in both field sites, effects of the policy first 
reach the larger landowners. Accessing MSP for a large section of the medium and small 
farmers is dependent on the percolation of information, which occurs through kinship ties.  
Female tenant farmers in Aranthangi can only sell their produce in government mills if they 
receive information of the same from landowners. However, these female tenants want to 
reduce their dependence on the landowner and turn to private traders who buy the crops 
from them at rates lower than MSP. The lower prices received keeps them in relations of 
debt and dependence on land for cultivation, indirectly generating dependence on the 
landowner. Hence, these female tenants remain tied to relations of debt with the 
landowner, private trader and lessor despite their efforts.  
In Chinsurah, even though women cultivate land, they are usually seen as unpaid labourers 
who accompany their husbands, or are identified as bandha kishens who cultivate land. 
Access to MSP and government mills takes place though the landowner, or their husbands. 
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These women do not directly sell their produce in the market. All information regarding 
when and where the government will procure comes directly to the larger landowners in 
the region, a process identified by Harriss-White (2008) in West Bengal.  Farmers such as 
Shafiq and Ramesh (see Chapter 7) received this information due to the links they enjoyed 
with the local bureaucracy. Female tenant farmers are able to sell their produce to 
government though relations with the landowner. These tenants are therefore dependent 
on the landowner, for land, employment and credit.  
For female labours implementation and access to government programmes in the two 
regions, are shaped by local level politics, because political clientelism and patronage 
politics rule policy implementation on the ground. Further, female labourers face severe 
restriction on their bargaining capacities due to their limited access to political institutions, 
often mediated through husbands and landowners. As observed in the case of Aranthangi, 
the very fact that the successful implementation of the different social welfare policies 
provided female labourers with an alternative, has created conditions of improved 
bargaining capacity, not witnessed in Chinsurah.  
Contributions, Limitation and Policy Implications  
To recapitulate, the tied labour relations identified in the two regions range from long term 
tying (such as bandha kishen) to short term labour tying that lasts only till the repayment 
of the loans. Loans between the employer and labourer help maintain the asymmetrical 
power relations. For landowners, it is not the amount of loan that matters, but rather the 
extension of a continuous supply of credit which is of greater value (De Neve, 2010); this 
process enables landowners to secure labour. Dependencies on the landowner are not 
created by agricultural wage work alone, but through land, market and state provisions.   
Tied labour relations identified in this research, are differentiated as per class, caste and 
gendered/familial relations. The gendered and caste divisions within the workspace are 
apparent, where low paid agricultural wage work is predominantly female, who belong to 
the low and Schedule Castes and Tribes. The plight of the agrarian female is particularly 
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notable within the context of male outmigration, where female labourers are drawn into 
low-paying, poor remunerative work (see Kapadia, 1996). The burden of meeting 
household expenses falls on the shoulders of these female labourers – they feed the family 
and pay off loans (see da Corta and Venkateshwarlu, 1999; Garikipati, 2008). It is this 
repayment of loans that draws female labour into tied labour relations. Female labourers 
who enter tied labour relations (irrespective of the duration), not only face restrictions on 
their mobility, but are drawn into relations of obligation to the landowner. The extension 
of privileges and the accompanied obligations result in female labourers carrying out 
unpaid work for landowners (a natural extension of gendered socialisations and 
expectations), which extends their work day. It thus places restrictions on their ability to 
look for higher paid jobs.  
The discussions that have arisen from this research point towards understanding the 
presence of tied labour relations through multi-scalar power relations. It is in this context 
that Hart’s (1986) analytical framework proves to be particularly relevant. The unfreedom 
experienced in these relations vary from mild to worse forms, and as Hart describes, 
restricting the understanding of these labour relations as free or unfree confines the 
discussions within the various theoretical disputes (1986a). This idea finds resonance in 
understanding unfree labour relations as a part of a continuum of labour relations, 
proposed by Lerche (2011). Identifying tied labour within this continuum takes into 
consideration the myriad ways in which labourers enter such relations and the varying 
degrees of unfreedom experienced.  
The entry into labour tying arrangements can be voluntary or involuntary. The decisions 
and choices made available to female labourers are shaped by the asymmetrical power 
relations. The presence of labour tying is therefore, not about choice or duration of tying 
but more about recognizing these power relations, where the landowners lay out the 
broader terms and conditions of the work contract. This comparative study underlines the 
cultural specificities of the two regions, and how this affects the formation and negotiation 
of tied labour relations. An important nexus is highlighted in this thesis between 
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bureaucracy, ruling elite and the classes of labour. State policies focus on social welfare of 
the rural poor, the implementation of which is crucial to maintain political power. 
However, the interactions between the rural elite and the local bureaucracy result in the 
manipulation of these policies. The limited effect of these policies result in female labour 
relying on agricultural wage work for their survival. The very same work that draws them 
into tied labour relations, keeps them fragmented and in exploitative relations.  This 
interaction of micro-level process and macro-level policies helps explain the presence of 
labour tying arrangement.  The presence of tied labour arrangements in both regions 
highlights that the process of agrarian capitalism thrives on such labour tying relations to 
generate surplus – a system that I identify as the ‘regime of labour tying’.  
The study suffers from a few limitations that need mention here. First, in order to 
understand the idea of persistence of labour tying more clearly, this research would have 
benefited from a longitudinal study that charts the changes observed within these specific 
relations.  
Second, the research focusses primarily on large landowners and female labourers (classes 
of labour) to identify asymmetrical power relation. Limited attention was paid to labour 
relation with medium farmers and how they affect labour relations. This research does 
identify certain labour relations with medium farmers. However, with a small sample size, 
it faces the problem of representativeness, and creates difficulties in analysing it as a 
broader trend. These limitations however, provide avenues for further research, which can 
help develop the idea of a regime of labour tying.  
The identification of female labour tying within the context of feminization of agricultural 
wage work, underscores certain policy level implications, and the need to address 
universalistic policies which end up marginalizing women. First, the proper 
implementation of the pro-poor MGNREGA policy in Aranthangi highlights how increased 
female participation in this work has improved bargaining capacities of female labourers. 
With women taking up the responsibility of repayment of loans, it becomes important that 
similar efforts are made in Chinsurah to prioritise female recruitment within its agenda.  
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Changes in MGNREGA policy suffer from gender biases. I observed this within the shift 
from direct cash payments to bank transfers. The job card is made in the name of the head 
of the household and so are the bank accounts. The head of the household on most 
occasions is not the woman. This process of bank transfers does not take into 
consideration the domestic politics that deprives female labourers of a part or even their 
entire earnings. Policy changes within MGNREGA should try and enhance women’s control 
over their earnings, which can help improve their bargaining capacity.   
Third, SHGs, despite their admissible limitations emerge as an alternate source of income 
for female labourers. I observed this particularly in Aranthangi, where membership 
consisted mainly of female labourers. Such was not the case in Chinsurah, where 
membership within the SHG was limited to women from medium landowner households. 
This situation resulted in female labourers to rely on landowners for their everyday 
consumption loans. Incorporating female classes of labour would help provide an alternate 
source of loans – there is diversification of credit sources which could result in a decline in 
dependence upon the landowner.  
Fourth, expanding the point of diversification of credit sources, policies should try and 
make state banks more easily accessible to women. Women complained about the long 
distances they had to travel to get to the banks, which acted as a deterrent. Opening banks 
closer to the villages, and providing women incentives to do so, could help transform the 
prevailing lending environment present in these regions. The access to loans at lower 
interest rates would not only reduce dependence on landowners but would also reduce 
dependence on money lenders (whose usurious loans are most easily accessible to female 
labourers).  
Fifth, with more women taking up the responsibility to repay loans, they have very limited 
capacity to influence household decisions. Asset ownership often emerges as policy 
suggestion which can change gender imbalances within the domestic sphere and increase 
their ability to refuse work that they consider exploitative (see Garikipati, 2008). One such 
asset is land ownership as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Land ownership for women will 
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provide them access to other benefits such as access to government loans for agriculture 
and even access to state procurement of grain.   
Finally, with male outmigration and women taking up cultivation (as observed in 
Aranthangi and to a lesser degree in Chinsurah), the government procurement of paddy 
needs to be made available to these female cultivators. This could potentially reduce 
dependence on landowners (Chinsurah) and on private traders (Aranthangi), and in turn 
reduce debts that these female cultivators and labourers are drawn into. 
The much larger issue that the findings in this thesis point to are the gender divisions of 
labour and the attitudes that surround work in agriculture, all of which are embedded in 
cultural norms (see Chant, 2007). Despite the provision of pro-poor policies and its effects 
on the bargaining capacities of female labourers, nothing is done to address the growing 
burden of women’s work. It is apparently a familial matter but is actually also a political 
issue.  
The presence of tied labour relations therefore, needs to move beyond a basic 
understanding of wage labour politics and the dichotomy of freedom versus unfreedom, 
to incorporate multi-scalar power relations within its analysis.  In order to understand and 
tackle issues of persistence of labour tying experienced particularly among female 
labourers, one needs to recognise there are many dynamics that emerge from these power 
relations that, do not entirely do away with tied labour and at the same time do not result 
in the unchangeable bonded labour relations. The persistence of tied labour is placed in 
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Percentage Wage Gap of Daily Wage Rates in Agricultural Occupations in Rural India 
(2009 and 2013) 
 
States Sowing Weeding Transplanting Harvesting 
 2009 2013 2009 2013 2009 2013 2009 2013 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
31.14 20.33 28.94 - 14.63 - 19.58 30.29 
Assam 13.15 - 9.75 - 18.41 - 13.63 7.01 
Bihar 8.40 12.65 5.58 8.59 13.76 11.78 6.98 9.97 
Gujarat 19.38 13.17 2.70 3.7 2.80 3.6 2.26 7.38 
Haryana - - 4.49 - 6.40 0.99 6.30 1.59 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
- - - - - - - - 
Jammu and 
Kashmir 
- - - - - - - - 
Karnataka 35.38 32.25 25.11 31.80 20.29 33.78 25.72 31.21 
Kerala - - - - - - - 18.13 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
19.59 12.45 16.79 13.04 12.21 22.90 23.14 10.09 
Maharashtr
a 
37.21 39.40 30.20 28.04 23.78 34.45 43.47 31.22 
Manipur - - 7.80 - 8.82 - 10.45 - 
Meghalaya 29.41 - 24.74 - 20.93 - 35.41 35.71 
Orissa - - - - 17.51 - 23.74 19.59 
Punjab - - - - - - - - 
Rajasthan - 23.56 24.74 3.26 - - 13.13 10.49 
Tamil Nadu  37.56 21.86 23.59 - 36.11 - 34.71 28.61 
Tripura - - - - - - - - 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
19.06 19.99 15.05 12.66 9.70 17.69 6.5 13.28 
West Bengal 11.11 43.88 10.211 4.88 11.01 7.73 10.05 7.07 
India 26.84 20.79 16.51 11.56 14.58 10.35 17.95 17.17 
     Source: Wage Rates in Rural India, 2009-10 and 2013, Government of India, Ministry of  













Household Level Village Census Questionnaire 
 
Serial No.  
Date:  
State name: District name:  
Sub-district name: Village name:  
 
 
1. Name of household head and address:  
 
2. Religion:  
 
3. Caste/ Tribe (actual name):  
 
4. Caste/Tribe category: Upper / OBC / MBC / SC / ST  
 
5. Current occupation of the head of the HH:  
 
6. Within the village, do you belong to the better off, middle or lowest economic group:  
 
7. The economic status of the household: * a. Upper; b. Middle; c. Poor; d. Poorest  
 
8. What is your occupation/s throughout the year? Do you migrate for work? (distance)  
 
9. What is your spouse’s occupation? Do they migrate for work? (distance)  
 








10. How many days of labour in the field are- 
 
Hired in  
Hired out  




Lease Out  





11. What is your major source of income from – 
 
Agricultural Wage Work  
Non-Agricultural Work  
Cultivation  
Rank in order of preference, with one being most preferred and 3 least preferred. 
 
 
12. Do you have an NREGA Card? If yes how many days of work have you received?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
